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PRESIDENTIAL C,OMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
ACCIDENT WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1986
Dean Acheson Auditorium
Department of State
Washington, D.C.
The Commission met, pursuant to recess,at 9:35 a.m.
PRESENT:
WILLIAM P. ROGERS, Chairman, Presiding
NEIL A. ARMSTRONG, Vice Chairman
DR. SALLY RIDE
DR. ARTHUR WALKER
DAVID C. ACHESON
MAJOR GENERAL DONALD KUTYNA
ROBERT HOTZ
DR. EUGENE COVERT
JOSEPH SUTTER
ROBERT RUMMEL
ALSO PRESENT:
AL KEEL, Commission Executive Director
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PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I will call the Commission to order, please.
The first witnesses this morning will be Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy. Will they please come
forward.
(Witnesses sworn.)
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TESTIMONY OF LARRY MULLOY, MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE SOLID ROCKET
BOOSTER PROGRAM, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER: AND GEORGE HARDY.
DE_CTY DIRECTOR, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGItT
CENTER
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Welcome, gentlemen. Will you begin by identifying yourselves and
giving a litt:e background of the experience that you have had with NASA and your present
assignment? I assume that you have some information you want to start with this morning.
Which order do you want to go in?
MR. HARDY: I believe Mr. Mulloy will go first.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. Proceed.
MR. MULLOY: Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission: [Ref. 2 14-2]
I am Larry Mulloy. [ am currently the manager of the space shuttle solid rocket booster
program at the Marshall Space Flight Center. I joined NASA in 1960. I worked as a loads and
dynamics analyst, and then in the Apollo program I worked in the structural subsystem area of
the second stage of the Apollo program.
Subsequent to that, I was on a leave of
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absence for a year for some postgraduate work, doing doctoral studies in public administration;
and subsequent to that I was assigned as the chief engineer of the external tank project at the
inception of the space shuttle program. I held that position until approximately 1979, and then I
was the chief engineer for NASA on the inertial upper stage in conjunction with the Air Force
until 1982.
In November of 1982, I was assigned as the project manager for the solid rocket booster pro-
gram. I have a B.S. in engineering from Louisiana State University, a master's in administration
from the University of Oklahoma, and, as I previously stated, some postgraduate work in admin-
istration at the University of California.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Hardy.
MR. HARDY: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission: [Ref. 2/26-il
My name is George Hardy, and I am currently the deputy director of science and engineer-
ing at the Marshall Space Flight Center.
I joined Marshall in 1960. I served for a number of years as project e,_gineer on the Saturn
1B booster. I later served as an assistant program manager on that program.
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Fron_ about 1967 to 1974, I was in charge of program engineering and integration o,_ the
Sky!ab program. In 1974 I became project manager of the solid rocket boos._.er and served in that
826
positionuntil 1982.Subsequentto that, I servedin the positionas associatecirector tbr engi-
neeringin thescienceandengineeringdirectorate.
I graduatedfrom GeorgiaInstitute of Technology.After approximatelysix .j_arsservicein
theNavy,I wasemployedbythe Army RocketandMissileCenter.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
May I ask the still cameras now to take your pictures, and then during t}t, _.estimony I
would ask you to refrain from making shots. It is distracting to the witnesses to _a_,e so many
shutters clicking each time. And so if you want a period now of taking stills, go ah-ad, and then
I would ask you not to do it during the testimony.
(Pause.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It's not that we object to you taking pictures. We want _ai;_, to be an
open hearing. But with all of the clutter and all of the shutters clicking at one time it's awfully
distracting and unfair to the witnesses.
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Okay. Mr. Mulloy, will you proceed?
MR. MULLOY: Yes. Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, yesterday i I t he testi-
mony that was given before this Commission, and before that I think in more dran:atic state-
ments that have been attributed to Thiokol personnel by the media, a picture has beo.a painted
of the events of January 27th that I think at best may be misleading.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to state the facts of the events cf Jar uary
27th, beginning with the 8:45 telecon. I believe there has been a great deal of testimony as to the
events leading up to the 8:45 telecon and, with your permission, I would like to begir_ at that
point.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, you may. Mr. Mulloy. We want you to feel l;ree to pre_ent any
evidence that you would like to and as long as you would like to. We wE1 hear anylhing you
want to say.
MR. MULLOY: Thank you, sir.
I previously testified to the flight readiness review process leading _p to the launch minus
one day review at Kennedy Space Center on January 26th, '86. I have stated how tl:..is con1:inuing
concern for joint O-ring erosxon had been treated in flight readiness review process and _11.o,_ the
events leading up to the decision
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on the 51-L launch.
I would like to now begin with the 8:45 telecon. After being notified of that and arriving at
the resident office at the Kennedy Space Center and having the data that had been teiefa_ed in
from the Utah plant--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was that the first time you considered the weather aspects of it?
MR. MULLOY: Oh, no, sir. We--after we stood down from the launch on the 27th at 1:00, I
and Mr. Reinartz, Mr. Reinartz polled all elements of the shuttle system ¢vr which he is respon-
sible, the SRB, the external tank, and the space shuttle ma_n engines. And I had a discussion on
my SRB loop with the SRB people dealing with the question of a 24-hour turnaround to attempt
to launch again at 9:38 on the 28th and the effect that the predicted cold temperature,_ ""_ the
night of the 27th might have on that.
The input was received back both to Mr. Reinartz and myself that we were lool_ing at the
Launch Commit Criteria relative to temperatures. It was felt there was a need to look at the
recovery battery temperatures that are in the forward skirt of the SRB and the fuel service
module temperatures that are in the fuel service modules for the thrust vector control
827
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systemin theaft skirt of thesolidrt_cketbooster.
Theinput receivedbackby mewasthat they did not feel that wouldbeof any concern.
Theyweregoingto continueto look at it, and if anyconcernarosethey wouldlet meknow.
I wentto the 2:00MissionManagementTeamandreportedthat therewerenoconstraints
to the solidrocketboosterfor a 24-hourturnaround,that wehad takena lookat the recovery
batterytemperaturesandthe fuel servicemodule.Wedid not feel at this time that therewould
beanyLaunchCommitCriteria for the lowtemperaturelimits that wereestablishedfor those
systems,but that wewerecontinuing to assess that; should anything change in that regard, I
would so rel:ort that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You referred to the Launch Commit Criteria. What were they as far
as you knew in terms of weather conditions? Any?
MR. MULLOY: In terms of weather conditions, yes, sir, I'm aware that there is a Launch
Commit Criteria for the system for weather. There are a number of factors in that Launch
Commit Criteria. One of them is the ambient temperature, which is established at 31 degrees.
Another is the sea state and winds in the 5RB
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recovery area. Another is the cross-winds at the return to landing site runway at Kennedy Space
Center. Another is the trans-Atlantic landing site weather, and another is severe weather, which
is related to lightning and thunderstorms in the area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And when you say there were no constraints in the 2:00 meeting,
does that mean that as far as you could see there were no problems in those areas?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, I did not evaluate those areas of the Launch Commit Criteria. What
I was looking at was the specific Launch Commit Criteria items that are on the solid rocket
booster and the effect that the low temperatures would have on that.
I would expect Mr. Aldrich would normally make the judgments on, and his people at John-
son Space Center, would make the judgments on crosswinds and trans-Atlantic weather and the
general ambient environment for launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just so the Commission has a little better idea, at least I have a
better idea, of what you would discuss at the 2 o'clock meeting, would you say, well, we don't
know what the weati_er's going to be like tomorrow, we will have to look at it as we go along, or
would you say, we're not sure what the
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seas are going to be and whether we can recover?
What type of discussion was it? I have a little problem fol]owing when you say no con-
straints, and it is the language that I don't quite follow.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. The discussion centered around the conditions that the launch pad
would be exposed to during the night, particular attention to freezing of the water system on the
pad, freezing of the water in the sound suppression devices that are filled with water at the base
of the pad, concern for the formation of ice on the pad, which could cause potential damage to
the shuttle vehicle, with primary concern for the orbiter tiles in that case, and I believe for the
insulation on the external tank.
Some other discussion, I believe, about the predicted weather for the landing sites, trans-
Atlantic landing sites, and the predicted weather for the local weather for KSC.
None of those discussions or the considerations of those discussions posed any constraint to
the solid rocket booster.
828
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ICHAIRMAN ROGERS: "Constraint" meaning that at that point you thought it would be
okay to launch the next day, but you couldn't be sure because those things might change?
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MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. Based upon the weather conditions that were being looked at at the
time and based upon the concerns that were being addressed at that time, I saw--and with the
commitment that we were going to continue to look at the weather through the night and then
assess that in real time in the morning, which is actually what was done, and the launch was
delayed because of the ice on the pad and getting some ice out of the sound suppression blan-
kets.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, will you proceed? So at the 2:00 meeting you felt that, al-
though there were problems that might exist the next day, that you felt that those problems
probably could be overcome and you could be able to launch?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, I was confident that the only thing that would - elate Launch
Commit Criteria on the solid rocket booster at that time were a potential violation of the recov-
ery battery low temperature and the fuel service module low temperature.
And as further analysis was done in the afternoon, the initial assessment ef that was upheld
and we did predict no violation of those Launch Commit Criteria.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And at that point the
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O-rings and the seams and so forth were not discussed?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, they were not.
I subsequently learned that my--and it was testified to yesterday, I believe, by some of the
Thiokol people. I subsequently learned that my solid rocket motor element manager, who was at
the Huntsville operations support center supporting the launch, did communicate to Mr. Boyd
Brinton, who is the project chief engineer for the solid rocket motor for Morton-Thiokol, that the
query had come, did we have any constraints for a turnaround.
That had been relayed to Mr. Brinton, who then called, I believe, Mr. Ebeling, it was testi-
fied to, at Thiokol in Utah, to begin to look into that. And that led into the events.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what was the man's name you referred to? You said your man?
MR. MULLOY: Mr. Larry Wear. He is my solid rocket motor element manager. I have a
solid rocket motor element manager and I have a booster assembly element manager for the
other aspects of the solid rocket booster other than the motor.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, proceed. I'm sorry to interrupt you.
MR. MULLOY: Okay, sir. When we got the
1502
charts containing the Thiokol engineering data and the conclusion tba_ Thiokol was drawing
from those data arrived at KSC and Marshall--began arriving at about 8:45, when the confer-
ence began.
We went ahead and began the conference, but the conclusion and recommendation charts
that Mr. Lund subsequently testified to yesterday did not come in until somewhat later. I don't
know exactly when they were there, but when we started into the telecon and began discussing
the data we did not have tLose conclusions and recommendations.
We were simply looking at the engineering data and reviewing those engineering data. The
concern, of course, that was being expressed was for the low ambient temperatures that were
predicted for the night and the effect those low ambient temperatures would have on the propel-
lant mean bulk temperature and on the joint particularly.
829
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If I could have chart SRB-6, please, on the screen, I would like to clarify. When we talk
about temperatures--
(Viewgraph.) [m.l'. " z,_ z I
--we have a number of them. These specific temperatures don't represent any particular
condition on STS 51-L. What we are showing there is the ambient
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temperature at pad B is at ground level, and it is about 50 feet away from the pad. For example,
that temperature, as an example, might be 36 degrees at ground level.
Then there is a local ambient temperature--and we will provide hard copies of this, sir, for
you later. The local ambient temperature is referred to as in the vicinity of the solid rocket
booster, that local ambient temperature will be in a tank condition. It will be below the general
ambient because of the effects of the cryogens in the external tank and the heat short that
exists through the to the attachments SRB and the wind blowing the cold air around the SRB.
That, for example, might be 30 degrees, while you have a ground ambient of 36 degrees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: "Ambient" means outside?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Outside temperatures?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. The ambient temperature at a point here in this room will be
slight!y different than the ambient temperature at a point back there by those lights
But the ambient temperature, it doesn't have to be outside. It could be the ambient tempera-
ture of the body of this room or a body of air in this room.
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Then the local ambient is affected by the proximity of heat sinks that are around the solid
rocke * booster and the wind blowing around that. At that same time, you might have a joint
temperature or a temperature right at the field joint that is lower than the local ambient, and
that will occur because the locai ambient and the ambient temperature has been lower possibly
three or four hours earlier, possibly say 18 or 20 degrees. And due to the lag, the local ambient
and the ambient may be coming up, but the steel parts are s_ill cold, and so you may have a
joint temperature of 27 degrees.
And then when we speak ot the propellant mean bulk temperature, that is the average tem-
perature of all the particles of the propellant in the motor taken--it is an average of from the
outside, inside. There is a slight gradient through that. That may be 57 degrees, because that is
a large heat sink, and if it was 60 or 70 degrees three or four days before, or say 70 uegrees, the
temperature can get very low and that propellant mean bulk temperature doesn't track that.
And so I just submit that for some clarification. The concern that we were talking about was
for the effect of the overnight low on the propellant mean bulk temperature and the effect that
it
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would have on the joint and the seals and the performance of those joints and seals.
The Thiokol eugineers were stating that they believed the effect of that lower temperature
on the O-rings would be to slow the time for the primary O-ring to seal, resulting in greater hot
gas past the primary seal and possibly erosion of the secondary seal. The data that they showed
included the previous coldest launch, which was STS 51-C, which they stated at least qualitative-
ly had the worst blow-by of any previously observed.
ConsiderablediscussionbetweenMarshall and Thiokol on the significance of those data
then ensued. There was at that time--we still didn't have conclusion and recommendatien
charts. All we were trying to do was understand what the data were telling us.
The major focus of that discussion was the effect low temperatures could have on blow-by of
the primary O-ring seal.
Now, if you bring up chart SRB-3, I think at this point it might be helpful to graphically
show again the configuration of the joint.
(Viewgraph.) Ira'* . 2 2,i 2 :, ,,,' :*l
When we were assessing--and if you could
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scale that down and focus on the left side first, if you would, please, and get the title in.
Okay. We will go from the upper left corner, down the column, and then back up to the
right. In the initial condition, the joint is assembled and it has squeeze on the O-rings. What we
have been talking to is the O-ring is actually compressed into that joint.
In the specific conditions of STS 51-L, that compression far exceeded the minimum compres-
sion required. The compression on the particular joint that has been of interest to us has been
38-thousandths to .10-thousandths, where the minimum requirement is 20-thousandths.
In that initial condition, you have redundant seals, the primary on your left and the second-
ary on your right.
If you would move down in the left column now.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mulloy, may I interrupt you for just a moment. Now, what is the time ele-
ment there in making that leak check?
MR. MULLOY: That leak check, sir--
MR. HOTZ: What day and what calendar day was it made?
MR. MULLOY: I believe it has been reported
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that it was about 28 days before the attempted launch. It was about the 1st. But when it is made
is when the joint is assembled.
MR. HOTZ: Before it goes out to the pad?
MR. MULLOY: Oh, yes, sir. As we assemble each SRM joint, before we put the next SRM
segm,mt on we leak check the previous one. In the event that you don't pass the leak check, you
have to de-mate and do it over again. So we don : run up the whole stack and then leak check
all the joint_.
We build it up from the bottom and check each joint as it is assembled.
MR. HOTZ: So it would have been at least 28 days before the launch?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Mulloy, may I ask a question, please? You said that there was plenty of
squeeze in the O-ring. What temperature would you say that that squeeze refbrred to?
MR. MULLOY: Okay, sir. In that initial condition, that referred to an ambient condition of
75 degrees. The consideration that was given during the course of the discussiol, is how much
would that squeeze be reduced as the temperature was reduced to 20 degrees?
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That was calculated and it was 3-thousandths of an inch. That occurs for two reason: the
diametrical shrinking, as well as the stretching of the O-ring as it is chilled.
DR. COVERT: Your 38- to 40-thousandths then would go 35 to 37?
MR. MULI_OY: Yes, sir, that is correct. 831
DR.COVERT:At 20degrees.
MR. MULLOY: At 20 degrcvs, I believe is the _emperature that was calculated at.
DR. COVERT: Thapk you, sir.
MR. MULLOY. Okay. Then when we do the leak check, the O-rings are then displaced as
shown in the second diagram down _n the left column. It pushes that primary O-ring back
toward _he motor pressure side. It pust,es the secondary O-ring back against t_:e surface against
v;hich it will subsequently seal, if called u_n to de, s.,), by any pressure from motor operation
impinging on it.
If you will go to the third one in the left column, please. Then, after you take the pressure
off--this pressurization i_ 200 psi initially, to be sure that the O-ring is pushed up against that
gap_ and tben that pressure is reduced. That is with an. open source, just turning, opening the
valve and letting it flow as
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much as it will, because you will get some blow-by initially in moving that in the pressure check.
Then that is reduced to 50 psi and held, and the spec on that is one psi allowable leakage in
15 minutes. That is with a closed sc,urce It has to hold the pressure between the regulator, the
valve on the pressure source, and flow by the seal.
Now, when that pressure is taken off there is some relaxation. Those Oorings don't stay
smashed up against that gap, as they were shown when you had the 200 psi.
If' you will go to the center column in tke top, please.
Now, during motor" operation there are two tLings that can occur. The first is where the
primal" sedl is actt_ated. Initia!ly in the initial pressurization, as was testified to yesterday_ from
zero to about 170 milliseconds, which equates to about 200 psi, there is no significant joint rota-
tion.
We have zest data, and I believe the engineers stated yesterday, tl,ere is a knee in there and
it is not linear It is not linear with pressure. You don't get on,third of the rotation at 200 psi.
You get less than one-third, and then it tends to ramp up due to the stiffness of that joint.
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So when the motor is pressurized at about 30 psi, which is 50 to 60 milli_conds, that pri-
mary O-ring is translated across from the forward face of the groove to the face that it wants to
seal against. We have shown in tests that al_ O-ring will seal or seat and begin to extrude into
the gap at 30 to 50 psi.
Go to the center 9n that center column, please.
Now, what happens at about 200 psi, again joint rotation is not a significant factor here.
You may got 2- to 3-thousandths of joint rotation at a maximum in this kind of a condition. The
pressure is impinging there and beginning to extrude the prima,z¢ seal into the gap.
Go to the bottom of that center column, please.
Now we get the joint rotation. Tests have shown that a good O-ring with a durometer of 90
even--and our spec on the O-ring is 75. This is the sponge and brick analogy that was used by
one of the engineers yesterday. I think that is a little dramatic in describing the change in that
O-ring stiffness in going from 75 to 90.
But it has been shown that the O-ring will extrude into that gap and seal.
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Now, if yon will go to the top on the right, please. Another condition that can happen, the
reason we have redundant seals, here at the moment of motor ignition the system is redundant.
If for any reason the primary seal does not seat--it is damaged, it has a twist in it, it has a _oid
832
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in it or whatever--the primary seal does not seat, the pressure actuation is now taking place cn
the secondary seal. That is where the redundancy is, in zero to 170 milliseconds.
Go to the center, please.
Now. that continues, and what happens to the secondary seal is exactly what happens to the
primary seal. The primary seal has failed to function, the redundant seal is performing its func-
tion at 200 psi.
DR. WALKER: Mr. M'alloy,can I ask a question about that? Would you in your discussion
also include your understanding of the waiver and what that meant in regards to how yoa could
consider whether or not the secondary seal was reallygoing to operate?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir,I had planned to do that later,but I willjust answer that now. My
understanding of the waiver isthe design goal on the shuttle was to have redundant systems.
That design goal is not met in all systems. There are some 829 Crit Is waivers en the shuttle
system. There are 213 Crit I
1512
waivers on the SRB.
This particularwaiver isone of 18 on the solidrocket motor. Now, my understanding of that
waiver, itisrequired because we have defined a condition under which the secondary seal may
not form a seal,and I emphasize "may not."
MR. SUTTER: Could I ask a question, please? Are allof these waivers of equal importance,
or ofall ofthese waivers which do you think isthe most important?
MR. MULLOY: We are assessing that now, because we're going back and locking at all of
the Crit Is.At the time that the Crit ls were established,they were ail considered to be lossof
lifeand lossof vehicleshould that system fail.
I think the question you're askiL1g:me is,what is the probabilityof failureand what isthe
experience with the system_that would say,well, this one ismore likelyto failthan the next one
and the next one, and put a priorityorder on those.I am not at this point prepared to say that,
of the 18 criticalsystems on the SRM, that an igniter,for instance,ismore or lesscrit.{calthan a
seal.
But we are asessing that, and the way you have to do that islook at our experience with
that.
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DR. WALKER: But you did have a task team working on this particular problem?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. WALKER: Did you have task teams on any of the other problems?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.Yes, sir,we did. As a matter of fact,on the nozzle we had, as has
been related, on STS-8 we found that we were getting some very unusual nozzle erosion. We
applied a task team to that to solve the ,,roblem,and that isa Crit I item. Burn-through of the
insulationon the linerof the nozzle is,_ ofmission _nd crew.
And yes, we had a task team working on that. And really,on the SRM, those are the two
that had very equal importance, really,because the crlticality--inanswering your question, sir,
those two, they would be a real foot race as to which one we would have considered more criti-
cal,depending upon the particulartime that you looked at your experience with that.
If you'd asked me that question a year and a half ago, I would have definitelysaid the
no_]e.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It sees to me, though, that based upon the testimony yesterday, and
what I think you're leading up to here, isthat the argumer_t isbeing made that thisshould have
been CriticalityIR. You're
833
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arguing there was a redundancy in the item and the item itselfsays there isn'ta redundancy,
that you have to operaze on the basisof Criticalityi;ifthere isa single failure,itisa lossof life
and lossofcrew.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir,but if"you read that totaldocument, which perhaps you have, what
itsays isander worst case conditions itcan be Criticalityi.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Wasn't this a pretty bad case, with the weather and all of the
alarms that you had, and the recommendations from the engineers at Thiokol? Wasn't this what
seemed likea pretty dangerous situation?
MR. MULLOY: Itdid not seem that way to me then, sir.
Now, ifI may continue and answer the question about what the CIL appliesto,itsays under
certain conditions you m_:v have a smj, le point failure. It very carefully says "under certain con-
ditions."
Mr. McDonald testified yesterday--and I cannot assert to the factualness of what he stated,
but what he said was, in reality we have never had that worst case condition where we actually
flew Crit 1, except on one motor, which was one joint on STS-4. Now, we're looking at that.
I think that certainly is closer to the case
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than we have had Crit 1 on everything except one motor, and the reason it is is because you look
at the squeeze that you actually have, given the dimensions that you actually have, and you look
at the worst case rotation that can (_cur under that condition, and that worst case rotation does
not result in a secondary seal unseating such that if the primary seal fails tbe secondary seal
will work. Therefore, it is redundant.
DR. RIDE: Does that calculation take into account the out-of-_oundness of the segments, the
calculation on the squeeze?
MR. HARDY: Yes, it does. If I could make--
DR. RIDE: I would just like to ask whether when you did this calculation for 51-L, which it
looks like you did on the 27th, to find out how much squeeze you had on the O-rings, whether
you actually did take into account the out-of-roundness on the segments, calcuiating the
squeeze?
MR. HARDY: Yes. Those calculations, Dr. Ride, were made prior to the 27th meeting, but
the out-of-roundness is taken into account. The rounding of the three cylinders, if I could de-
scribe it that way, you've get inner leg and the outer leg of the clevis, and then the tang itself.
The rounding of those cylinders, which occurs
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at relatively low pressures, is also taken into account.
I would like to mention one thing, if I could read from one place in the critical items list
regarding this waiver, I think it clearly describes my interpretation of the waiver, and i don't
choose to get into a discussion with somebody else's interpretation. But there is a note that says
leakage of the primary O-ring seal is classified a=: a single failure point due to the possibility of
loss of sealing at the secondary O-ring because of joint rotation after motor pressurization. IR,,f. 2 2(_-:)1
And I am personally aware of the facts that drove the submission of this w_)iver, and it was
clearly associated with the fact that after motor pressurization, after it's been through the igni-
tion transient, you can have a stackup of tolerances on the metal parts and the O-ring which
indeed would not--under which case you would indeed not have a redundant seal.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Let's stick with that }anguage.becauseit seemsto me that goes
right to the heart of it Readit again.Andas I r _dit. it meansthat _fthe primarysealfails
that themissionwill tail. Am I wrong?
MP., HARDY: That is not my interpretation.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let's read it. "Loss of mission"--this is actual loss. "Failure
effects summary. Actual loss. Loss of mission, vehicle and crew due to metal erosion, burn-
through, and probable case burst, re_ulting in fire and deflagration." Now "Note, leakage of the
primary"--and this is the part that I want to refer to.
"'Leakage of the primary O-ring seal is classified as a single failure point "--" as a single
failure point "--" due to possibility of loss of sealing at the secondary O-ring because of joint
rotation after motor pressurization."
Now, that suggests to me that the critical items iist says that if the primary O-ring seal
fails, that you have got a good probability that the mission will be a catastrophe. Am I wrong
about that?
MR. HARDY: You are not wrong, if I might put my clarification into that, if the primary O-
ring fails after motor pressurization, after joint rotation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I g_less what I'm saying is, isn't that a possibility of exactly what
happened in this launch?
MR. HARDY: I don't believe so.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why?
MR. HARDY: Well, I will elaborate on that a
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little bit later here. But in the considerations, at least in the considerations of the subjects at
hand, relative to the discussion on the 27th, the discussion on the 21th had to do with the possi-
bility of the cold temperature d_'.!aying the complete actuation of the primary seal, thereby ex-
tending the duration of blow-by.
Now, when we talk about blow-by of the primary seal, blow-by has to go somewhere, and
where it goes to is the secondary seal. If blow-by occurs as soon as the pressure gets to the pri-
mary seal, early in the ignition, and that seal doesn't sustain that pressure, it goes immediately
to the secondary seal, prior to the time that the joint is rotated.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: This says "possibility of the loss of the sealing of the secondary O-
ring."
MR. MULLOY: After the joint has rotated, sir. The condition that is on the screen now is
before joint rotation.
DR. WALKER: But I think a critical and a literal interpretation of that waiver has to be
that the primary seal is a single point failure. Now, the wording goes on to explain why this is
so, but the wording does not nmke an exception. It merely explains why the single point failure
mode rvfers to the primary
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seal.
But a strict interpretation of that wording to my mind is that the primary O-ring is a single
point failure.
MR. HARDY: l wcu':dn't deny that. I am relating to what many of us knew about the per-
formance of that joint, its rotation, when we lost_when we could lose, because of the stackup of
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tolerances, when in the ignition transient prior to lull motor pressurization or after full motor
pressurization whett we could lose that secondary seal.
Our interpretation or my interpretation of the waiver was not to remove the secondary seal
from the hardware.
DR. RIDE: It seems to me that really crucial to all of this is the timing function and how
quickly you think that the primary will seal, whether it's in that first 160 millisec, ads or wheth-
er it's not. And if it is not, then you run the risk of getting into the period where joint rotation
is more likely.
I guess what I wonder about is the data that ;ou've got to show how the timing function
changes at low temperature, because it is certainly going to be a function of the temperature,
just because the O-ring is diffi_rent and it is behaving differently. It is
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deformed in some way.
And it is not clear to me that you've got the data to say that, to discriminate at the level of
milliseconds, which is what you are really doing, and to apply engineering judgment based upon
really not very much data, and applying that engineering judgment to a Criticality 1 case.
MR. HARDY: Well, I will comment on part of that and _aaybe Larry would like to comment,
too. I would like to clarify and emphasize, if it is not clear, that this seal performance of the
primary and secondary seal in the early part of the ignition pbase, it is not a step one, step two.
Step one and step two occur simultaneously, meaning that if I get blow-by the primary I am
pressurizing the secondary. So it is not a situation where I get blow-by the primary and that
extends for some _erlod of time and during that period of time the joint rotates, and then I call
on the secondary seal.
I can't have blow-by the primary unless I am trying to pressurize the secondary seal. So it ix
not a situation where for some number of milliseconds i've got blow-by the primary and then
later I call on the secondary seal. I am calling on the secondary seal to function the instant I get
blow-by the primary seal.
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DR. RIDE: I think that Mr. Boisjoly described it very well when he said that it is kind of a
race. Although you've got blow-by past the primary and the secondary is presumably holding at
that point, the race is between the erosion that is occurring on the primary and its attempt to
seal.
SO it is whether it seals first or erodes first.
MR. HARDY: Which erodes first, Dr. Ride?
DR. RIDE: The primary.
MR. HARDY: Well, if I have initiated--early in the ignitk, n transmnt phase, if I have initi-
ated a sealing of the secondary seal, subsequent erosion on the primary seal is not of interest.
DR. RIDE: Well, it is if the primary erodes to the point that when joint rotation occurs then
you no longer have the seconda.'T.
MR. HARDY: The secordary seal will seal--if the secondary seals at the pressure that it is
supposed to seal, and there have been tests run at 30 degrees that indicate that the seal--that a
seal will in fact form an extrusion seal.
If that occurs, then subsequent joint rotation, which occurs on every primary seal that ever
seals, that will not cause you to lose that seal. And
1522
it is becat_se of the extrusion of that O-ring into the extrusion g_p.
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Again, let me re-emphasize, every time the primary seals on a joint early in the ignition
plaase, that joint, the primary seal, the rotation of the joint is greater on the primary seal than
it is on the secondary seal.
So every flight demonstrates the ['act that once you initiate an extrusion seal, subsequent
rotation of the joint does not affect that seal.
DR. WALKER: But if you have a situation where _:he rotation begins to occur even after the
seals have been made, is this not where temperature is truly critical and where the tests carried
out at Mortoa-Thiokol measuring the response of the seals as a function of temperature should
have been very critica!ly considered, because now at lower temperature the seal is going to b _ve
a harder time following the movements of the metal parts'?
MR. HARDY: I can assure you that that particular characteristic will be thoroughly exam-
ined. It is being thoroughly examined. My assessment on the night of the 24th and in fact today
is that if I properly extrude that seal into the sealing gap and have the forcing pressure behind
it, that the temperatures of interest
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would not have any effect on losing that seal as it goes open.
The key factor which I think many of you have determined, and I agree with you, the key
factor is whether or not the initiating pressure on the primary occurs early in the ignition tran-
sient. And that was my knowledge at the time, the 24th, and I believe that to be--or the 27th--
and I believe that to be the knowledge of everybody participating in that meeting, because there
was no discussion to the contrary that I'm aware of"
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Hardy, Ben Powers, one of your engineers, did have an opposite
view on that. How did you rationalize his concern?
MR. HARDY: If I may, I'm a little out of sequence here. If I may, when I get into my state-
ment I will address that.
VICE CH_,_PMAN ARMSTRONG: I would like to ask a question specifically with regard to
the joints on 51-L. Based upon your analysis of the measurements that you have on those joints,
would you expect that after full flight pressurization of the motor you would have a secondary
seal?
Or, to put it in another way, do you think on these joints you had a Criticality 1 or a Criti-
cality
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1R?
MR. MULLOY: Given the temperature?
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Given everything you know about it at this point in
time.
MR. MULLOY: And the known resiliency. It would be my judgment that, with the resiliency
data that was presented on the 27th, that that would be a condition where the secondary seal
may aot function.
MR. HARDY: After joint rotation.
MR. MULLOY: After joint rotation.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: So, to just repeat that, in this case we might have a
single seal failure, namely the primary seal failure after motor pressurization, that could cause
a problem of the kind we are investigating?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. That is the condition that is recognized, in the CIL. If I may go to
the chart on the bottom, I would like to explain that further, sir.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It seems to me that that question and answ_:r become extremely im-
portant. Let's be sure that the record is clear on that. I thought Mr. Armstrong's question went
right to the heart of the matter, and I'm not sure that I understood the answer.
ls it possible to read that back?
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THE REPORTER: "Specifically with regard to the joints on 51-L, based upon your analysis
of the measurements that you have on those joints, would you expect that after full flight pres-
surization of the motor you would have a secondary seal? Or, to put it anethcr way, do you think
on these joints you had a Criticality 1 or a Criticality 1R?"
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could we get an answer just to that one? Was that Criticality 1 or
Criticality IR?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. It was our judgment that we were redundant at ignition. As Dr.
Ride has pointed out, there was a timing function. We did not conclude on that night that the
primary seal would not function and seal. That was inconclusive.
If under the conditions described, if the primary seal did function and seal. then we have
joint rotation, then the primary seal subsequently fails, I believe the question was that, under
the conditions of temperature, would you anticipate that you had a worst case condition wherein
the secondary seal would not be in a position to energize.
I said that may be the case. That may be the case. It has not been shown--what we had was
resiliency data that says that the metal under rotation lifts off the seal. It has not been shown
that that seal would not function under that condition.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mulloy, in the interest of
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clarity, could you just simply state, was it 1 or 1R?
MR. MULLOY: It was 1R, sir.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
MR. SUTTER: Could I ask a question, please. I get a little confused. It was my understand-
ing yesterday when the question was asked to transmit data to Kennedy, I asked what was going
to be done with the data, was it going to be analyzed so that Kennedy could make a decision?
And the answer came back: Well, no decision had been made at that point, and so it was just for
information.
But yesterday the impression I got is that the engineers at Thiokol reached a conclusion
and, whether it was right or wrong, their conclusion was wait for a warmer temperature. Then
the management of Thiokol, as I remember it, reversed that condition to say, go ahead and fly,
forget the temperature.
This presentation seems to be another analysis maybe justifying why the decision to fly was
all right. Now, if somebody was in charge of this launch--now I see three parties, the Thiokol
engineers saying one thing, the Thiokol management saying another thing, and perhaps this dis-
cussion saying another thing.
Who does the launch manager listen to?
MR. MULLOY: Well, sir, the launch manager
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listens to Mr. Aldrich, who provides the readines_ for launch to the launch director during the
launch count. If you go back to the events that you were relating, sir, in t:he afternoon I was not
aware of the engineering conclusions until we were an hour into this telecon, which started at
8:45.
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mWewerelookingat data.Yourquestionwaswasit transmittedto Kennedysothat Kennedy
couldmakethe decision?No,sir. The datawereactually transmittedto the MarshallSpace
FlightCenter.Partof theMarshallSpaceFlight Centerhappenedto beat KSC.
Anotherpart--a partof Thiokolhappenedto beat KSC.Anothergoodpart of the Marshall
Spact.Flight Centerwasstill in Huntsville.That teleconthat occurredin the evening"at S:45
wasa MarshallSpaceFlightCentersolidrocketboc:sterdiscussion.
MR.SUTTER:Well,somewherealongthe line, perhapsafterall of the testimonyis given,I
wouldlike to askthat questionagain.If theThiokolpeoplesaydon't lly, doesthat stick?Canit
be overruled?Who is the final judge that makesa recommendationto whoeverhas to saylaunch?
I',,1confusedandI wouldlike to get it clarifiedsometime.
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MR.HARDY:Mr. Chairman,I think I understandthe questionandit is cer'cainlya legiti-
mate interestto have.If I might suggesthat Mr. Mulloy and myselfbepermittedto proceed
with ourstatements,I believethat someof theplayersandwheretheyfit wouldbea little clear-
er to you.
CHAIRMANROGERS:I think that is correct.Mr. Mulloy,wewill comebackto someof
thesequestionslater on,and particularly Mr. Armstrong'squestion,becauseI really hopewe
cangetanansweryesorno.
Butin anyevent,goaheadwith yourpresentation,andwewill try to listencarefully.
MR.MULLOY:Okay.I guesswherewedigressed,I'm to the last diagramhere.Thecondi-
tion, the other conditionthat carl exist,wheretim redundantsealdoesfunction,the primary
sealhasfailedandtheredundantsealdoesfuncGsn,whenyoustart witha redundantsystem,is
depictedon that picturethere.Theprimary sealis compromised,the redundantsealhasbeen
pressurizedinto thegap,_.ndseals.That isanotherconditionthat is a "Crit 1" condition.
Shouldthat conditionoccur--andI will goonnow andcontinuethe discussion.As I said,
the focusof that discussionat 8:45----andI wouldreiterate,that wasa discussionthat _.:ascarried
on
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under my direction, if you will; ! am the SRB project r',lanager and all elements on that discus-
sion were in support of me. As has been stated, Mr. Reinartz, who is the shuttle program manag-
er at Marshall, was also there.
But about halfway through, after we had looked at all of the data, the conclusion and rec-
ommendation charts that Mr. Lund had prepared came in and the logic for his recommendation,
which did not specificaV_,y address don't launch 51-L, what it said was that, within our experi-
ence base we should not operate any solid rocket motor at any temperature colder than we have
previously operated one, which was 51-C.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Didn't you take that to be a negative recommendation?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. That was an engineering conclusion, which I found this conclusion
without basis and I challenged its logic. Now, that has been interpreted by some people as apply-
ing pressure. I certainly don't consider it to be applying pressure.
Any time that one of my contractor_ or, for that matter, some of Mr. Hardy's people who
come to me with a recommendation and a conclusion that is based on engineering data, I probe
the basis for their conclusion to assure that it is sound and that it is logical.
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I foundthi recommendation,ot to launchanSRMat a temperaturebelow53degreesasto
be--it cameassomewhatof a surpriseto me,and the reaso,lit did, after 51-C,which is when
the observationwasmadeaboutthe blow-by,whichhasbeentestifiedto,wedealtwith the ob-
servationson51.-Cverycarefullyin goinginto thenext launchreadinessreview.
Theconclusionsthat cameout of that wasthat there may be, there may, be some effect of
temperature that is causing this additional blow-by, but tne conclusions as presented to by flight
readiness re¢iew by Morton Thiokol--and I certainly had no dissent at that time--was that 51-E,
which was going to be launched in a much warmer temperature, may have exactly the same
type of erosion and blow-by, that we might expect that; that the t_.sts and analysis that had been
done showing that did show that we were tolerant to that.
And the conclusion was that 51-E was acceptable to launch with full expectation that we
might see again exactly what we saw in 51-C. We tested that logic and rationale in great detail. I
signed an action item in my solid rocket booster flight readiness review board, which I chaired,
to provide additional data relative to that particular recommendation on 51-E. IR,.l'. z ',-_-l I
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Those specific actions were: give me a graphic comparison of the 51-C case joint O-ring ero-
sion dimension with previously observed eroded O-rings; provide description and disposition of
all PRs--that is a problem report--on case field joints for both STS-51-C and 51-E; include the
metal part problem reports, O-ring, putty, leak tests, all data relative to 51-C and 51-E, since in
the initial presentation that was not provided.
Correlate the putty lot that was used on 51-C with the case joints. Did we see any correla-
tion between the lot of putty and erosion in one case joint and not having it in another? Identify
any problems with th;.z putty layup.
And number five was. what was the effect of low ambient temperature on the joint?
Number six was, what is joint geometry and O-ring squeeze on both the primary and second-
ary O-rings for 51-C and 51-E, and to analyze the soot to determine the source.
That action item was answered. The conclusion relative to temperature was that that tem-
perature effect would still give us adequate squeeze and joint operation.
Now, that was the basis that I was coming from,
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which led me to conclude that this was a rather surprising recommendation. There were other
factors that were involved in that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can we have a cop)" of that, Mr. Malloy?
MR. MULLOY: Yes.
And this was a rather surprising conclusion, based upon data that didn't seem to hang to-
gether, and so I challenged that. And I assure you, sir, that there was no reversal of the tradi-
tion of NASA which says prove to me why you can't fly versus prove to me why you can.
As I say, to me that is--it doesn't make any difference. If somebody is giving me a recom-
mendation and a conclusion that is based upon engineering data, I am going to understand the
basis for that recommendation and conclusion to assure that it is logical. I think that has been
interpreted, when one challenges someone who says, I don't have anything too qualitative, but
I'm worried, that that is pressure, and I don't see it that way.
Now, I asked Mr. Kilminster then, who is the vice president of space booster projects, for his
recommendation for 51-L. He stated that, based upon the engineering recommendation, he could
not recommend
840
t4 ¸ "
1533
launch.
Now, I fully understood what Mr. Kilminster was saying at that time. He did not say the
engineering data says that you can't launch. He says: I've got an engineering recommendation
here and based upon that I certainly cannot recommend launch.
I construed that as making a point that he really had not had an opportunity to think
through all of the points that were made during that two-hour discussion, because there were a
lot of additional considerations that that data generated during that two-hour discussion, with
some 30 engineers involved in that discussion, raising questions, questioning data, questioning
the conclusions that are drawn from tEose data.
And sir, that is not at all unusual in any of our processes. It is not at all unusual.
Now, then I gave--at that point, 1 gave my assessment of where we had been, including that
consideration for 51-E which was in my mind, which I don't believe I stated at that time. But
where I was coming from was we had been flying since STS-2 with a known condition in the
joints that was duly considered and accepted by Thiokol, it was accepted by me, and it was ac-
cepted by all levels of NASA management through
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the flight readiness review process, through special presentations that we had put together and
provided up here to the headquarters people. The rationale for accepting that condition had
been previously documented.
I would like to now read what I said on that night. You have the notes, because I jotted
these things down. This is what was described as a rather logical conclusion by Mr. Russell of
Thiokol yesterday.
I stated that, after that beginning, this is a condition that we have had since STS-2, that has
been accepted; that blow-by of the O-rings cannot be correlated to the temperature by these
data. STS-61 had blow-by at 75 degrees. Soot blow-by of the primary O-rings has occurred on
more than one occasion, independent of temperature.
This is in the nature of challenges: Think about this, think about your data.
Primary erosion occurs due to concentrated hot gas passed through the putty. I just wrote
that down to say we know why we get erosion. We have done tests, we have done analyses, we
understand the limits that the erosion can be, and we understand by tests how much we can
withstand.
The colder temperature may result in greater
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primary O-ring erosion and some heat effect on the secondary because of increased hardness of
O-ring, resulting in slower seating. Early static tests, howe_er, hydrotests--and I have subse-
quently found that that is 150 of those, and I will show _hat on a chart--with a 90 durometer O-
ring--now, when we're talking about the hardness of O-rings, this is the brick and sponge.
The 75 durome_r O-ring is a little softer than a 90 durometer. The durometer is a measure
of the hardness of the O-ring. As the temperature approaches about 30 degrees, the du_ometer is
about 90.
It was stated in the Thiokol data that was presented that we had successfully shown that an
O-ring with a durometer of 90 would extrude into the gap and seal. It wasn't too hard to extrude
into the gap. Further, I have subsequently found out that the diameter of that O-ring was .275
inches. So it is reduced in diameter also, which gives a pretty good simulation of a cold O-ring.
That wasn't stated on the night of the 27gh.
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Theotherpositivepoint is that the squeezeat 20 degrees is positive, it is greater than 20
thousandths. We saw a 3 rail reduce.ion in the overall squeeze and we were starting out with a
squeeze of some
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36 to--or 3_ to :10 mils.
The secondary seal is in a position to seat. It is in a position to seat and seal by the 200 psi
and 50 psi pressurization at leak check, The primary may not seal due to reauced resiliency and
increased duronmter, may not seal, the worst case condition, if the worst thing happens.
However, during the period of flow past the primary the secondary will be seated and seal
before significant joint rotation occurs, which is less than 170 milliseconds.
M, _ conclusion was that that condition has been recognized at all levels of NASA manage-
ment and is applicable to 51-L.
Mr. Reinartz at that point, after I had made that statement, which was in the intent of look
at all of the data that we have, look at our flight experience, look at our test data, look at our
analysis, don't just look at this isolated body of data that we have on 12 charts in reaching your
conclusion, Mr. Reinartz then asked Mr. Hardy for his comments. George will state what he
said, but what 1 understood him tc say was that he basically agreed with that summary, but he
certainly would not recomme_.d launch against Thiokol's recommendation. And this is
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the gentleman that I rely on for engineering recommendation to launch, and I certainly could
not decide to launch in the absence of' bis recommendation to launch.
Mr. Kilminster then reques_ed an off-net caucus, It has been suggested, implied, or stated
that we directed Thiokol to go reconsider these data. That is not true. Thiokol asked for a caucus
so that they could consider the discussions that had ensued and the comments that Mr. Hardy
and I and others had made.
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That caucus, as has been stated, was going to start. At that point, and Mr. McDonald inter-
jected into the teleconierence. At that point, he made the first comment that he had made
during this entire teleconference.
Mr. McDonald testified for quite a while yesterday about his thoughts on this, but he did not
say any of them until this point. At that point, he stated that he thought what George Hardy
said was a very important consideration, and that consideration was, and he asked Mr. Kilmin-
ster to be sure and consider the comment made by George Hardy during the course of the dis-
cussions, that the concerns expressed were for primary O-ring blow-by and that the secondary O-
ring was in a position to seal during the time of blow-by and would do so befbre significant joint
rotation had occurred.
They then went into their caucus, having asked for five minutes--
DR. WALKER: Could I just ask a question?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR WALKER: That comment by Mr. McDonald, how did you interpret that, as a comment
in f'a_or of proceeding to launch?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, I certainly did,
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because--that is, I was sitting--Mr. McDonald was sitting here and it clearly was a supportive
comment. I wouid not say he was recommending launch. What he was saying was that what we
were asking them to do was a very important consideration, and as ! remember he said, I think
that's very important.
And I took it as a supportive comment to the rationale. He certainly didn't say, I think this
will support a decision to launch.
DR. WALKER: Could you also, as you proceed with your narrative, tell us about any conver-
sations you had with Mr. McDonald during the 30 or 35-minute caucus?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. If I may, I can't recall the things that have been attributed to me
as to whether they occurred during the caucus or whether they occurred subsequent to Thiokol
coming off the caucus and making their recommendation.
I don't know that that is germane, but I simply can't recall whether some of these discus-
sions occurred during the 30 minutes we were on mute or subsequent to the decision coming
down.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mulloy, in that regard, could you perhaps recall just one of those com-
ments? It figures quite prominently in the discussion that you
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were quoted as saying, do you expect us to wait 'til April to launch?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
MR. HOTZ: Is tha" an accurate statement or not?
MR. MULLOY: It is certainly a statement that is out of context, and the way I read the
quote, sir--and I have seen it many times, too many times--the quote I read was: My God, _'hio-
kol, when do you want me to launch, next April?
Mr. McDonald testified to another quote that says: You guys are generating new Launch
Commit Criteria.
Now, both of those I think kind of go together, and that is what I was saying. I don't know
whether that occurred during the caucus or subsequent to. I just simply can't remember that.
MR HOTZ: Well, never mind the timing.
MR. MULLOY: Well, yes, sir. I'm going to answer your question now. I think those quotes
derive from a single thought that may have been expressed by me using some of tl-:ose words.
i have not yet encountered anyone other than those at KSC who heard those words, so I
don't believe they were transmitted over the net. The total context, I
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think, in wnich those words may have been used is, there are currently no Launch Commit Cri-
teria for joint temperature. What you are proposing to do is to generate a new Launch Commit
Criteria on the eve of launch, after we have successfully flown with the existing Launch Commit
Criteria 24 previous times. With this LCC, i.e., do not launch with a temperature greater than 53
degrees, we may not be able to launch until next April. We need to consider this carefully before
we jump to any conclusions.
It is ail in the context, again, with challenging your interpretation of the data, what does it
mean and is it logical, is it truly logical that we really have a system that has to be 53 degrees
to fly?
DR. WALKER: I understand how you have clarified that, but I think you have raised an
important question, which I hope that you and Mr. Hardy will address, and that is, why was
there no Launch Commit Criteria which addressed the O-ring specifically?
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We haveaskedthat questionof ThmkolandI don't think wehavegot'tenan answer,soI
hopeperhapswecangetan understandingof that andyour thinkingandthe reasonwhy,after
yousetupa taskteamto addressthisquestion,youdid not alsobringyourpaperworksortof in
line w;_hthis concern.
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MR. MULLOY:Yes,sir, I will try, andI think betweenGeorgeandI, possiblywecanad-
dressthat to yoursatisfaction.
CHAIRMANROGERS:I want to alsoraisea point. You mentionea in your statement that
there was somebody from Thiokol that aske-' for a five-minute recess and you said that the
other--I think you used the word--lie or not true. I don't believe anybooy testified to the con-
trary.
I think the testimony yesterday was that they were not certain about who made that sugges-
tion. I wouldn't want the record to state that you said that was a lie, because I don't believe it is
in the testimony.
MR. MULLOY: I hope I didn't say that, sir. I hope I said "implied."
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Maybe I misunderstood it. In any event, I thought the testimony was
unclear about that, and I'm not sure it's all that relevant who asked for it. It's pretty clear that
you and Mr. Hardy were very unhappy about the recommendation of the engineers.
As we understand it, the recommendation of the engineers was don't launch, and you ex-
pressed your displeasure. And somewhere along the line, they decided to have what seems like a
five-minute recess, which
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seemed very odd to me the first time I heard it. Why five minutes on a matter of such major
importance? Why would anybody say, let's have a five-minute recess? I would have thought they
would have had a five-h_ur recc_ o_ a matter of such major importance.
But in -ny event, I wa_.t the record to be clear. I don't believe there is any contradiction of
testimony on that point.
MR. MULLOY: I hope that I have not said that I was upset by a recommendatior, not to
launch. What I was challenging were conclusions that were drawn. The recommendation not to
launch or to launch at that time wouldn't upset me one way or the other.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that was the whole purpose of the discussion, whether you
would launch or not.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, the end result would be that. But the purpose of the discussion was
to understand the data and the logic of conclusions being drawn from those data, and that is the
way I was working.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Mulloy, if in fact the criteria were 53 degrees, it would have an
impact not only on this launch, but on the shuttle program. Can you describe the impacts that it
would have had on the shuttle program as far as launches at Kennedy, at
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Vandenberg?
It is a fairly important decision to say you can't launch below 53 degrees, isn't it?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, I agree with that. I cannot describe the impacts, but, as I say, based
upon our previous experience and our actions in flying subsequent vehicles after 51-C, I found
that to be a surprising conclusion.
I did not assess what the long-term impact would be. I wasn't in a position to do that at that
time.
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If I maycontinue--
MR. SU'UFER:I wouldlike to aska questioa.Forgettingall of the testimony,what if it
cameout that therewasadeficiency,that in the interestof meetingthelaunchcriteria implied,
whichis don'tlaunchuntil safe,if it cameout 53degreesyouwouldn'tlaur,ch,wouldyou?
MR.MULLOY:I'm notsureI understandthe question,sir.
MR.SUTTER:Well, this sealhashada historyof beingin trouble.Therewasa task force
setup.Therewerememoswritten, thereweretestprogramsplanned.Theseal,to me,wasvery,
verytender,andit wasknownto bevery,verytender.At leastsomepeople
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thought the situationwas tenderenoughthat, no matter what the conditionswerefor this
launch,theysaid,youknow,wewill wait until thetemperatureis warmer.
Sothe launchcriteriaaswrittendownwouldbeviolated,but undercircumstanceslike that
it wouldbe.SoI don't understandwhy wehangaroundthe 53-degreething. I think that seal
wastenderat 80degreesmaybe,dependinguponhowit wasput togetherandthetolerancesand
what-not.
MR.MULLOY:I agreewithyou,sir.
MR.SUTTER:But then, insteadof sayingyouhaveto wait until nextApril to launch,the
thing that youdo is yougo andthere werethree different levelsof improvementsthat were
discussed.Thething to do thenwasto put thoseimprovementsin the program,not infer that
theseengineersare saying,we're throwinga ringer at you that saysdon't launchuntil next
April.
I think that is puttingthoseengineersinto a little bit of a hot seat.And if they're try_,ngto
dotheir job andsay,hey,weoughtto dosomethingaboutthis, thereoughtto havebe_nmore
attentionpaid.
MR.MULLOY:Yes,sir. I think wehavetestifiedtherewasa greatdealof attentionpaidto
that. BothThiokolandwehavetestifiedtherehadbeena greatdealof attentionpaidto that,
fromthe
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AssociateAdministratorof MannedSpaceFlight downto theengineersat Thiokol,overthe pre-
viousyear.
And I agreewith yourconclusion,sir.
VICECHAIRMANARMSTRONG:CouldI askyouto speaka bit moreto Dr.Walker'sques-
tion,whichin my viewaskedwhywasn'ttherea LaunchCommitCriteriaonsealtemperature?
Whyhadn't somethingbubbledup throughthe systemthat wouldindicatea morewell-defined
constrainton launch?
MR.MULLOY:I think that I haveto gobackoverthe year where all of the attention had
been paid to the seal and the research that we have done and what considerations were being
worked in the seal task force at that time.
And I have done some research on that and, starting with, again, starting with the next
flight after 51-C and looking at the discussions, the tasks, the program that had been laid out by
the Thiokol sea, team in conjunction with our people, there just wasn't any great concern ex-
pressed about temFerature during that time.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: How about any other factors that might influence the
seal constraints that were not currently ;,.n the LCCs? Was there anything else?
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MR.MULLOY:Mr. Armstrong,I don'tthink anyone,_ddressingthesealproblemwerecon-
scious that they were working a Launch Commit Criteria problem. I think what they were work-
ing was tryi,_g to improve the margin in that joint and to reduce the incidence of blow-by a_d
erosion.
I doubt that the engineers working that were thinking in terms of Launch Commit Criteria
at all, They were trying to look at--they were doing testing, they were doing analysis, they were
doing tests on putty, putty layup patterns. They were doing tests on alter,iative_ to putty, they
were doing tests on larger size O-rings, putting spacers in the joint to preclude the O-ring, the
primary O-ring and the nozzle joints, from having to translate so far.
And I don't believe there was any focus at all on, we have to develop a Launch Commit
Criteria for a joint.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Mulloy, yesterday there was a letter which was made public, which was
written by Mr. Boisjoly to his superiors, which predicted thvt unless the seal problem was ad-
dressed a catastrophe was possible. And it's my impression tha_ Mr. Boisjoly is the raost knowl-
edgeable engineer at Thiokol in regard to the seals.
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Now, was any warning or flavor of that very serious letter transmitted to anyone at NASA,
to your knowledge?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, not that letter. And I guess I wouldn't nave expected it to be. That
is a correspondence that occurs between an engineer and perhaps his section chief, and I
wouldn't expect that type of correspondence to go up the line.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Larry, I have a problem with that. You had a briefing in July that
talks about resiliency, you've got a briefing in August at NASA headquarters that talks about
resiliency of those seals as a number one concern.
Now, how can you say that wasn't transmitted to NASA'?
MR. MULLOY: The memo.
GENERAL KUTYNA: I know the memo. But his concern is what Dr. Walker was asking.
DR. WALKER: Or the flavor of that.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. I have looked back at that briefing. That is one of the things on the
title sheet.
GENERAL KUTYNA: It's on the conclusion sheet: "Conclusions: primary concerns, resilien-
cy." I I_,'r. 2 2_i :,1
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. And what I have looked
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at in that report is for the substance behind that, and l can't find it.
Mh. ACHESON: But wouldn't temperature automatically be critical to any elastomer which
had a critical function?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. RIDE: Do you think that there should be a Launch Commit Criteria on the seals or on
the joint, as far as temperature goes?
MR. MULLOY: I would prefer to reserve judgment on that until we determine whether
there shouia be or not.
DR. RIDE: I guess that is my point. There wasn't one. but it doesn't appear as though you
have data to know whether there should be one or not and if there should be one what it should
be.
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MR MULLOY: That is a correct statement.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mul!ov, could we go back fbr just a minute to page 4, t_ _ lr conclusion,
which reads: "'The risk recognized at all levels, of NASA management is appt -oh J to STS-51-L
in regard to the O-rings." Im,t. 2 I I 2 ; ,,r 7!
I have a little trouble with that, because in our testimony so far it seems to indicate that the
risk on the cold temperatures and the O-rings was not
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transmitted to the highest Level of NASA. So how do you explain this conclusion'?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. I think the conclusion is the logic that George Hardy will go
through in some more detail when he gets to his testimony, but the logic _s related to the fact
that we have redundancy at i_nition, that the concern expressed for the cold temperature based
upon the data would appear co be for slower seating of the primary seal, thus more blow-by, and
in a worst case condition which would not be quantified, in which case the redundant secondary
O-ring seal would seat and seal under worst case conditions.
MR. HOTZ: But was all this information transmitted up to Level II or Level I, to NASA
management?
MR. MULLOY: All reformation--this information that was discussed on the night of Janu-
ary 27th was not transmitted beyond Dr. Lucas at the Marshall Space Flight Center.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Mulloy, let me just clarify your response to one question. In regard to
the comments made tc Thiokol management by their engineers regarding the concern with the
seals, do you think
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Thiokol management discharged its responsibility to NASA in terms of conveying the proper
level of concern to you and your colleagaes at Marshall?
Should they have raised a larger red flag or did they act properly in giving you the briefings
they gave you and alerting yon to this problem?
MR. MULLOY: I think we had the attention of Thiokol management relative to putting a
dedicated effort on improving the margin in the joint and reducing the incidence of erosion and
blow-by. They responded to that by setting up the dedicated team in conjunction with NASA to
work those problems.
They did transmit to us all the data through weekly teleo::ns and through period,c meetings
that was being generated by that task team in joint meetings, and the total content of the task
team concerns is known to NASA.
I simply am saying, to my knowledge, that th_ effect of temperature never came across as
the overwhelming and most important concern on that joint. What came across was the necessi-
ty to get a primary O-ring that would not have blow-by such that we wouldn't have erosion of
the primary O-ring.
MR. ACHESON: As I understand your testimony, Mr. Mulloy, your argument, if I may call
it that, on the
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telecon with the Thiokol people was prompted not by your concern about the launch date, but by
a feeling on your part that the data you were looking at to support their recommendation was
not what you might call a thorough engineering job.
1"hat is the sense I get from your testimony.
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MR.MULLOY:Yes,sir. It didn't hangtogether,It didn't hangtogetherwith a!! of ourother
experienceand our knowledge,of whichThioko' engineershavetremendousknowledgeabout
the operation el tlns joint.
MR. ACt-IRSON: Did you have any feeling or apprehension that a delay of the launch date
tbr reasons related to the propulsion system would reflect on you or the Marshall organization' _
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. My decision to proceed with the launch as recommended by the
Thiokcl official responsible for making such recommendations was based solely on the engineer-
ing data presented by Thiokol engineering and the Marshall engineering evaluation of those
data.
I can assure you, because I am absolutely certain, that no extraneous consideration, such os
schedule, came into that decision process.
MR. ACHESON: Thank you.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you want to proceed with your presentation?
MR. MULLOY: Okay, sir. At the completion of the caucus, of course, Mr. Kilminster came
back on the loop and stated they had assessed all the data and considered the discussions that
had ensued for the _zast couple of hours and the discussions that occurred during their caucus.
CHA1RMAN ROGERS: Was it a couple of hours?
MR. MUI,LOY: Yes, sir. We started at 8:45 and I believe it was probably 11:00 o'clock before
he came back on the loop. It was a long discussion. And I must emphasize that I had no knowl-
edge of what interchange occurred during the caucus at Thiokol, because all sites were on mute.
We were on mute at KEC. No communications occurred between myself and Mr. Hardy at
Huntsville, nor did any communication occur between KSC and Thiokol during that caucus.
After Mr. Kilminster made that recommendation, Mr. Reinartz then asked if there were
any further comments, and to my recollection there were none. There were no further comments
made.
I then asked I_.r. Kilminster to send me a copy of his flight readiness rationale and recom-
mendation. The conference was then terminated at approximately
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11:!5.
I have no knowledge of, as has been testified, of Mr. McDonald being asked to sign that
documentation. That would have been unusual, because Mr. Kilminster signs all flight readiness
documentation.
Now, after the teleconference was completed, Mr. McDonald informed Mr. Reinartz and me
that if the Tbiokol engineering concern for the effect of cold was not sufficient cause to recom-
mend not launching, there were two other considerations--launch pad ice and recovery area
weather.
I stated that launch pad ice had been considered by the Mission Management Team--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Excuse me. Could you identity that discussion, where that took
place7
MR. MULLOY: That was after the teleconference was completed, after Mr. Kilminster made
his recommendation, after Mr. Reinartz asked, are there any other comments. There were no
other comments on the telecon from anyone.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that ended; then _' _ t was another discussion?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. Immediately after the teleconference was completed.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who took part in that?
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MR. MULLOY: Mr. McDonald _tated to Mr. Reinartz and me that if the Thiokol engineer-
ing concern for the effect of cold was not sufficient cause to recommend not launching, there
were two other considerations--launch pad ice and recovery area weather.
I stated that launch pad ice had been considered by the Mission Management Team betbre
deciding to proceed and that a further periodic monitoring of that condition was pianned I fur-
ther stated that I had been made aware of the recovery area weather previously and planned to
place a call to Mr Aldrich and advise him that the weather in the recovery area exceeded the
Launch Commit Criteria.
So I stated earlier, when you asked what were the Launch Commit Criteria; one of them
was that the recovery area weather has limitations on _t. The report we had, that Mr. McDonaid
confirmed, was that we were outside of those limits.
Now, I must point out that that is not a hard Launch Commit Criteria. That is an advisory
call, and the LCC so states that. It does require that we discuss the condition.
So at about 11:30 p::n., Mr. Cecil Houston e:_tablished a teleconference with Mr. Aldrich and
Mr.
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Sestile at KSC. I informed Mr. Aldrich that the weather in the recovery area could preclude
immediate recovery of the SRB, since the ships were in a survival mode and they were moving
back toward Cape Kennedy at about three knots, and the estimate provided to us by Mr. Sostile
was that they woula be probably 40 miles from the SRB impact area at the time of launch, at
9:38; and then, continuing at three knots, it was going to be some period of time before they
could get back and locate the boosters.
The concern I had for that was not loss of the total booster, but loss of the main parachutes
tbr the booster, which are separated at water impact, and loss of the frustum of the boosters,
which has the drogue parachute on it, which comes down separately, because with the 50-knot
winds we had out there and with the kind of sea states we had, by the time the recovery ships
got back out there, there was little probability of being able to recover those.
I informed Mr. Aldrich of that, and he decided to proceed with the launch after that infbr-
mation. I did not discuss with Mr. Aldrich the cenversations that we had just completed with
Morton Thiokol.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you explain why?
MR. M!TLLOY: Yes, sir. At that time, and I
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still consider today, that was a Level III issue, Level !II being an SRB element or an external
tank element or space shuttle main engine element or an orbiter. There was no violation of'
Launch Commit Criteria. There was no waiver required, in my judgment, at that time and still
today.
And we work many probl,_ms at the orbiter and the SRB and the external tank level that
never get communicated to M'. Aldrich or Mr. Moore. It was clearly a Level III issue that had
been resolved.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Mulloy, could I just return for a moment to your conversations with Mr.
McDonald. I believe yesterday he stated that he had a discussion with you about the meaning of
the temperature on the Launch Commit Criteria of 40 to 90 degrees, whether it applied just to
the solid bulk temperature or whether it applied t_ every element of the shuttle system.
Do you recall that conversation, and could you perhaps tell u_ your recollection of it?
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MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. There was some discussion that occurred, and I be!ieve this may
have occurred during the caucus, it may have occurred alter. Mr. McDonald stated that we
ought to at least get the joint temperature to 40 degrees. He indicated that at 40 degrees he
would fee! more comtbrtab!e with it,
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because we had a spec that said that we had to be good from 40 to 9i) degrees.
I didn't find that logic or that argument to be very logical at all, because based upon the
data the engineers were recommending don't launch below .')':_degrees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why is that not logical if he said, why don't you at least require a
40-degree temperature'? And you say you didn't think it was logical. It seems very logical to me.
MR. MULLOY: Not on an engineering ba,.is, sir. If one was concerned about the engineering
data that said th,".t at a temperature ..below ;33 degrees we have an ansaf_ condition, there is
certainly no logic for accepting that at 40 degrees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, it's more logical than 30.
DR. RIDE: What are the solid rncket motors qualified to, what temperature, not the prt4_el-
iant?
MR. MULLOY: Okay. There are two specifications on temperature on the end item specifi-
cations to which the solid rocket motors are procured. The first specification states that the
motor must be capable of providing a given thrust time trace within limits from zero to 200000
feet at a temperature
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of 40 to 90 degrees.
The second--
DR. RIDE: And that is basically on the propellant, is that right?
MR. MULLOY: At a propellant mean bulk temperature of 40 to 90 degrees, for clarification.
There is another requirement in the end item specification for the solid rocket motor, that states
that it must. be capable of meeting the natural environments that are specified in JSC document
()77_), volume 10, appendix i0.10.
When you go look at that document, it has a number of environmental data in it. The one
that is of intere,_t here is the ambient temperature specifications for the launch site, which i_
ther, picked v,p in the Launch Commit Criteria that we discussed earlier.
In that volume 10.10, it states that it must be capable of operating at an ambient tempera-
ture of 31 degre:es while being exposed to a five-degree sky.
Now, you have to get into heat transfer then to apply that to what the temperatures would
be on the SRM.
DR. RIDE: So what you're saying is there was a spec that NASA imposed saying that the
SRM should be qualified to launch at 31 degrees. Now, was that taken
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into account in the qual test program for the SRM?
MR. MULLOY: Okay. We came into this discussion not as specific as I can present it to you
today, but I have tried to go back and pick up most of the things that we discussed and what we
were using in terms of qualificaticn.
May I have the last SRB chart on the screen, please.
(Viewgraph.)
MR. MULLOY: The kinds of things we were discussing during the course of that telecon
were what basis did we have for understanding what _e would be good for in terms of tempera-
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Itureon thejoint. Now.I cannotsit:,that all of thesethings were discussed, but I know some of
them were.
What you will find, you will find a iot of room temperature tests up there at the top of the
chart, which is the leak tests which are done on two t_eld joints, the structural test article that
was pressure-cycled many times, proof tests that were run to measure the rotation under pres-
sure ,,i: the joint, a lightweight cylinder burst test that was dane with an intentionally-damaged
primary O-ring to assure that the secondary O-ring would seat, and it did.
There were 27 full-scale seal tests with an
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O-rirg groove damage tolerances, damage in the grooves and damage tol,,r race on O-rings. And
then there were two cold gas tests.
And these data were presented on the night of the 27th. All of that was at amlaient tempera-
ture. And then we did discuss what is the development qualification motor experience range,
and that is shown on the chart. We had experience everywhere from 40 to $5 degrees.
"there then were data presented oil two cold gas tests at 30 degrees, where the O-ring was
pressurized at the motor pressurization rate at 30 degrees, whicb would indicate that an O-ring
would operate before joint rotation at 30 degrees.
DR. RIDE: Was that actually in a joint?
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MR MULLOY: No, _t is not. It is a full-scale O-ring, full-scale groove, in a scaled test device,
where the pressurize rate on that O-ring is zero to 900 psi in t;00 milliseconds at a temperature
of a0 degrees.
DR. WALKER: You would say, then, that the O-ring was qualified to a temperature of 30
degrees'? Would that be an accurate statement?
MR. MULI,OY: The data that. we were looking at on the 27th were these two tests that indi-
cated that it would oerform at 30 degrees under the motor pressurization rate before the joint
rotated.
DR. WALKER: What about, let's consider the putty and the O-ring, because that is really
the system that responds to the pressure surge. What temperature was the putty O-ring system
qualified to?
MR. MULLOY: The lowest that I'm aware of--and we're still fleshing this out, because this
is kind of what we talked about on the 27th, hut the lowest that I'm aware of is the 40-degree
test on one of the development motors.
DR. WALKER: And of course., during those tests the putty was modified before the test. The
putty was not just laid up and then the seal made. The putty was then smoothed out or some
attempt was made to remove the
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volcanoes, I think.
MR. MULLOY: Because the horizontal assembly caused that.
Now, there's one other significant point on this chart that we did discuss, that we didn't
have the quantities on on the 27th, and I mentioned this earlier. We have 150 case segment
proof tests, with a large number of joints with a simulation of a cold O-ring. That is the 90 du-
rometer with a .275, and that was at about 35 degrees.
So those are the certification data that we kind of discussed, all of which we didn't discuss.
The two cold gas tests we did, the segrlent proof tests we did, the development and qualification
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motortestswedid,as a basis tbr understanding what we could expect to happen at coldel tem-
peratures on the joints.
DR. WALKER: Could we focus on the putty |br just a moment? There has not been a great
deal of discussion about its response to the cold temperatures, but it is an elastic substance as
well. in fact, I am a little surprised that there was not more discussion in your telecon about the
effect of the cold temoeratures on the putty.
Was that in anycne's minds, and _'hat data did you have to allow you to extrapolate the
behavior of the
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putty at these lower temperatures?
MR. MULLOY: Well, I don't recall a discussion of the effect of the cold presented by Thiokol
or discussed by anyone--perhaps George does--in the teleconference on the 27th.
DR. WALKER: What about the effects of moisture on the putty? My understanding is that
the putty does not respond well to moisture, and I guess it had been raining. Was there any
discussion of that?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Mu'loy, I want to let you finish, but let me tell you what trou-
bles me very much. I se, le charts and I have heard your presentations before, and I recognize
your expertise and knowledge in this field.
What is troubling, very seriously troubling, is wh_', if this is such a convincing matter to
you, you are certain of these things, you are sure it's okay, how come then in a matter of such
major importance, involving lives of seven astronauts, you apparently were not able to convince
any of the engineers at Thiokol who were working on this on a daily basis that you were right?
MR. MULLOY: Sir, I was not aware that the)" were not convinced, I _ad no knowledge of
what went on
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in the 30-minute caucus at Thiokol, and when asked--when Mr. Reinartz asked, are there any
other comments, there were none.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, would your opinion have changed if you had known all of the
engineers or substantially all of _hv engineers at Thiokol took another position and were op-
posed to the launch?
MR. MULLOY: Sir, I cannot speculate on that my decision would have been given certain
other data.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, why can't you right now, based on the knowledge that you
gleaned yesterday from the testimony, why can't you say whether you would have been influ-
enced one way or the other by the fact that all of those engineers seemed to be opposed to the
launch?
MR. MULLOY: Well, I would like to answer your question, sir, except that that is so foreign
to the way that NASA does business that I would have to think a long time about an answer to
that question.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm not trying to put you on the spot, but we're checking on the
particular process. We're checking on the decisionmaking process. Now, in the process we have
the manufacturer or the engineers of the manufacturer who were working with this on a regu-
lar basis, testifying they were all against the launch.
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And we have testimony that management took over and made the decision contrary to the
advice of the engineers. Now, the question is, if you had known that would it have made a differ-
ence? Was the process a total failure, so that you and Mr. Hardy and others didn't know that at
all?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. I presume if Mr. Boisjoly or Mr. Thompson or Mr. [ und said, look,
we have a unanimous opinion here that it is unsafe to launch the 5!-L vehicle, that would have
influenced, obviously, the decision that I would ultimately make.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Leave out the word "unanimously". Suppose it's 80 percent of the
engineers. Wouldn't that have _ised a major red flag to you, and wouldn't you have said to
everybody around that this is a very serious matter? We have oeen concerned about the O-rings
for a long time r_ow, and we have a different weather condition and we've never tried it at these
temperatures, and the engineers, a lot of them are very worried.
Wouldn't that have made a difference to you?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. And I think what I would have done--and it is speculation. I think
what I would have done in that case, I would have asked Mr. Kilminster how, in the light of
that recommendation, he
1567
could recommend launching 51-L, and I would have asked Mr. Hardy how he could concur in
that.
MR. ACHESON: May I ask Mr. Mulloy a question going back to the point raised earlier
about the logic of the bvli_f one may summarize by saying colder is worse. Now, the Thiokol
people had been testing since the summer of 1985, and NASA I believe had a member of its
Marshall staff participating in that task force exercise, did they not?
MR. MULLOY: That is correct. We had several.
MR. ACHESON: For the record, who was that?
MR. MULLOY: I need some help with that.
MR. HARDY: Mr. Peoples was our senior representative. There were several other people. I
don't know all their names right now, but Mr. Peoples was leading that effort from Marshall.
MR. ACHESON: Seemingly, from what we heard yesterday, this test program led the Thio-
kol people to the widely-shared view that colder is worse. And the logic of that is, of course, you
recognize, because you're dealing with elastomer materials.
Now, did that belief or that logic or, if you want to call it, that general principle, play any
part in your thinking or in the discussion you had with your
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own people?
MR. MULLOY: Prior to the 27th, sir?
MR. ACHESON: No, during your deliberations an the 27th.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. The engineering data presented did contain the effects of resiliency
and a qualitative assessment of how that would slow down the primary O-ring, and that was
considered. And I think, sir, that pretty well completes the points that I wanted to make.
Mr. Hardy I think can address some of these others.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Following up on my question before, I want to point out testimony
yesterday. The testimony yesterday was to the effect that at one point it1 the Thiokol discussion
Mr. Lund was told to take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat, because
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Lund _: that point had disapproved the launch decision. So they said, take off your engineering
hat and put on your management hat.
And I asked, how do you explain the fact that you seemed to change your mind when you
cilanged your hat? Mr. Lund responded by saying we got our--by blaming NASA's reversal of its
launch readiness review policy, we got ourselves in this--and this is a quote
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--"we got ourselves into the thought process that we were trying to find some way to prove to
them that it wouldn't work. We were unable to do that. We couldn't prove absolutely that it
wouldn't work. That is the kind of boat we got ourselves into that evening."
That is his explanation. He says that NASA put him in that frame of mind and that is why,
because he couldn't prove absolutely that it wouldn't work, that he changed his vote. That is his
testimony.
Do yot_ accep_ that testimony?
MR. MULLOY: I heard the testimony, sir. Again, I wasn't privy to the conversation where
he was told to change from an engineering hat to a management hat. But, as I stated earlier, I
deny that I had any change of philosophy which says prove to me that you can't launch versus
prove to me that you can.
[ was simply looking at the engineering data that were presented and the conclusion that
was drawn from those data, and I found it not to be logical.
MR. SUTTER: Could I ask a question, and it goes back to the last question. When Mr. Aeh-
eson was asking you earlier, you made the remark the analysis didn't hold together, and I'm
still curious as to which engineering department is the one that calls the shots.
I had the impression yesterday that Thiokol in
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this area had to say yes or no, and Mr. Kilminster was asked for a piece of data saying it's all
right to launch. But I bel_;eve you are saying that their analysis of the data is wrong and you
overruled them. And I'm just curious.
Is this the way this program is managed? I'm just asking a question.
MR. MULLOY: Well, let me explain how I manage the program, sir. I rely on the project
manager of my prime contractors to arrive at all flight readiness recommendations. I rely on
him to manage the resources that he has available to him within his company.
In this case, it is Mr. Joe Kilminster who has the resources of engineering, manufacturing,
quality control, and safety. I do not get involved in resolving conflicts between those depart-
ments. I rely on Mr. Kilminster to do that, and I take my recommendations--
MR. SUTTER: But you said you disagreed with the analysis of the engineers' data.
MR. MULLOY: I said, sir, that it did not seem to hold together.
MR. SU_I'rER: That's a disagreement.
MR. MULLOY: But I rely on Mr. Kilminster to sort all of that out and make a flight readi-
ness recommendation, and he has been doing that for some 24
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flights now.
MR. SU'I_I"ER: Even though you knew to some extent that the engineers up there had some
pretty grave concerns, you put the burden on Kilminster's back to turn them around?
MR. MULLOY: Not te turn them around. He always has the burden, sir, to make flight
readiness recommendations.
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SI did not detect in the engineering comments--I didn't see this discussion that was going on
any different than many other discussions that we have had relative to the validity of data _hat
wero being presented as the basis of a conclusion and the logic of the conclusion that was being
drawn from those data.
I was not working a problem of i don't want a recommendation not to launch.
MR. SUTTER: But in going back over tbo history of 1985 and witt- the concerns over the
seal, it seems to me there is a lack of communications and that the real severity of some of the
problems has not floated to the surface of the management of NASA properly, and that is what I
am trying to get at. And I really am drawing that conclusion.
MR. MULLOY: Sir, I would draw your attention to the August 19th detailed briefing that
was given here
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in Washington of last year, where everything that was related to the joint, the experience with
the joint, the history of it, the testing that was being done, the analysis that was being done, and
the rationale for continuing to fly in the face of that evidence.
MR. SUTTER: I think the rationale to continue to fly isn't very good when you know that
work is in place to put--well, to put shims in, to extend the lip to keep the deflection from
taking place, to talk about putting O-rings in.
It just seems to me that the whole system was not aware of how serious the concern was,
and maybe the flight should have been re-evaluated and maybe some changes should have been
made to continue flying. It seemed to me that the philosophy was let's keep her flying, let's
work on the changes, but I didn't see any heat to get those changes in the system.
MR. MULLOY: Well, sir, in July of 1985 I ordered billets to allow the incorporation of a
capture feature on the steel cases, to eliminate the joint rotation.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Mulloy, about that August 19 briefing, I believe you said a little while
earlier, and I may not have written the notes accurately, but I think you said: I knew of the MTI
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seal concerns; I looked at the cover of the briefing charts and felt there was no substance in the
briefing.
Did I get that down accurately?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, on temperature.
DR. COVERT: What would it take to have substance?
MR. MULLOY: I think possibly these things that possibly have come out in testimony yes-
terday could have been discussed.
DR. COVERT: In your experience as an engineer, do you always have complete 100 percent
fact._ available, or do you from time to time have to make decisions based upon incomplete infor-
mation?
MR. MULLOY: I--most of the time, I have information sufficient to make the decision. _/ou
never have all of the data that you would like to have before, sometimes you have to make deci-
sions.
MR. ACHESON: Can I ask just briefly? ! still don't understand it. If from 1984 through the
Thiokol testing in 1985 through the presentation here in Washington in August, if during all of
that time it was recognized that resiliency was important, perhaps critical, to the performance of
the seals, why didn't it follow that temperature was a critical part of that resiliency problem?
1574
I just don't understand that.
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MR. MULLOY: Well, sir, I will try again. I'm just saying that that never did come fcrth in
the level of brie:'_g_ that I took on the subject.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But Mr. Mulloy, there's reference to that all through the memoran-
da. I reread them yesterday.
MR. MULLOY: Sir, I have not seen those memoranda.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I will show them to you. There are a lot of discussions about resilien-
cy and the importance to their operation of the O-ring. And, as Mr. Acheson said, it is so appar-
ent that you are going to launch at Vandenberg and Kennedy, there are times when it is cold.
And I can't believe that there weren't lots of discussions about the cffect of temperature on the
O-rings.
In any e_ent, let me come back, because I'm very concerned about the analysis that we are
making or that we have to make about that night when you were having the telecon. Now, you
make it sound as if this was sort of a routine discussion about data and you always have a free
exchange of information about data and so forth.
The thing that is different, it seems to me,
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about this, you had a positive recommendation of no launch. The charts showed that Thiokol
recommended against launch. Do you remember any other occasion when the contractor recom-
mended against launch and that you persuaded them that they were wrong and had them
change their mind?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is the part that is troublesome. And they said that yesterday,
that they thought that you wanted them to change their minds, and that is why they had to rely
on management. And they had their contract coming up for renewal, I believe, some time pretty
soon this year. So they were under a lot of commercial pressure to give you the answer you
wanted.
And they construed what you and Mr. Hardy said to mean that you wanted them to change
their minds. They didn't construe it to mean you had a fair discussion about the data. They con-
strued it to mean, just as Mr. Lund said, that's what he thought you wanted.
And I guess what you're saying is that wasn't what you wanted, you just wanted an intellec-
tual discussion about the data.
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. May I address three
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things in your comments, I guess?
Number one, I cannot conceive how Thiokol felt any pressure for the renewal of their con-
tract, because they are our sole source for solid rocket motors at this time, and that contract was
going to be renewed. There was no alternative, given the mission model, and so that certainly
wasn't a pressure factor for them.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, can I say that in one of the memos I read yesterday, there was
a reference to that fact, and that they were concerned that NASA might be looking for another
contractor.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Larry, I think what we're talking about is the dual source, and
you've got responses from the contractors due on the 14th of March, I think. And there is some
leeway as tc how much you're going te buy from Thiokol versus the dual source.
Is that true? A minimum of six from the dual source?
MR. MULLOY: In the solicitation of interest that is on the street, yes. But again, I can't
conceive of that being pressure to take a risk of safety of flight if they thought it was unsafe.
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Thesecondpoint,I cannotunderstandwhy theywouldbemotivatedtotakea risk that they
thoughtwas
1577
a 3afetyof flight risk, because they have absolutely no incentive to do that. Om contract incen-
tive is set up in the opposite direction.
Thiokol has a production incentive contract. They don't have an award :ee that they get
depending upon how I think they respond to my _vishes. They have a $10 million penalty If an
SRM causes a Crit 1 failure. That $10 million ca:, escalate into much more money than that,
given the loss of fee for the mission success fee that is on a block of vehicles, which is another
125 percent over the fee otherwise earned.
They have negative incentives to take a risk, and I cannot conceive of how they would allow
or think that NASA could pressure them into making an unsafe decision.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you explain, then, why the management had to take over the
decisionmaking process and exclude the engineers?
MR. MULLOY: Well, sir, I was not aware of that conversation that went on, that said, hey,
we're going to make a management decision. I am aware that tke people who normally _ake all
of the input, _tudy all of the data and then arrive at a recommendation that they make to me is
Mr. Kilminster, who is the program manager.
!578
And not being aware of that, I guess I wasn't surprised that, given the opportunity to think
it through, to take advantage of the discussion, the free interchange of discussion in a calm and
deliberate manner--I didn't hear a single engineer say it is unsafe to fly 51-L.
What I heard those engineers saying was talking to their data. They were talking to their
data and they were talking to their lack of data, and they were giving engineering opinion,
which they have stated that they cannot quantify.
And I guess I was not surprised that Thiokol came back after that discussion and came with
the here's how I can prove to you we're ready to fly statement.
MR. WALKER: Mr. Mulloy, I know you don't like "what-if" questions, but let's look at the
situation a little differently. Let's suppose that the conversations in which the engineers present-
ed their data--and indeed, they have indic,,ted they thought the decision was going to go their
way, that is a no launch decision, and so they were really presenting their data, they felt, in a
pretty straightforward way--let's suppose that after that presentation Mr. Kilminster had said:
Well, the engineers really don't
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have solid data to demonstrate that we have a problem; therefore, my recommendation is to
launch.
At that point, would you have questioned Mr. Kilminster on that decision, or would you
have been happy with that decision and have terminated the conversation and the telecon at
that point?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, l believe I would have questioned him on that. Given that you don't
have solid data, how can you make that recommendation, because I would insist on that. I would
insist on a rationale and a sound basis for flight readiness, as we always have and which we did
in this case.
And I would then turn to Mr. Hardy and ask for his assessment, his engineering assessment
of the Thiokol recommendation.
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MR.WALKER:Sowhatyou'resayingis that, nomatter what the decisionaadrecommen-
dationwas,youwouldhavebeenthedevil'sadvocate?
MR.MULLOY:Oh.yes,sir.
MR.WALKER:Anddemandeda morethoroughdiscussion?
MR.MULLOY:Sir, I havetried to establishthat whenI amlookingat a conclusionand a
recommendaticnthat is basedupcnengineeringdata,it is totally within my character to ques-
tion those data.
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It even is within my character to look at those data and offer an -lternative conclusion, to test
hew conclusive they are.
DR. RIDE: Their main problem during all of this, the engineers' main problem, was that
they felt they didn't have the data. They felt that their temperature data was inconclusive and
they were worried about it, but they didn't have the data to quantify what problems the temper-
ature could cause. And that was one of the bases for their recommendation not to launch in the
first place, was that they just simply felt that they didn't have the prool that it was safe.
Did you think you had the proof?. Did you think that you had the data base to show that it
was safe at these temperatures?
MR. MULLOY: No. All I did was recite the data that we had available to us and ask that we
consider that decision in the light of all of those data.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you go to the telefax and see what m the telefax satisfied you?
Because the telefax said the evidence was not conclusive.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. The engineering assessment--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is what Dr. Ride is
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pointing out. They say it's n,)t conclusive. They don't say we think it's safe. They say the data is
not conclusive. And you say Lhe data is conclusive to you.
MR. MULLOY: The engineering assessment is what I relied upon in the telefax, and I don't
kno_ whether I have that here.
Here it is: "Engineering assessment is that colder O-rings wiE have increased effective du-
rometer, harder." We have no argument with that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Cold will make it harder.
MR. MULLOY: "Harder O-rings will take longer to seat." We had no argument with that.
"More gas may pass the primary O-ring before the primary seal seats relative to SRM-15." We
had no argument with that.
"Demonstrated ceiling threshold is three times greater than the 038 erosion experienced on
15." That is a fact. "If the primary seal does not seat, the secondary seal will seat."
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is pretty positive, isn't it?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And this critical items list doesn't say that, does it?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, nor should it. The whole concept of redundancy is if the primary
system
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doesn't function the secondary will.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But this critical items list says the possibility is loss of sealing of the
secondary O-ring. It says the opposite of what this telefax does.
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MR. MULLOY: You see, that is a waiver to the requirement to have a redundant system.
What this says is the redundant--that if the primary seal does not seat, the secondary seal will.
It says you have redundancy and you have not shown that the primary won't function, but if it
doesn't the redundant system will still operate.
That is the way I interpret that.
MR. ACHESON: In other words, you say it is consistent with the basis of the waiver?
MR. MULLOY: Sir?
_.MR. ACHESON: _s that your testimony? As I understand you, you are saying that the con-
cIusion here in Kiiminster's wire is consistent with the basis of the waiver?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, I am not. I am saying that the waiver acl,:nowledges a condition
where under worst case circumstances you may not have redundancy after full motor pressuriza-
tion and the joint has rotated. What we are saying here is--
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MR. SUTTER: Could I ask a question about this worst case?
MR. MULLOY: Yes. it's tolerance buildup.
MR. SUTTER: I know that. But aren't you always dealing with the worst case? Shouldn't
you assume every flight you've got everything going against you?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, because we measure. We measure the clevis and we measure the
tang, and we calculate the gap. And, as Mr. Hardy has stated, we take into consideration the
rounding and the further rounding with the initial pressure and work in that gap.
And as Mr. McDonald stated yesterday, to his knowledge there is only one case where we
have ever had that worst case condition.
MR. SUTTER: One case is too many.
MR. MULLOY: On STS-4.
MR. SUTTER: Well, it's lucky it got home, I guess.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I just finish on this telefax, because it says "temperature data
not conclusive on predicting primary O-ring blow-by." That suggests to me that there was a pos-
sibility of primary O-ring blow-by.
Is that right? Do you accept that?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And then they say that "pressure will get to secondary seal before
the metal parts rotate."
MP MULLOY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And then they continue to indicate that they are putting some reli-
ance on the secondary seal.
MR. MULLOY: I don't read that that way. That is where we keep, I think, diverging. What
they are saying--
CHAIRMAN ROGER3: What does it say to you, then?
MR. MULLOY: Well, it says to me that we have redundancy at ignition. We can expect
blow-by at any temperature, at any temperature.
MR. WALKER: Mr. Mulloy, let's try an analogy and see if you think it's an apt one. Let's
suppose you are a manager of a baseball team and ygu have an ace relief pitcher, but let's sup-
pose that that person is injured and has a sore arm and so you put him on the disabled list, and
then you can't say that, if my starting pitcher gets into trouble in the fifth inning I can bring in
my acn reliever, because he is not available to you by the rules.
It seems to me that that is the situation _¢ith
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thiswaiver,that youhada redundantseal.Accordingto thewaiverthe redundantsealwasnot
effective,andthewaiverdidn't excusein anywayyouto usetheredundantseal.
Now,I understandthat youknowin thebackof yourmindthat, well, it is still there,even
though:as far as the paperwork is concerned it is not still _here, and I know in the back of my
mind how it's going to function. But in fact, by a strict interpretation of that rule, you can't rely
on the secondary seal. Now that is the way I _mderstand it.
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MR. MULLOY: That is correct, sir, and what I'm trying to get across, and doing a poor job
of it, is that the basic, the basic criteria of 1R was in effect at motor ignition. The data were not
conclusive that we wouldn't have 1R at motor ignition. The data were not conclusive that the
primary O-ring would not extrude into the gap and seat, but given the worry that was being
expressed, if that was the case, the redundant O-ring wot'_!d, which doesn't require a waiver.
That is w hy you have the redundant system.
DR. W,4LKER: Well, it is that "but" which gives us a problem.
MR. MULLOY: I unde_tand.
MR. hARDY: I believe Mr. Boisjoly testified yesterday that it was some of the work that he
did to define the relationship with pressure and joint rotation that was related to or a backup to
the submission of this waiver, and it was that work which shows that in the early part of the
ignition transient that the joint rotation has not proceeded to the point that you are in fact, or
that you do not in fact have redundancy.
Now, I suspect we could go on for some time on the interpretation of that waiver, and what
it means, and how it might be applied in this case, but clearly to me, after motor pressurization,
after joint rotation is
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not the time period that we are talking about. What 1 am talking about in my assessment of the
data is the initial part of the ignition transient.
DR. RIDE: I guess what concerns me is that we have got a system that is a Criticality 1, and
it is defined as a Criticality 1.
MR. HARDY: Correct.
DR. RIDE: The primary O-ring is what is defined as that Criticality 1 item. Now, all Criti-
cality 1 items are reviewed and signed off all the way up the NASA chain, alI the way up to
Level I, and have to be signed off and understood at a very high level, and it would concern me,
i guess, if I thought that on the day before launch or even the week before launch that engi-
neers were allowed to decide, even based on good engineering data, that well, it was okay to
consider that a Criticality 1R because we have added up the tolerances and we have done this
sort of analysis, and so we think that we have a redundant seal during these !60 milliseconds.
They may be right, but that just hasn't reached the visibility that the original waiver had, and
that decision hasn't been signed off at the levels that the original decision was signed off at, and
it would concern me to think that Criticality ls could be hand]ed that way by our system.
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GENERAL KUTYNA: Larry, let me follow through on that, and I am kind of aware of the
launch decision process, and you said you made the decision at your level on this thing.
If tkis were an airplane, an airliner, and I just had a two-hour argument with Boeing on
whether the wing was going to fall off or not, I think I would tell the pilot, at least mention it.
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Why didn't we escalate a decision of this importance?
MR. MULLOY: I did, sir,
GENERAL KUTYNA: You did?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Tell me what levels above you.
MR. MULLOY: As I stated earlier, Mr. Reinartz, who is my manager, was at the meeting.
and on the morning, about 5:00 in the operations support room where we all are I informed Dr.
Lucas of the contenz of the discussion.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But Dr. Lucas is not in the launch decision chain.
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. Mr. Reinartz is in the launch decision chain though.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And is he the highest level
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in that chain?
MR. MULLOY: No. Normally it would go from me to Mr. Reinartz to Mr. Aldrich to Mr.
Moore.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could we go back to Dr. Ride's question because it seems to me that
is really the heart of the matter.
Can you try to answer her question?
MR. HARDY: Well, I believe, if I understood, Dr. Ride was pointing out that since the
waiver had been pro,_essed to the proper levels, the highest leve!s, that any consideration on the
use of the secondary O-ring should not have been given unless it also was processed to some
aigher level.
CttAIRMAN ROGERS: Exactly.
MR. HARDY: As far as the levels of review and so forth, I really can't comment on tha?
because that is really not within my purview, but I was making my comments primarily as it
relat_ to the engineering assessment of the performance of the seal, and particularly as it was
related to the matter of interest, and that is the temperature on the night before.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The reason that I think her question and your answer is very help-
ful is because it was clear that that critical items list was based on the fact that there was no
redundancy, that you had to rely
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upon the primary seal. Then you had this discussion back and forth on the eve of the launch,
and then the contractor writes temperature data, weather not conclusive on predicting primary
O-ring blow-by, and so that says, in effect, because of the weather that the data is not conclusive.
You may have primary O-ring blow-by.
MR. HARDY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And then the Critical Items List says if you have primary O-ring
blow-by, it may be a catastrophe. So your contractor him_lf gives you a signal in this telefax
that this may violate the Critical Items List and may be a catastrophe.
MR. HARDY: Well, I think we have a different interpretation of that. I think it is quite
obvious we have a different interpretation of that.
Yes, on 51-L one had to be prepared for primary O-ring blow-by. That is also true on every
other flight we have had. We have had--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But this relates to temperature data not conclusive. This is an anal-
ysis of the weather condition.
MR. HARDY: I agTee with you, sir, that the temperature data was not conclusive. In fact,
we had had blow-by on primary O-rings with joints at 75
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degrees. So it was obviously not conclusive, l agree with that, that it was not conclusive, that the
temperature induced O-ring blow-by.
Now. ! will discuss later what one can infer in terms of the durra,on of that blow-by, but it
was obviously inconclusive that temperature induced blow-by. We had more blow-by at higher
temperatures, relatively higher temperatures, and we had mere incident of blow-by at relatively
higher temperatures than we had at lower temperatures. There was also no question about the
fact that the program had recognized that launch by launch by launch. Every occasion that had
occurred in the subsequent flight readiness reviewwand to my knowledge, this was up to all
levels--of the subsequent flight readiness review, the occasion of that blow-by on the previous
flight bad been evaluated, it had been analyzed. TI_e cause of that blow-by or the phenomenon of
that blow-by had been assessed, and it was determined that on each one of those cases, that the
understanding of that blow-by and in fact the existence of the secondary O-ring in the early I_rt
of the ignition phase to terminate if required, to terminate by sealing the primary O-ring blow-
by.
And so, there may well be a misinterpretation or some misapplication, but I dou't think
there has been
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anything sinister or hidden or, for that matter, even unknown about it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I don't t nink anybody suggested that.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Itardy, we heard some testimJny yesterday that the character of the
damage in the low temperature blow-by and soot was of a much different nature and much more
severe than any of your higher temperat_re experiences.
MR. HARDY: That is correct.
MR. HOTZ: How did you evaluate that factor in reaching your conclusions?
MR. HARDY: I evaluated that as some evidence of the fact that temperature did have av
effect on the duration of blow-by. I do not believe that temperature in and of itself induces the
blow-by, and I think that is kind of obvious because we have occasions for blow-by at all tem-
peratures, but I do believe that that was indicative of the fact that temperature could have an
effect on the duration of the blow-by.
MR. HOTZ: Well, is the duration of the blow-by critical to this whole cycle?
MR. HARDY: The duration of the blow-by is critical only tc erosion that might be sustained
on the primary O-ring. Tt,e duration of blow-by has nothing to
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do with the ability" *_oseal the secondary O-ring. in fact, it is more likely to seal the secondary O-
ring in the case that the blow-by is extended.
Again, it is very difficult, I think, difficult for me to convey, but_well, let me request that
when I get into my statement I address some of those issues.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Armstrong has one question, and then after that we would like
to have a short recess.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: A question regarding the signature approval or recom-
mendations flora the contractor in this case, My question is, in cases of this type is that always
done? Do you always have some responsible persons sign off on their recommendations?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, that is the normal process in any flight readiness review, L-l, or
any issue related to flight readiness, and the files show that at all levels. We require it at every
level.
862
i ! -_i-"
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: So the f_ct that Mr. Kilminster signed this thing was
typic d, and it would be the standard procedare?
MR MUi:LOY: Yes. sir.
CHAIFtMAN ROGERS: Would it be _igned by him and not the man on the scene'?
1;39,1
MR MULLOY That is correct, sir. We require the elt'ment project manager to certify flight
readiness and not anyone el3e.
CHAIRMAN R(_GERS: Let's have a t.en-minute recess,
!A brief rececs was taken._
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will please come to order
Mr. Mulloy, Dr. Keel has a couple of questions, and then we will go to you, Mr. [lardy, right
away.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Mulloy, I think at the end of the previous session you said that it was
normal to ask for a written statement, that all flight readines,* reviews required written state-
ments. Is that accurate? Was that your statement?
MR. MULLOY: Y_, sir, that is.
DR. KEEL: But this wasn't a flight readiness review, was it?
MR. MULLOY: It was, in a sense, it was a review like an L-1 or dealing with issues related
to the flight. It was not a chaired flight readiness review.
DR. KEEL: Aren't all flight readiness reviews Level I and Level II?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, we have a Level III
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readiness review which I chair fbr the solidrocket booster. I also have a flightreadiness review
that Mr. Wear chairs for the solid irocketmotor betbre itgets to me, a flightreadiness review
that is chaired by Mr. le Burr, who is the booster assembly manager before itgets to me, and
then the prime contractors,USBL FPC, and Thioko] have a flightreadiness review chaired by a
management officialabove the levelof the program manager prior to the time of getting to the
element managers.
DR. KEEL: But what about the pommal reference to flightreadiness review, the one that
occurs two weeks prior to launch. Is that a Level I and Level If?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir,that'sLevel I.Then there isone subsequent to that which isthe L-2
or L-l review, which, italso has a signed certificationwith it.
DR. KEEL: And what level isthat?
MR. MULLOY: That isa Level I review that occurs one day prior to the launch.
DR. KEEL: I think there was just a risk of confusion because you referred to this in a state-
ment that itrequired a written sign-off,since all flightreadiness reviews do, and I think nomi-
nally the Commissioners think of flightreadiness reviews as those
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I_vel I and II meetings that have been briefed to the Commission, and this certainly wasn '_
flight readiness review in that context.
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
I might say that another thing that does require a sign-off by the program manager is any
action that results from anything related to a flight, and this would certainly fall in that catego-
ry where concern was raised and an action is assig_.ed to go develop data and then review those
data.
I view it as part, of the flight readiness review process.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All right, you may proceed, Mr Hardy, and I apologize for not get-
ting to you sooner
MR. HARDY: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission. betbre I relate to you my partici-
pation in and recollections of the teleconference between Morton Thiokol personnel and Mar-
shall Space Flight Center personnel on the evening of January 27. 1,986. I would like to describe
just briefly to you what my role is and the role of other personnel from Science and Engineering
Directorate is with respect to flight readiness assessment for Shuttle flights.
The role of the Science and Engineering Directorate
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at Marshall in this regard is to participate in flight readiness reviews, identify any pertinent
issues relative to flight readiness, and review any issues identified by others, including contrac-
tors. and to assess the rationale for flight and supporting data on any issue, and then finally, to
provide recommendations to the appropriate readiness review board, if such a board is in session
or otherwise to the program management.
With reference to the teleconference that started approximately 8:45 Eastern Standard Time
on January 27, 1986, I would like to identify the personnel at Huntsville from the Science and
Engineering Directorate that were in direct support of me during this teleconference: Dr. Wayne
Littles, Associate Director for Engineering; Mr. Jim Smith, the solid rocket booster Chief Engi-
neer: Mr. Robert Schwinghammer, Director of our Materials and Processes Laboratory: Mr. Bill
Riehl, an engineer in the Materials and Processes Laboratory, and Mr. Riehl is a nonmetallic
materials expert; Mr. John McCarty, Deputy Director of our Structures and Propulsion Labora-
tory: Mr. Ben Powers, an engineer in the Structures and Propulsion Laboratory specializing in
solid propulsion; and Mr. Keith Coates, who is in the Office of the Associate Director for
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Engineering.
At the teleconference on the evening of January 27, 1986, Thiokol engineering personnel in
Utah reviewed charts that had been datafaxed to Huntsville and KSC pa_icipants just prior to
the beginning of the conference. Now, I am not going to repeat a lot of what you have already
heard, but I will give you some of my views on the whole matter.
The presentations were professional in nature. There were numerous questions and answers.
There was a discussion of various data and points raised by individuals at Thiokol or at Mar-
shall or at Kennedy. I think it was a rather full discussion. There were some 14 charts present-
ed, and as has been mentioned earlier, we spent about two, two and a half hours reviewing
those. To my knowledge, anyone who desired to make a point, ask a qu_tion or expressed a view
was in no way restrained from doing so.
As others have mentioned, I have heard this particular teleconference characterized as
heated discussion. I acknowledged that there were penetrating questions that were asked, I
think, from both, from all people involved. There were various points of view and interpretation
of the data that was exchanged. The discussion was not, in my view, uncharacteristic of
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discussions on many flight readiness issues on many previous occasions. Thiokol Engineering
concluded their presentation with the recommendation that the launch time be determined con-
sistent with flight experience to date, and that is the launch with the O-ring temperatures at or
greater than 53 degrees Fahrenheit.
Mr. Kilminster at Thiokol stated that with, to the best of my recollection, that with that
engineering assessment, he recommended we not launch on Tuesday morning as scheduled.
864
I /
After some short discussion, Mr. Mulloy at KSC summarized his assessment of the data and his
rationale with that data, and I think he has testified to that.
Mr. Reinartz. who was at KSC, asked me for comment, and [ stated I was somewhat ap-
palled, aad that was referring specifically to some of the data or the interpretation of some of
the data that Thiokol had presented with respect to its influence on the joint seal performance
relative to the issue under discussion, which specifically was the possibility that the primary
seal may take longer to actuate and therefore the blow-by of the primary seal may be longer. I
am going to elaborate in that a little further in this statement.
Then I went on to say that I supported the
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assessment of data presented essentially as summarized by Mr. Mulloy, but I would not recom-
mend launch over Thiokol's objections.
Somewhere aaout this time, Mr. Kilminster at Utah stated that he wanted to go off the loop
to caucus for about five minutes. I believe at this point Mr. McDonald, the senior Thiokol repre-
sentative at KSC for this launch suggested to Mr. Kilminster that he consider a point that I
think I had made earlier, that the secondary O-ring is in the proper position to seal if blow-by of
the primary O-ring occurred.
I clearly interpreted this as a somewhat positive statement of supporting rationale for
launch. Per3onal [y, I believe any other interpretation of that is a case of convenience of memory.
The status of the caucus by Thiokol lasted some 30, 35 minutes. At Huntsville during this Thio-
kol caucus, we omtinued to discuss the data presented. We were off the loop, we were on muse.
We were _round a table in small groups. It was not an organized type discussion. But I did take
that opportunity to discuss my assessment and understanding of the data with several of my key
advisors, and none of us nad any disagreement or differences in our interpretation of what we
believed the da?a was telling us with regard to the primary issue
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at hand.
When Thiokol came back on line, Mr. Kilmiuster reviewed rationale that supported proceed-
ing with the launch and so recommended. I have no knowledge of who participated in the caucus
at Thiokol. It is not typical to ask for a vote count when a senior responsible official of the con-
tractor presents the company positron. What is typical is to assess the rationale for that position,
whichever way it may come down. During the caucus I had written my evaluation of the data
presented as I developed it in my mind, and as I reviewed it with some of my senior, key advi-
sors during the caucus, and I wi!l review that with you later in this statement.
Mr. Reinartz asked if anyone on the loop had a different position or disagreed, or something
to that effect, with the Thiokol recommendation as presented by Mr. Kilminster. There were no
dissenting responses.
The telecon was terminated shortly after, and I have no knowledge of any subsequent events
or discussions between personnel at KSC or at Thiokol on this matter.
As I stated earlier, during the Thiokol caucus, I discussed the data and the issues with sev-
eral of my key advisors, and there was no disagreement among
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us. I have also stated earlier that there was no dissenting responses when Mr. Reinartz asked if
there were any disagreements following Mr. Kilminster's recommendation to proceed with
launch.
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[ havelearnedsincethe 51-Lincidentthat Mr. BenPowersexpressedsomeconcernabout
the O-ringperformancedirectly to Mr. Smith,the SRBchief engineer, and Mr. McCarty, the
Deputy Director of Structures and Propulsion Laboratory. Mr. McCarty is Mr. Powers' supervi-
sor. Mr. McCarty has stated to me that he considered Mr. Powers' comments along with all the
other data presented and discussed when he made his input to me.
Now, I believe at this point, if I may, I need to address befbre l proceed on into my assess-
ment and evaluation of the data, I would like to address two points that have been discussed
rather prominently in these hearings. The first one relates to the assertion or inference that
pressure was or may have been applied to the contractor during the course of this teleconfer-
ence. With regard to my participation in the discussion of January 27, 1986, I would like to give
you a little insight into my mode of operation in these matters, and I believe those that are
familiar with me will recognize these quite readily.
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In any matter related to flight readiness issues, I am dedicated to a thorough and open dis-
cussion of the data and the rationale developed from such data. I have tried to the best of my
ability to determine the facts in the data. Unfortunately, facts and engineering data are not
always interpreted by all engineers the same way. But regardless of the side that I come down
on, it is in the pursuit of the facts of the data.
I am likely to probe and sometimes even challenge either a pro position or a con position, or
sometimes even both, on an individual issue that is being put forward or a set of rationale or an
interpretation of the data that might be associated with that.
And the objective of this is just simply to test the data, test the degree of understanding of
the individual that is presenting the data. test his, not only his engineering knowledge, but his
engineering assessment of that data. So that is characteristic of the way that I do, and I think
anybody that knows me would realize that that is not interpreted as coming on strong or apply-
ing pressure.
But I have thought a lot about this business of applying pressure, and the application of
pressure is, of course, to no avail unless there is a response to
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that pressure. And if there is to be a response, in my mind, there must be a motivation. And I
can't speak for any contractor personnel that was involved, but since the issue was first raised, I
have wracked my brain to try to see if there was any conceivable motivation that may have
made any contractor representative feel that he was under pressure from anything I said.
And we are not talking about customer relations here. We are talking about flight readiness
issues. Mr. McDonald attached it to the thoroughness down to the smallest detail that he was
accustomed to in all flight readiness reviews. He also mentioned his conviction that the conserv-
ative approach was emphasized.
Thiokol will also remember that on more than one occasion that I have rejected their pro-
posal to fly. One such occasion occurred the latter part of last year when a segment was dam-
aged, the joint clevis, in fact, on that, the clevi,_ joint on that segment was damaged during han-
dling. Thiokol proposed that we fly that segment, and I nonconcurred. And although it is not in
my area of responsibility, I am aware that as Mr. Mulloy has attested, that the contractor is
highly incentivized by terms of the contract for a mission success with a rather significant pen-
alty clause, and
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further, as I have testified and others have also testified, on the evening of' January 27. I clearly
stated that I would not recommend launch over the contractor's objection.
And so I have great difficulty in seeing what anv moti,'ation h)r response to "pressure." But
I am sure you are going to pursue that even further.
Now, with regard to the second item that has been rather prominent in these hearings, I
would like to state that as far as my participation in the discussions at issue, I categorically
reject any suggestion that the process v_as prove to me it isn't ready to fly as opposed to the
traaitional approach of prove tt,at this craft is ready to fly. I have no responsibility for sched-
ules, I nave no r¢.sponsibility for manifest. I couldn't tell you with any degree of certainty what
the next launch cargo was on the next flight. ! couldn't tell you with any high degree of certain-
ty even what date it was sche,m!ed to fly.
As I said, I have no responsibility for that, and I have occasion to know that at times, but it
is not m:, primary job.
I would hope that simple logic would suggest that no one in their right mind would know-
ingly accept increased flight risk for a few hours of schedule. I
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can say certainly that not the dedicated men and women with whom I am associated, many of
whom have literally put their blood, sweat and tears into the Shuttle program.
And I will only say one other thing on that subject, and that is that I believe to suggest that
flight safety was disregard_t or not properly regarded in the discussions on the night of January
27 in my opinion does a great disservice to many dedicated, committed professionals.
Now, if I could, I wouid like to proceed on with a summary of my assessment of the data
presented and the conclusions that I came from this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I interrupt because I think you did say something that was
disturbing. When you referred to Mr. McDonald, you referred to convenience of memory, which
suggested to me that you thought he was making something up for the record or some such.
Was there anything that he said that you thought was not true?
MR. HARDY: No, sir, I did not mean to imply that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why did you use "convenience of memory?" That is what it sounded
like.
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MR. HARDY: Well, I will explain that, and that may not be a good, proper term to use. But
there have been many of us that were involved in flight readiness issues for 51-L, even more
than the issue of temperature on January 27, and I think there have been many of us that have
gone back and asked ourselves questions and second guessed ourselves, that have really probed
to bring back to the same level of understanding in the consideration of any of these issues that
we had on the other side of 51-L
And that is not easy. It is not easy just within your own heart and mind to try to separate
yourself from what you know has happened. I don't mean by that the cause or failure. I am
talking about the tragic incident itself. And I am not suggesting that anyone, and in any testi-
mony beibre this committee or this Commission has knowingly in any way presented untruth.
But I have talked to some of my colleagues, and I have found that they found it very difficult to
remember precisely not only everything said and everything done, but even more than that,
some of the motivations or some of the thoughts that took plac.. _ at that time.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can I say, speaking for myself, that I respect your views and I be-
lieve what you
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just said. I also have the same feeling about Mr. McDonald, and I would like to have you with-
draw those words, "convenience of memory," because I don't think that is what he did.
MR. HARDY: I would be pleased to do that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, thanks.
MR. HARDY: I would like now to give you a summary of my assessment of the data present-
ed and the conclusions that I drew from that data. I have chosen to discuss the assessment of
each type of data and then my conclusions that were drawn from that, and that is a little bit
different from the arrangement that is in the material that has been provided you. It is the
same material but arranged slightly differently.
I interpreted and assessed the data presented by Thiokol in the context of the accepted per-
formance and operational characteristics of the field joint during the motor ignition transient.
The essential features of these characteristics are the primary O-ring moves from the position it
has assumed dur_ ng the leak test to its sealing position as the pressure upstream of the primary
O-ring increases from ambient pressure to approximately 25 to 50 pounds per square inch.
Secondly, this pressure is imposed on the primary O-ring during the first few milliseconds of
the
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ignition transient.
And thirdly, if blow-by or failure of the primary O-ring occurs in this timeframe, that is, in
the early part of the ignition transient, the secondary O-ring is in its seating position, and this
has been assured by the leak test port.
Now, I might add that I make that statement, Your apparent interpretation of the Critical
Items List waiver notwithstanding. No one in the meeting questioned the fact that the secondary
seal was capable and in the position to seal during the early part of the ignition t=ansient prior
to any significant joint rotation. Thiokol, in fact, presented data to that effect in that meeting,
and since Marshall actually originated the waiver, I can also say that that was in fact the inter-
pretation at the time of the submission of that waiver.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I will relate to you my assessment of the data as I understood it, and I
assessed it on the 27th. As you appropriately noted at the beginning of the session, the cause or
causes of failure have not been determined, and the effects of temperature as well as any other
potential cause are being actively and aggressively pursue, and the failure analysis is under
way. The issues addressed during the
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teleconference was the potential for the predicted temperatures to adversely affect the perform-
ance of the seals during the ignition transient; specifically as it might affect the actuation time
of the primary O-ring.
Thiokol engineering presented data on the history of primary O-ring erosion and blow-by at
the motor field joint. I concluded that there was no direct correlation with this data and temper-
ature. O-ring blow-by was experienced on 61-A with a joint temperature of 75 degrees, and O-
ring blow-by was experienced on 51-C ,vith the joint at 50 degrees. There was no O-ring blow-by
or erosion on two ground test motors at somewhat lower temperatures.
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MR. CUMMEL: Mr. Hardy, if I may interrupt a second, wouldn't the fact that you had
blow-by at the higher temperatures only heighten the concern at the lower temperatures, under-
standing the elastomeric characteristics of the seal?
MR. HARDY: I think the fact that there was blow-by experienced on the higher tempera-
tures as well as the low temperatures heightened the interest in, number one, understanding the
cause of the blow-by, and number two, proceeding with activities associated with eliminating the
blow-by.
Now, let me make just a couple of other
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comments. I believe there are a number of factors involved in the phenomenon of blow-by of the
primary O-ring. As I have stated earlier, I do not believe that temperature, high or low, induces
primary blow-by. I do believe that temperature can have a potential effect on the duration of
that blow-by. Blow-by occurs during the period of time when the primary O-ring is being pres-
sure actuated from one side of the seal to the other side of the seal, and being extrusion-sealed
into the seal.
And so, I would accept that evidence would indicate, and I think 5142 is supportive evidence
of that fact, I would accept that evidence would indicate that the duration, and I think that is
very important, the time during the ignition transient when blow-by is occurring, the length of
time that it occurs can be affected by temperature, and later on, as you can see, I took that into
consideration in my assessment of the data.
MR. RUMMEL: Just another aspect for clarification.
Wouldn't you say, or would you not say that the greater the duration of the blow-by, the
greater the risk?
MR. HARDY: If that blow-by occurs in the early part of the ignition phase, which every
indication
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of everything we have seen indicates that it has, no, I don't think the duration of blow-by in-
creased the risk. I think the duration of blow-by increases the probability you will have to call
on the secondary seal at that time.
MR. RUMMEL: Well, can you help me a little? I would assume that blow-by might be called
a first stage to erosion, and that the greater the length of time that the seal is exposed to blow-
by, the greater the possibility of erosion, and the longer erosion occurs, if it does, the greater the
risk.
Is that incorrect?
MR. HARDY: That is essentially correct.
There are two things that happen to a primary O-ring when you get blow-by, or conceivably
three things. One is it ter.,ninates itself in a short period of time because the seal continues to
pressure actuate, and that is about the end of it. You see some evidence of that blow-by with
soot on the back side of the seal, and if the blow-by is sustained for a very long period of time,
you might see some evidence of heat effect on the primary O-ring.
However, blow-by, the primary O-ring pressurizes the cavity between the primary O-ring
and the secondary O-ring, and as I mentioned earlier, it is
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a mistake to think about these things as steF one, step two, step three. If step one is blow-by the
primary O-ring and step two is pressurizi ag the secondary O-ring, then step one and step two
are the same thing. They occur simultaneous with each other.
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Now,in the eventyousustainblow-bythe primary O-ringfor the full periodof time and
sealedthesecondaryO-ringfor the full periodof timethat it tookyouto fill the cavitybetween
the primaryO-ringandthe secondaryO-ringwouldlimit the amountof erosionyougeton the
primary O-ring,becausewhenyou fill the cavity andequalizethe pressure,youstopthe flow,
andtherei:: nomoreheattransfer.
And that limiting factorhasbeencalculatedto be,I haveforgottenthe exact number, but it
is at least twice, at least twice the amount that it would be allowable as demonstrated by tests
before you lost the primary O-ring.
There is a lim;,ting factor on erosion, and that is in every case the amount of flow that you
can sustain, and the amount of flow you can sustain is the size of the cavity that you are pres-
surizing versus the source pressure.
DR. RIDE: Is your factor of two safety, is that considering only whether the O-ring is still
able
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to seal, or does that take into account its structural integrity?
MR. HARDY: Both.
DR. RIDE: So you have done an analysis of the structural integrity of an O-ring that has
experienced what you consider to be the maximum, the number you are quoting as the maxi-
mum erosio'a?
MR. HARDY: Yes.
DR. RIDE: So you wouldn't expect, for example, high winds or other kinds of forces that the
O-ring might see in an overly eroded state to cause it to break?
MR. HARDY: I would not before 51-L, and where I stand right now, I would not, but I would
reserve total judgment on that until we complete the failure analysis.
MR. SUTTER: Could I ask a question?
Some of the hypothesis depends upon the secondary seal being in place because of the pres-
sure check, is that right?
MR. HARDY: Yes, sir.
MR. SUTTER: The pressure check is done at assembly.
MR. HARDY: Correct.
MR. SUTTER: The lower units could be pressure
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checked, and then as you put the others on you in effect are changing the load even in the as-
sembly bay.
MR. HARDY: That is correct.
MR. SUTTER: Then the machine is hauled out on a ramp which puts some vibratory loads
on it, I assume. Then it is put in position, which puts another load on it. Then it sits there for 28
days with the temperature going up and down, which in effect l_Uts some work on the seal.
What assurance is there that after those 28 days that that secondary seal really is in posi-
tion and all of them completely around the circumferences?
It seems to me that is a risky assumption.
And another question is has anybody gone out and made a pressure check, say, the day
before the launch to make sure those seals are in place?
MR. HARDY: I am not aware of any pressure checks the day before or a few days before the
launch anywhere in the program. I am not aware of that.
Eat if I could address just a couple of points you make, that is, that is true that when the
additional segments and then the entire Shuttle is added on to the field joiu'c of interest or
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addedon above the field joint of interest, that that c6mpressive load, the compressive load at
that point, in contrast to the tension load,
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that tends to open the clevis when you pressuriz(, the motor, at that point you have got a very
high compressive load on it.
Now, it is true that that compressive load also tends to open the gap, if you will, but a v_ry,
very small amount compared to that which occurs when you pressurize it.
MR. SUTTER: Well, what about the thing sitting out on the ramp and the temperature
dropping, which in effect makes the diameter of the seal get smaller and puts at. tension on it so
it again gets smaller? Couldn't it pep out of its sealed position then?
MR. HARDY: Well, the temperature, or the shrinkage of the O-ring, if you will, due to tem-
perature effects is calculated and has been calculated and is considered and was considered in
this meeting on the 27th.
MR. SUTTER: But does anybody know that the calculations are accurate?
MR HARDY: I have not personally checked the calculations, but I believe those calculations
are fairly straightforward to calculate the shrinkage of the material, but I have not personally
checked those calculations.
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MR. RUMMEL: Have you encountered separation of the vulcanized joints in the O-rings, to
your knowledge?
MR. HARDY: Excuse me, sir?
MR RUMMEL: Have you ever encountered any sort of separation during operation of the
vulcanized joints in the O-rings?
MR. HARDY: Not to my knowledge. You are talking abop_ the vulcanization of the ends of
the O-rings or sections of the O-rings?
MR. RUMMEL: Yes. I understand that five joints are allowed in each O-ring, and I am
simply curious as to whether there is any record of premature separation of those joints.
MR. HARDY: I am not aware of any, and I think I would be well aware of them if they
occurred anywhere in tbe field after delivery of the hardware.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Not being an engineer, and because I am surrounded by so many
capable engineers, I would like to ask a question that is not an engineering question.
At some point, I gather, you have to_ you will agree that the colder the weather the greater
the risk. Is that accura*,e?
MR. HARDY: I am not sure that that is an
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accurate statement. I would say--and again, I am going to, with your permission, 1 am going to
look at that question from the other side of 51-L.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I mean at the moment you are inclined to say it doesn't make
any difference how cold it gets as far as the risk is concerned on the O-rings?
MR. HARDY: At the moment I would say that the consideration of the effect of t_mperature
on the joint is certainly an active failure analysis, and there are some features of the joint,
indeed, where temperature can affect it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that's a key question, it seems to me, because if you in the back
of your mind, in the back of Mr. Mulloy's mind you said it really doesn't make any difference
how cold it gets as far as the joint is concerned.
MR. HARDY: No, sir, I don't believe 1 said that
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CHAIRMANROGERS:No. I amaskingnowdoyouthink that at somepointthecoldnessof
theweathermakesa differenceon therisk?
MR. HARDY:Well, I am sure theremust besomepoint becausethere is somepoint at
which the structural integrity of the O-rings just wouldn't be
1619
maintained.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: At what point would that be?
MR. HARDY: I think that would be somewhere in the minus 40, minus 50 range.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Se insofar as you are concerned now, it wouldn't make any differ-
ence about the risk in connection with the joints if it was above 40 below? In other words, I am
trying to see what your thought process was.
I think most people, or a lot of people have felt that the worse the weather, the more the
risk insofar as these joints are concerned, and I guess you are saying you don't agree with that.
MR. HARDY: Well, I think probably there might be dozens and dozens of things on the ve-
hicle that one could say--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No, I am talking about the O-rings now and the joints.
MR. HARDY: I cou!d not in my mind quantify any increased risk--let m_ make sure I say
that correctly. I could not in my mind determine that there was any increased risk to safety as a
result of the temperature that we were discussing on the night of the 27th.
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CttAIRMAN ROGERS: Or any lower temlaerature?
MR. HARDY: Well, that is extremely hypothetical. We didn't discuss any lower tempera-
ture. There is bound to be some lower temperature.
CHAIRMAN KOGERS: Well, it might have gotten colder overnight?
MR. HARDY: No, no lower temperature within the general range of predicted and expected
temperature.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think the engineers, though, at Thiokol expressed concern, as you
heard yesterday, on the question of the weather, and they felt that the cold weather might have
an adverse effect on the joints, and therefore they recommended against launch, as I understood
it. And you are saying as far as you were concerned, it really didn't play a role. It wasn't a
factor in your consideration.
MR. HARDY: Well, let me say it this way. The key factor, the key area of concern expressed
concerning the effect of temperature on the joint, the key area of concern expressed was the
potential for increased time, the duration of blow-by on the primary O-ring, and that and its
effect on the timing function of the seal of the joint, and addressing that specific key area of
concern and the evaluation of the data for that, I came to the
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cor.clusion in my mind that temperatures at the levels that we were talking about was not domi-
nant in the functioning of that joint, and therefore there was no increased flight risk.
Now, in spite of the fact that I came to that conclusion, and in spite of the fact that I con-
ferred with several of my key odvisors who expressed no different opinion, I was fully prepared,
and _o stated, and frankly--well, I was fully prepared and so stated that I would accept the rec-
ommendation of Thiokol, or, the opposite of that, I would not go against the recommendation of
Thiokol. I think that these discussions occur frequently between NASA engineers and contractor
engineers. We find many areas of agreement and frequently areas of disagreement, and I am
relating to safety of flight issues, too.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Well, I think we all understandthat part of it. I think the more
difficult part to understandis thefact that youhada no-launchrecommendation,andyouhave
alreadytestifiedthat youcan'trememberany time whenyouhavehada no-launchrecommen-
dationandthenhad a discussionwith the contractors and they changed their minds on some-
tiling of such key importance on the night before the launch. So it does seem that it is not typi-
cal. You said in
1622
your comments you thought this was sort of a typical situation. I wouldn't think, based upon the
testimony, that it is typical. It is quite unusual.
MR. HARDY: I meant to say that the discussion over the data and trying to understand the
data, and determine--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But it wasn't just a discussion about the data. It ¢¢as a discussion
about the no-launch recommendation. This wasn't just an intellectual exerzise. Your statement
about being appalled and Mr. Mulloy's about April and so forth all gave the Thiokol people the
idea that you strongly disagreed with them on the no-launch recommendation, and that is why
they wanted the recess for five minutes, and that is what they did. But it is not just a discussion
among engineers about the theoretical matter; it was a very practical question, were you going
to launch the next day or not?
And I think that is the problem that I am having with it.
MR. HARDY: Well, maybe the point that is missing is that on recommendations on any
matter, regard]ess of _[at position that recommendation takes, it is typical and traditional to
ask first of all that we don't just do things with people dropping letters in
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to each other; a recommendation is made. The question is asked, or it doesn't have to be asked
because they know it is going to be asked, what is your rationnle for that. And the next step
usually is, well, my rationale is based on this data, and the next question is, well, how do you
interpret that data and on what basis do you interpret that data?
I)R WALKER: Mr. Hardy, the data which was discussed by Mr. Thompson yesterday in
which they tried to simulate the separation of the metal parts which were holding the O-ring,
and Mr. Thompson discussed trying to increase the rate of separation to better simulate the pro-
file which occurred during the launch, was that data presented during the telecon?
MR. HARDY: If you mean the data where tests were run to try to measure the joint separa-
tion with pressure--
DR. WALKER: And how the O-ring responded to that.
MR. HARDY: Resiliency data was presented.
DR. WALKER: That's the data I'm talking about.
MR. HARD " Yes, it was.
DR. WALKER Was that data at all convincing to you in regard to the sensitivity of the
performance
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of the joint with respect to temperature?
MR. HARDY: In the time period and the function of the seals that we were discussip.g, in
the initial phase, transient phase of the pressurize, no,
DR. WALKER: But this data, of course, applied to the rotation period which came later?
MR. HARDY: That is correct. 873
DR.WALKER:Whataboutthat period'?Did yo_"think that possiblyevenif youhada seal
during the ignition phase,that the rotation mighthavebrokenthat sealand the resiliencyof
th, O-ringbeeninsufficientto remakethat sealimmediatelyeither for the primary or the sec-
ondaryO-ring?
MR.HARDY:Dr. Walker,if I understandwhatyouaresaying--andlet mesayfirst of all
that theblow-byofthe primaryO-ringbydefinitionoccurswhenpressuregetsto the primaryO-
ring. Thereis nophenomenonthat I knowof that will allowpressureto hangaroundsome-
wherein front of tha, primaryO-ringandnot doone of two things, and that is either pressure
actuate its seal or blow by.
DR. WALKER: But let's suppose that the O-ring has been sealed, whether blow-by occurred
or not, and now rotation occurs.
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MR. HARDY: Yes.
DR. WALKER: And so the metal parts which are surrounding the O-ring begin to move
apart. The O-ring must follow those in order to maintain the seal, and it seems to me that the
data presented by Mr. Thompson addressed the abihty of the O-ring to respond.
And what I'm asking is did that raise a concern that even though the orbiter seal L,ight
have been made during the initial phases of the launch, that that seal might have been broken
later on because the O-ring resiliency had been ,'educed to the point by low temperature that it
could no longer respond to the rotation transient?
MR. HARDY: I ,aderstand what you are saying. There was no discussion that I am aware
of, nor has there been any concern expressed regarding the seals, that once a seal, like a pri-
mary seal, once it seals, there has been nc concern of any magnitude that I am aware of that it
would subsequently fail.
DR. WALKER: I guess I am confused now because I thought that that was one of the con-
cerns that Mr. Boisjoly and Mr. Thompson had.
MR. HARDY: It is my underst_anding that Mr. Boisjoly's and Mr. Thompson's concer,n., at
least on tee evening that we discussed this, _as that the cold
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temperature could cause the blow-by. Well, first of all, you can get blow-by of the primary O-
ring. You can get it any time at any temperature, and that has been recogni_',ed, and as I said,
this position has come up in flight readiness reviews time and time again. The cold temperature
might sustain that blow-by for a longer period of time. I mean, it may be longer, and as someone
had mentioned _o you, the longer it is, the more erosion, if you get any erosion, that you will see
o_. the primary O-ring, and that if somehow--and I could never figure out in my mind how this
happens, but if somehow that while that blow-by is occurring on the primary O-ring, the second-
ary seal, presumabl5 it doesn't seal anywhere, but the secondary seal is not pressure actuated by
that blow-by, then the joint could rotate, and indeed, both joint rotation and resiliency would
then have an adverse effect on the secondary O-ring sealing.
But the difficulty I have with the application of that data, there is no question about the
fact that temperature affects the resiliency of the material. But the difficulty ! had with the
application of that data was in the period of the pertbrmance of the seal that we were discuss-
ing, and "the issue we were discussing about sustained blow-by or a longer period blow-by on the
i627
primary, and in fact it was that that prompted my statement that I was appalled.
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DR. WALKER: Of course, emphasize the question of the first few h,_._dred milliseconds
when the seal is formed, but the seal, of course, has to maintain itself throughout the period of
firing the motor which is some 100 seconds or so.
MR. HARDY: That is correct, a_.d that is correct on any seal at any temperature, and it has
bee,] recognized and documented that *hat secondary seal, at any temperature, may in fact after
motor pressurization, after joint rotation, may not be redundant, and a waiver has been proc-
essed to that effect.
So in that particular case one has to recognize the fact that that could happen, whether he
is talking about cold O-rings or hot O-rings or whatever.
DR. WALKER: But evidently that was _lot an issue during this teleconference?
MR. HARDY: No, sir. The issue of whether or not the secondary seal is still good after joint
rotatio% not to my knowledge. We were talking about the initial ignition phase and the poten-
tial for an effect on the timing function, between the primary and the secondary O-ring.
DR. WALKER: I don't want Zo get ahead of your presentation, so if this question is too pre-
mature for
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you, answer it later, but I hope that you will tell us what you think are the controlling factors
which determilm whether blow-by will occur or not. Evidently you think temperature is not one
of the major factors.
MR. HARDY: Okay.
Well, let me try that now. I think it is, as I mentioned, during the transient period when the
O-ring is sliding, and maybe even a certain portion of that O-ring is rolling or--well, you really
can't roll it. We are talking 20/1000 to 30/1000 of travel, so you can't roll the O-ring, but tendip_
to roll or twist a little bit, that while that pressurization is going on, then there are some--the. ,.
is a possibility of gas going by. I think it has to do with the finish on the sealing surfaces them-
selves, them passing from one finish to the other.
DR. WALKER: That is imperfections in the sealing su. _.:.zz_?
MR. HARDY: And small, slight, imperfections in the O-ring itself. There is quite a difference
between the way the O-ring was sealed, as I am sure you are aware, when I am sealing between
two surfaces with squeeze or sliding that way as opposed to how it would seal when I extrude it
into a gap that is much, much smaller than the O-ring.
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So I think when it is across those two sealing surfaces, that it experiences this blow-by.
DR. WALKER: Could the treatment of the joints be a contributing factor, imperfect joints?
MR. HARDY: The amount of squeeze could be a factor.
DR. WALKER: No, I meant the--let me be a little more careful. The joints in the O-ring,
the five joints in the O-ring.
MR. HARDY: Oh, yes. Well, I say oh, yes, yes, that could be a factor.
DR. WALKER: Are those inspected, each joint?
MR. HARDY: To my knowledge, they are.
MR. ACHESON: Mr. Mutloy, have you ever seen an O-ring in which the vulcanized ends
had come apart in a motor which was recovered from a flight?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. I have not, and none have been reported to me.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Hardy, going back to the process itself, the decisionmaking proc-
ess-and I think that is vitally important because we have to make recommendations to the
President about the future, and I thi_k all of us feel that there has been a breakdown of sorts in
the process--you said that you would not have 875
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approvedof a launchif Thiokolhadrecommendedagainstit.
Thatis correct,isn't it?
MR.HARDY:Yes,sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, suppose that Mr. Kilminster had said to you I am sending the
telefax, and tiffs represents management's decision, and there are three or four cf us. but all the
engineers are still opposed to the launch, how would you have reacted to that?
MR. HARDY: I would not have accepted it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Hardy, I would like to pursue the Chairman's line of inquiry here, if I may.
You have characterized the tone of these discussions as normal engineering discussions, the type
of thing that goes on all the time. Yet one of the Thiokol people at Marshall told us that you
had spoken as strongly as he had ever heard you speak in that telecon, and I would like to ask
you whether you in fact apologized to any of the Thiokol people the next day for speaking so
harshly?
MR. HARDY: No, sir, I have no recollection at all of apologizing for anybody speaking
harshly. I don't think I spoke harshly. I certainly did not speak in any way harshly toward any
individual. I may have
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spoken in a tone that someone my have interpreted as coming on strong. I would suggest if you
have continued interest in that that there is a large number of people that you might have
access to that could give you a little better insight into my mode of operation and how I conduct
myself in meetings of that sort, and then maybe from that you could determine whether I could
be properly characterized as coming on strong in that meeting.
MR. HOTZ: We will do that, thank you.
DR. RIDE: Could I just pursue this question of sort of implied pressure or whether Thiokol
felt pressure from your comments?
You have said that in engineering discussions you always rightly try and probe the data and
make sure that the conclusions follow from the data, and that the data is well presented, and I
think in Mr. Mulloy's terms, hangs together.
Normally, contractors are in the position of trying to prove to both of you that they are
ready to fly, that their systems are safe to fly, and they are used to having to defend that point
of view.
This time they were in the other position. They were so concerned that they in fact recom-
mended not to launch, and I think that you might argue that they were so used to hearing you
say are you sure it is safe
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that when you both said are you sure it is not safe, that they were so taken aback that they
perceived that as pressure. And ! guess I am wondering whether it is possible that you didn't
realize that you could have been generating this reaction just because of the reversal of their
normal position relative to you.
MR. HARDY: Well, of course, first of all, I don't think you intended to imply this, but we
didn't ask them are you sure it's not safe? There was no discussion that I'm aware of where that
question was asked like that.
Now, as to whether or not someone else could perceiw._ a line of questioning to try to under-
stand the data and in fact probed the data and in fact challenged certain points on the data, but
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I maintain you are not really going to understand it sometimes unless you challenge it. and then
I find that--I have [bund that in most cases engineers, managers or whatever else who have a
true conviction in the data that they are presenting to you, will hang tough and not resent
someone probing _md penetrating that data
But as to whether _r not someone else could interpret that situation as being pressure or
being a reverse normal operation or whatever, l cou!dn't judge that. I would hope not. I would
certainly ho_" not because I
l(4a:_
would like to think that there is a clear understanding of what we are about when we get int,
discussions like that. and I would like to think that without exception there is a c',ear under-
standing that nobody is asking anybody to accept or do anything that has any significant effect
on safety of flight, and I have been in this basiness to() long to imagine. [ can't imagine who
could pressure me in what way to get me to accept some, any significant increase or any in-
crease in safety of flight. I can't imagine who could do that.
DR. RIDE: Well. the indications from the testimony we heard yesterday were that the engi-
neers did, in your terminology, hang tough, that the engineers at Thiokol were still arguing the
points that they had been arguing at the beginning.
MR. HARDY: Well. I am not aware of that part of the discussion or the facts that took
place.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Armstrong?
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: We heard yesterday what the various points of view and
how many people expressed those points at the Utah end. Were you at Marshall?
MR. HARDY: I was at Marshall, yes.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Could you characterize for us how many people were in-
volved in the
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meet, ing at Huntsville? And you have already testified that Mr. Powers expressed some support
of the contractor view.
Were there others, and could you say there was a split in opinion among the people at Mar-
shall, please?
MR. HARDY: Well, let me say first, I can't give you the exact number of people, but certain-
ly I think you have the list, but I would guess there were probably 20 people, maybe somewhere
in that neighborhood, maybe not quite that many.
Okay, was it 14? I didn't have the count, 14 or 15 people. There was discussion by a number
of people, I don't know who or how many right now, during the course of the meeting, asking
questions _,_out the data, or asking questions about this test, how many tests were run, was that
one data point or was more than that run, how do you interpret that, or do I understand you
interpret that this way and things of that nature.
There were a number of people participating during the course of the cenversation. I men-
tioned the fact that I had learned since 51-L that Mr. Powers had made the comments that he
had made, not to me, and not during the teleconference when it was in process, but as stated to
me by Mr. McCarty, his supervisor, during a side
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meeting. I did not detect any strong dissent.
Well, let me be careful about this because I want to say it right. I did not detect any dissent
when Thiokol came back with their final recommendation, and in fact, as I have stated, I didn't
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talk to everybody in the room. Dr. Lovingood, who was there, is a senior program official, l don't
believe he talked to everybody in the room. but had I had--maybe the best way to answer the
question is to say that if I had been conscious of--and I am quite confident that this was non-
existent but it" I had been conscious of the fact that there were 20 percent or 23 percent or any-
thing like that oI opinions that were contrary to the recommendation that w_q made and the
discussion of that data. I would have pursued that with the individuals involved
V!CE CIIAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Going back not to the final decision but at the time of
the early recommendation of Thiokol not to launch, were there expressions of support for their
posmoa at that point, or can you characterize that in any way':
,_LR HARDY: l don't recall that there were any expressions of support or any significant
discussion on it.
Well, let me put it this way. [f there were
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any expressions of support other than mine wherein I said [ will not go against the contractor's
objections, and I don't know how anybody else interprets that, but if I was on the other end of
the loop I would have interpreted that as support, regardless of what had transpired prior to
that time. but I don't believe there are any expressions of support or at least that I heard or was
conveyed to me.
MR ACHESON: A brief question, Mr. Hardy, going to a minor, or maybe not so minor con-
flict in the testimony. Your testimony appears to be that you used the word "appalled" in con-
necti:.n with the data that had been presented during the teleeonference. Mr. McDonald's testi-
mony of yesterday and I think his notes say that your words were "I am appalled at your recom-
mendation."
MR. HARDY: Well, I don't recall that I stated I'm appalled at your recoramendation. I do
recall that when [ made that statement, it was in the timeframe that they made the recommen-
dation, but I also clearly know in my mind and [ have testified to that thor, on what basis I
made that statement, and again reiterate the fact that [ would not recommend launch o_,,r the
contractor's objection. And I have worked with these individuals tbr some time, and I thin _ that
they knew
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clearly that I would not--that I meant what I said regarding what I would do.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We would like to declare a recess in just a moment, but before we
do, I would like to ask one or two questions on the subject of pressure.
Has there been an}' pressure from any source against, on either of you'? In other words, has
aqybody urged you to get this launch off, or has there been any intercession on the part of any-
body asking you to be sure that you worked hard to _L _ ,_u._, on or anymmg of that kind
at all?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
MR. HARDY: None whatsoever, as far as I am concerned.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No outside interference or attempt to put pressure on you at all?
MR. HARDY: No, sir.
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, quite the contrary.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
We will come back at about five minutes after 2:00.
(Whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the Commission recessed, to reconvene at 2:00 o'clock p.m.,
this same day.)
878
,4"
163S
AFTERN(X)N SESSION
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Will the Commission c_z.me to order, please?
bit. Hardy. would you proceed, please'?
TESTIMONY OF GEORGE HARDY AND LARRY MULI.OY--Resumed
MR. HARDY: Yes, sir.
I believe I was down to the point where I had started providing you with my assessment of
the data as presented, and first of all, I reviewed in my mind during the course of the discussion
and at the caucus and in some discussion with some of my key advisors the question about blow-
by, and I mentioned that O-ring blow-by was experienced on 61-A and 51-C, and also not experi-
enced on motors at somewhat lower temperature.
I also mentioned that I think there were a number of things that probably play into the
equation for blow-by, but I did not believe that temperature was an inducement factor.
I thought that temperature could potentially affect the actuation time and therefore the
time of blow-by. The experience base and data on the primary. O-ring erosion of the case joint
was also reviewed in this meeting, and the maximum erosion that had ever been experienced on
a primary O-ring was at a joint with a
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temperature of approximately 70 degrees. Thiokol had data that showed that subscale hot fire
tests had demonstrated the capability of the primary O-ring to sustain erosion of.125 inches and
maintain pressure with no Leakage, and this was the reference I made to the fact that that is
approximately two times the factor that has been calculated as to be the maximum erosion _hat
could occur in the time that is available to equalize the pressure, and that is a factor of approxi-
mately three times that experienced on 51-C.
Now, these analyses were made some time ago, and they were reported to us at Marshall in
a briefing on August 19, 1986. I was not in that briefing, but I did have that data that was pre-
sented. So my conclusions relative to blow-by was that blow-by on the primary O-ring may occur
on 51-L because it had occurred on joints that were at ranges all the way from 75 to even below
50 degrees, and it also had not occurred on most occasions at temperatures even over a wider
span than that.
But obviously, one had to be prepared in his assessment of the data there that blow-by could
occur.
I al_o assessed and in effect agreed with the Thiokol engineers that tLe duration of that
blow-by on the primary O-ring could be longer than the normal that
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we have seen, and I think that the evidence for that was the amount of blow-by that was seen on
51-C.
With respect to the primary O-ring erosion, well, let me just say one other thing. As I men-
tioned earlier this morning, in my mind the duration of primary O-ring blow-by was not a key
issue. The key issue was, as we stated several times, the existence of the secondary O-ring at
that point in the ignition transient to accept that blow-by and in the event that it was not termi-
nated by the primary O-ring actuating and sealing, it would be terminated by pressurizing the
secondary O-ring. 879
DR.RIDE:Can I ask you a quick question about that?
You say that if you get blow-by past the primary O-ring. _hat because of the pressure check.
the secondary will be in a position to seal, and so you won't get blow-by past the secondary O-
ring.
Let me just ask you about the black puff of smoke that we saw.
Do you think that a reasonable interpretation of that is that you got blow-by past both O-
rings?
MR. HARDY: I think that is one of possibly two or three interpretations.
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DR. RIDE: I guess the reason that I bring that up is that it apparently is conceivable that
you could have blow-by past the secondary O-ring, and if you do, then the timing function be-
comes very important because then you would have the primary O-ring eroding, the erosion
wouldn't stop because the secondary had sealed, but the primary could keep eroding possibly to
a dangerous point.
MR. HARDY: Well, it was, I think, clearly recognized by everybody involved that the sec-
ondary seal has to be prepared to be sealed if you get blow-by the primary O-ring, and it sus-
tains itself. So I don't take issue with what you said there.
But the secondary O-ring, of course, doesn't have to pressure actuate. All of our evidence to
date is that the blow-by occurs during the pressure actuation of the primar_ seal. The primary
seal does have to pressure actuate, and the secondary seal doesn't have to pressure actuate, and
as the pressure builds up on the secondary seal, it startsmits first function is to extrude into the
gap. That is its first function. The primary seal's first function is to pressure actuate and then
extrude into the gap.
So the occasion for blow-by on the secondary O-ring, in my opinion, would be extremely nil
or maybe
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not even possible.
Now, if there was a defective secondary O-ring or something of that nature, then obviously
the primary O-ring blow-by could be substained right on past the secondary O-ring, and that
would describe a problem.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As I understand, your answer is that the puff of smoke had occurred
before the first second had elapsed, might be an indication the secondary O-ring had failed?
MR. HARDY: Yes, sir. What I meant to say is that there are conditions whereby the second-
ary O-ring could fail to hold that pressure when I get blow-by by the primary O-ring. I do not
believe one of those conditions is biow-by the secondary O-ring in the sar, ie context that we de-
scribed that with the primary O-ring, but there are conditions whereby '_he secondary seal would
not seal, and in fact, result in a puff of smoke.
There are others, I might hasten to say, there are other possibilities for that same thing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that is one of them, though?
MR. HARDY: Yes.
MR. HOTZ: Could you describe those other conditions where the secondary O-ring might not
seal?
MR. HARDY: A defective O-ring, a defective
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O-ring sealing surihce, and when I say a defective O-ring, I can tnink of more than one type of
defect.
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MR. HOT, Z: How about displacement?
MR HARDY: Well. if the pressure for some reason doesn't get to the primary O-ring and
when it does, let me say if the pressure is delayed in getting to the primary O-ring, and [ mean
delayed in terms of a few hundred milliseconds, and then when it does arrive at the primary O-
ring. the primary (}-ring sustains blow-by, under that condition the secondary seal could be in a
position where it would not seal. It would depend upon how long in the ignition transient or the
reverse ef that. how early in the ignition transient that occurred.
But all of our assessment on blow-by to date had indicated that pressure gets to the primary
O-ring very early. It pressure actuates or starts pressure actuating at a relatively low pressure. I
think it is 25, 35 psi. and when blow-by occurs, that is when it occurs, and at that position, the
secondary O-ring would be in a position to seal.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Hardy, with regard to your comment that there is a pressure delay for
several hundred milliseconds, it is my understanding that the putty is a plastic material and
therefore it cannot
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withstand pressure loads of any kind.
What kind of a physical phenomenon would give rise to a delay in the pressurization of that
volume between the end of the putty and the primary O-ring?
MR. HARDY: Well, I think if for whatever reason the putty kept the pressure off the pri-
mary O-ring for several hundred milliseconds, and I might just add at this time that the poten-
tial for that to occur was not discussed in the meeting of January 27th. Subsequent to that time.
in fact, I would say the first or second day of the failure investigation, I raised that issue, or I
asked at that time, we were just starting to formulate failure scenarios, and I asked if there was
any potential that the putty might delay the pressure actuation of the primary O-ring. I believe
it was Mr. Boisjoly who was with me, and several other people at that time, and he said, or
words to the effect that within his knowledge of how that joint pressurizes, he doesn't believe
there's any delay at all in pressurizing the primary O-ring by virtue of the putty.
DR. COVERT: If the putty were at 29 degrees, would it possibly cease to be a :_elatively plas-
tic material and be a brittle material that could for a while carry the pressure loaL_?
MR. HARDY: Dr. Covert, I can't answer that in
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detail. I can tell you that we are intensively investigating the role of that putty at various tem-
peratures in the pressure sequence. There are several things involved there. One is that the
structural capability will, if you will, of the putty itself, there is also the fact _hat there are
fibrous materials in the putty which could provide porous type leak paths, and the other thing is
that there are dynamics in the joint immediately when, at very low pressures, tending to sepa-
rate the putty or at least providing a force to try to separate the putty from the rubber.
DR. COVERT: I think let's not go fu_her with this and wait until some of this other techni-
cal data becomes available.
Thank you, Mr. Hardy.
MR. HARDY: The second item of discussion was the primary O-ring erosion, and I believe I
have pretty well covered that, the fact being that yes, we had to be prepared for primary O-ring
erosion on 51-L, as we had to be prepared for that on any flight. There was no evidence of tem-
perature affecting erosion. Erosion phenomenon occurs in one of two ways. One is that the ero-
sion would occur from a concentrated jet, a concentrated jet
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of hot gas that is imposed by virtue of a hole that is formed in the putty when the putty gets
pressurized.
Now, the reason for the hole could be many things, but not the least of which would be the
variability in the way it is laid up every time, and not the least of which would be the effects of
moisture, because we do know that the putty is sticky and less pliable when it is wet. But that
issue had been addressed in great detail in a number of previous flight readiness reviews at all
levels. Analysis had been done to show that the limiting factor again was the time it takes to
equalize the pressure across that jet, the source pressure, which is the motor pressure, and the
pressure just downstream of the jet, in front of the primary O-ring. And these were the numbers
I mentioned to you earlier that calculated maximum theoretical erosion that you could experi-
ence was around 65/1000. That was confirmed in tests, and then there was a test to show that
approximately twice of that was tolerable.
The other way to get erosion on the primary seal is the hot gas that blows by when this
phenomenon of blow-by occurs.
Now, I think you understand erosion and blow-by don't occur at the same time. They do
occur separately. They sometimes occur at the same time even
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though the phenomena that causes them is different. But in this particular case, again, i_ would
be due to sustained blow-by the primary O-ring, at which time the secondary O-ring is in a posi-
tion to _,eal.
The other subject that was discussed and material that was presented had to do with O-ring
resiliency. The data showed indeed that there was a decreased response rate of the O-rings with
decreased temperature, and by that I mean if you compress the O-ring, it takes it longer to come
back to its original position with temperature, and I think that is fairly standard data and was
of no great surprise.
The data presented, however, coupled with the O-ring erosion and blow-by experience, did
not indicate that resiliency was a dominant factor, and I emphasize dominant factor, in the
early part of the ignition transient.
Now, certainly resiliency is a factor in that portion of the ignition transient where the joint
has started to rotate any significant amount. The data that would plot a curve from those three
data points, there was one at 100 degrees Fahrenheit, one at 75 degrees Fahrenheit, and one at
50 degrees Fahrenheit, would show that immediate response of the O-ring from compression set
would not occur at temperatures below 70, 75, 80
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degrees. It was the application of that--well, let me go on one step further--which again rein-
forced my belief that in the portion of the ignition transient that we were interested in, that is,
that part where we might sustain longer blow-by or extended blow-by of the primary, resiliency
was not a dominant factor, and I think that is substantiated in the experience base that we had.
To make the point again, the primary O-ring actuates and seals early in the ignition tran-
sient phase, about 25 or 30 psi, and I know no better way to describe this than to say that when
that pressure gets to the primary O-ring, it either seals or it doesn't seal. If it seals, I've got
nothing else to be concerned about. If it doesn't seal, what I have got to be concerned about is
the secondary O-ring. But at the same time I am getting blow-by on the primary O-ring, I am
pressure actuating the secondary O-ring.
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Data was presented relative to O-ring hardness and temperature, and while hardness is af-
fected by temperature on the O-rings, in tact, two data points, one that shows a durometer, or a
measure of hardness, at 84 at 50 degrees Fahrenheit and 92 at 30 degrees Fahrenheit, but there
are two significant data points with respect to "harden O-rings." One was a test that
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had been conducted by Thiokol. The question here is will an O-ring extrude into the gap? Will it
seal? Once it gets harder, will it have a higher resistance to sealing in this extrusion gap? And if
it does, will that have any effect on the sealing time or any significant effect on the sealing
time?
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Tests were run at Thiokol that showed that on more than one test, in fact all the tests--I
have forgotten exactly how many it was, but the tests showed that at 30 degrees the seal would
seal without leakage, and then beyond that there had been a durometer of 90 O-rings were used
earlier in the program. They were used early in the test program, and they were used early in
the program to do hydroproof tests on segments.
I concluded that the effects of changes in O-ring resiliency and hardness were not dominant
factors in the early part of the ignition transient, since am' violation of the primary O-ring is
expected to occur early in the ignition transient, while the secondary O-ring remains in a
squeezed position, seated by the leak test pressure, and ready to seal.
MR. SUTTER: Do you think that 28 days later that that secondary O-ring is still in the
sealed position?
MR. HARDY: Yes, absolutely.
MR. SUTTER: Do you have any data on that?
MR. HARDY: Well, I don't h_ve the data here with me, but there is data on the stiffness of
that joint, the characteristics of the joint under various types of loads, everything from on-pad
loads tn the loads that it experiences when the SSMEs fire up and
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push it over, to the pressure loads.
And without question, the pressure load, of course, is the biggest load that that joint ever
sees.
MR. SUTTER: But the thing is sitting there for 28 days, and there are variations in temper-
ature which makes the vehicle work some, and there is nothing to hold it in position, except it
has been pushed in position.
But if something tries to pry it out around that great big circumference, it would seem to
me there might be a chance that at least parts of it would pop out.
MR. HARDY: Well, of course, it is in a groove, as you know, and it is sitting there under
those conditions with about, in this case, 35, 36-thousandths compression.
MR. SUTTER: Except that if it gets colder it might shrink, and that reduces.
MR. HARDY: As it get colder, that 38-thousandths would come down to 35-thousandths.
MR. SUTTER: I have a little bit of trouble. This run-through of data that you're presenting
and your analysis of it sounds like everything is copacetic, and yesterday I listened to these
other fellows who showed great concerns.
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And it is hard for me to understand two different groups of engineering with the same data,
one drawing a very great concern, a critical concern, and the other one being fairly relaxed. And
that is why I keep asking the question of these two groups, who is the group that is the group
that makes a recommendation to the decisionmakers to make the proper decision?
I'm still very confused en that.
MR. HARDY: Let me just clarity that for you a little bit= What--the responsibility of myself
and engineers that work in science and engineering is to review, assess, probe, analyze data that
is put forth by the contractor engineering.
MR. SUTTER: And you draw a different conclusion than they draw?
MR. HARDY: That is correct.
MR. SUTTER: So then when they advise their management as to go or no go, it really isn't
a very strong input, and when their management says go or no go it may be a decision that
doesn't have to be paid attention to?
MR. HARDY: Well as I was going to say, we have interface with that engineering depart-
ment and our engineers do. We don't make recommendations to their management. Their engi-
neering doesn't make
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recommendations to our management. Their engineering makes recommendations to the con-
tractor management and then we make recommendations to our project management.
Now, what the project manager is then assessing is the contractor's input to him and his
civil service engineering input. That is what he ends up assessing.
MR. SUTTER: And I can tell you that if I were that guy I would have a hell of a time
knowing what to do.
MR. HARDY: Well, I don't know of any case--I don't know of many cases--there may have
been some, but I don't know of many cases where he has just overridden or ignored the civil
service engineering input that he has had.
MR. SU2_FER: Then it gets back to the fact that the engineers at Thiokol, who designed the
thing, ran the tests, and did some interpreting of it, are a nonentity. They don't count.
MR. HARDY: Well, of course, to us the contractor is the entity. We don't cut the contractor
up into departments.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Following up on the question, aren't you and Mr. Mulloy still worlds
apart from the views of the engineers at Thiokol?
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MR. HARDY: I would say today that, based upon what I heard yesterday, that yes, we
have--or I have some sigrdficant difference. Mr. Mulloy would have to speak for himself.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Are you about finished?
MR. HARDY: Yes, sir, I think I have finished.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question, please?
Mr. Hardy, this assembly was 28 days in a vertical stack and these O-rings were squeezed 14
or 15 percent all these 28 days.
MR. HARDY: That's my understanding.
DR. COVERT: Is the characteristic of this elastomeric material such that it is going to tend
to come to equilibrium with the fact that it has been--I don't know, what's the right word--
squoze that long? So that could this contribute to a lack of resilience and the ability _o slow up
the spring-back?
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MR. _iARDY: l believf- that these compressions, one could have a higher, an extremely high
compression _vhere that ,:ould be more of a problem. But at these compressions, we have had
vehicles sitting on the pz,d tbr--I can remember, well, we have had them stacked,
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we have had the rectors stacked for in excess of a year and have subsequently satisfacto_,ly
tested them.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. RUMMEL: If I could ask a questio.l for clarification, from either Mr. Hardy or Mr.
Mulloy or both, with respect to the capture ring development. As l understand it, it was said
this morning tbat that was sent to production, or at least billets were ordered last July.
Now, that is a fairly major change, sir, ce it affects the forging and machining, et cetera, et
cetera, in the normal course of production, iVy first question is, when was that decision made to
order it to p,'oduction?
I note :.n passing that it has already been incorporated in the filament-wound case, and of
course the obvious purpose of it is to kf_p the joint from separating. Was it when you first dis-
covered s,';paration, and when was the capture ring ordered for the steel case?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, the filament-wound case design was done about three years ago.
That was subsequent to the time that the measurements hacl been taken on the structural test
article, on the steel case, that did show that, contrary to Thiokol's calculations, that when the
pressure load was put on the case the
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joint opened instead of closed.
The original calculation shcwed that it would close. When we got the filament-wound case
desi_._md, it is about 1.6 inch thick composite, which puts a bigger eccentricity into that joint, if
you will. So when that is pressurized and it's less flexible, it causes even more beading, and so it
wa_ determined that it was an unacceptable rotation on the filament-wound case.
Now, in this activity tha'_ began in looking at near-term, mid-term and long-term solutions
that some of the Thiokol personnel described yesterday, one of the "long-term" improvements
was to incorporate that same latch or capture feature on that inooard leg of the clevis on the
steel case.
Even before the August 19th meet;ng here at headquarters, the discussions had evolved to
the point where my element project manager, Mr. Wear, deemed it prudent to go ahead and
order the forgings with an additional three inches on the ID such that when we designed and did
the stress analysis and got the design complete, we would be in a position to machine that cap-
ture feature in for steel cases.
Now, you only need that on the field joints, because there is no problem with the factory
joints because they have the insulation over that.
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We're in a position to start getting those segments in, after we go through the design review
on those, in the fall of this year.
MR. RUMMEL: It seems to me a substantial difference or a large interval in time, if I un-
derstand this correctly, between the availability of the capture joint in the steel case and the
availability in the fabricated wound case.
MR. MULLOY: Oh, yes, sir. It was incorporated initially in the design in the wound case,
which is just--it is just a ring that goes onto the composite. And it just wasn't decided until July
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cf !985that wewantedto protectthe option for being able to put that Gn as a long-term im-
provement.
And it is about a year and a half lead time from the time you get a forging until you get a
part.
MR. RUMMEL: Well, I guess the problem I'm having is it seems apparent to me, as we were
hearing the discussion yesterday and today, that considerable conce,'n has existed with respect
to maintaining the seal in the O-rings for a very extended period of time. And I am puzzled as to
why, if that's so, that is compatible with what may seem to be a delay in the decision to incorpo-
rate the capture ring in the steel case.
Do you care to comment o_ that?
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MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. There was a great deal of testing, as we have testified, staging in
mid-1984, going through 1985, with a dedicated effort at trying to isolate the variables, if you
will, that tend to increase erosion and primary O-ring blow-by.
There were a lot of concepts evaluated. The capture feature was one of those. There was--
the intense effort was on the near-term solution, because there is such a long lead time o, that,
and it just was not concluded--and I'm not offering any excuses for that, but it just was not
concluded until July, when everything kind of came together that said, what we need to do is
put a .292 diameter O-ring in the field joint, put a spacer in the primary O-ring on the nozzle
joint, and incorporate a capture feature as soon as possible.
And Thiokol made that recommendation at the August 19th briefing here at headquarters,
and we had already moved out in advance of that.
MR. RUMMEL: Could that have represented an effort to use up production on hand without
the capture ring, for example, prior to moving into the capture ring situation?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. As I say, we would mix these, the casting segments. There are two
segments with each one. So the G::ly one that we need the _apture
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feature on is the tang of the field joint. So we would be mixing in the current inventory with
this, with the new case segments with the tang incorporated.
A_d we would continue throughout the program to use the existing inventory of those seg-
ments. We don't have to set those aside. We were able to use them without the capture feature.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much. We will be able to pursue this later on, I'm
sure. Thank you very much, Mr. Mulloy. Thank you, Mr. Hardy.
Now, Mr. Lovingood and Mr. Reinartz.
(Witnesses sworn.)
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Mr. Chairman - Members of the Commission
I am George Hardy, Deputy Director of the Science and Engineering
Directorate at the Marshall Space Flight Center.
Before I relate to you my participation in, and recollections of
the teleconference between Morton Thiokol personnel and Marshall
Space Flight Center personnel on the evening of January 27, 1986.
I would llke to dcscrlbe the role of myself and other
personnel of the Science and Engineering Directorate with respect
to Flight Readiness Assessment fcr Shuttle flights.
- The 9rimary role of Science and Engineering in this
regard is to:
Participate in Flight Readiness Reviews
Identify any pertinent issues relative to flight
readiness
Review any issues identified by o%hers (including
contractors)
Assess the rationale for flight and supporting
data for any issue
Provide recommendations to the appropriate
Readiness Review Board chairman (if suc_ a
Board is In session) or otherwise to Marshall
Program Management
IRef. 2_26-I '2 of 15]
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With reference to the teleconference that started at approxlmately
8:u_ p.m. EST on January 27, 1986---
The _eleconference between Marshall Space Flight
personnel and Morton Thlokol personnel at Kennedy,
Huntsville and in Utah---you have been given a list of
all participants at each location.
I would like to identify the personnel at Huntsville fror_
t_e Science and Engineering Directorate that wero _upportlng me
during the teleconfe_-ence:
Dr. Wayne Littles (Assoclatc Director fo_ Englneerng)
Mr. Jim Smzth (The Solid Rocket Booster Chief Engineer)
Mr. Robert Schwinghamer (Director of our Materials &
Processes Laboratory)
Mr. Bill Riehl (an engineer in the Materials & Processes
Laboratory - a non-metallics materials expert)
Mr. John McCarty (Dep. Director of our S_ructures &
Propulsion Laboratory)
Mr. Ben Powers (an engineer in the Structures &
Propulsion Laboratory - specializing in solid
propulsion)
Mr. Ke _ ates (in the Office of the Lssociate Director
for _ngineering)
[Ref. 2/26-1 3 of 15]
Thiokol engineering personDel in Utah reviewed charts that had
been datafaxed to the Huntsville add KSC participants Just prior
to the beginning of the teleconfereDce.
- The presentations were professlona] in nature.
THere were numerous questions and answere.
There was a discussion of various data and points
raised by individuals at Thlokol-Utah, at Marshall add
at Kennedy.
- A rather full discussion, I would say (Thiokol
presented 14 charts and we spent 2 to 2 I/2 hours
reviewing and discussing the data and all i_sues
related thereto).
- To my knowledge, anyone whe desired to make a point,
ask a question, _r express a view was in no way
restrained from doing so.
[Ref. 2 26-1 4 of 151
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[I ha"e heard the telecouference characterized as "heated
Jiscussions":
- Penetrating questions were asked
- Various points of view and interpretations of data were
exchanged and discussed.
- The discussion was not, in my view, uncharacteristic of
discussions of flight readiness issues on previous
occasions
[Ref. "2/'26-1 5 of 151
Thiokol Engineering concluded their presentation with a
recommendation that the launch time be determined consistent with
fl_ght experience to date (launch with the o-ring temperature
53_=).
Mr. Kilmlnster (Thiokcl-Utah) stated that with the engineering
assessment he recommended that we not launch Tuesday morning as
scheduled.
After a sh_rt discussion followed, Mr. Mull_y (at KSC) summarized
his assessment of the data and his rationale for flight.
Mr. Reinartz (at KSC) asked me for comments. I stated that I was
somewhat appalled (referring to Thiokol's interpretation of some
of the data presented with respect to its influence on the
Joint/seal performance to the issue under discussion). ! will
discuss this specific data later in this statement. Then I went
on to say that I supported the assessment of data presented
essentially as summaflzed by Mr. Mulloy, but I would not recommen4
launch over Thiokol's ob_ectlons.
[Ref. 212(_-1 6 of 15]
889
Somewhere about this time, Mr. Kilminster (Thiokol-Utah) stated
that they wanted to go off..tBe-loop to caucus for about 5 minutes.
I believe at this _olnt, M{'. McDonald (The Thiokol Senior
Representative at ffSC for this launch) suggested tO Mr. Kilminste?
that he consider a point I had made earlier, that the secondary
o-rlng is in the proper position to seal if blow-by the primary
o-_ng OCCUrred. To the best of my recollection, that was the
only comment made on the loop <i.e., during the t _leconferet_ce) by
Mr. McDonald before or after the Thiokol caucus.
The caucus by Thiokol lasted 30-35 minuteS. At HuntSville during
the Thlokol caucus we continued to discuss the data presented--_e
were off the loop--around the table--in small groups. I discussed
my assessment and understanding of the data with several or my key
advisors. None of them expressed any disagreement or differences.
[Ref. 2-26-1 7 of 15]
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When Thiokol came back on llne, Mr. Kilminster reviewed rationale
that supported proceeding with the launch and so recommended. I
had no knowledge of who particlpated in the caucus at Thlokol. It
is not typical to ask for a vote count when a senior/responsible
official of the contractor presents the company position. What is
typical is to assess the rationale for that position.
During the caucus, I had written my evaluation of the data
presented as I developed it in my mind and by the discussion that
had ensued. (I will review that with you later in this
statement).
Mr. Reinartz asked if anyone (on the loop) had a different
position or disagreed with the Thlokol recommendation as presentea
by Mr, Kilminster. There were no dissenting responses. The
teleco_ was terminated shortly thereafter. I have no knowledge of
any subsequent events, or discussions between personnel at KSC or
at Thiokol on the matter.
r .
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As _ stated earlier, _uring the _hioko]. caucus. I JlscusseJ the
data and _ne issues with se.teral of my key advicora and there was
no disagreement among us. [ also stated earlier, that there were
no dissenting responses when Mr Relnartz ask if there were an_
disagreements following Mr. Kilmlnster's recommen4_tion to prccee!
with the launch.
I have learned since the 51-L incident that Mr. Ben Powers
expressed some concern about _M<" o-rlng performance directly tc
Mr. Smith ithe S_B Chief Enginee" and Mr. McCarty (the Deputy
Director of the 3tructures and F: _5_Is!on Labors&cry). Mr.
McCarty iS Mr. Power's supervisor Mr. McCarty has stated to me
that _e considered Mr. Power's com_,_zts _]ong with all the data
presented an@ dis?ussed when he m_d_- ":is input to me.
[Ref. " :26-1 9 of 1,3_
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I would llke now to give you a summary of my assessment of the
data presented and the conclusion I drew from that data.
I interpreted and assesseQ the data presented by Thlokol in the
context of the accepted performance and operational
chsrlsteristics of the field Joint during the motor ignition
transient.
The essential features of these characteristics are:
(i) The primary o-_'ing moves from the position it has
assumed during the leak test to its sealing position as the
pressure upstream of the o-rlng increases from ambient to
approximately 25 to 50 pounds per square inch,
(2) This pressure is imposed on the primary o-ring during
the first few milliseconds (100 milliseconds or less) of the
ignition transient, and
(3) If a blow-by or failure of the primary o-ring occurs in
this timeframe, the secondary o-rlng is in its seating position
(this is assured by the leak test pressure).
[Ref. 2 26-1 I0 of 15]
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The issue addressed during the teleconference was the potential
for tDe predi_te_ temperatures to adversely effect the performance
_f the se_s during the ignition transient.
Tblokol engtneerLng presente_ _ata OL the _Istory of primary
D-ring erDslcz an_ Di?w-b[ at t_e _ot'r fle[d _D[nts. [ _oe2[_Je!
t_a ° there wa_ n5 _Irett correlation %lth this Ja%a and
te_pera:.re:
:]-rLng Dl_w-ty wa_ e:(perlence_ _
- _!-A wltn the _3Lnt at ap_r_xLaately 750? anl _n
5:-C with _e ]cLot at app-oxE_ate[y 50°F
T_ere was n_ _-r_n_ b[3w-_v Dr er?sio_ _n two _rDU_
test mot]c3 _t 3c_ew2_t tower temperst_Ires tha_ 5T-3
The _a_imum erosi3_ ever experienced _n a primary
c-r=ng was wzt_ _ne jo_t at a temperature of
approximately _F
Subscale hotfire tests _ave demonstrated a capability
of tie primary o-rLng to sustain erosion of 3._25
inches and maLntain pressure wit_ no leakage (tnis is
greater than 3 !/2 times th; erosion experlenced on
[Ref. '2 211-1 I I of 15 i
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Data on o-rln5 resiliency was presented and discussed
The data showed a decrease response rate of the o-rings with
decreased temperatures.
The data presented coupled wlth o-rlng erosion and blow-by
history did not indicate that res±llency was a dominant
factor in the early part of the ignition transient.
Three data points were presented ---100°F, 75°F and
50-F
These data would plot a curve that shows that o-rings
would not respond immediately to gap opening (due to
joint rotatiOnoWith pressure) if the temperature was
below 65 or 70 F.
It was the application and interpretation of these data into
our knowledge of the joint sealing characteristics during
the ignition transient pressure rise that prompted my
statement that I was "somewhat appalled."
[Ref. 2/26-1 12 of 1.51
Data was pre_ented and discussed relattve to
3-rtn_ har_ness vs. temperature
Whzle nar_ess £s effe_teJ by the temRera_re of the o-rings
(durgmeter of 92 at 30_F v_. _ at 50_F) .....
Two _zg_tfLoant Jat_ poz_ts _x_steJ to _s_e_s the effe_t_ 3f
the "harder" o-rings on their _ealLng oapabiki_y
_i Test dat_ _a3 prese_te_ by Mcrtoc T_iok_l that s_owe:_
su-_essf_l sealing w_t_ :o leakage wtta the o-rlngs at
30DF
,,2 O-rings wzth _ duromete_ of 90 was succes_fully used in
the early test phases of the program
[Ref. "2 26-1 I:1 .f I._ I
My conclusions were:
(i) Blow-by the primary o-rlng m_occur on 51-L
It has occurred _n flights with Joints at
approximately 75 F and at approximately 50°F
even though it has not occurred on flights and
ground test motors w-wT_'h Joints over a somewhat
wider temperature range
The duration of blow-by on 51-L may be a few
milliseconds longer than 51-C
The duration of blow-by the primary o-ring is not
an issue since it occurs early in the ignition
transient while the secondary o-ring is available
to seal
[Ref. 2/26-| 14 of 15|
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(2) I cOncluded that the effects of changes in o-ring
resiliency end hardness was not a dominant factor in
the early part of the ignition translen_
Since any violation of the primary o-rlng is
expected to occur early in the iKnltion transient
while the secondary o-rlng remains in a squeezed
position, seated by the leak test pressure, ready
to seal...
and further...
Tests have demonstrated the capability of the
o-rings to seal at 30 F
With my assessment of the data and wit_ inputs from my key
advisors on the evening of January 27, I supported Morton
Tniokol's recommendation to proceed with the launch.
(l_er. 2/28-1 15 of 15]
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History of O-Ring Damage in Field Joints
O-Ring Temp
(OF)
Development Motor
Number
O-Ring Temp
(°F}
Qualification Motor
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O-Ring
Erosion
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of Primary
O-Ring
D = No Damage
STATIC TEST MOTORS
O HORIZONTAL ASSEMBLY
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I_M_TION ON T_ S _AG_ WAS P_[PA_[D TO SUPPORT AN ORAL PRESENTATION
ANO CANNOT It CONS_0EREO C0kt_ETI _,THOUT THE OAA_ D,SCUSSION IRef. 2/26-2 1 of 3]
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History of O-Ring Damage in Field Joints (Cont)
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O-Ring
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m
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Field Joint in Rocket Motor
i ....
Propellant
Flap i
Insulation
Steel Case /_
/ X
Test Port PlugJ
(Located at 0 Dag)
_-- Inhibitor
Insulation
Y
Steel Case
Pin
Pin Retention
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of Zhe tan_, which S|?C_$ acrc;s _he O-ring _urtng JOint RSSe_oly, 15 3_. The _o_n[ @esl;_ =rov_des an CO
for t_s O-rtn I tns:ll_atlon, _nlc_ _a¢_l_IeS nltefltlon _urlng Jo_n_ S;Sm_ly. The _lr._ _aS e |ll'_i snll|ov
angle cha_f_r on one *.i_ _0 :_rEven: t._e Cu=_in 9 Of t._e O-_n 9 I_ asl_o;y, ;he _eS_9 n oraw_net {l_¢t_tS
¢_1t@._t|0_ Of 0-r_n9 lu_r_cmnt _rtmr :0 :he _nstai_etion. T_ fac:ory IWSL_Ie_ _otn:s _v¢ StiR rubber
mlterlsl vulCin_:e_ IcrOss _n¢ _ernal _oint laying |urfices as a pa_ of ;he C_se in_r_al l_s_li_o_
SgbsTSt_m.
A s_411 ,_$ _or_ lel_'nq to c_e annular cavity be_een the _nda_: seals =crates a look _hect of 1fie sea_s
tl_edta_ly of=or joln_n_ se_en_s. The _ _1u9, ln|talle_ _fteP' }elk tea:, his e ritiln_n9 _ve and
_rlss_on _SCI lOT 17,S 0-r_ng sea], A _ins _o _S: U_ soil of t_e Installed _S plu_ his not Dean
cst_D11shed.
The 0-r_n_s for t_e case ._o_n:s are _0td fo_-ed Snd ground tO close to|stint! l.d _he 0-r_ngi for _h_ _ISC
_t_ 8rll Imld for_ to me( _imens_ons. fio_n O-rtneS ave maOe for _tgfl =mmeritvre, I0_, camO_lllOn sea
fl:¢roc¢@on elas:_met'. _h_ ¢=$_n _er_ts fl_e scarf jotn;s for th_ Case _o_nt weal rings. The g-rln_
dotnt strength rust _ual or excess 40=. of t_ oar_nt r_tersll streng_.
I. T_STTNG
TO date, e¢¢jh_ s_at_c ¢Ir_ngs and ftve flights t_ave resulte_ _n 1°0 (5_' fleld and 126 f_cto,'y) _Oqntl
teste_ _th nO ev_aence o¢ ]eaaaGe. The t(tan IS| #rogrl_ us{ha a $_milar j01nc conC_lmt has _s_ a tolil
cf _076 Jo_nts success_u!11.
[Ref. 2/26-3 1 of 2J
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oRB CRITICAL ITEMS LI'.. "-.,..z_,,...L
|ilmce t l_e
SOL t.___r)'(T 8f)_._T f-q r.-_,v C_,_l_ • n_0,_ r,.,_. _o_,
m fade: , 10-01-01 h_: ,i-GI
:(_se. P/_ (l_ aece,c,oa _tlo_lwl - -
, _ , ,-..__ ...... . ,., J' .... i m
IqA11ONAk( FOR MFT|N'rmoN (CCNI"OI
A ]l_rz¢•ry teJt pr_ra,, dmmlstrited ¢J_e Ibtltty "_f the O-r_n 9 to cDeMIte successful1)' when e_tT-_ded
Into liPS ve|t over thOSe chcetmtered |R g_z$ O*r(_ lgpliCltlgn. UlllfOrlt IIII)S of _/8-$f_ch lnd O_s_" {_'dR.
|J48_) s_ceSsfully wttAnst_od pressures Of 1|0_ psi. The _y_._ut,_t erC_rl_ (_._1;S4) sr, d t_e $tPucturll
Test P_ogrm {$T_-l) for th_ st_no=_ _fg_t r_se (T'._-|2_S|) zM :_e Lllht_Sgn: CaS_ Jo_t le_tf_cs_o.
_tSt (M'|Z [rz_l) ll1 hive shinto LMt tile O-fin| i;an _tt_=ln_l I Idhi.-IJ_ of fmff pl'eSSUl"llltlOn$ bef_)rt dimige
P,O [M r_rd_ C4fl _ISIL I_qI 1tibiae.
Ir_l_hef I[l_ll_l_StTlt1Ofl Of ghl CIDilD|]It), of _otlt_ !e1111_ ts f_h<l $_ :h_ hl_h_.lcq_ ettq_41_ t4 ¢ _l_ I_(I
rtfvr_tshel case tl_ents. Over $40 .1"o{aL_ hive 0_n txr_std _ 14Quid prelsurtZl{lons lt|lvel$
trlClCdin t a0=OP Prr_ v_;_t no |ldlage uplr_lnce_ ;l_;g t/_l :rlr4t'_ _-_$r_. Thl O/_)y •CCIItDNI -_'rl lfl_lal
II$ etptrSen¢lcl ill dU_l W ref_isl_lflt of ST$-_ .n_re _ |*.i_f_ner slitters _ Ilvlffel_ dir_l_t{ {urin 9
uvity c=llapse st ricer _pe_.
A more deta|14d dtscripc:on Of Sl_ .Joint :estlrql nl$_ry is ¢ont_ned tn t_nt-l_20, lev_s_en A.
lhe tmng -_* d_eter e,d clevis -¢- dll_e_er Ire _emsurl4 m_d t_co_ed. The depth, vtett_ lnCl $_t'_ece
ft.tsh _f C,_e G-_inS5 ;r_oves lr_ _rtfied. The surflU f_r_fs/t of :,_e _lfl_ {s l;$o vsrSffld. Cl',lrlC_er_$tfss
er_ 5nspec_td on etch O-ri_ to allure Clmforssinu _0 _ht J:indlrcS _ $_:l_de:
I 4_n"l'ece ¢nnc_tlM_ns
• Ho|d fl|lhtng
I Sclrf _o_nt _lsmatc_ or Slplratt@n
• Cr_ss see{ton
O C! rc_fe_ence
[l¢_ ISSe_led _o_l_t ell _1 tested per _T_0_747 _$e pressul"_=In_ _e lnnulir elVtty be_._ten Sells _.o SO *_
S p$| Ind r_t_Ot'lt_ ' _ )0 I|_lut_s. A prtsstn'e dlCiy of _ )s_,9 =P )tilter (s noi mccep_eble. @ollo,_n;
sell verlficstlon )y Q'_. _• Silk ttsl; ?c_-t plu_ is ifiStl|led._th {..vtr(fy(_ tflstatle;lon and t_ut_,
..;.', -.,._',_en¢l_. _ in ".-%: t._)Ic flr;ng _f );_ree _villfJca_on arotsrS, file develom_t
_t_ end _t_ _i;_t _orS.
__ [Ref. 2/26-3 2 of 2}
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AC-TiG,ITSi _,;C:
o,_D TO:ASSI.....
ACTIO;I"_"-': _"_
ACTiO;_IT.=_"!DEZCRIPTIO_I:
ATTACHZD SHZ_ R-::-AR_INGSTS-'IC
SRH-3
SA_2 (J. Thomzs)
2/3185
PROVIDE AODITIC:;AL DATA S_:WN ON
CASE GOINT EROSION.
(CznBinued P_ 2}
D_S_S _o _.._h.: See the following (attached) FRR charts for each item:
It._____ Chart Number(s 1
I RB-21A
2 RB-2¢, 24A, 24B
3 RB-24, 24Ao 24B
4 RB-27, RB-28, RB-29, RB-30, and RB-31
5 RB-30 and RB-31
6 RB-4
7 RB-22
S_B,,:TTEDBY:
C_,IC_RRc,_::
.. :_LL3'Y IRef. 2,2ti-.1 1 of 14]
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sxa J3x
51-1[ (5T5-22)
._:t£on ZtAm Clomire Paper
#SL_-3
sx_2
Descript;tmst (Cou*.4uu.d)
1. GR_'_IC COMPAII$0N 01t' STS-51C CiSE JOL'qT 0-1iL_G L'I_SI_N DIIQ3SION
I.Tl'li 1_IOUS',,¥ OaSE_V_D L'RO_ED O-]r._3G$.
2. ,_ROVIDZ DrscIi!PT_0N AND D_SPOSITI0._ OF ALL P_'S ON CASE FIELD J01N'TS
FOE BOTH STS-51C .%._D51-E. JCLUOE NETAL ?A_IT$ PR'$, O-fliNGS, PIYI'I_,
LEAK TESTS, ETC.
¢0_ PETIT LOT WiTH CASE 301-_5. I_ENT_FY ANY PIi0_LE"._WITH
?UTTT LAYU:_.
DEVI[I_P A "MOST PROBA3LE" SCENARIO OF RO$;AND 1_.:
- li0T GAS PASSEE PRI,W.ARY0-RING
- PEODUCTS 0F C0._UST_0N AIZ DLr?0SITED BI_IIND PRL_IARY O-ii!._G
- FLOW PAST O-RING STOP_
- FrC.
SUPPOItT SC_ARIO,WITR A._ALY$I_/T_-ST DATA
T.-_F-_¢T0F LOW AM31ENT i'EMPER_%I'UR_0._Jcr._'_.
_0L_T GI_._I_TRY_._:DO-_/NG S_I_EEZE 0,_ 30T_ PRLMARY &_ SEC0,N'0ARYTCR
STS-51C.
A3ALYZE SO_T TO DETERMINE SOUICZ. [Kef. '_ 2fi-| 2 o|' l|]
4.
6.
7.
5r¢ 4tD /
__/
EROO_D tENGTH
I-
MLt" tram tt _ l_s)
.m
L
_/C
_.: "I'-""71 1-- 3 ""
i_ll.r f_u_l i* Am I41111
VTECff_ICAI. ISSUES (COBT)
COf4PARI30NOF STS-SIC Affl) STS-5]F
0 NO PROBLE¢_ISEHCOllflTERF.nHITII PUTTY LOT BHMFERSOR fflSTALLATiOII Off _l.L FIELD JO!HT,_
0 l'lO AfIORAI.P,U3 CO#IDITIOIlS AT /tSSEI_III.YOF:
00-RlflGS
0 GREASE
0 I.h.AKCHECK
ALL ST,(:;-5]C (SP,N-iS) MID STS-5}E (SflfVl6) F1EL[I JOl_ff,(::PASSEDLEJIK
q_EC.KUITli P. IJECAYOF {.to2 PS! OR LF,SS, FIRST ATTEHPT. (1.0 PSI
LEAKAGEALLfJNED])IIP.If!G If) r4IrIIIIE PERIOD AT 50 PSIG)
[Ref. '226-_ ! oi 11]
TECIII_ICAL lESSORS (CObrf]NU£D)
O C_'IPAEISON OF STS-$1C AND STS-SIE
II_l rll_ [e t
l_tt E
Stock No.
Lot lJo,
DR'MS
Tlelght, Ibs
Di_'b
Complete Time
Hate
Ytrnt Pin Time
#
llat ln_ $ur faeea
PR ' ;J
S'rS -$ } C L}l
_orlaard
5809 5808
0011 0009
None
26.0
None
10/29. 15:15
10/29, 20:24
C_tO_
5809 5808
0011 0009
26.2
None
I0/26. 14:30
10/26, 23;60
S_-LF-007-O001 Noue
Contam|nation.
eanded
Aft
5809
001 !
No_e
2G.5
None
5808
0010
10/25, 14:10
10/25, 21:33
An-B]-OISi.-
000-0003
Scratch above
O-glt_ groove
0", blend
r I El'S-SiC RI!
FoRward Ce_¢o¢
5809 SBO_ I 5809 5BOB
0011 0010 I 0010 0010
_ne }14105
25.B
Ho ne
26.4
None
Aft
5809 380B
0009 OO09
111334. It901
118991
25.9
t_ono
10/27. 20:50
10/27, 23:0_
SIS-BL-OISR-
00_:
Gaucc in pln-
holei use
10/24. 13:35
10/26. 20"16
SB-DZ-OISR
0005
Vtsfble plta
that could not
be felt, use
10/23, 20:00
10/24. 00:02
SB-B/-015R-t
0006
Surface Jen I
Itot perform,
"Juat prior'
I_llte_ USe
*D_ 'e ii6i06 - 5808-0010. uritten !1/20/8_. holee i, plnmtic eea:. putty retested m_ rcaealed
111336 - 5B09-0009, vrltten 3/15/86. batches tdetltJf(ed au one lot, extra teet uamplee verff|ed putty propergie
119015 - 5809-0009, vritten 12/1_/R6. holeu In plastic _eal. _utty retested and resesled
118991 - 5809-O009.'vrltten 1/11/85, _tty o_t of 40'F. etarege over 30 days. zeteetod
[Ref. 2 26-4 5 of I.l]
9O2
®
F
i _t._.tzStock No.
Lot No.
DR*A*
Ln_Y_E
Weight. Lbs.
DR*_
Complete time
H_te
First pin tim
:_ t_9_B ..%r fat ea
PR_,
*DRea
Fo_mrd
5809 5808
0011 0010
[14106
25.2
12/18. !4:30
12/18, 17:58
5809 5808
0009 0009
111334. 119015
110991
26.2
12/17, 14:30
12/17, 18:30
Aft
5809 5808
0009 0009
111334, 1190i5
!1899l
26.1
12/15, 15:O0
.12/15, 19:10
sT8-51 z uwr
For_rd '
5809 5808
0009 0009
111334. 119015
118991
23.5
12/5, 14:20
t2/5. ifl:43
Center
5809 5808
00O9 0010
IE1334, 119015
118991, I[4106
28.1
12/4, 16:30
12/_. 19:46
A_'t
_69 58o8
0010 0009
None
11/30. 23:20
A]I-]_T-OI6R-
000-000L
258"-282"
gcpalr pits
114106 - 5808-0010. written 11120/04, holes In plsstfc seal, potty retestexi and rolcaled
111334 - 5R09-0009j written 3/15/8_. tl,r_e batches identified as one ]at. eztra test uamp]ea verified putty proF
119015 - 5809-0009, vritten 12116184. holes in plastic seal: putty geteaged and raseaXed
118991 - 5R09-0OO9. vritten 11]I/85, l_Jtty _,t of 40"F. _corafie over 30 days, retested
IRef. 2/26-I _ ¢,f 1.1]
SIS-51C (SRH-15} SIS-20 O-RING EROSION SCEfiARIO
A 0
B 0
NO EROSION UNTIL SONIC FLOg ESTABLISHED IN FIELD JOINT AREA
(0 - _0 PSI)
PRIHARY O-RING SEATING PIIASE (50 - 200 PSI)
0 LOH TEIYERATUflE SHRINKS O-RING Ah_ INCREASES DUROPIETER
0 GAS JET TIIROUGH PUTTY IHPINGES ON PR]HARY O-RIN_
0 IHITI_L EROSION OF PRIHARY O-RING OCCURS (¢ 10 filLS)
0 GAS FLOg PAST PRIF_RY O-RING OCCURS
0 O-RING PRODUCTS FOUrm ]N SOOT
0 PUTTY PRODUCTS FOUND IN SOOT
0 G_S _LOg DEPOSITS SOOT AND LOSES HEAT (/_T = 5265*F)
IN CIRCUP_FERENTIAL EXPANSION BET_EH O-RIN_S,
AT = 570"F BETWEEN O-RINGS
0 NO DAMAGE TO SECOHDARY O-RING
/ ._/ ....
[Ref. 2/26-1 7 of l.I]
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STS-51C (SR1"1-15)STS-20 O-RING EROSIONSCENARIO (COWl')
PR]RARYO-RING SEALS AI'IBCONTINUESTO ERODE
0 PRIMARYO-RING SEATS BY THE TIME PRESSUREREAQIES 200 PSI
0 FREE VOLUMEINCREASESlOX FROMPOINT "A" TO POITIT "C"
DUE TO MOTORPRESSURIZATIONAND JOINT EXPANSION
O I.iAJORITYOF O-RING EROSIONOCCURSDURING THIS PHASEUNTIL
PRESSUREEQUIUBRATION OCCURSAT APPROXIMATELY330MS
0 DEPTtl OF EROS;IONIS A FUNCTION OF GAS JET SIZE i.E.
SMALLER SIZE IIIGtlEREROSION
O AG7 (L.H.) GAS FATH 2,2 INCHES NEAR O-RING COFIPAREDTO
1.0 INCH ON A68 (R.II.)I.E. AREA RATIO = 4.8,ERGSION
DEPTIIRATIO = 3.SjAS._'_MINGFINAL AREA SA_ RATIO ,'_S
IIIITIAL
[Ref. 2 _6- I 8 of 1 1]
IIPH Pradictod Prossura gradiml{
7t] d_gTee Base P Fodiction Data
904
'I J
; _ i : i i i i i i
li
'[' B 0 g ...................................... J ............................................................................... _ ...........................................
_-"t .............. _;"...........i] J-'-_:'!"I {' .......... !i................... !i............. !i............... _i............... !!...................... i !ff............
i I _'," :. ! : : " : : i
: I ./ I : _ : i i :
r/i
o.-,-,-,_,1,_ ......... _..... ,,,,m,,-,-,-,i-_ ..... , .... -,-,r, ........ i.................. I......... ,
O. gO O. lO 0.20 0. 30 P.40 .0.50 O. bO 0.76 0.00 0.99 L.90
T i ,no. f_o.co'ad5}
[Ref. 2/2_-4. 9 of I1]
_SP, M IGB CENTER FIELD JOINT SQUEEZE
ANALYSIS WITH TEMPERATURE DIFFERENTIAL
,44. k'; of
'- /_-T= S3 °
AT ACRO._s _E_,LJMG, SuRF'S,c-r=. = 4 °
AXJr = KDAT_ = (_.3(I0-_) 14_.5"/ (4.) = 0.0018 e
Z
SQUEEZE WiTH TEMPERATURE- DIFFERENTIAL
PRIM __:_y
I_ 13 _/ INITi_,L STATIC
SQUEEZE = (-I"J3(.o.?.?3") - o.oo 18_ =o.o'*.'_'7 _ = 12.._33 _'-
S F_CO N D _R.y
(_ 4.8 _ tNITI_,L AT PRESSURE
-SC_UEE;"F__" (0.O48(0.2.'/3_-O.0018) = O.OI !:3"= 4-1 _ Irer-'-'"6-_ lo-r!4 I
NOTE: &T BP-,SED ON TEMPERI, TURE CYCLE WITH UNIFORM "r'EMPERA'I"U_
'AT 4-S.°! :'" AND AMBIENT TEMPER._TURE RAISED TO 64°FF..
ii
TFCIIHICIII. ISSIIE,(; (COllT)
tW"
TEMPERATURE EFFECTS ..-:/
•,'_
ii TI!ERH/_L,IIIALYSISSIIOI.'STIrAT THE girl;FOLLOI;S D,_II.YTEPIPBIATUIIES TO A _PTFI OF
FIVE" IIICIIES
0 PUTTY BECOMES SIlt:FEll ,11tl) LE_S TACI'Y
0 O-Rl_r, _ECOHE$ IIAlilJER
/tVIION o-riiE- If111170 DtlRI_r._ETERAT 711"F CAN IIICREASE TO 85 DUROMETER AT 20"I
TEMPER/_TI;Rf!PIIII)II 10 rl. lti:II DRI'PPEllTO ]7"F
0 TEt_,PERA11!I'.E.Rp I'FZE P.[DIjCED BY _ 1X [_lIE TO _. q'F l)ELTA [Ref. 2/2_i-.1 I1 of 14]
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TZQI. tSSUES (o0wr.)
FIELD JOINT O-RING SqI_k'ZE (Z) n
PRII_RY SEAl. SECONDAtY SEA1.
._tOl'OR I_D CTm _PT _ L'rR ATr
SRH 15 A (IT) |&.7 8.4 7.3 8.1
a (rr)
15.8
16,1
13.7 15.6 L4,7
12.7 I)o0 lb.7
7.3 8.6 9.6
7,0 8.8 6°2
6._ 6.8 6.2
a |_/]TIAL SOU]_'t_E B_.iE9 OI4 NEW Ot¢ LATEST |rEFURBISHEr) IIARIYJAP_ ACTUALS AND HINTHt|H O-RIN_ OI_IETER.
J* PRI O-RING DAMAGE DEPTII
[Ref. 2,2_-1 12 of !_]
'TECHNICAL ]SSUE5 -O_flrl._lUJ3))
Anmlym|m of Soot frrJm STS-51C L_t Forward P|eld Joint
906
FTIN
Hote: No H! Polymer,
No Fluorocarbon
det:cted
Fluoride (O-ring)
Sodlus (Grease)
_lagnesium (Asbestos,
tmCty)
Alu,,t mm (l'ropellant)
SII Icon (Asbestos.
putty)
Chloride (Propel lant
At' oc Sea kisser)
Calc Its (Grease)
Sulfur (Grease)
Fluorlda Ion Teoc
(±20Z)
Prlmry Cr_ve
. _. S_mple
l_2,, Water
Prement
I_renent
Present
HaJ or
Present.
Major
.._.-.-.
Minor
0.SZ
1_nd H_£_een
O-Rings
RD-2. _ater
Trace
Present
Present
Htn.r
Present
Ha]or
HI]war
1.67X
tle!ntLve amounts detectt.d. Seal"ring wtth r, rc'ate*tt
fro Jot
]fJnor
Present
Trace
Noue
'rang
Saaple
lID-2, I/ater
Polyester
(Putty)
Present
Prcsc_t
lItnor
Hlnor
Htnor
.aJo_._r
_llnor
2.lZ
Clevis
Polyester, | Polyester,
$_ster 1 _mter
_one
Small Trace
_aJor
Pre_,e_
_aJor
Preson_
None
_one
0.64Z
Nohe
Sm._ I Trace
Major
Trace
t_lor
None
None
None
[Ref. 2/26-4 13 of l l]
ORIGINAL PAGE'- !_
(]1r POOR QUALITY
FLIGIIT rlEATIINESSASSESSfqENT FOWlSTS-51E
n EVALUAI IOPISUMMARY
o STS-51C PRIHARY O'.'R,lr_O EROSION ON T_VOFIEI D JOINTS
b' $1S-51C SOD[ bETWEEN PRII.1AIIY AND SECOIil)ARY O'RUIGS ON BOTII FIELD J(IIIITS
PREDICTED AFTER STS-11 OBSERVATION, FIRST TIME OBSERVED
o EVIDENCE OF IIEAT AFFECT G_'I SEEOHDARYO'RI_IG OF AG8 (RIGItT IIArtD) CEtI1ER
FIFLD JOINT BUT NO EIIOSIOII - FIRST TIME IIEAT. AFFECT ON SECONDARY
O'P, ING HAS BEEN OBSERVED
o E[IIICI.USI nrl
o ST_-51._____CCO;ISISrErIT 1.11111ER()SIOPI DATA BASE
0 LOW IEflPEP,._TUI_EErlIIArlCEDPROBABILITY OF BLOW-BY - STS-51C EXPERIENCED
WORSt CASE TErlI'ERArUREEIIAIIGEIrlFLORIDA IIISTORY
n _I_S-51_ COUI_I) EXIIIBIT S_t_E REItAVIOR
o C"!!fIITION IS ACCI!I'IAI] [
SIS-5]E FIELD JOt{_l_ ARE ACCI!?IA_ 'E FOR Fl_lGIll'
Mol{yot el]IIOI'OL IRC_
[Ref. 2'26-4 l.l of 11]
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General Conclusions
• All O-ring erosion has occurred where gas paths in the vacuum putty are
formed
• Gas paths in the vacuum putty can occur during assembiy, leak check, or
during motor pressurization
• Improved filler materials or layup configurations which still allow a valid leak
check of the primary O-rings may reduce frequency of O-ring erosion but will
probably not eliminate it or reduce the severity of erosion
• Elimination of vacuum putty in a tighter joint area will eliminate O-ring erosion
if circumferential flow is not present - if it is present, some baffle arrangement
may be required
• Erosion in the nozzle joint is more severe due to eccentricity; however, the
secondary seal in the nozzle will seal and will not erode through
• The primary O-ring in the field joint should not erode through but if it leaks due
to erosion or lack of sealing the secondary seal may not seal the motor.
Data obtained on resiliency of the O.rings Indicate that
lower temperatures aggravate this problem
• The igniter Gask-O-Seal design is adequate providing proper quality
inspections are made to eliminate overfill conditions
0-15= [Ref. 2/26-5]
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/T]'| ASSESSMENT OF TEMPERATURE CONCERN OH $RM-25 (51L) LAUHCH
i i i ii
0 CALCULATIONS SIIOH THAT SRM-25 O-RINGS WILL BE 20" COLDER THAN SR_-IE O-RINGS
0 TEMPERATURE DATA NOT CONCLUSIVE OP PREDICTING PRIP_RY O-RING BLOH-BY
0 ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT IS TIIAT:
0 COLDER O-RINGS WILL HAVE INCREASED EFFECTIVE DUROMETER (UHARDER n)
0 mt_RDERm O-RINGS WILL TAKE LONGER TO _SEAT"
0 MORE GAS MAY PASS PR|HARY O-RING BEFORE THE.PRIMARY SEAL SEATS
(RELATIVE TO SRB-15)
0 DEMONSTRATED SEALING THRESHOLD IS 3 TIMES GREATER THAN 0.038"
EROSION EXPERIENCED ON SP_1-15
0 IF THE PRIMARY SEAL DOES NOT SEAT, THE SECONDARY SEAL WILL SEAT
0 PRESSURE HILL GET TO SECONDARY SEAL BEFORE THE METAL PARTS ROTATE
0 O-RING PRESSURE LEAK CHECK PLACES. SECONDARY SEAL IN OUTBOARD
POSITION HHICH MINIMIZES SEALING TIME
0 PIT] RECOMMENDS STS-SIL LAUNCH PROCEED ON 28 JANUAkY 1986
0 SJ_-2_ WILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFE:tENT FROM S_I.-_5
JM C KI_MiNSTER, ViCE PRESIDENT
_PACE BOOSTER PROGRAMS
[Ref. 2/26-6_
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TESTIMONY OF STANLEY REINARTZ. MANAGER, MARSHALL SHUTTLE PROJECTS
OFFICE: AND DR, JUDSON A. LOVINGOOD, DEPUTY MANAGER, MARSHALL SHUT-
TLE PROJECTS OFFICE
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Gentlemen, would you briefly identify yourselves and your position
and a brief history of your association with NASA?
MR. REINARTZ: All right, sir. I am Stanley Reinartz. I am currently manager of the Mar-
shall shuttle projects office, which incorporates the external tank, the space shuttle main
engine, and the solid rocket booster.
D
910
And my background:I originallywent to the Army BallisticMissileAgencyin 1957,after
graduatingfromtheUniversityofCincinnatiin 1956asanengineer.I joinedNASAin 1960and,
after a periodof work in thestructuresandmechanicslaboratory,I becamedeputyof the--after
beinga projectengineer,thenbecamedeputyof the Saturn1, 1B vehicleprojectoffice,then
movedinto beingdeputymanagerof the Skylabprojectfor approximatelyeight years,director
of the test laboratoryat Marshallfor a periodof threeyears,deputymanagerof the Spacelab
payloadprojectfor severalyears,anddeputydirectorof the specialprojectsoffice ibr a period
beforeI tookmy current
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positiononAugust31st,1985.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Mr. Lovingood.
DR.LOVINGOOD:Mr. Chairmanandmembersof theCommission:
I am JudsonA. Lovingood,deputymanagerof shuttleprojectsoffice.I havea bachelorof
sciencedegreein electricalengineeringfromtheUniversityof Alabamain 1958.
Upongraduating,I workedat Martin Marietta in Orlando,andthen I wentto Honeywell,
Incorporated,in Minneapolis.I receiveda masterof sciencedegreefrom the Universityof Min-
nesotain appliedmath.
I joinedNASAin 1962.Until 1967,I workedin dynamicsandflight control,guidanceand
celestialmechanics,in variouspositions.In 1967,NASAsentmeto schoolfor oneyear to com-
pletemydoctorof philosophy.
In 1969I becamechiefof the dynamicscontroldivisionof the aero-astrodynamicslaborato-
ry. In 1974I becamedirectorof thesystemsdynamicslaboratory.All of theabovepositionswere
in the Scienceand EngineeringDirectorateof the Marshall Center.The projectssupported
duringthisperiodwereprimarily Apollo,Skylab,andSpaceShuttle.
In 1979,I becamedeputymanagerof the
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shuttleprojectsoffice,and in Februaryof 1982I becamemanagerof the shuttlemain engine
project.And in October1983,whenthe mainengineprojectwasdividedinto separatedevelop-
mentandflight projectoffices,I againbecamedeputymanagerof theshuttle.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Thankyou.
Howdoyoutwogentlemenrelateto eachotherin termsof yourworkassignments?
MR.REINARTZ:I'm the managerof the projectsandJud is mydeputy,andhehasworked
manytechnicalitemsandwith his pastexperiencein the enginearea,I haveusedhim for that
advicein theenginearea.
CHAIRMANROGERS:All right. Andyour immediatesuperioris whom?
MR.REINARTZ:Dr. WilliamLucas,thedirectoroftheMarshallSpaceFlightCenter.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Now,wewouldlike to askyousomequestionsaboutwhenyouwere
first madeawareof thisproblemin connectionwith 51-L.Andyouknowwhatthe testimonyhas
been,sowedon'tnecessarilywantyou to repeatit all, but weareparticularlyinterestedin how
it happenedthat the decisionmakingpeople,at particularlythe LevelI and II, werenot made
awareof all of thesethingswehavebeentalkingaboutyesterdayandtoday.
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So will you--Mr. Reinartz, will you relate when you first heard about this problem and
what you did from that point on?
MR. REINARTL: All right, sir. With your permission, I would like to use my statement to
pick up those major points, if that is all right.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Sure, that's fine.
MR. REINARTZ: My recollections of the decision process on a summary basis for the launch
recommendation, Mr. Hardy and Mr. Mulloy have covered a lot of the detail of that and I will
show how [ interacted with that activity.
In regard to the launch recommendation process, I continue to believe that the activities
associated with this process, specifically the January 27th discussion between Thiokol and Mar-
shall, were conducted in a thorough and professional manner and in the NASA tradition of full
and open participation of the personnel necessary for appropriate disposition of the specific con-
cern.
And I think one of my roles in that was to see that that was carried out. It was a problem
being worked by the shuttle rocket booster, but I felt it was appropriate to see that that was
carried out in that manner, and made no indication of my feelings during the
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course of the discussions.
In the case of the 51-L, a concern was raised by Thiokol on the evening of January 27th, the
night before the planned launch, concerning possible effects of the predicted temperatures on
the solid rocket motor case-to-case field joint O-rings.
After this concern was raised, we set about an orderly and normal process set in motion to
assure a full examination of the concern and the engineering data and the rationale associated
with this concern. First we had an identification of this concern during the preliminary telecon
early in the evening, and during the course of that discussion we had very poor communications.
We were at a number of different locations and were scattered. And so we had a request for
Thiokol to supply their written data to us, and then we were to assemble all the necessary per-
sonnel at Marshall, Thiokol Wasatch in Utah, and those senior Thiokol project representatives
at KSC, to get a good telecon.
The senior 51-L Thiokol representative was Mr. A1 McDonald. Mr. Mulloy and I were the
senior Mar_:.hall project representatives on site. Dr. Lucas and Mr. Kingsbary were in the KSC
area for the launch the next day and had been at the 2:00 meeting that
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afternoon that set the plan for the next day.
Then, in an approximately two-hour meeting, Thiokol engineering personnel presented and
discussed material relating to their concern. As Mr. Hardy testifie& I believe Marshall thor-
oughly probed the data, and all parties had an opportunity to provide inputs and express their
views.
After the initial Thiokol recommendation to not launch until the temperature was at least
53 degrees, Mr. Mulloy, a,s he indicated, stated a rationale that he believed supported a launch
recommendation. I asked Mr. Hardy at that point for his comments. After Mr. Hardy's remarks,
to which he has testified earlier, including his clear and unequivocal statement to me, as well as
all parties on the line--it was not addressed just to Thiokol--a clear statement that he would
not recommend launch over Thiokol's objections, I then asked Mr. Kilminster for his comments
at that point.
Then Mr. Kilminster asked for a five-minute caucus. And I might say, Mr. Chairman, that
with that comment of Mr. Hardy's, I took that ms a very clear and direct thing, not only in dis-
cussing with Thiokol but to Mr. Mulloy as the project manager and to myself. And I look to the
science and engineering group for engineering recommendations, and have worked personally
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with Mr. Hardy for 25 years, and know that when he says he wouldn't launch that he means
exactly that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I don't think anybody has ever questioned that.
MR REiNARTZ: Yes, sir,Ijust wanted to emphasize that point,sir.
At the end of the two-and-a-half-hour period,including an approximately 35-minute-off-the-
loop Thiokol caucus, and after their recommendation, their finalrecommendation, to launch, I
collectivelyasked alltelecon partiesifthere were any disagreement with Thiokol's rationale and
recommendation as stated by Mr. Kilminster.
There were none received from Thiokol at Wasatch, Marshall at Huntsville,nor Mr. McDon-
ald,who was sittingwith Mr. Mu]loy and myself at KSC. Thioko] was then asked to document
their verbal rationale and launch recommendation statement, as isour normal practice.
Based on the process I described and the conclusions reached as a result of that process,
including the contractor recommendation and the Marshall engineering support, I concurred
with the "lecisionof the Level Ill project manager, Mr. Mulloy, supporting the launch recom-
mendation and continuing with the launch
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process.
Before going into my post-decisionactivities,which I am sure are of interestto the commit-
tee,I would like to amplify one portion. During the January 27th post-scrub discussions all Mar-
shall support elements and to my knowledge the contractor representatives at KSC were present
on the launch center-Marshall voice loop when I made a request for capability to support a 24-
hour turn-around capability, recognizing the colder predicted temperatures for the January 23th
launch.
The senior Thiokol program representative has a duty station on the 1oo,_ at KSC, did not
provide any input on the loop or to the physically adjacent Marshall SRB reprosentative regard-
ing any items that should be looked into while proceeding with the launch preparation.
During the two-and-a-half-hour telecon between Thiokol and Marshall, extended over that
time--it was muted for approximately 30 minutes--I would characterize the presentation and
associated discussions as deliberate and intense, and a professional engineering examination of
the data, and not highly heated or emotional. And no heated protest was injected into the open
discussion by the senior Thiokol representative at KSC during that two-and-a-half-hour
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period.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Isn't it true, though, that you were made aware, because you lis-
tened to that conference, that Thiokol had recommended no launch, and that they were almost
unanimous at that time in recommending no launch?
MR. REINARTZ: No, sir, your statement about nearly unanimous was not a bit of knowl-
edge that I had in that time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How man) _ the Thiokol people on that telecon voted in favor of
launch?
MR. REINARTZ: As far as I know, sir, there wasn't any voting at that time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, maybe not a vote, but I mean the expressions that were made
by the Thiokol people up u q_i] the time of the recess. Information we have is there was nobody
on the Thiokol side that was t_rging a launch.
Do you remember anybody that urged a launch on the part of Thiokol up to that point?
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_MR.REINARTZ:No,sir. Tbeydidnotvoteor provide--
CHAIRMANROGERS: I'm not talking about a vote. I'm talking about did anybody express
a view, we think you should launch the shuttle, the Challenger, at
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that point?
MR. REINARTZ: They had provided a recommendation that it. not be launched below 53
degrees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did anybody in the telecon say, we disagree, we think you. should go
ahead and launch?
MR. REINARTZ: No. sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So as far as you knew based upon what was said, it seemed to be a
unanimous view of the Thiokol people on the telecon that they were recommending no launch?
MR. REINARTZ: At that point in time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is what I asked.
MR. REINARTZ: At that point in time, yes, sir.
The senior Thioku representative at KSC did inject one significant comment just after--as I
have said, Mr. Kilminster has asked for a caucus; just after he asked for this caucus, at about
the two hour juncture in this discussion. This comment by Mr. McDonald was perceived, I be-
lieve, by all parties and, I believe, as testified by Thiokol in the hearings yesterday, as a support-
:,ng point for a positive launch recommendation, or at least a positive point.
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He did not make a statement, I recommend launch. Mr. McDonald said that Mr. Kilminster
should consider a point made by Mr. Hardy earlier, that the secondary O-ring is iv_ the proper
position to seal if blow-by of the primary O-ring occurred. And I believe that M,r. Hardy tried to
elaborate on the importance of the secondary ()-ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Reinartz, during the caucus did_'t you have a discussion with
Mr. McDonald where he voiced his strong opposition to the launch:
MR. REINARTZ: Mr. McDonald during that time of the period that we were on that, he
discussed some of the same concerns that were covered during the telecon and had talked about
some of those concerns during that time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And weren't those concerns--didn't that--didn't you draw the con-
clusion from that that he was opposed to the launch?
MR. REINARTZ: At that point I did not draw that conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that he was
completely opposed to the launch, having made the statement that you should consider the sec-
ondary seal.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Didn't he recommend at that time to you that the launch be delayed
until late in the afterroon, until the temperatures reached 48 or 50?
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MR, REINARTZ: I'm not sure whether that was done during the caucus, as Mr. Mulloy had
,_,lked this morning, whether that was during the caucus or whether that was in the statement
that Mr. McDonald made after the telecon was complete, where he said that there were these
three things that might be considered for a launch delay.
I'm not sure of that, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you're not really trying to convince the Commission that you
didn't know that Mr. McDonald had serious questions about the launch and didn't really want
the launch to occur, are you?
9[4
MR.REINARTZ:No,sir. I'm trying to relaywhatcameacrossthat eveningduring thedis-
cussion, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Go ahead.
MR. REINARTZ: Marshall elements in Huntsville and those elements at KSC, of course, as
has been testified, had no knowledge of the internal Thiokol discussions during the 30 to 35-
minute caucus that preceded their launch recommendation. At that point and to my knowledge,
Mr. McDonald, who had indicated, as you had stated, some concerns, as far a:_ I know did not
take that opportunity to inject any of his thoughts or concerns via private telephone input into
the internal
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Thiokol discussions that were going on during that caucus.
As stated earlier, when I asked all the parties collectively if there were any disagreements
with the final Thiokol recommendation that I received from Mr. Kilminster, there was no state-
ment or comment from Mr. McDonald, at that time sitting with Mr. Mulloy and myself here at
the Cape.
Now, I would like to discuss--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And so your testimony is that, after the decision was made, you
were satisfied that Mr. McDonald had no question in his mind, that he went along with the
decision to launch?
MR. REINARTZ: At the point, Mr. Chairman, when I asked very clearly and very deliber-
ately on the telecon, while all parties were involved, I asked if there were any disagreements to
all the p_rties, including Mr. McDonald, who was sitting right across from me, and there was no
comment, no objection or anything raised at that time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I accept that. But later on didn't you know he continued to object
and there was a lot of opposition on the part of the Thiokol people?
MR. REINARTZ: I did not know of the lot of opposition of the Thiokol people.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you know that he opposed?
MR. REINARTZ: After the lat.nch, as Mr. Mulloy testified--or, excuse me, sir. Not after the
launch, but after the telecon, Mr. McDonald said, after we had completed and hung up he said,
well, if there was not sufficient reason related to the concerns on O-ring temperature, then how
about the ice situation, and how about the recovery sea state.
And Mr. Mulloy testified as to the comments to the ice situation and to the _ecovery situa-
tion, and we participated jointly, which was the next item I was going to discuss--we participat-
ed jointly in a telecon with the KSC personnel and Mr. Aldrich about the possible loss of SRB
parachutes and frastums resulting from that sea state.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But Mr. McDonald testified yesterday under oath that he had a dis-
cussion with you and pointed out there were three reasons why he opposed the launch, and one
was the O-rings and the other two were the things that you mentioned.
Didn't you know that?
MR. RE:NARTZ: Yes, sir. I said that he stated that, if--the way that I recall he stated it, he
said: If that is not enough of a concern for you, is
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! be!;eve the way he said it, then if I were launch director there were three things, that there
would be that and then the other two that he named.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Mr. Reinartz,the _'easonI'm pressingyou,asI amsureyouknow,
it's verydifficult for the Commissionto understandhowthis seriousmatterwasdiscussedby so
manypeoplejust prior to the launch,and therestill wereseriousquestions,obviously,in the
mindsof a lot of people,howthoseconcernswerenot conveyedto the peoplewhohadto make
theultimatedecisionwhetherthe shuttlewouldbelaunchedor not.
That iswhat isverydifficult tbr usto understand.
MR.REINARTZ:I canappreciatethat, Mr. Chairman,the difficulty that youare having,
andthe people,eachoneof us,collectivelygoingbackto that pointin time.
But I think it is importantto differentiatebetweena coupleofitems.Wehadtheknowledge
that evening,Mr. Chairman,of the datathat Thiokolpresentedin their chartsandthe discus-
sionthat wasin that t_,lecon.I did not knowof anymemosthat hadbeencirculated,that have
beennowsaidtheywerecirculatedto somelevelswithin Thiokol.I hadnoneof
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that knowledge.
I hadnoneof the knowledgeof anydissension that was going on within the internal discus-
sion at Thiokol. None of that was available.
Mr. McDonald had the opportunity to inject anything into that Thiokol internal if he chose
to. As far as I know, there was nothing constraining him. And the only thing that I had, after
the results that I had, the recommendation from the Thiokol program manager, I had the Mar-
shall engineering support of that activity, and I had the SRB manager's decision that he wanted
to proceed, which I concurred with.
And those were the inputs that I had that evening at that point in time. And then Mr.
McDonald said--he did not make any statement that said, hey, I want to go take this to anybody
else, or I have a difficulty with this.
He said: If I was launch director, these are the things that I would be considering for tomor-
row.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I reall:_ don't intend to make it just a matter of Mr. McDonald and
you. It is much more serious than that, it seems to me. Let's assume that you were satisfied with
all of the paperwork, and let's assume when you got the telefax you said: Ah, we've got the piece
of paper from Thiokol.
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Knowing what you knew, didn't you have in your own mind some question about the
wisdom of going ahead with the launch? Or were you totally satisfied that there was no prob-
lem?
MR. REINARTZ: I was satisfied that there was not a flight safety problem, based on the
discussion and the advice that I got related to that. That was made up of two parts: the final
recommendation from Thiokol program manager and the input from the Marshall engineering
people, as detailed by Mr. Hardy.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: At the time of the te!econ and before you got the piece of paper tele-
faxed, listening to the arguments, didn't you have some concern about the safety of that launch?
MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir. I have concerns about the safety of every launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I mean, this one, a little more so on this one. Did you ever have
a situation where the recommendation from the contractor was no launch and then they
changed their mind as a result of urging on the part of NASA?
MR. REINARTZ: I would like to answer that question in two parts, if I may. I am not
aware--I have not personally participated in that exact situation as you described.
916
®
MICROCOt"Y RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 10101
(ANSI lind ISO TEST CHART No. 2)
.&
1677
And secondly, I did not urge, nor do I think my people urged, Thiokol to change their recom-
mendation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I will withdraw that part of the question. Do you ever remember or
do you know of any situation where the contractor at any time recommended no launch and
subsequently changed their minds?
MR. REINARTZ: I do net : ecall personally being in that situation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And wouldn't that call to your attention the seriousness of the situa-
tion?
MR. REINARTZ: The seriousness of the situation was certainly recognized and examined by
us. Bat I think it is important to understand at the same ti_,_e that we--that Thiokol had indi-
cated to us during the telecon that they were still working the problem, as I think has been
testified to by Thiokol, that there were some parallel activities going on at the same time that
was being worked.
And the only---when I asked for comments to Thiokol, I was not asking for a change of deci-
sion. I was wanting to be sure that all of their activities that they had been working somewhat
in parallel, as I think has come out in the testimony, that that had all been
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completed and they had come up with a final recommendation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess the question that still lingers in my mind is, in the Navy we
used to F¢e an expremion about going by the book, and I gather you were going by the book.
But doesn't the Frocess require some judgment?
Don't you have to use common sense? Wouldn't common sense require that you tell the deci-
sionmakers about this serious problem that was different from anything in the past?
MR. REINARTZ: In looking at that one, Mr. Chairman, together with Mr. Mulloy when we
looked at were there any launch commits, any Level IL as I perceived during the telecon, I got
no disagreement _'oncerning the Thiokol launch between any of the Level III elements, the con-
tractor, with Mr. McDonald there.
I felt that the Thiokol and Marshall people had fully examined that concern, and that it had
been satisfactorily dispoeitioned based upon the evidence and the data that was supplied to that
decision process on that evening, from that material, and not extraneous to what else may have
been going on within Thiokol that I had no knowledge of.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Thank you. I'm sorry
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for the long interruption.
MR. REINARTZ: Based upon--and as we skipped over, it isonly a point to illustrate,_J.r.
Ch_rrnan, that in our discussion about the parschute with KSC and Mr. Aldrich, was to indi-
cate that there was a clear area there where we had a very direct respomzibilityto inform them
of the situation,which Mr. Mulloy did.And after a discussionof that issue,Mr. Aldrich conclud-
ed that the launch should proceed in that nature.
Based on the resultsof the meeting and the conclusions out of the meeting, Mr. Mulloy and
I informed the director of Marshall, Dr. Lucas, and the director of science and engineering, Mr.
Kingsbury, on the 28th of January about 5:00 of the initialThiokol concerns and engineering
recommendations, the fmsl Thiokol launch recommendation, and the fullsupport of the Mar-
shallengineering for the launch recommendation, that Ifelthad led to a successfulresolution of
thisconcern.
m . -- ........
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GENERAL KUTYNA: Could Iinterruptfo a minute? You informed Dr. Lucas.He ism _m
the reportingchain?
MR. REINARTZ: No, sir.
GENERAL KUTYNA: IfI coulduse an analogy,ifyou want to reporta fireyou don'tgo to
the mayor.
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In his positionas centerdirector,Dr. Lucas was cut out of the reportingchain,much likea
mayor. Ifitwas impor*,antenough to reporttohim, why didn'tyou go through the firedepart-
ment and go up your decisionchain?
MR. REINARTZ: That,General Kutyna, isa normal courseof our oper3tingmode within
the center,that I keep Dr. Lucas informed of my activities,be they thistype ofthing or other.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But you did thatat 5 o'clockin the morning. That'skind ofearly.It
would seem that's important.
Why didn't you go up the chain?
MI_ REINARTZ: No, sir. That is the time whey. we go iN, basically go into the launch, and
so it was not waking him up to tell him that informs_on. It was when we go into the launch in
the morning.
And based upon my assessment of the situation as dispositioned that evening, for better or
worse,Idid not perceiveany e!_-_trrequirementforinteractionwith Level If,as the concern was
worked and dispesitionz_iw th fullagreement among all responsiblepartiesas to that agree-
ment.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did Iunderstand what you justsaid,thatyou toldDr. Lucas thatall
the
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engineersat Thiokolwere in accord?
MR. RVJNARTZ: No, sir.What I toldhim was ofthe initi_Thiokolconcernsthat we had
and the initialrecommendation and the finalThiokolrecommendation and the rationaleassoci-
atedwith thatrecommendation,and the factthatwe had the fullsupportofthe seniorMarshall
engineeringand, as George has testified,to the extensivenessofthe group ofpeoplewe had in-
volvedin thatteleconwith the variousdisciplines,thatthosethree elements made up the final
recommendation.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Reinartz,are you tellingus thatyou in factare the person who made the
decisionnot toescalatethisto a Level IIitem?
MR. REINARTZ: That iscorrect,sir.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you think the system shouldbe changed now? Do you think that
thisCommission shouldmake a recommendation to correctthatwhat appearstobe inadequacy?
MR. REINARTZ: Iwould not givea very quick,off-thecuffanswer to that,Mr. Chairman. I
would likethe opportunityto study that questionsome beforeI would recommend any major
changes tothe system.
DR. RIDE: Did you discusswi_ Dr. Lucas at
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allthe possibilityofreportingittoArnie Aldrich?
MR. REINARTZ: No, ma'am, Idid not.
DR. RIDE: Did anyone recommend toyou thatyou reportitto Mr. Aldrich?
MR. REINARTZ: No, Dr. Ride,theydid not.
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DR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, can Ifollowup on that?
Mr. Lovingood,in your personal notes providedto the committee,you indicatedthat you
toldMr. ReinartztoadviseAldrichofthe conference.Can you tellus exactlywhat you toldhim?
DR LOVINGOOD: Yes, I think the way Stan justanswered that question,I didn'tadvise
Stem sE_erthe8:45EasternTime telecontoadviseMr. Aldrich.When we terminatedthe telecon,
Stan and I didn'ttalkany more. When we had the earlyeveni-_gtelecon,thatbegan at,Ithink
!twas, 4:45Huntsvilletime--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which day?
DR. LOVINGOOD: On the 27th.
Then everybody has mentioned thatwe had a bed hookup. We had peopleat home and we
didn'thave the chartsthere so that we could clearlyfollowthe data.I probablycould hear
betterthan anybody,becauseIwas in my officeand Ihad a good tie-inwith Wasatch.
And on the basisofthatdiscussion,Ifelt
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likewe were probablyapproachinga launch delay,and thatiswhy Isuggestedthen on thatloop
thatwe plan to have a latermeeting,and we needed to get the chartsin there so we couldsit
down and carefullygo through allthe dataand assessit.
Aftercompletingthatteleconand then makingmand everyone agreeingto meet at certain
locationsand have the subsequentteleconthatevening,IcalledStan at the motel and Isuggest-
ed tohim thathe go ahead and alertArnie atthatpoint.
ROGERS: "Arnie" being?.
DR. LOVINGOO[k. Arnie Aldrich. At that point that we were having the meeting, and thet
we were going to get together within the center and decide what to do, and then prepaze Arnie
for getting Level I together and then going on up the line.
But what I was looking at then was, I was thinking that there was a goc_t pessibi]ity of a
launch delay.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Of a what?
DR. LOVINGOOCk. Of a launch delay.
Now, I neve."toldStart,ifwe don'tdelay the launch then go to Arnie.I never made that
recommendation tohim. Imade the recommendation at the time itappeared to me that,we we_
coming up on a
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clelay.
(THAIR_ ROGERS: Mr. Reinartz,,do you remember him advisingyou thatyou letMr.
Aldrichknow?
MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir,earlierin the evening.As he indicated,on the teleconat that
tin.'eI had felt,as he indicated,we had had a very poorcommunica .ion,we did not have a good
undel_ding ofthe situation,and Ifeltitwas nece_ary, Mr. Chairman, to geta fulland com-
pleteundersmndlng ofthe situation,and would proceedfrom there.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I was addressingmy qtmstionto whether you remember being
advisedtoletMr. Aldrichkncw, and ifso why didn'tyou lethim know?
MR. REINARTZ: As I indicated,I feltthat we needed--thatwe did not have a fallunder-
standing of the situationas I understood itat that time,and feltthat was appropriateto do
beforewe involvedthe LevelH intothe system.
So Iguess,in my briefconclusion,Mr. Chairman, thatfrom the viewpointas a participant
in thatJanuary 27th telecon,Ibelievedt.hathe totalThiokoland Marsb_dl teams performed in
a responsiblemanner, based upon the knowledge thatIhad,in the
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continuation of the dedicated professional approach by which these issues involving the space
shuttle are addressed and resolved through an engineering and managerial assessment of the
data to determine if the vehicle was ready and safe to fly.
I be!ieve the process was appropriate and that the concern was dispositi_ned in the pr )per
manner. I did not perceive, nor did I personally exert, any pressure on Thiokol. I stayed basical-
ly out of the telecon, as a listener, trying to discern the situation, and did not believe that I was
exerting pressure on Thiokol.
Now, I might say, Mr. Chairman, that in light of your question, in hindsight it may have
been better to inform Level II of the decisions, since they would--however, since they would only
know what we knew from our side of the loop, it is sort of speculetive on my part to consider
what they would have done with the data that we had reported, t:onsidering at that point in
time we had a final launch recommendation from the contractor and the concurrence by the
Marshall engineering people. That would be the normal checkpoints that would be asked by
Level II in the event of some discussion of a decision.
CHAIRMAN ROGER_: I guess you realizethat
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this morning we had testimony to the effectthat, from Mr. Hardy, that had he known that all of
the engineers at Tbiokol were stillopposed to the launch, that his decision might have been
different.In fact,I think he said itwould have been different.
So there again, it seems to me at least that there was a failure of the process. And you
reliedon _he telefaxfrom Mr. Kilminster, and Mr. Hardy and others didn't real_ that all the
engineers at Thiokol were against the launch even then. So that that information never got to
you and itnever got to Mr. Moore or Mr. Aldrich.
MR. REINARTZ: You are correct,Mr. Chairman, and I think the question that you raised,
be itfor this issueor many others,will be the question relatingto internal processes used within
the contractors or within government agencies by which a final decision is arrived at. And I
think that is entirely appropriate.
DR. RIDE: Did you appreciate that this was a Criticality 1 system that was being discussed?
MR. REINARTZ: Yes, Dr. Ride, I did.
MR. S_R: When you get ready to launch you've got to look at the main power plants,
the tank, the whole system. But did NASA perceive that this joint maybe was sub-marginal com-
pared to the rest of the
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system, or did you assume it was business as usual?
MR. REINARTZ: No, sir. I think that how I would like to answer that is, within the total
shuttle system there are a number of iss,les and problems with hardware being worked at any
one time, and we had some that were being worked across the board in engines, and th_s one--
MR. SUTrER: But not as critical as this item?
MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir, we have items that represent single point failures across the
system. As Mr. Mulloy indicated, there is a number in his. There is a substantial number.
MR. SU'IWER: And are there changes that are anticipated to brin_ them up to a better
level, like the joint?
MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir. There are capability improvements that are going on in all of our
systems at this point in time.
MR. SUT_R: Capability improvements?
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MR. REINARTZ" That would improve--excuse me. Let me say, that would improve their
safety margins, are going on at this time.
MR. SUTTER: I would like to see a li_.of what tho_e items are and prioritizethem, and
where
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would that jointbe on that list?
MR. REINARTZ: I co',Idgive you a list.It would be after the fact,any prioritizingI would
do, Mr. Sutter.
MR. SU'I'rER: Well, the reason I ask that question isthat when you listento Thiokol they
reallygave me the impression that that joint was in serious difficulty,and they mentioned the
two meetings and they mentioned the short-term and the middle-term and the long-term
changes.
And some of their engineers expressed--well, you read their lettersnow. Maybe they never
showed them to you. But again, isthere a communication gap, with one engineering department
saying itisokay and another one saying we've got great concerns?
I stillthink, ffthere was a total communications system going on, anybody that would-be
facing that situationwould have a tough time saying go. And so I reallythink there isa serious
communication and management problem here.
MR. REINARTZ: During the discussion from the August time frame, Mr. Sutter,the discus-
sions continued for each one of the launches that were associated from that time frame. And the
Thiokol personnel--and I do not know at what point that stopped or started--
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presented to the system, to Marshall, to headquarters, and all the rest of the system, the fact
that that booster as itexisted was completely safe and reliablefor launching while these con-
cerns about O-rings were being worked in a parallelfashion.
MR. SLrI'rER: Well, I may be Monday morning quarterbacking, but the way I read the
Thiokol engineers, they knew of these concerns in the joint,.qnd the Priority 1,the 1R and the
blow-by, and I reallythink that they were getting themselves in a v_sition where they suddenly
got to a point where they now were outside of the area where they i_adthe experience, and they
just sort of said enough was enough.
They built up a real concern themselves, and I'm surprised tl'.eydidn't build up that same
concern in the engineers at NASA.
MR. REINARTZ: Going back in hindsight, Mr. Sutter, I'm surprised that the day before,
where we were scheduled to launch and itwas in the approximately 40 degrees, Thiokol raised
no issue regarding O-ring temperature joints.
MR. SIYFrER: Itseems there'sa communications gap here.
MR. REINARTZ: I just said that I was surprised in hindsight that they had not raised that,
in
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lightof the subsequent discussionsof Monday evening.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Reinartz, I would like to understand your analysis of the technical
issues. Mr. Hardy has stated that in his view perhaps the major cause of blow-by were imperfec-
tions in the seals and the sealing surfaces, and I think that that may very well be the case.
There are certainly strong reasons to think that.
Did you in fact also think that and therefore feel that temperature was really not a signifi-
cant parameter?
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MR. REINARTZ: Dr. Walker, you've had several O-ring experts and other people that have
spent theircareersin detailedengineeringactivities.Ido not qualifymyselfas a sealexpert,but
I listenedvery carefullyto the reasonsand the rationalethatwas generatedduringthe course
ofthatdiscussionand during Mr. Hs.,ziy'scomments and discussion,and reliedvery.heavilyon
the combinationofthe contractor'srecommendation and the engineeringrecommendation ofthe
peoplethatIhave worked with formany years.
DR. WALKER: But did you have an opinionas to why Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy did not
agreethattempera,*urewas a very importantparameter? |mean, thatwas reallythe c,ux ofthe
matter.
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MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir, I did have an opinion on that, and the fact that, b_qed upon the
range at which blow-by had occurred on the various motors and flight experience, and based
upon the fact that it appeared from that data that there was not a correlation with temperature
and tLe incipient blow-by, and the whole point of our evening discussion, that we were--a
narrow' issue that Thiokol raised that evening to discuss was the question of whether or not the
primary ring would take longer to seat and therefore increase the risk of blowoby, the longer
seating being from the cold temperature.
And during that, that was a possibility that Thiokol and ourselves had acknowledged. The
condition of blow-by was a condition that had been acknowledged for the past year in all the
flight readiness reviews, that that was a possibility that could occur.
DR. WALKER: Let's suppose that Thiokol was incorrect and that temperature was not
really an important parameter. Did you feel that you wanted to understand this situation and
therefore develop an alternative theory which would exulain the blow-by data?
And presumably, Mr. Hardy had done that in his own mind. He was convinced imperfec-
tions and other
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sorts of--imperfections and the nicks and what have you in the surfaces were the real cause..)id
you inquire or ask for that analysis so that you would understand why the Thiokol analysis was
an incorrect one, or at least incorrect in the opinion of Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Herdy?
MR. REINARTZ: I thiv.k, Dr. Walker, that the discussion as I understood was centered
around the ability of the prim_y O-rin_ to seal and that blow-by might occur in the timir_. I
think Mr. Hardy, where he talked about the effects, said there could be several reasons why you
might be able to lose, I think, iv response to a proposed failure scenario that was suggested
about the black puff of smoke, saying that there could be other things that might have caused a
defectiveness on the ring, that it was not just temperature-originated.
And those other defects, yes, sir, I was aware that there could be possible other defects that
might cause that.
DR. WALKER: So were you satisfied,then,that there was enough understanding of the
causes of blow-by so that you weren't really concerned and you were able to feel that the tem-
perature problem raised by Thiokol could be laid to rest because you understood what was
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going on well enough to know that that temperature concern was really not a legitimate one?
MR. REINARTZ: The conclusion that the temperature was not a major factor and that we
would not see increased launch risk as a result of that, yes, sir, that was my conclusion.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Lovingood, you were the one who was actually contacted by the resident
manager of Marshall at Kennedy to set up the early afternoon telecon, is that right?
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DR. LOVINGOOD: That'scorrect.
DR. KEEL: And then you and Mr. Rein_-rtzboth pa,ticipatedin thatearlyafternoontele-
conference?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes. Stan was in themotel.
DR. KEEL: But Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy did not?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Mr. Hardy was at home and had a very bad connectic,n.In fact,a lotof
what I did in that teleconwas I was tryingto relayinformationfrom what was being saidat
V_a_tch to Hardy, and then what Hardy said back to Wasatch guys.
DR. KEEL: So Hardy was on it, but had a poor connection?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes, he had a very bad
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ConneCtion.
DR. KEEL: And Mr. Mulloy was not on it?
DR. LOVINGOOD: That is correct.
DR. KEEL: You just indicated earlier that, based upon that teleconference, you thought
there was a good poesibility of delay. Is that what Thiokol was recommending then, was delay?
DR. LOVlNGOOI_. That is the way I heard it, and they were talking about the 5142 experi-
ence and the fact that they had exporienced the worst case blow-by as far as the are and the soot
and 8o forth. And also, they talked about the resiliency data that they had.
So it appeared to me--and we didn't have all of the proper people there. That was another
aspect of this. It appeared to me that we had bettor sit down and get the data so that we could
understand exactly what they were talking about and assees that data.
And that is why I suggem_l that we go ahead and have a tolecon within the center, so that
we could review that.
DR. KEEL: So as early as after that first afternoon conference at 5:45, it appeared that
Thiokol was basically saying delay; is that right?
DR. LOVlNGOOD: That is the way it came across to me. I don't know how other people
perceived it, but
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that's the way it came ac_ to me.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Reinartz, how did you perceive it?
MR. REINARTZ: I did not perceive it that way- I perceived that they were raising some
questions and issues which required looking into by all the right parties, but I did not perceive it
as a recommendation to delay.
DR. KEEL: Some prospects for delay?
MR. REINARTZ: Yea, sir, that poesibility is always there.
DR. II_L: Did you convey that to Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy before the 8:15 conference?
MR. REINARTZ: Yes, I did. And as a matter of fact, we had a discussion. Mr. MuUoy was
just out of communication for about an hour, and then after that I got in contact with him and
we both had a short disctmsion relating to the general nature of the concerns with Dr. Lucas and
Mr. Kingsbury at the motel before we both departed for the telecon that we had set up out at
the Cape.
DR. KEEL: But based upon that, Mr. Lovingood, that impremion, you thought it was a sig-
nificant enough po_ibility that Mr. Aldrich should have been contacted?
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DR.KEEL: In addition, did you recommend that Mr. Lucas, who is director of Marshall, of
course, and Mr. Kingsbury, who is Mr. Hardy's boss, participate in the 8:15 conference?
DR. LOVINC_:)OD: Yes, I did.
DR. KEEL: And you recommended that to whom?
DR. LOVINGOOD: I believe I said that over the net° I said that I thought we ought to have
an inter-center meeting involving Dr. Lucas and Mr. Kingsbury, and then plan to go on up the
line to Level II and Level I.
And then it was after we broke off that first telecon I called Stan at the motel and told him
that he ought to go ahead and alert Arnie to that possibility.
DR. KEEL: And Mr. Reinartz, you then visited the motel room of Mr. Lucas with M;. i_Angs-
bury, and also was Mr. Mulloy with you then?
MR REINARTZ: Yes, he was, sir. In the first couple of minutes I believe ! was there by
myself, and then Mr. Mulloy joined us.
DR. KEI_L: And did you discuss with them Mr. Lovingood's recommendation that the two of
them, Lucas and Kingsbury, participate?
MR. REINARTZ: No, sir. I don't recall
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discussing Mr. Lovingcod's recommendations. I discussed with them the nature of the te!econ,
ti_e nature of the concerns raised by Thiokol, and the plans to gather the proper technical sup-
pore people at Marshall for examination of the data.
And I believe that was the essence of the di_u_ion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you didn't recommend that the information be given to Level II
or Level I?
MR. REINARTZ: I don't recall that I raised that issue with Dr. Lucas. I told him what the
plans were for proceeding. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, making any statement regarding that.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Lovingood and Mr. Reinar*,z.
DR. LOVING(_')D: Sir, could I make a brief statement concerning the telecon?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Sure.
DR. LOVINGOOD: I would like to read this into the record to give my point of view of the
8:30 teleoon.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: ires, please do, and I didn't realize that you had something you
wanted to submit, but go right ahead.
DR. LOVINGOOD: I did not perceive during the discussion of January 27 anyone demand-
ing or even requecting that Morton Thiokol prove to NASA that it was not safe to fly. The pre_
entntion by Morton 'l,_iokol was intended to convey data relating to the effect low temperatures
might have on the O-riugs sealing, and the ensuing discussions were perceived by me to be an
attempt to tmderstand precisely what they were saying. This approach is characteristic of all
NASA-contractor discussions, regardless of the nature of the issue or the nature of the data
being presented.
As Mr. Mulloy has testified, we had previously established a rationale for safe flight in the
light of O-ring erosion and blow-by. I was listening intently to
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the discussions to determine if the data presented that night altered that rationale. However,
the bottom line had to be the following. If the decision was made to fly, a rationale for safe
flight, including the new information we had, would have to be stated and assessed. I believe it
was a consensus among NASA personnel involved, and cert_ inly it was my position, that if
Morton Thiokol recommended we not launch, we should not launch.
The rationale for safe flight was stated over the network by Mr. Mulloy, as he has testified.
ARer Morton Thiokol made theix recommendation not to fly, Mr. Hardy supported Mulloy and
stated why, and of course, he has testified to that, why in his opinion the rationale was still
valid in light of the _ data. There was no pressure on MTI to change their recommendation.
After Mulloy and Hardy had spoken,Mr. Reinartz,in what I perceivedto be a very politetone
of voice,asked Joe Kilminsterifhe wanted to respond to Mulloy'sand Hardy's comments. At
thistime Kilminsterasked forthe five-minutecaucus.
After the caucus,Kilminsterpresentedthe MTI recommendation to launch.I understood
the MTI positionbeing thateven ifthe data concerningcoldtemp effectson the O-ringswere
correct,the riskofa slowprimary
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O-ringwas increased,but the riskwas not su_hstantiallydifferentfrom STS 5142.The key tothe
rationaleforsafeflightwas thatifthe primary ring experiencedblow-by dur._ ignition,the
secondarysealwould experiencethe pre_ure and would sealpriortojointrotation,and that
has been elaboratedon quitea bit,Ithink.
MR. sUTrER: There isa waiver sayingdon'tdepend on the secondaryseal.Within allthe
NASA ground rulesforlaunch,how couldyou acceptthatrationale?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Excuse me, sir.Let me tryto explainthe way Iunderstand thatwaiver,
and therehave been a lotofpeopledoingthat.
The waivers_ysthere are two conditionsyou have tohave beforeyou don'thave redundan-
cy.One of them iswhat ! calla spatialconditionwhich says thatthe dimensionaltolerances
have tobe _uch thatyou geta bad stackup,you don'thave propersqueeze,etc.,on the O-ring,so
thatwhen you getjointrotation,you willlifthe metal surfacesoffthe O-ring.All right,that's
the one condition,and thatisa worst caseconditioninvolvingdimensionaltolerances.
The otherconditionisa temporal conditionwhich saysthatyou have tobe pastthe pointof
joint
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rotation,and ofcourse,thatrelatesback to what Ijustsaid,thejointhas to rotate.
So firstof all,ifyou don'thave thisbad stackup,then you have fullredundancy.Now, sec-
ondiy,ifyou do have the bad stackup,you have redundancy duringthe ignitiontransientup to
the 170 millisecondpointor 300 millisecondpoint,whatever itis,but that isthe way I under-
stand the CIL.
MR. SUTYER: That is not what I understand a waiver means.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Go ahead.
DR. LOVINGOOD: I would like to emphasize that in my opinion NASA was asking itself
and MTI whether there was any re, ion not to expect a safe flight. As far as I was aware at the
time,everyoneconcludedthat it was safeto proceed.
Now, I would liketoadd tothat:Iwould liketorespond tothe questionthatyou asked Mr.
Reinartzconcerningwould Ihave concludedat the end ofthe first,at the caucus,at the begin-
ning of the caucus,would I have concluded that the recommendation by Thiokol engineering
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was unanimous? I would not have. I have been working tbr NASA almost 24 year_., and I have
seen many oc. _,,i ns where there have been differences within our own eng_meering within
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NASA. I was in engineering. I was in ScAence and Engineerin$' for 18 years before coming to the
project office; many occasions where there have been differences or opinion looking at the same
data, different conclusions. I have seen differences between contractc, rs, and in particular, I
worked very closely with Rocketdyne as Engine Project Manager, and I have seen many occa-
sions where the Rocketdyne engineers and the NASA er4sdneers locked at the same data and
reached different conclusions.
So in fact, since Thiokol was recommending not to launch, I would not have concluded thet
their engineering was unanimo-tsly opposed to launch. Ov the other hand, when they came back
to launch, perhaps incorrectly I _ncluded that they were all for "it,that it was unanimous. I had
no reason to believe otherwise.._d I never did know that they weren't unanimous until after
the launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, thank you very much.
Unless there are questions, we appreciate it.
DR. KEEL: If we could have Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Davis and Colonel Kolczynski.
(Witnesses sworn.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Gentlemen, we understand that you three have been designated or
were designated
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as the Ice Team that worked at Kennedy Space Center, and worked in connection with the
launch of the Challenger.
Would you give the Commission some knowledge about yourselves and how you operated,
and then tellus in narrativeform what happened on the day--we!l,on the 27.,tnand 28th,ifyou
will.Did you startworking on the 28thon thisor didyou work on the 27th,too?
7
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February 25, 1986
MR, CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION
I am Stanley Relnartz, Manager of the Marshall Space Flight
Center's Shuttle Projects Office. This office includes the Solid
Rocket Booster, External Tank, and the Space Shuttle Engine
Projects.
I appreciate this opportunity to present to the Commission data
concerning, as I understand it, two points of today's hearing to
the Commission. The first is the decision process that was used
in arriving at a launch recommendation and the second is the
basis for the iaunjh recommendation.
My statement will cover primarily my recollections of the
decision process and the summary basis for the launch
recommendation emanating from a January 27, 1986, telecon between
Morton-Thiokol Wasatch and MSFC elements. I propose that this be
followed by Mr. Larry Mulloy, the Level Ill MSFC SRB Project
Manager, who will elaborate on both points, and Mr. George Hardy,
Deputy Director of the MSFC Science and Engineering Directorate,
who will detail the MSFC engineering considerations and the
rationale for a;_c_._t ";:!th+he _o_ton-Thiokol launch
recommendation provided by Mr. Joe Kilminster, Vice President and
Manager, Shuttle Projects (Wasatch).
In regard to the launch recommendation process, I continue to
believe that all activities associated wlth' this process,
specifically the January 27 discussion between Thiokol and MSFC,
were _onducted in a thorough and professional manner, in the NASA
tradition, with full and open participation of personnel
necessary for appropriate disposition of this speci_'ic concern.
In the case of STS 51-L, a concern was raised by Thiokol the
evening _f January 27, the night before the planned launch,
concerning possible effects of the predicted temperatures on the
Solid Rocket Motor case to case field joint O-rings.
After this concern was raised, an orderly and normal process was
set in motion to assure full examination of the concern and the
engineering data and rationale associated with this concern.
First was identification of the concern during a preliminary
telecon early in the evening and a request for Thiokol to
provide written data related to the concern.
The second step was to assemble all the necessary personnel
at MSFC, Thiokol, Wasatch in Utah and those senior MSFC and
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Thtokol project representatives at KSC and establish good
telecon communications. The senior 51-L Thtokol
representative at KSC was Mr. A1 McDonald, Manager of the
SRM Project. Mr. Hulloy and ! were the senior MSFC project
representatives on site.
Then, in approximately a two-hour meeting, Thtokol
engineering presented and discussed material related to
their concern; MSFC thoroughly probed the data; an_, all
p_rties had an opportunity to provide inputs and express
their views.
At the end of a 2-1/2 hour period, including a 30-35 minute
off-the-loop Thiokol caucus and after Thioko]'s
recommendation to launch, I co]lectively asked all telecon
parties if there were any disagreements with Thiokol's
rationale and recommendation as stated by Mr. Kiiminster.
There were none received from Thiokol at Wasatch, MSFC at
Huntsville, nor Mr. McDonald sitting with Mr. Mulloy and me
at KSC.
Thiokol was then asked to document their verbal rationale
and launch recommendation statement as is our norma]
practice.
Based on the process I described and the conclusions reached
as a result of that process, I concurrfd with the decision
of the Level Ill Project Manager (Mr. Mulloy) supporting the
launch recommendation and continuing with the launch
process.
Before going into my post decision activities, I would like to
amplify one portion of the above process.
During the January 27 post-scrub discussion, all MSFC
support elements and to my knowledge the contractor
representatives at KSC were present on the launch center
MSFC voice loop when I made a request for capability to
support a 24-hour turnaround, recogni_;ng the colder
predicted temperatures for the January 2_th launch. The
senior Thiokol program representative, who has a duty
station on the loop at KSC, did not provide any input on the
loop or, to my knowledge, to the physically adjaceRt MSFC
SRB representatives, regarding any items that _hould be
looked into while proceeding with launch preparations.
[Ref. 2/26-7 3 of 5]
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During the 2-1/2 hour telecon hetween Thtokol and MSFC, I
would characterize the presentations and associated
discussions on the loop as delfverate and lntese, and
professional engineering examination of the data - not as
highly heated or emotional.
No heated protest was injected into the open discussion by
the senior Thiokol representative at KSC in the 2-i/2 hour
telecon.
However, the senior Thlokol representative at KSC did inject
one significant comment Just after Mr. Kilmi_:ter asked for
a caucus at about the 2-hour Juncture in the (Iscussion.
lhis comment by the senior Thiokol representative at KSC was
perceived, I believe by all parties, as a supporting point
for _ positive launch recommendation. The senior Thiokol
representative said that Mr. Kilminster should consider a
point, made by Mr. Hardy earlier, that the secondary O-ring
is in the proper position to seal if blow-by the primary O-
ring occurred. The importance of this point will be
discussed later by Mr. Hardy.
MSFC elements in Huntsville and those MSFC elements at KSC
had no knowledge of the internal Thiokol discussions during
the 30-35 minute Thiokol caucus that preceded their launch
recommendation. To my knowledge, the senior Thiokol
representative at KSC did not t_ke this oppJ_tunity to
inject any oi his thoughts or concerns via a private
telephone input, into the internal Thiokol discussions at
Wa_atch.
As stated earlier, when I asked all p_rtles collectively if
there were any disagreements with the Thiokol launch
_ecommendatlon, there was no statement or co_ment from the
senior Thiokol representative sitting with Mr. Mulloy and me
at KSC.
Now I would like to turn very briefly to my actions after the
conclusions of this telecon...preceded by a short illustration of
another STS 51-L launch issue that illustrates the Level
III/Lev_l II interaction.
Since we had been informed of a launch recovery area sea state
that had forced the recovery ships to move away from their
prescribed launch area, Mr. Mulloy, Mr. Houston, and I contacted
the KSC operations personnel (Mr. Gene Sestile) and Mr. Aldrich
(National J_ace Transportation System Program Manager) to advise
Mr. Aldrich of the recovery area situation and potential SRB
impacts. Since the ships would not be in position at launch
time, Mr. Mulloy stated there was a good probability of loss of
7
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the two SRB Parachute systems, the nose cones and frustums. They
would probably disperse before the ships could arrive. After
discussion of the issue Mr. Aldrich concluded that the launch
should proceed.
{ have tncluded thls Level III/Level 7I tssu= resolution process
to Illustrate that where there is a Level 111 activity that can
not be dtsposttioned wtthin Level 1II authority and
responsibility, then Level II ts informed and a decision is made
by Level II.
I would now llke to return to the post-decision tlmeframe and
summarize my actions: In consultation with the SRB Project
Manager, I concluded that there was:
o No launch Commit Criteria violation
o No Level II requirement violation that required a waiver.
o No dl_reement concerning the Thiokol launch
recommendation between any Level II! elements.
o That Thlokol and MSFC had fully and openly examined the
concern and satisfactorily dispositioned that concern.
Based on the above conclusions, we informed the MSFC Director and
the MSFC Director of Science and Engineering early on the 28th of
January (about 5:00 a.m.) of the initial ThioLcl concerns and
engineering recommendations, the final Thiokcl launch
recommendation, and the full support of MSFC engineering for the
launch recommendations that led to a successful resolution of
this concern.
In conclusion, I believe that the total Thiokol and MSFC teams
performed in a responsible manner in a continuation of the
dedicated professional approach by which all issues involving the
Space Shuttle are addressed and resolved through an engineering
and managerial assessment of th_ data to determine that a vehicle
is ready and safe to fly. I believe the process was appreoriate
and that the concern was dispositioned in a proper manner. I did
not perceive, nor did I personally exert, any pressure on
Thiokol.
At this time, we do not know the precise cause or causes of the
STS-51L accident, but I can assure the Commission that we are
diligently pursuing all aspects of this matter to arrive at a
full understanding of the failure, its causes, and the required
corrections.
Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy will gc into additional detail
concerning these issues.
Mr. Chairman: This concludes my statement.
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_ . .._ SAC-SA-0_5-86
February 20, 1986
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
SMIB/James C. Harrington
SA01/Judson A. Lovingood
Personal Documentation
Enclosed is the information you requested concerning the activities
relating to the SRM field joint seals on the 51-L launch.
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THIS NOTE PREPARED JANUARY 31, 1986
NOTES FROM JANUARY 27, 1986
.4:25 p.m. - CST -.Huntsville
I received a call from Cecil Houston. Houston had attempted to
call Relnartz at his motel in Florida with respect to MTI's (AI
McDonald) concern about launchlng January 28 at 8:36 a.m. because
of the overnight teaperature prediction and the temperature pre-
diction at launch time. The concern related to the temperature
effect on the o-rings at field jcints. Cecil wanted to establish
a telecon with Relnartz, Mulloy, Hardy, and MTI Wasatch Division
to discuss the issue.
I told Cecil to proceed with setting up the telecon and locate
Mulloy; I would call Reinartz. I either had my secretary or LIEF
Board to get Relnartz on the phone at his motel.
I called Keith Coates in the Science. and Engineering Directorate
(S&E) to question ham about the issue; I was _.nterrupted by _._p_"_
Relnartz on the phone waiting to speak to me; I informed Reinartz _'- _of the issue and proposed that he get Jim Kingsburv (D_Fector of
--S&E) to participate"ln the te_econ as he had been closely fol-
lowing the o-rin_ work of MSFC and MTI.
i
I called Coates back and told him to get Jim Smith (SRB Chief
Engineer) and come to my office.
I had my _ecretary call Larry Wear to my office and told Wear to
get Center o-ring experts to my office.
4:45 p.m. Telecon
Attendees - my office
Myself Coates
Smith Brinton, MTI
Wear Other MTI
Adams
Hardy in Athens - Reinartz at motel - McDonald/Houston at KSC.
Kilminster and others at MTI -,Wasatch.
A data discussion by MTI engineerin_ followed with MTI of the
_°Pln_°n we should _p_y _n_ J_,me_ until noon or afternoon. Their
concern was based on previous erosion experience from the January
1985 _aunch at which o-ring temperature at launch was calculated
at 53-F. Specifically, they were concerned about o-ring resil-
iency at low temperatures. We asked MTI: "What is the criterion
for launch in terms of o-rlng temp, considering the projected
overnight temperature?" Becaus% of difficult7 in fQllowing the
discussion without detailed charts,__ proposed to Reinartz-a_other
_on later that night, at which t£me MTI should crisply de-
fine _ne_r"po_l_on using charts and make their recommendation. I
[Ref. 2/26-8 2 of 12]
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said I suggested this be a Center-only meeting, involvin_ Lucas
_1
-_.d Kzngsoury t=anO p_an _o _o to Level II i_ HTT r_commended not >_
launching. It was agreed to start another telecon at 7:15 p.m.
" CST. The q:30 telecon was concluded at approximately 6:00 p_m.
CST.
I called Reinartz at the motel and told him if MTI persisted in
their recommenoation at the 7:15 meeting, we _hould not launch. I
suggesteo ne aovlse Aldridge of our meeting to prepare him fo_ _"
_-_v_n_ a m_ec_ng w_n bevel ± Co _nform them of a possible recom-
mendation to delay.
934
7:15 p.m. meeting delayed until approximately 7:45 p.m. CST.
Charts: MTI Engine_ring recommended we not launch unless o-ring
temp prediction _53_F.
Mulloy argument based on previous rationale for flight.
._d with Mulloy and stated he doubted if difference ic pre-
dicted temp of o-ring at launch and 53 F experience could have
any effect beyond the effect of other parameters involved in
o-rlng sealing.
Reinartz asked Ki!minster to respond to Mulloy and Hardy.
KiZminster ,equested 5-minute caucus.
After 15 to 30 min, Kiiminster _tated his summary - see notes on
chart.
Relnartz asked if anyone disaRreed.. No disagreement. During
n-ight, MTI prepped new recommendation chart (attached).
Attendees - Rm. 411 - Bldg. _202
Deputy Director, S&E/George Hardy
Associate Director of Engineering/Wayne Littles
SRB Chief Englneer/Jim Smith
SRM Project Manager/Larry Near
Deputy Manager, SRB Project/Frank Adams
MTIIBoyd Brinton
Structures and Propulsior, S&EIBen Powers
Office of Associate Director of Engineerin£, S&E/Kieth Coates
Director, Materials and Processes, S&EIBob Schwinghamer
Deputy Director, Structures and Propulsion, S&EIJohn McCarty
SRB Project Office/John M£11er
Others
KSC:
Man----ager,Shuttle Projects OfficelStan Reinartz
Manager, SRB Project/Larry Mulloy
Manager, KSC Resident Office/Cecil Houston
MTI/AI McDonald
[Ref. 2/26-8 3 of 12]
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ADDENDUM - FEBRUARY 15, 1986.
Upon arrtvtn_ at HOSC at approxtmatel_ 7:00 a.q. CST on January
, _ 2b, i inrormqa Jack Lee of the meetln_s on the evening of January
27. I told him no detail except that Thiokol had at first recom-
"-H_'nde no auno ng e_use of their concern for low temperature
effects on the o-rings and, after a Wasatch caucus, recommended we
proceed to launch. I also informed him that Thiokol was to pro-
vide us, in writing, their recommendation to launch on January 28
at 8:36 a.m.
[Ref. 2/26-8 4 of 12]
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SAC-SA-027-86 February 17, 1986
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SAO1/Judson A. Lovingood
Meetings on January 27, 198_, Regarding Low Temperature
Effect on SRM O-Ring
Attached are my notes pertaining to the subject meetings.
Attachment I: This r_cord was prepared by me on J_nuary 31,
1986, on the advice of T. J. Lee that I should write down my
recollection of events of January 27, 1986.
Attachment 2: -This is a Marshall Space Flight Center Organi-
zation Chart which allows identification of the organizational
elements of.NASA personnel named in Attachment I_ The Shuttle
Projects Office, as in the.case of the other MSFC Project
Offices, receives engineering support from the Science & Engi-
neering Directorate through the Associate Director for Engi-
neering Office. Each MSFC Shuttle Project element (External
Tank, Main Engine, and Solid Rocket Booster) has a Chief Engi-
neer, functionally reporting to the Project Manager, and insti-
tutionally reporting to the Associate Director of Engineering.
Attachment 3: fhese are my handwritten notes from the 4:45 p.m.
CST, January 27, 1986, telecon.
Attachment 4: This is the conclusion chart presented at the
approximately 7:45 p.m. CST telecon. The annotatiors shown are
my notes at the time of the briefing.
[Ref. 2/26-8 11 of 12]
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Attachment 5: This chart is the recommendation made by MTI prior
to their caucus (the hand-lettering at the top of tl2e page.) The
script under CorRigendum are notes I wrote as Joe Kilminster
presented the final MTI recommendation after the MTI caucus.
Attachment 6: This chart is the signed recommendation by MTI to
proceed with the launch.
_ Lovingood
co:
SAO1/Stan Re_nartz
[Ref. 2/26-8 12 of 12]
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STATEHENT TO THE
PRESIDENTIAL C_HRISSION
ON THE
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
m
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S. R. REINARTZ
•FEBRUARY 25, 1986
February 25, 198_
MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBEk$ OF THE COMMISSIG_
[gef. 2/26-7 1 of 5]
I. am Stanley Retnartz, Manager of the Marshall Space Flight
Center's Shuttle Projects Office. This office tncludes the Solid
Rocket Booster, External Tank, and the Space Shuttle Engine
eroJects.
I appreciate thls opportunlty to present to the Comm_,slon data
concerning, as I understand It, two polnts of today's hearlng to
the Commlsslon. The first Is the declslon process _hat was used
tn arriving at a launch reco_endattnn and the second Is the
basis for the launch recommendation.
Hy statement w_11 cover primarily my recollections of the
decision process and the summary basis for the launch
recommendatlon emanating from a January 27, 1986, telecon between
Morton-Thtokol Wasatch and MSFC elements. ] propose that thts be
followed by Mr. Larry Mulloy, the Level II1 MSFC SRB ProJect
Manager, who wtll elaborate on both points, and Mr. George Hardy,
Deputy Director of the MSFC Science and Engineering Directorate,
who will detail the MSFC engineering :onslderatlons and the
ratlona)e for agreement wlth the Morton-Thlokol launch
recommendation provided by Mr. Joe K11mlnster, Vice Presloent and
Manager, Shuttle Projects (wasatch).
In regard to the launch recommendation process, ] continue to
belteve that _1I activities associated with this process,
specifically the January 27 dlscusslon between Thlokol and MSFC,
were conducted In a therough and professional mlnner, In the NASA
tredltlon, wlth full and open participation of personnel
necessary for appropriate disposition of this specific concern.
In the case of STS S1-L, a concern was raised by Thtokol the
evenln) of January 27, the night before the planned launch,
concerning possible effects of the predicted temperatures on the
Solid Rocket Motor case to case field joint 0-rlngs.
After thls concern was raised, an orderly and normal process was
set In motion to assure full examination of the concern and the
eng_neerlng data and rationale associated wlth this concern.
First was identification of the concern during a preliminary
telecon early in the cvenlng and a request for Thlokol to
provide written data related to the concern.
The second step was to assemble all the necessary personnel
at MSFC, Thlokol, Wasatch in Utah and those senior MSFC and [Ref. 2/26-7 2 of G]
Thtlko1 project representatives at KSC and establish good
telecon communications. The senior 51-L Thtokol
representative at KSC was Mr. A1 McDonald, Manager of the
SAM Project. Mr. Mulloy and I were the senior MSFC project
representatives on site.
Then. In approximately a two-hour meeting, Thtokol
englneertn_ presentea and discussed material related to
their concern; MSFC thoroughly probed the data; and, el;
pirates had an Opportunity to provide inputs end express
thetr vtews.
At the end of a 2-I/2 hour _ertod, including a 30-35 minute
off-the-looo Th:oko! Caucus end after Th!oknl's
recommendation to launch, I collectively asked all te!econ
parties if there were any dlsag,eements wlth Thlokol'5
rationale and recommendation Is state_ by Mr. K11mlnster.
There were none received from Thlokol at Wasatch, MSFC at
Huntsvlll(, nor Mr. McDonald sitting with Mr. Mul;oy and me
a" KSC.
Thtokol was th_n asked to document their verbal rationale
and launch recommendation statement as ts our normal
practice.
Based on the process I desc, lbed and the conclusions reached
as 8 result of that process, I concurred with the decision
of the Level Ill Project Manager (Mr, Mulloy) SuppOrting the
launch recommendation and cor_inuing with the launch
procesS,
Before go ng into my post decision activities, I would llke to
ampllfy one portlon of the above process.
During the January 27 post-scrub olscus_ion, all MSFC
support elembnts and to my knowledge the contractor
representatives at KSC were present on the launch center
MSFC volce loop when I made 8 request for capablllty to
support a 24-hour turnaround, recognlzln_ the colder
predicted tem-eratures for toe January 28th launch. The
senior Thlokoi program representative, who has a duty
statton on the loop at KSC, did not provide any input on the
loop or, to my knowledge, to the physically adjacent HSFC
SRB representatives, rega,dtng any items that should be
looked into while proceeding with launch preparations.
i
Durtng the 2-1/2 hour teleoon between Thtokol end MSFC. I
would characterize the presentations and associated
discussions on the loop as dellverate and lntese, end
professional engineering examination of the data - not as
hlghly heated or emotional.
No heeled protest was injected 1ned the open discussion b)
the sen10r Thtokol representative at KSC In the 2-1/2 hour
telecon.
However, the senior Thfokol representative it KSC did inject
one significant comment Just after Hr. Kllmlnster asked for
I caucus at about the 2-hour Juncture in the discussion.
Thl_ comment by the senior Thto _-" representative at KSC was
perceived, I believe by all pestles, as a supporting polnt
for a posttlve launch recommendation. The senior- Thtokol
representative said that Mr. Kllmlnster should constder a
point, made by Mr. Hardy earlier, that the secondary O-rtng
Is tn the proper position to seal if blow-by the primary O-
ring occurred. The importance of thls point mlll be
discussed later by Hr. Hardy.
MSFC elements tn Huntsville and those MSFC elements at KSC
had no knowledge of the internal Thtokol discussions durtng
the 30-35 minute Thiokol caucus that preceded their launch
recommendation, TO my knowledge, the senior Thtokol
representative at KSC dld not t_ke this opportunity to
InJect any of his thoughts or concern_ via a prlvate
telephone Input, Into the Internal Thiokol discusslons at
Wasatch.
As stated earlter, when I asked all parties collectively If
there were any disagreements w!th the Thtokol launch
recommendation, there was no statement or Comment fro,; the
sentor Thtokol representative sitting wtth M-. _.l!oy and me
at KSC.
Now I mould llke to turn very brlefly to uy actions after the
concluslons of thls telecon...preceded by a short 111ustratlon of
another STS SI-I l_unch Issue that illustrates the Level
Ill/Level II interaction.
Since we had been informed of a launch recovery area sea state
that had forced the recovery sh1_; to move away from their
prescribed launch area, Mr. Mulloy, Mr. Houston, and ] contacted
the KSC operations personnel (Mr. Gene Sesttle) and Mr. Aldrtch
(National 5pace Transportation System Program Manager) to advise
Mr. Aldrlcn of the recovery area situation and potentlal SRB
impacts. Since the ships would not be In posltlon at launch
time, Hr. Mu;1oy stated there was | good probability of loss of
omamL PAQE.B
oF POORQUALn 
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rthe two SRB Parachute systems, the nose cones and frustums. Trey
would problb y disperse before the shtps could arrive. After
dlscusslon of the Issue Mr. Aldrich concluded that the launch
should nroceed.
I hive |ncluded thls Level Ill/Level 11 issue _esolutlon process
to l]]ustrate that where there Is I Level %II actlvlty that can
not be dlsposltloned within Level Ill authority and
responsibility, t_en Level II I_ informed and a decision is made
by Level el.
I would no* llke to return to the post-decislon tlmeframe and
summarize my actions: In consultation wlth the SRB Project
Maneger, | concluded that there was:
o No launch Commit Crlteria violation
o No Level el requlrement vlolatlon that required _ waiver.
o No disagreement concerning the Thlokol launch
recommendation between any Level el! elements.
o That Thtokul and NSFC hid fully and openly eximined the
concern and ;Ittsfactorlly dtspostttoned that concern
Based on the above conclusions, we informed the MSFC Director and
the HSFC Director of Science and Engineering early on the 28th of
January {about S:O0 a.m.) of the initial Thlokol concerns and
englneerlng recommendations, the final Thlokol launch
recommendation, and the full Support of MSFC engineering for th)
launch recommendations that led to a successful resolution of
this concern.
In conclusion, I believe that the total Thlokol and MSFC t_ams
performed In i responsible manner in a continuation of the
dedicated professional approach by which ill issues involving the
Space Shuttle are addressed Ind -esolved through an engineering
and manlgerlal i_sessment of the data to determine that a vehicle
is ready and safe to fly. I believe the process was ipprop.'late
and that the concern was dlsposlt(oned in a prcper manner. I did
not perceive, nor did I person_'ly exert, any pressure on
Thlokol.
At thls time, we do not know the precise cause or causes of the
STS-SIL accident, but I can assure the Commission that we are
dil!qently pursuing ill aspects of this matter to arrive at a
full understanding of the fallure, Its causes, and the required
corrections.
Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy wlll go into additional detail
concerning these issues.
Mr. Chilrmin: Thls concludes my statement. [_ef. 2/26-7 S of 5]
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_bw_ ae_w_u_cs and
C _J S_ Fllght _
Min_aa _ l_ht C4mmr.A_ma
3.5812
SAC-SA-035-86
February 20, 1986
FROM :
SUBJECT :
SMIB/James C. Harrington
SAOl/Judson A. Lovingood
Personal Documentation
Enclosed _s the information you requested concerning the acti,:itle$
relating to the SRM field Joint seals on the 51-L launch.
[Ref. 2/26-8 l of 12]
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THIS NOTE PREPARED JANUARY 3 _, 1986
NOTES FROM JANUARY 27, _986
_:25 p.m. - CST - Huntsville
I received a call from Cecil Houston. Houston had attempted to
call Reinartz at nls motel in Florida wlth respect to MTI's (AI
McDonald) concern about launching January 28 at 8:36 a.m. because
of the overnight temperature prediction and the temperature pre-
diction at launch time. The concern related to the temperature
effect on the o-rlngs at field Joints. Cecil wanted to establish
a telecon with Reinartz, Mulloy, Hardy, and MTI Wasatch Division
to discuss the issue.
I told Cecil to proceed wlth setting up the telecon and _uoate
Mulloy; I would call Relnartz. I either had my secretary or LIEF
Board to get Reinartz on the phone at his motel.
I called Keith Coates in the Sclence. and Engineering D_rectorate
(S&E) to question him about the issue; I was interrupted by _d-_._-_
Reinartz on the phone waiting to speak to me; I informed Reinartz
of the issue and proposed that he _et Jim Kin_sburv (Director of
"-S&E) to particzpate in the ten,con as he had been closely fol-
lowing the o-rin_ work of MSFC and MTI.
I called Coates back and told him to get Jim Smith (SRB Chief
Engineer) and come to my office.
I had my aecreta_-y call Larry Wear to my office and told Wear to
get Center o-rlng experts to my offloe.
_:_5 p.m. Telecon
Attendees - my office
Myself Coates
Smith Brinton, MTI
Wear Other MTI
Adams
Hardy in Athens - Neinartz at motel - McDonald/Housbon at KSC.
Kilminster and others at MTI - Wasatch.
A data discussion by MTI engineerin_ followed with MTI of the
oolnloq we should d_l_y _n_ _=,,n_ until noon or afternoon_ Their
--concern was based on nrevlous erosion experience from the January
1985 _aunch at which o-ring temperature at launch was calculated
• t 53 F. Specifically, they were concerned about o-rlng resil-
iency at low temperatures. We asked MTI: -What is the criterion
for launch in terms of o-rlng temp, considering the projected
overnight temperature?" _cause of _ifficultv in followinR the
discussion without detailed cbarts,_ Droposed tQ Reinartz'_other
_on later that night, at which time MTI should crisply de-
_fzne their posz_zor _sln_ charts and make their recommendation- I
[Ref. 2/26-_ 2 of 12]
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said I suggested this be a Center-only meetinKL involvln_ Lucas
A n_ K_nASDUr_i anu Dlan _o _o to Level II if MTI recommended not
lau_cnlng_ It was agreed to start another telecon at 7:15 p.m.
rCtT. T_e 4:30 telecon was concluded at appeoxlmately 6:00 p.m.
CST.
I called Relnartz at the motel and told him if MTI persisted in
t--_ir rscommenoation at the 7:15 meetzn_ we should not launch. I
suggeste_-ne aovlse Aldrldge of our meetln_ to prepare him rot
_ tnavln_a m_Ing wl_n Level ± _o inform them of a possible recom-
mendation to delay.
7:15 p.m. meeting delayed until approximately 7:_5 p.m.C.+.
Charts: MTI Engine_rlng recommended we not launch unless c-vinE
temp prediction _53_F.
nt based on previous rationale for flight.
ulloy and stated he doubted if difference in pre-
dlcted temp of o-ring at launch and 53 F experience could have
any effect beyond the effect of other parameters l_volved in
o-rlng sealing.
Relnartz asked Kilmlnster to resoond to Mulloy and Hardy.
Kllmlnster requested 5-mlnute caucus.
After 15 to 30 mln, Kllmlnster stated his summary - see notes on
chart.
Relnartz asked if aDvone dlsamreed. No d_a_r@eme_t. During
night, MTI prepped new recommendation chart (attacPed).
Attendees - Rm. _11 - Bldg. _202
Deputy Director, S&EIGeorge Hardy
Associate Director of Englneerlng/Wayne Littles
SRB Chief Englneer/Jim Smith
SRM P'oJect Manager/Larry Wear
Deputy Manager, SRB Project Frank Adams
MTI/Boyd Brinton
Structures and Propulsion, S&E/Ben Powers
Office of Associate Director of Engineering, S&E/Kieth Coates
Director, Materials and Processes, S&E/Bob Schwlnghamer
Deputy Director, Structures and Propulsion, S&E/John McCarty
SRB Project Offlce/John MIlIeF
Others
KSC:
Man--"-ager,Shuttle Projects Office/Stan Relnartz
Manager, SRB Project/Larry Muiloy
Manager, KSC Resident Offlce/Cecil Houston
MTI/AI McDonald
[Ref. 2/26-8 3 of 12]
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ADDEMDUM .- FE,lklluAMT 15,41986.
t &-
_Upon =rrlvln_ at Bose at approximately 7:00 a.m. CST on January
2.. i Informed Jack Lae of the meetxnKs on the evenln_ of January
27., I tol_d hi• no detaiX except that Thlokol had at _Irs
M _ ' t recom-
a-'-_Ehdea not launc_zng nee•use of their concern for 2or temperature
effects on the o-rlngs and, after • Wasatch caucus, recommended we
proc_eed to launch. I also informed him that Thlokol was to pro-
vide us, in writing, their recommendatlon to launch on January 28
aL 8:36 a.=.
(Ref. 2"26-8 4 of 12.]
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I
fiTl ASSESSMENT OF TEHPERATURE CONCERN ON SP_-25 (51L) LAUaCH
I I I l II m I I
0 CALCULATIONS SHOW THAT $RH-25 O-RINGS WILL $E 20" C¢_.DER THAN SPJ_-]5'O-RINGS
0 TEMPERATURE DATA NOT CONCLUSIVE ON PREDICTING PRIMARY O-RING ILON-IY
0 E_GINEERING ASSESSMENT IS THAT:
0 cOLDER O-RINGS MILL HAVE INCREASED EFFECTIVE DUROI_ETER (eHARDER _)
0 "HARDER_ O-RINGS MILL TAKE LONGER TO mSEATa
0 MORE GAS HAY PASS PRIMARY O-RING SEFORE THE.PRIMARY SEAL SEATS
(RELATIVE TO SRPr-15)
0 DEMONSTRATED SEALING THRESHOLD IS _ TIMES GREATER THAH 0,O_"
EROSION EXPERIENCED ON SPJ_-15
0 IF THE PRIMARY SEAL DOES NOT SEAT_ THE SECONDARY GEAL MILL SEAT
0 PRESSURE HILL GET TO SECONDADY SEAL _EFORE THE METAL PARTS ROTATE
0 O-RING PRESSURE LEAK CHECK PLACES. SECONDARY SEAL IN OUTI_OARD
POSITION HHIC_ HINIMSZES SEALING TIME
0 HTI RECO_e_ENDS STS-51L LAUNCH PROCEED on 28 JANUARY _98_
0 SP_-25 HILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM SP_-_5
/
C. K:(H/'NSTER, VICE PRESlrEHT
CE BOOSTER PROGRAMS
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m,, m_,,,_ SAC-3A-027-86 February 17, 1986
TO: MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
FROM: $A01/Judson A. Lovlngood
SUBJECT: Meetings on January 27, 1986, Regarding Lo_ iemperature
Effect on SRM O-Ring
Att_med are my notes peF_aCning to the subject meeting_-
Attachment I: This record wa_ ;repared by me on January 31,
1986, on the advice of T. J. Lee that I should write down my
recollection Of events of January 27, 1986.
Attachment 2: This is a Marshall Space Flig_t Center Organi-
zation Chart which allows identification of the organizational
elements of.NASA personnel named in Attachment I. The Shuttle
Projects Office, as in the.case of th_ other MSFC Project
Offices, receives engineering support from the Sclex=e & Engi-
neering Directorate through the Associate Director for Engi-
neering Office. Each MSFC Shuttle Project element (Exte:cal
Tank, Main Engine, and Solid Rocket Booster) has a Chief Engi-
neer, functionally reporting to the Project Manager, and instl-
tutionally reporting to the Associate Director of Engineering.
Attachment 3: These are my handwritten notes from the 4:q5 p.m.
CST, January 27, 1986, telecon.
Attachment 4: This is the conclusion chart presented at the
approximately 7:_5 p.m. CST telecon, the annotations shown are
my notes at the time of the briefing.
m
[Ref. 2/26-8 11 of 12]
Attachment 5: This chart is the reco_mendation made by MTI prior
to their caucus (the hand-letterlng at the _op of the page.) The
script under Corrigendum are notes I wrote as Joe Kilmlnster
presented the fina_ MTI recommendation after the MTI :_ucus.
Attachment 6: This chart is the signed recommend_tlon by MTI to
proceed with the launch.
Lovingoo_O__
co:
$1011$tan Be:l_artz [Ref. 2/26-8 12 of 12]
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TESTIMONY OF CHARLES STEVENSON, AND B. K. DAVIS, ICE TEAM MEMBERS, AND
LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD F. KOLCZYNSKI, COMMANDER, DETACHMENT
11, 2d WEATHER SQUADRON, PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE
MR. STEVENSON: We did it both days.
Okay, I am Charles Stevenson, and I have been employed by NASA at the Kennedy Space
Center since 1965. During the past 20 years I have been a member of the test checkout and
launch team for all manned space flights.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you move the mike over a little bit?
MR. STEVENSON: Starting with the Gemini program and running through Apollo and into
the Shuttle program. I am a graduate of North Carolina State University, and I have a degree in
engineering mechanics, a B.S. degree, and a B.S. degree also in physics and applied mathemat-
ics. I am currently the section chief for the external tank and the solid rocket booster mecF ._ni-
cal systems section.
In regards to the questions I am ar, ticipating, I am also responsible for TPS, ice, frost and
debris damage on the Shuttle.
MR. DAVIS: I am Billy K. Davis. I have been
• • :?.!.'v-- ..-
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with NASA since 1960 I have a degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Ala-
bama, and I started in the manufacturing/engineering area for Marshall Space Flight Center,
and then systems engineering, and post that, I have been in the Chief Engineering Office for the
External Tank, and in that area, I have been responsible for development of the manufacturing
pro_.esses, the facilities and the other things tha_ go with the external tank insulation system,
and as a part of th, t, was instrumental in seeing to it that we got a development that could
provide us with knowledge as to whether or not we would make ice, and at what time we would
have ice, and how we could detect it.
And so, for that reason, for each launch I have been the senior test representative for the
external tank and work with Mr. Stevenson in the ice and debris area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Colonel Kolczynski, I think I mislabeled you as a member of the ice
_am. I understand that you are th_ Air Force weatherman, is that correct?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: Yes, sir, that is true.
I am L:'eutcnant Colonel Edward F. Kolczynski. I am Commander of Detachment 1i, 2d
Weather Squadron at Patrick Air Force Base. In that capacity, I provide
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support to the Eastern Test Range, Eastern Space and Missile Center, Air Force Tactical Appli-
cations,and then, of course, to NASA in support of all Shuttle operations up to and including
launch.
My expertise isI have been in the Air Force 19V2 years, and for 18_/2of those years I have
been a meteorologist. I have a bachelor's degree in mathematics, a master's degree f:_umTexas
A&M in meteorology, and I've got some doctoral work at the University of Maryland, also in
meteorology. My experience has been as a forecaster at Grand Forks Air Force Basc for my
early days in the Air Force, then as a staffmeteorologist consulting on weather support to devel-
oping systems like the F-15 and the A-10 aircraft at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. I worked
at St,ldiesand Analysis in the Pentagon in operations research doing force depl6yment issues,
trade-offanalyses and simulations. And of course, at Headquarters, Air Weather Service again
at Studies and Analyses. And classifiedSpecial Projects.And finallya year at the Kennedy
Space Center.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
Mr. Stevenson, would you proceed? Do you have a statement or do you want to proceed to
just narrate what happened on those two days?
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MR. STEVENSON: Okay, let me--I will do beth.
As a TPS ice, fro6t and debris team we have really seven major activities, and I would just
nw_e the seven, and then I will get into the ones we are really interested in.
We initially do a pre-launch pad debris and vehicle familiarization walkdown to familiarize
all the people with the possibilities of debris i_u_ and to familiarize them with the latest con-
i'_mration of the vehicle. That is for the advantage of some of the people who normally do not
work the vehicle every day but come to us from off4?_enter
We then conduct during the launch a T-3 hour ice/frost walkdown where again we look at
the vehicle for ice/frost conditions, TPS anomalies, and any last minute debr:__ that we may fred.
Following launch, we immediately go to the pad again and do a po6tlaunch debris assess-
ment. The purpooe of this mainly is to determine if there is any flight hardware on the pad or
any damage that may h=ve occurred to the vehicle as a result of some pad debris.
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We then do a postflight photo analysis in which we again look at the vehicle, that is, as it is
launched through the lalmch film, to see if there is any
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damage to the vehicle. We also review the SRB for postflight debris assessment, and we review
the orbiter once it returns.
In regards to the launch day activities. I guess I should jus_ read a sVJtement.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay.
MR. STEVENSON: The members of the ice/frost team made three assessments of the icing
conditions on the FSS, the RSS, the MLP deck and Pad B apron du:ing the STS-33 pre!aunch
actavitias. Due to a drop in temperatures to below freezing during the preceding day and mght,
the freeze protection plan last used for STS-20 on January 24, 1985 was implemented to protect
the various facility systems.
Two actions within the _'lan were intended to limit the ice debris which could potentially
cause damage to the Shuttle vehicle during the launch. The first action involved adding 1450
gallons of antifreeze iv.to the over-pressure water troughs.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which day now are you speaking about, please?
MR. STEVENSON: I am talking about launch day.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: January 28, launch day?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes.
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CHAirMAN ROGERS: Ifyou would speak a littlebit more into the mike, I b._vejust a bit
oftrouble hearing you.
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. The water troughs in both SRB holds have a total capacity of
6,580 gallons. The resulting antifreeze to water ratio is calculated to be at approximately 21.3
percent, which protected the water trougb_ from freezing down t_,an ambient temperature of 16
degrees.
The second action involved the draining, where practical,of all water systems. Several sys-
tems, such as the flex,the deluge, the emergency shower and eye wash were not drained. These
systems were opened slightlyand allowed to tricklehnW the drains. The tricklingwater was
found to cause the drains to overflow, and the high wind gusts spre_ad the water over large
areas, and itthen froze.
Based upon those conditions,when we came into the firingroom on the day of laPnch and
had a call to stations,the ice,frost,TPS and debris team observed the icing conditions which
were on the leSS and notifiedour upper management. A decision was made at that time to send
the ice/fret team to the pad for an assessment of the facility icin:; _xmditions.
The team arrived at the pad at approximately
:710
0130 in the morning and remained there for approximately one and one half hours.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And who was the team?
MR. STEVENSON: The team at this time consisted of B. K. Daw:s, myself, and two facility
members who were familiar with the water system.
CHAIRMA ._ ROGERS: Was that un,mual to have you go to the pea at that time?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, it is.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Had it ever been done before?
MR. STEVENSON: Once before when we had a similar condition.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Proceed.
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iJR. STEVENSON: Okay.
Upon arrival at the pad we noted the following conditions, and I will just more or less suu_-
mamze those.
As far as the pad apron was concerned, ice w,:_ concentrated in an area under the RSS and
covered approxim-tcly 3,_,_9 _*quare feet. The ice _a.ng_'_l in thickness f:_om one fourth of an inch
to about three inches. On the MLP deck itself, we hw_ o shm_t of ice mostly on the west side
between the left hand SRB exhatmt holes and the west side, or the east side of the
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FSS.
This ice--the sheet ice was approximately one,eighth inch thick, and the secondary over-
pressure water troughs, we found that we had ice which was estimated to be approximately one-
half inch thick. A:_d the density of that ice was estimated to be approximately 25 pounds per
cubic foot.
As for the fixedsea-ices::'qcturebetween the I00 and 220-foot levels,we had a l_e quanti-
ty of icicleswhich averaged .approximately fiveeightb_ ":nchin diameter and ranged from six
inches to one foot long. We had ice on all panels, such as dlstributioz:7_anels,structural mem-
bers of the facility,valve pm_els_ _Thisice averaged approximately one#c_hth to one-half inch
thick.
Upon returning to the LC_, of ccmrse,we immediately held a meeting with our upper man-
agement, and members of the management system were probably Mr. Aldrich and Horace Lam-
breth, who is Director _,_"_._huttle Engineering.
CHAIRMAN ROGE_ . Mr. _Adrich and who else?
MR. STEVENSON: Horace Lambreth, Director of Shuttle Engineering, and several other
key management people who I don't have the names of right off.
The results of that meeting was that we
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immediately started the engineering effort to calculate the trajectories of ice which would be
falling off of the FSS. We concluded that the ice which we had seen in the water troughs, the
overpreswwe troughs, would not be acceptable for launch based on our previous experience of
debris comih5 out of the water troughs.
We decided to send a facility technician, group of technicians with us to the pad again when
we went during <,_r aormal three-hour inspection, and _ve proceeded to make a second assess-
ment during the %3 hour hold on the conditions we found the_, we left the L(X_--
MR. HOtrZ: What t._me did you go out on the pad the second time?
MR. STEVENSON: W_ arrived at the pad at 0654 in the morning, and we departed at 0844.
Again, the team was augmented by several facility personnel to aid us in the removal of i.ce
from the water troughs, which ve had determined to be unacceptable for launch.
Our temperatures, our ambwm temperatures as we recorded them on our consoles and
found them during the ti_e we were there ranged from 26.1 to 30.1 degrees Fahrenheit. The ice
was found in the troughs to have thickened and was solid. These are the overpressure water
troughs.
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A Rsh net was employed to break up the ice and remove it. Approximately 95 percent of the
ice was removed using this method. The ice and unfrozen antifreeze solution was measured at
that time with the infrared pyrometer and found to have a temperature between 8 degrees and
10 degrees Fahrenheit. Those temperatures have since been corrected to read between 14 and 16
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degrees. Also most of the iciclesthat we had seen or reported earlieron the lefthand SRB aft
skirt were removed during this period.
As far -sthe FSS goes,the !ce had increased, but the overallextent of the ice was generally
the same.
Upon returning to the LCC, wc immediately held a secor.d meeting with about the same
members present. We had at that time completed our trajectory calculations which predicted
that the ice fallingfrom the FSS, ifitfellat ignition,would probably impact the MLP deck at a
distance of approximately 20 feet from the FSS. These calculationsdid not include the effectsof
aspiration,which was unknown.
We had decided in the meeting that ifwe had ice fallingaway from the vehicle,that aspira-
tion would not draw ice into the water trough holes, and therefore,that the ice on the FSS was
not a safety of flight
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We proceeded back to the pad for a third inspection, and the reason we went back for the
third inspection--and this would not normally be an inspection we would conduct--was to
remove all of the ice off of the MLP deck on the west side of the MLP deck, which would have a
potential for getting--being drawn in by aspiration or by vibration of the deck.
MR. HOTZ: Could you give us the times on that again?
MR. STEVENSON: That time was between 10:30 and approximately 11:00 a.m. We again
carried the facility crew with us who aided us in the removal of all of the ice on the west part of
the MLP deck away from the left hand SRB. The conditions of the ambient temperatures, as
measured in the firing room, too, by our instrumentation for this period of time ranged from
34.8 to 36.2 degl _s Fahrenheit. We also found that there was igain a little bit of ice in the
overpressure water troughs, and again, we fished that ice out, and we returned to the LCC at
approximately T-20 minutes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Your function was to make the inspections that you referred to and
report back to Mr. Aldrich, is that it?
MR. STEVENSON: I report back normally to the
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launch director.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In this case, who was he?
MR. STEVENSON: In this case the laun:h director was Mr. Gene Thomas, but in our
normal report we do it over the communicatior s system, which akqo "_'ncludes whatever top man-
agement.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But in this case wbo did you report to?
MR. STEVENSON: In this case, each time we held a special meeting off-line to discuss the
ice issues and what we should be doing about it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was that because it was a little worse than previous launches?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did the low temperature readings cause any concern among the ice
team members?
MR. STEVENSON: You mean our scani_er readings?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes.
MR. STEVENSON: Well, we took a considerable amount of readings using the IR scanner.
We normall_: take a lot of readings using the IR scanner. We are charged with the responsibility
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of and use the IR scanner mainly to determine the temperatures on the ET skin because the ET
surface is where we are really
1716
expecting ice, and the icing conci _ ons, and tbat is really what we look for when we make an ice
inspection is the ice that is normally on the tank that will cause damage to the orbiter duri_lg
flight.
CttAIRMAN ROGERS: But in this case you did something more?
MR. STEVENSON: Well, we took the---in this case we took readings that we normally take.
We take more readings than we are required to take, if that is your question.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you take readings on the SRBs?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you normally do that?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And were there differences in the readings between the left and the
right booster?
MR. STEVENSON: Approximately 14 degrees delta.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what were those readings?
MR. STEVENSON: The uncorrected readings were 9 degrees and 23 degrees. We have since
scaled those up to 19 degrees and 33 degrees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So the right was 19 degrees,
1717
you think, and the left was 33 dcgrees?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And was there any discussion about those readings with other mem-
bers of the launch team?
MR. STEVENSON: With other members of the launch team, no, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what were those discussions?
MR. STEVENSON: We did not discuss those specific temperatures with other members of
the launch team.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you report those temperatures to others?
MR. STEVENSON: No, sir, not those specific temperatures.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why not?
MR. STEVENSON: Because, in our opinion, first--well, two reasons, I guess. Number one,
the vehicle was operating within the red lines that we have, the guidelines that we have to go
by, and when we go out and make our inspection, we are required to report on anomalies,
number one, and having no anomalies, you report on the points of interest.
Since the vehicle is operating within its red
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lines, within my guidelines, within its Launch Commit Criteria, within the OMRSD require-
ments, that was not a point to report.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Davis, did I see you about to say scmething?
MR. DAVIS: Well, when you first asked the question earlier, did we disct_s it among our-
selves, Charlie and I did discuss it at the time and concluded that this 9-degree reading probably
might not be exactly right, and felt that the set of readings that you get on the left-hand booster
was more representative of what the true conditions were.
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As far as the temperature readings taken on the tank itself, they followed fairly close to the
predictions that we had, although right at the bottom the temperature readings were somewhat
further than normal away from the predicted readings. They were colder, but they were not so
much colder that it would cause any particular consternation or anything because our insulation
is quite capable of working at liquid hydrogen temperatures, and in fact, you can immerse it in
liquid hydrogen and it really doesn't do anything to it other than it just takes a while for it to
get cold in the middle.
,So as far as the tank was concerned, and ail
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of the things that it normally would be expected to do, it was doing it in fact better t aan usual
because we had ice in smaller amoun_ in places that we normally had a lot of ice, like inter-
faces between the orbiter and the tank and the interface between the solids and the tank They
had ice in the regular places but it was--and there are certain places where it is quite accepta-
ble to have them. v_ this case we had much less than usual, and it can be attributed to the fact
that there was no atmospheric moisture available to be forming on it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, the icing conditions were not as bad on this flight as
on others?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
MR. STEVENSON: As far as the vehicle is concerned.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As far as the vehicle is concerned.
MR. STEVENSON: Right.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about other aspects of the Shuttle?
MR. DAVIS: Do you mean like the orbiter?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, everything else.
MR. DAVIS: Well, the temperatures, of course, were much colder than we have ever seen
before. Some of the readings, like the temperature, for exar_lple, that I
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took on the side of the orbiter, were colder than I have t.ver seen, but the orbiter is quite capable
of handling those kind of temperatures, too. In fact, if you _eave the orbiter pointed in one direc-
tion during flight, it will get extremely cold if it is looking at the night sky. And so the actual
readings that I got were not anything of any significance, but the fact that they were reading a
low almost as cold as if it were on the side of the tank made me wonder if maybe I wasn't get-
ting some effect from the night sky.
And so once we had recorded all of the data, ! was prepared afterwards, you know, some-
body would probably ask me whether those readings were really true or not, and all I could say
at the time of the readings was that this was what the gun said, and it was possible then to go
back and do something to fln_ out what it really was, maybe.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You have talk_ about the orbiter and the external tank. You
haven't mentioned the boosters.
MR. DAVIS: The bo_ter, I have made a practice of measuring temperatures on the boosters
simply because T had gotten into the habit of measuring the whole vehicle since other elements
had asked for specific inputs because of changes that they were making
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or modifications or something, and so I said, ,_hy not make the record of the whole thing be-
cause, who knows, someday somebody mig[,t want to know, and somebody might be able to pick
a trend out cf it. And I've seen differences in temperature between the two boosters quite often.
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PThe sun makes an extreme difference, and like one time, 118 degrees on one side and about 84
on the other, a 34 degree difference. And this didn't cause any problems. It was juat something
that I noted.
We don't try to report the details because, first of all, if you look at this drawing that we
will give you a copy of, you will see that there are no readings on the right hand booeter above
the lower end of it, simply because I am unable to reach it, and I can't take the normal readi g
And so I cannot trust tho6e readings at all.
I know tbat they give you odd readings when you have a glancing angle with the Omegas-
cope or with _he other II_ gun that we have used in the past. So for that reason we have always
concentrated on what the differences were at the bottom and then take a general _ew of the
side of the SRB.
There was one difference, this time, too. We had ice for about 30 feet up the side of the left
hand
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solid. We had a small amount of ice. This is at T-3 hour inspection point, on the left hand wing.
By the time that we were back out there at T-20 minutes, the ice on the wing had melted off and
was gone completely. The ice on the SRB was still solid and was in the shade.
CHAIRMAN" ROGERS: But that was the left?
MR. DAVIS: The left, yes, sir.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Glaze ice?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And what do you attmbL,_c the source of that to be?
MR. DAVIS: It came from the FSS, the wind blowing moisture off of the FSS and hitting the
side of the SRB.
DR. RIDE: Is that the sort of thing that you would report to the launch director? Was that
reported?
MR. DAVIS: We did report that, yes, ma'am.
DR. COVERT: Did you have any idea what that ice weighed?
MR. DAVIS: Do you mean its density?
DR. COVERT: No, how much additional weight was on the vehicle due to the ice?
MR. DAVIS: It was about an eighth of an inch thick from what I could observe. So it
couldn't have
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weighed very much, maybe 25 pounds or so.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. RUMMEL: In your opinion, would any propellant leaks in the ET have showed up on
the infrared scanner?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, the)" would have particularly in that I was looking at a small, let's see,
rhombus shaped area that had a little bit more frost on it than the others in this general vicini-
ty that everybody is now seeing the puff of smoke in, and at the time that I was taking a read-
ing of that, which by the way, read minus 20, but I knew that it was a thin place, and we talked
among ourselves about what was that representative of and concluded what did it, and there are
other places on it, is where a gun is spraying insulation on will either slow down or else it will
stop, and you pick a new gun up, and we have it built so that you have a redundancy in the
operation. And so that was a slightly thinner place than in the other places, and you would
expect it to be cold. And I took a scan in that general area on the tank If we had had a hydro-
gen leak, it would have gone off scale.
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LIn fact, if I look at the overboard bleed on the engines, it goes off scale.
MR. RUMMEL: I take it, then, you are fairly
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satisfied that no leak was apparent at that time?
Was this scan coveiage quite complete do you think?
MR. DAVIS: Well, in the area of the question e_ far as the smoke is concerned, it was very,
very well covered because of this little anomaly tb._t I was looking at there.
MR. RUMMEL: I didn't intend to limit the question to that area.
Did you see anything anywhere in the tank, or were you able to look at other places?
MR DAVIS: I make a habit of taking a scan at the interface between the orbiter and the
ET on both the liquid hydrogen and the liquid oxygen connection points, and if we had bad a
liquid hydrogen leak there, I would have seen it. We would have gone off scale then. If we had
had an oxygen leak on the other side, I would have seen it, and it would have gone off scale.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I understand you take that through optics? Is that meas-
urement taken through optics?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.The IR gun isa thing that in this particularcase the one we are using
is an Omegascope, and itisa pistolgrip type gun with a telescopicsight on it,and itactually
looks tl_rough
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the center line of the view so that what you see in the scope iswhat you are actually measuring
the temperature of.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And what percentage of the totalvehicle are you able to
scan?
MR. DAVIS: Well, I can answer that two ways. I can probably make a scan of about 40
percent of it,but Iwould say that we probably don't look at more than 10 percent.
MR. RUMMEL: Are those readings recorded?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir,they are.
MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
MR. ACHESON: Isita fact that that infrared gun must be expo_,l to the operating temper-
ature for some length of time before itisaccurate?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.In fact,that'sthe reason for the corrections we made in the tempera-
ture readings. We were lucky in that we have a very good time line that we keep of when we
leave where and what we do in between times, and we were able to reconstruct which--and I
knew which one of the readings were taken firstbecause I have set up a son of an operating
sequence that I always follow to try to keep from forgettinganything. And so we could account
for within a minute or so when every reading was made, and then run
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the IR gun through a testchamber which we have set up to run at,say, 24 degrees, and watch it
come down, and keep a record of every minute as we went through, and we were able to recon-
struct the necessary correctionson it.
And one of the things that we feltwe had to do on this before we could make a legitimate
correction on itwas to have the correction come out and match the water trough temperatures
because we knew that the water in then bad to melt at 16 degrees and ithad to be solid at
something below that,and an antifreeze solution islike solder in that ithas to cnol off.It isnot
likejust plain pure water that would go from a liquidto a solidat the same temperature. Ithas
to be colder.
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And _ the reaaings that I got from the solidly-frozen areas were in the 8-degree range, and
the ones that had 3ome water that I was looking at with the antifreeze solution in it were at 10
degrees. And so I just went through the timing and let the other gentlemen that ran the calibra-
tion tests for us give me the corrections, and I simply added them to it, and it came out that the
cold ice part was 14 degrees and the melting part was 16 degrees, and we felt that that kind of
pegged it pretty close to what was real.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: After you applied all of the corrections to the readings of
the Omegascope and s_ on, what do you conclude the actual temperatures of the SRB skirt and
so on were now?
MR. DAVIS: For the skirt--and I would like to talk about that just a little bit, but I will go
ahead and give you the numbers first. The skirt corrects to 16 degrees; the solid motor case on--
and thi_ m on the right hand, to 19 degrees. Now, the le_'t hand at the 95-foot or the 100-foot
level, as they call it over on Pad B, corrected to 33 for the solid motor case and 36 for the aft
skirt. And in looking back at pictures of the area--an,: we, by the way, also take representative
pictures of different angles of this--there is a light television camera set that they follow us
around while we are out there and try to keep up with what we are doing, and it was shining at
the same time I was making the measurements on this area, and I am sure that we were getting
some moisture from the leaking area behind us, and I believe I was reading water that was in
the process of freezing and seeing some reflections of the lights in it so that we got, I believe, a
slightlyerroneous reading on the 23 and 25 degrees.
And the correction,then, isas erroneous as itwas originally,and so itprobably was on the
order
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of the temperatures that we got up higher, like 28, 29, maybe 30 degrees at the bottom. And as I
was about to say earlier, the skirt on the right hand booster was colder than the solids for two
reascns. One is that it has a better night sky view angle, and another is that it is insulated on
the inside, and it is a relatively thin skinned material whereas the insulation and other material
inside the solid motor itself has got a much lower--I mean a much higher heat transfer capabil-
ity than the insulation on the inside of the skirt.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Was the night sky you were looking at, was it a cloudy
sky?
MR. DAVIS: No, sir, it was absolutely clear.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Davis, how do you account for the difference between the ambient tempera-
tures on the pad which you said were 34 to 36 degrees and these much colder temperatures
down in the water trough, and at the field joint of the right solid booster which were 14 to 16
degrees in the water and 19 degrees on the booster?
MR. DAVIS: Okay, let's go back to the 33 and 36-degree reading that I mentioned earlier.
What I was reading there was a reflectionas well as the fact that I had water that was blowing
offthe fLxed servicestnlcture on the side of the solid.
MR. HOTZ: Were these pyrometer readings?
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MR. DAVIS: No, the pyrometer readings gave me 23 and 25, but the corrected readings then
said that itwould have been reading 33 and 36.
MR. HOTZ: No, but what I mean is you were making all of these measurements with the
Omegascope. You weren't using any normal thermometers or things likethat.
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MR. DAVIS: No, sir. Our ambient temperatures at this time, and we had several readings,
and we do not use just the coldest that we get, we use a composite average for our calculations
for the tank, were reading in the general vicinity of, say, 26 degrees.
Later, at launch time we were up to, I believe, 36 or 38 degrees, and as far as the tempera-
ture in the water troughs, we have attempted to e_plain it, and I am not sure that we have
completely put that one to bed, but it appears that this is a real special case that we had in that
we had extremely dry air, and it was extremely cold air, like about, say 25 or 26-degree air, and
when it acts as a heat transfer material to warm the tank effectively because you are conduction
limit _d through the insulation of the tank, you end up having a sensible heat change, or, to say
it another way, the temperature of the air has to go down in order to furnish the heat tbr.mgh
the heat leak into the hydrogen
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tank and into the oxygen tank. So this will give you a big change in temperature, and it will
cause that cold air to fall down.
So we feel a part of the problem in trying to explain all of this came from the fact that cold
air was running off the bottom of the tank much like cold air will run down the side of a Coke
bottle or anything else that you have got cold around.
The other thing is that the wind was blowing just right so that it was blowing more on the
right hand booster side, and we may have _ten a little bit of it over on that side, and that
helps to account for the lower temperature cn the right hand booster. And the other area that
would account for part of it is night sky radiation. Night sky radiation tends to take either way.
I am sure you have all noticed that quite often you will come out in the morning to fred ice on
your windshield when it never got below freezing the night before, and that is the phenomenon
that you see here. And so for that reason we believe that that explains the water trough temper-
ature, that part of it may have been simply that the air was running straight down, and then
fanned out and ran over the top of the water, and it did freeze from the top first, and that the
other would be it is looking directly at night sky, and so that would
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help to chill it also, and you also get some air motion over it which would tend to bring it down,
too. "_
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Davis, I understand that there is an investigative group that is
working on all aspects of the weather in Cape Kennedy, is that correct? Isn't there a report
about to be made on this subject?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I think I may more appropriately answer that. That has to do
with the environmental weather conditions at Cape Kennedy and improve the forecasting capa-
bility of such. It is called the Meteorological Systems Modernization Program, which has since
reported to NASA headquarters. There is a team headed up by Dr. John Theon that is looking
at improvements to models, instrumentation, and systems which would improve the forecast ca-
pability to give us a better forecasting capability at the Cape.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Ride points out that there is an ice team working group that is
working at Cape Kennedy.
Are you familiar w_th that?
MR. STEVENSON_ Not in those terms, no, sir.
DR. RIDE: I guess that I was under the impression that there was a group set up originally
by the interim board, and then that has eithercontinued on
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or ju,stccmpletedits work to just basicallyevaluateandassessthe thingsthat you foundpre-
launch and postlaunch.
MR. STI_VENSON: I am not aware of that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we _:ill look into that.
I think we are going to take a recess pretty soon here and ask you gentlemen maybe to
come back in the morning.
Before you leave, though, was there any--and we will ask you some more questions in the
morning--was there anything that was called to your attention or that you noticed that caused
you any concern about whether Challenger should be launched or not? Were you required in
your duties to use any discretion in connection with that, or was that something that was passed
on to other people and they assessed?
MR. DAVIS: We were specifically asked what we thought about it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what did you think about it? Did you have any serious concerns
or any other concerns about whether that launch should be made?
MR. DAVIS: Well, I had some concerns relative to the ice on the fLxed service structure. I
didn't know anything about the solid booster problem and all at
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the time, and that w'as that in my experience, when the sun starts to shine on adhered ice on
steel structures and other things of that type, it loosens at the interface between the ice and
that substructure that is underneath it. And I will let Charlie say what he said about the--be-
cause he got asked the same question, but in my answer to the question what I thought about
the subject of launching was this, that considering this fact that the ice would get looser as it got
warmer, I felt that if we decided or if they decided that we should launch, that they shored do it
as soon as possible because this rising sun was shining on the f'LXed service structure as well as
the ice that was on the mobile launch platform surface and would tend to loosen it and thereby
make it more dangerous as far as a quantity of it falling off, and that if they were going to fly,
they should fly as early as possible and not wait until later.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you pass judgment at all or give any advice on whether you
thought it was desirable to lmmch at all or not?
MR. DAVIS: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How about you?
MR. STEVENSON: What we really do, we do a total assessment of the pad and the vehicle
based upon
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the conditions that we observe, and based upon the conditions that we observed, particularly for
the flight vehicle, there was no reason to say not to launch. Our concern most of that day, and
we spent the last ten hours before launch, we spent at least four hours of that on the pad, 6ur
major concern on that day was to facility ice, and once the facility ice problem had been resolved
to the point that as long as the ice was not falling into the SRB hole, that there would not be a
safety of flight issue, then the team as a whole had no problem with the launch.
DR. RIDE: Did you feel tl_at the ice problem had eased to that point that the ice was no
longer going to be falling into the SRB?
MR. STEVENSON: In our mind, and based on our experience, the thing that was missing
and that gave us problems as a team was the unknown associated with the aspiration.We were
smart enough to figure out that the ice that felloffof the facilitywould falloffwithin just free-
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!fall would be 15 to 20 feet away from the edge of the FSS. The big unknown, and for this pro-
gram we hadn't done any studies on aspiration, and so, and ba_d upon previous launches, which
we had not had any problem with the facility icing up the side of the structure, and so we had
no data base, let's say, to
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make an as_c_ssment of the aspirational effects on the falling ice.
And once the management had assessed that problem and had decided that it was not a
safety of flight issue for the conditions we had described, then we really didn't have any problem
with launching.
The launch film, by the way, does support that they probably did make the right decision in
that we do not have any impacts over the vehicle from ice off of the facility. We did have a
slight amount of impact to the SRB, left hand SRB aft skirt area, but we had no impacts to the
orbiter vehicle.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there any way to judge whether the ice had any impact on the
orbiter based upon the pictures?
MR. STEVENSON: Well, the photographs of the film is high speed film, and if there are
any impacts to the vehicle, we were able or have been able to dete,-'mine that there were none.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So far as you can tell, there was no damage?
MR. STEVENSON: No damage to the orbiter vehicle or damage to the SRB.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All right.
Could you provide in the morning some sample
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pictures that were taken of your ice?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If there are no further questions by Commissioners, let's adjourn
until tomorrow morning at 9:30.
(Whereupon, at 4:20 o'clock p.m., the Commission recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 o'clock a.m.,
Thur_ay, February 27, 1986.)
1737
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
ACCIDENT--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1986
Dean Acheson Auditorium
State Department
Washington, D.C.
The Commmsion met, pursuant to recess, at 9:35 a.m.
PRESENT:
WILLIAM P. ROGERS, Chairnian, Presiding
NEIL A. ARMSTRONG, Vice Chairman
DR. SALLY RIDE
DR. ARTHUR WALKER
DAVID C. ACHESON
MAJOR GENERAL DONALD KUTYNA
ROBERT HOTZ
DR. EUGENE COVERT
967
• I
JOSEPH SUT]'ER
ROBERT RUMMEL
ALSO PRESENT:
AL KEEL, Commission Executive Director
1738
PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to ordor, please.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Davis, and Colonel Kolczynski.
CONTINUED TESTIMONY OF CHARLES STEVENSON, B.K. DAVIS, AND
LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD KOLCZYNSKI
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Good morning.
The Commissi-_n would like to receive any information that you have after the session is
over. l know you provided some information for us, and we would like to, as we go along, get any
information that you have from any of your documents for our records.
Mr. Hotz and General Kutyna have some questions they would like to ask you, and we will
probably not keep you too long today.
Bob, do you want to go ahead.
MR. HOTZ: Char!ie, you mentioned yesterday that when you were going around the pad
with your pyrometer, none of the readings you received on the pyrometer exceeded the red lines
and therefore you didn't report them.
Could you explain what those red lines are and what the limits of the red line is.
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MR. STEVENSON: Okay. My reply was intended to mean that we operate by certain re-
quirements, OMRSD requirements, and certain Launch Col _mit Criteria requirements. And
those mea3urements we had--let's say the vehicle was operating within those limits. As far as
the particular measurement_ of the SRB which you were mentioning, we have no requirements
as to the temperature of the SRB in the area that you were questioning, the 19 de m'ees.
MR. HOTZ: So you have no red lines as far as the SRB's are concerned?
STEVENSON: No, sir.
HOTZ: And what are the red lines concerned with the external tank or the orbiter or
MR.
MR.
what?
MR. STEVENSON: The red lines as far as the ice frost goes re"ersto the tank itself,to the
external tank, and this is mainly in terms of temperatures relating--our duties are mainly in
terms of temperatures relating to the external tank. The orbiter temperatures, again, as has
been stated, 31 degrees to 99 degrees.
MR. HOTZ: But that is the same as the general launch criteria?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
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MR. HOTZ: So you didn't report these temperatures on the SRB because there is r,o place in
the ,aunch criteria that requires any?
MR. STEVENSON: That is correct.
MR. HOTZ: Have you ever had antifreeze freeze on the pad before this launch?
MR. STEVENSON: As far as the facility goes?
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MR. HOTZ: Yes.
MR. STEVENSON: STS-20 was a similar ease the night before we launched, but it was not
the same conditions at launch time.
MR. HOTZ: Was that the one where the facility became encased with ice?
MR. SrEVENSON: Yes, sir.
MR. HOTZ: You didn't actually launch after that one?
MR. STEVENSON: No, we did not.
MR. HOTZ: Is this ti.e worst pad ice that you have ever encountered in your excursions out
there where an _ ctuat launch took place?
MR STEVENSON: As far as the facility goes, that is correct. As far as the launch vehicle
goes, that is not correct. We have had more ice on the vehicle at a launch time than we had this
time. For this particular launch, the vehicle was performing well,
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and it was mostly frost.
MR. HOTZ: Now, you mentioned earlier that you, as you move around the pad, you are in
constant communication with the launch control room, because they need to know where you
are and what you're doing. And so, in addition to your conference reports when you come back,
you are also giwng real time chat*.,er to them while you are out on the pad, is that correct?
MR. STEVENSON: We are in communication with two different groups. We're in cc -muni-
cation with the launch, the NTD or the LTD.
MR. HOTZ: Could you spell that out for us, please.
MR. STEVENSON. Okay. We are in communications with the launch test director on the
!01S net, and our responsibility is mainly to tell him where we are, where we're going, and what
we're dc!ng. He occasionally asks what conditions we are finding.
We are also in communications with the---
MR. HOTZ: In this particular case, were you reporting findings back to him?
MR. STEVENSON: Not specifica.qy, no, sir.
MR. HOTZ: You waited until you came in for your conference?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
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There was a case where we also were reporting back through the management loop on chan-
nel 245, and we also normally carry on communications with our people back in firing room 2,
who are doing the monitoring for our ice frost. We report various conditions that we say which
may be different than what is being observed on the TV system, so that we can hnve a better
understanding of the conditions.
MR. HOTZ: Thanks very much.
I have a couple of questions for Colonel Kolczynski on the weather forecast. Could you give
us in brief terms when and where you made you pre-launch forecast when you p_ edicted the
hard freeze for the night of January 27th-28th?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: We gave several briefings throughout the time period. We gave
some briefings on Saturday which in the afternoon--
MR. HOTZ: Could you use the dates.
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: Yes. On the 25th at 1100 local, we had a Mission Management
Team briefing which we attended and presented our data, which indicated a strong cold frontal
system coming down with Arclic air, strong Arctic air behind it. And we anticipated at launch
time having layered clouds, approximately broken at 3,000 feet, layered up through about 24,000
feet.
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Based on that, we came back in the eve_fiz_g on the telephone conference on the 25th at 2100
local. The system still was moving very rapidly toward the Florida peninsula, and it was still our
estimate that we would have the clouds in there and po_*ltlally some rain shower_ or even some
thunder showers to the West.
Based on that, the mission was _rubbed. We subsequently came back on the 26th at 1400
local. That was an in-person briefing to the Mission Management Team again. At that tim,-, ,re
ta_ked about the cold frontal system passing thro'agh, strong winds for the Monday morning
launch time period, potential cro_swinds.
As an outlook which we give--we always give an outlook fc.r the day after. We indicated
that once the cold high had set in in the Florida area, that we did anticipate having some colder
temperatures. At that time, we were ferecasting the rnid-20's to the upper 20's.
As you well know, we scrubbed for strong crosew!nds again on the Monday morning. That is
the 26th--I'm sorry, the 27th. So we ca,_-ne back. on the telephone this time, the 27th at 1400
local, and we presented again a forecast of clear cor.ditions, basically, good winds, no precipitable
kind of weather.
But we did indicate that we would have a
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little colder temperature than we had predicted before. In front of you you can see--at least y_,u
could for a while--the actual weather temperature trace, which is in the blue dashed line versus
cur predicted temperature.
(Vi_wgraph.) Ik,.r. z ZT-I I
We started it at about 1200 to 1200 for the temperature trace, and we started our forecast
trace at midnight because it was our anticipated predaction that at 12:00 midnight we would go
below 32 degrees. We were about three degrees warm approximately until about 4:00 a.m., at
which time we caught up with the curve, and then we were a slight bit, as you can see, colder in
our prediction than the actual weather was.
Is that sufficient?
MR. HOTZ: Yes.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
DR. COVERT: Colonel Kolczynski. I would like to ask you a question or two if I may on "he
information that you had generated on the winds aloft particularly the wind shear conditior_
and the jet stream location at 35, 40,000 feetat the time of launch, how often that was updated
and so tbrth.
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I d_d _rovide a package. Unfortunately, you don't have the
launch times of our
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upper air sounding systems. But I do have available for the panel a listingof aJ] of the balloons
and rockets that were sent up, and I willprovide that.
DR. COVERT: How often do you send up balloons?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: The balloon that was used I believe for the loads c_aJcu]ations
was the 3 hour and 30 minute prior to launch _,al!ooa.
DR. COVERT: That would be 8:00 a.m.,roubnly?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: No, sir.The launch time--if the launch time were at 10:30,that
would have l_n somewhere around 0700, I believe.And the actual time of that was--I believe
that is7:05,bat I will double check that for you.
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Basically,that informationis collecteda_d then transmittedto the Johnsonwindspeople,
whoareMarshallpeople.I'm sure,theygot_ Johnsonto dothewindloadscalculations.
We sendup a balloon.It is my contractorPanAm ti:at doesthe launchl,g andthe data
collection and the transfer of that data in automated fashion to those people. Per se we don't do
;And shears, and I would defer that question to the Marshall people because they can explain
that much better than I can as to how they
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do the loads calculations.
All we do is the measurement of the upper air soundings and pass _he information to Mar-
shall.
DR. COVERT: That is all I am interested in at this point. About the time that balloon went
through 35 to 40,000 feet, how far was it displaced from the position where the space shuttle
would have penetrated that altitude?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I don't have that information. I can get that for you.
DR. COVERT: Would you guess it was a substantial distance?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I really wouldn't want to speculate. I just haven't looked at the
data that closely. But I can get you that information.
DR. COVERT: Are there other ways of doing altitude soundings that would be more precise?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: We have several techniques that we use at the Cape. One of
them is a radar track mylar balloon w_th little conical shaped protrusions all over it. It is called
a JIMSFHERE, and we track that balloon, and it has an accuracy of approximately about--we
can collect da_ in approximately I00 foot intervals.
The balloons rise at about 1,000 feet per
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minute. Then there are the rawinsondes and the windsones, and they are substantially less accu-
rate.
There are other techniques that are beiug investigated, the upper air radar sounders, dopp-
ler acoustic radars, that show some potential. But again, as to the real capability of those kh-._s
of systems, I think those questions again would be better addressed to _he Marshall people, be
cause they have folks right there that have been looking at those kinds of systems.
DR. COVERT: I guess I would just like to go back and again emphasize one point. All of
these drift techniques, the balloons are lAunchcd near th_ pad?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: No, the balloons are launched on the Cape Canavelal side of the
complex. So they are south of the area where the shuttle is. And I'm not very good with dis-
tences, but I would estimate perhaps five miles, and that could be in error.
DR. COVERT: What kind of gradients exist in the upper air winds, .so that if you have a
balloon that is ten miles from where the shuttle is going to penetrate this altitude, how do you
correct? Or again, is this a Marshall task and not yours?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: We don't correct the balloons. All we do is--essentially, when it
moves, it is a radio frequency kind of thing. We get radio
1748
s'_n_ back sad as the balloon drifts that gives some indication of not only the speed, but also
the direction in which we at a certain level feel the wind is blowing. It's not a feeling. We meas-
ure it to the best of our ability.
DR. COVERT: Okay.
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COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: So if you are asking _: how continuous is the atmosphere, I
can't answer that question. I would--again, I'm not an ¢:pper air dynamicist, and I think you
probably could find somebody who could give you a much better answer than I could.
DR. COVERT: Thank you, Colonel.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Davis, you said that the weather conditions on the pad were the
worst of any launch, any previvus launch, is that correct? Or maybe it was Mr. Stevenson that
said that.
MR. DAVIS: We probably both said it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you want to discuss that a bit _ Ii_ other words, the conditions on
the launch pad themselve_ were the worst of any flight, any pre,rlous flight, is that accurate?
MR. D_VIS: Okay, I will give it a try,. Earlier in the year before January launch, we got ice
all over the fixed service structure. However, we were able to decide t_ot to launch--
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You scrubbed that launch?
MR. DAVIS: We scrubbed that launch, and it all melted off before the time of the actual
launch. And so as far as launch time is concerned, it was relatively warm by the time that we
did launch.
This time, however, we were in the 20's, like 24 to 26 degrees, at the time we were out there
at the T minus 3 hold, and this is well below" anything we had ever experienced before. And it
d; l serve to verify our math model which we use to predict the amount of ice that we may get
on the ou*,_id_ of the tank.
N-_rmally, we all talk about the fact that below 32 degrees you're going to have ice. But this
isn't strictly true if .he ice has to come from the moisture in the air, which is the case here. So
as far as the tan.. itself is concerned, we verified within a reasonable amount of error what the
actual ten.peratures were, and they were well below freezing. And we also verified that the pre-
dicted amount of frost was really what was getting on it, which was practically none.
And so as far as the vehicle itself was concerned, the extern_ tank part of it, and also the
int_ rface between the tank and the orbiter, we had less ice than we have seen before. But the
weathe, conditions for the other things that we encountered were
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much worse.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But the condition, the ice on the launch pad, was worse than anS,
previous flight?
MR. DAVIS: Ye,, sir, it was. And we can go through that in some detail. We have some
charts that would show that if you like, that show where the ice was and essentially how much
it was, and also I think will partly explain my remark yesterday to the effect that the sanlight
would make some of it on the eastern side of the stand be more likely to fall off during launch.
C-2-I,_. IRMAN ROGERS: Well, why don't you go ahead and do that. Do you have pictures that
you could 'bow us?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, we have them, and I guess we can have them projected on the
screen up there.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine, go ahead, why don't you.
(Viewgraph.) [R_l. "'"7 '1
,MR. STEVENSON: The first picture is jtmt an orientation type picture showing the MLP
deck, the leSS, and the RSS.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you explain some of those acronyms so we understand them?
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MR. STEVENSON: The platfu,-_ :hat the shuttle sits on is the mobile launch platform, the
MLP.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You refer to that as the launch platform?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir, the mobile launch platform.
The structure off to you right with the swing arms attached which come out to the vehicle is
called the fixed service structure, the FSS. And the part that is rotated back on the tracks to
what we call the south is the rotational service structure. And we use that for payload
changeout.
CHAIRM._CN ROGERS: Okay.
MR. STEVENSON: The next chart.
(Viewgravh.) IX_.r. z zT:q
MR. STEVENSON: Okay, this chart just shows you a different view of the FSS and the
MLP and the shuttle vehicle. This chart also shows some of the projections we made as far as
the trajectories for the ice that would come off of the facility.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Say that again? Now, what are the figures that you show in the
chart? They are projections, you say?
MR. STEVENSON: Trajectories of the ice particles as we were predicting that they would
fall off of the faciF.ty.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I see.
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MR. STEVENSON: The highest level which we had ice on the facility--and I will go into
those in more detail in the future charts here, but the highest elevation was at the 220 foot
elevation. And if you see the--we made predictions for three size particles, a six inch by one
inch by one inch particle, which is one of those traces: a 12 inch by one inch by one inch parti-
cle, which is the center trace; sold the 24 inch by one inch by one inch ice particle, which is the
inboard trace.
And we had predicted that they would come out on the MLP deck approximately 16 feet
from the FSS toward the shuttle vehicle, based upon a 10 knot wind at 300 degrees azimuth.
DR. RIDE: Again, I think you mentioned this yesterday, but that calculation doesn't include
the effects of aspiration?
MR. STEVENSON: That is correct. And there's a note on the chart up in the upper right-
hand corner that says "Effects of aspiration not included." That was unknown to us.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) lk,.,._ _7 t I
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. This is just a break across the fixed service structure at the 220
foot
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level. At the 220 foot level is the first level at which we encountered ice, and the darkened area
you see off there where the arrow pointing toward the north is m where the ice wa_. on that
level.
It is the first fire X hose which was let trickled to keep from freezing, and it was drained
into an eye bath or an eye wash, and the hose had fallen out of the basin and the water was
running on the facility. So that is *.he first, the highest level at which we had ice, and the dark-
ened area is away from the vehicle to the northwest.
Next chart.
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(Viewgraph.) [_,._.z _7 _I
This chart is the level immediately below the 200 foot ievel,which we probably had the
most ice.The darkened area again shows the part of the facilityof the FSS at which we had ice.
There i._a color.
The next chart.
(Slide.)l_,.I_ _;"l
Okay, this isa color photograph that was taken at T minus 3.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What are we looking at?
MR. STEVENSON: You are looking at the northwest corner of the fixed service structure,
the plumbing, the structural moments itselfwhere you see
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the iciclesthat have formed as a resultof the water coming, running down from the levelimme-
diatelyabove.
Icicleson this level were approximately two feet long and a maximum diameter of about
three-quarters ofan inch.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) IR_r. z "-7-7I
The pievious chart, by the way, was the level of the access arm, orbiter access arm, from
which the crew enters the vehicle. This happens to be the 16#) foot level, and again the black-
ened area shows the area where _ e encountered ice.
This area does show a little bit more ice over on what I'm calling the east side, which is the
side toward the vehicle, which would be in the top of the frame.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The last picture you say showed the area where the crew entered
the vehicle?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, the same level from which the crew enters the vehicle. The photo
was actually taken from the area of the slide w_:re, which is the emergency egress system.
The next chart.
(Slide.)(m,r. , '7-_ I
MR. STEVENSON: Again, this is a color photo
1755
taken at T minus 3 hours from the MLP deck. But it does show the 160 foot level. Icicles on this
level were approximately one foot in length and approximately five-eighths inch in diameter,
and you can see them on the stairways and all of the substructure of the facility.
MR. DAVIS: If I may, in this area the sun would be hitting the eastern section of it, which
is right in this area, and all of those small icicles up at the top would be the ones that would be
getting the sun first and _vould begin to loosen and would be ready to fall at the time of iiftoff.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Davis, did you perform the same functions on previous launches,
particularly the two previous launches?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Those were both launched from pad A, is that correct?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And this was at pad B?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And this is the first time pad B had been used?
MR. DAVIS: That iscorrect.
CHAIRMAN R(GERS: Did pad A have weather
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protectionof soinekind?
MR.DAVIS:No,sir.
CHAIRMANROGERS:OnpadA wasn'tthere_me weatherprotectiondevice?
MR. DAVIS:We haveone,but it is not in this area,as far as protectingthat structure
CHAIRMANROGERS:But therewassome,,,eatherprotectionequipmentonpadA, wasn't
there?
MR.STEVENSON:Yes,there'sthesamefreezeprcAectionplat,,for both pads, the same type
of protection.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We were told, I think when we wtrc i.n Kennedy, that there was
weather protection equipment on pad A, but it had not been installed _,_ -,_d B.
MR. DAVIS: No, I think they were referring to weather orotection devices for the orbiter.
That was to keep rain and so forth off the orbiter itself. It was not to protect a structure like
this. The only thing that is done to protect the structure as such is like draining pipes and pre-
paring it to handie the cold weather situation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you expb,_n the equipment that was on the launch pad A that
wasn't on launch pad B?
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MR. STEVENSON: The equipment that is on pad A in terms of weather protection is equip-
ment wh.ich is used to protect the orbiter from rain and hail, the weather. It is part of the rota-
tional service structure, and for launch, of course, that is rolled back. It is rolled back at ap-
proximately T minus 20 hours, say.
CHAIRMAN ROGER3: V_aat kind of equipment isit?Is ita cover of some kind that cover_
the orbiter?
MR. STEVENSON: Currently itisa canvas type. We call ita sail,and italso involves some
hard structure.For thispad and for the future,itwillallbe hard structure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But itdidn'thave anything to do with the external tank or the solid
rocket boosters?
MR. STEVENSON: No, sir,not in this time frame. Both pads would be identicalin thistime
frame.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm not sure that I know what you mean by "this time frame." I'm
trying to figure out whether there was a difference :n the protection against the weather in the
last launch compared to this one.
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MR. STEVENSON: In this time frame, the part of the weather protection for the orbiter
which is attached to the RSS would not be in place, because the RKq would be in its launch
position. And regardless, both pads would have the same conf_uration at this point in time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, why don't we go ahead. We can straighten it out later.
MR. DAVIS: Could I just for a second? I might be able to t'ut it. What it is, we have batwing
type things that are on the rotating service structure, and those things will fold up out of the
way. And you have to rotate that service structure back away from the vehicle. That takes all of
that stuff with it.
At this time, those things are not on pad B, but they would have been away anyway for this
period of time. Like we're fluting to launch, so they would move it back out of the way.
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IAnd an) of the things that you see here, like the icicles and so forth, would have been just
like they are now, regardless of what the weather protection device and so forth had been, had it
been identical Lo pad A.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: But for the s_veral days before launch there would have
been a difference in
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protection of the orbiter?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, in your mind that had no significance as far as this flight is
concern,.,d?
MR. DAVIS: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, if that is the case, why bother having the protection on the
orbiter, if it made no difference?
MF DAVIS: Well, I will try to answer it, though I am not a Kennedy person. But I will give
it _ shot, because of this--the real intent of that protective device that they're putting over the
orbiter itself is to prevent absorption of moisture into the tiles.
Now, they did have some protection. That was to keep the orbiter from getting damaged by
the fact of getting wet, and that protection is what we're talking about. That has just been
moved away regardle_, and between the time that that was rolled back and the time of launch
there was no precipitation and nothing happened that would have made a difference one way or
the other.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Go ahead.
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) Im.r ' _7-_,I
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The next chart is just a plan vie_, again moving down the FSS to the 140 foot level. Again,
the darkened area shows the area at which we encountered ice of some form.
Next chart.
(Slide.) Im.r. ' "'7-,o I
Again, this is a color photo showing the ice. At this time it's on the vehicle side of the leSS.
The vehicle in the background is the left-hand SRB at the ET attach ring. That is the area at
which we attach the tank to the SRB and the area at which we attach the orbiter to the exter-
nal tank.
You see the orbiter in the background. The lower surface, the icicles here are approximately
one foot in length and about one-half inch in diameter.
Next chart, please.
(Slide.) IX,.r. ' ,7-111
Again, this is a color photo of the same area, jtmt taken one slice higher on the vehicle. You
can actually stack the previous photo and this one together, and you will get the idea--if they
were stacked in this fashion, you would get the idea of what the total level looks like on the 140
foot level.
The next photo.
(Slide.) IH,.r. _ 27-i" I
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I included one to show some of the icing conditions on _ome of the equipment that we were
using• This happens to be a communications station which we use to communicate back to the
LCC and other areas on the pad.
Icicles here are approximately one foot in length and about a half an inch in diameter.
There was ice, as we mentioned yesterday, on various disIributicn panels and valve box panels,
as well as on side walls of the structure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was there any concern that that ice would affect the operation of
those instruments?
MR. STEVENSON: That particular instrument I couldn't use because of the ice, because I
couldn't turn the knobs to get to the right channel, and I had "_ go to another.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Say that again so I can unuerstand it? A little louder, please?
MR. STEVENSON: This particular box I tried to use, as a matter of fact, and I had to go to
another station, because I could not turn the ]ia.'s to get to the proper channel.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that had no effect on the safety of the launch as far as you were
concerned?
176Z
MR. STEVENSON: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It was just an alternate soarce of equipment?
MR. STEVENSON: That is correct. And as a matter of fact, these units are not in operation
during a normal launch except when we're on the pad, and they are usually in the inert, let's
say, condition.
DR. RIDE: You said that you saw ice on other equipment on the launch pad, the distribution
boxes, presumably valves and that sort of thing?
MR. STEVENSON: All of which are in the remote condition.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) IR," . z z7 I:_l
MR, STEVENSON: Moving down the structure, this happens to be the !20 foot level, and
again the darkened area shows the area where we found ice. And in all of these, I should point
out that most of the areas that you've seen, the darkened area is .-eally the north and northwest
part of the facility. That is where we saw the most heavy concentrations of ice. The east rode,
which is in the top part of the TV screen, we actually saw the least amount of ice.
T,he next chart.
(Slide._ Im, I. "- "7 t ,!
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MR. STEVENSON: This is a color photograph looki_:g at the 120 foot level from the mobile
launch platform deck, that shows the icicles that were forming on the roof or on the floor,
whichever may be the case, on the grating, as the water had dripped through the grating.
Again, this side is the northeast c_rner and it is toward the vehicle.
The next chart.
(Slide.) lair. " "7-15l
photograph was taken from the 100 foot level of the leSS. It shows the orbiter in the
background with a part of the external tank, and on the far left the part of the SRB. It shows
one of the beams, structural moments of the I_$, with the icicles on it.
These icicles are about three inches long and les_ than half an inch in diameter.
The next chart.
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(Viewgraph.) Im,l 2 z7 l,[
This chart is just a plan view of the MLP deck. We are showing in the crosshatched area the
16 feet that we were predicting would be the footprint for ice which we were projecting would
fall off of the FSS at ignition.
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And again, this chart does 'not take into effect the effect of aspiration. And we will _o over
in the next few charts and talk. about the SRB flame holes which you see in the center part of
the photo.
The next chart.
(Slide._l_,,i-'-'__7i
This photo isa photo of the MLB deck looking from the FSS to east,toward the vehicle.The
vehicle would be in the Wp part of the frame. The shiny part of the MLB deck is sheet ice ap-
proximately one-eighth of an inch thick•
Down in the bottom of the frame, you see icicles,which were running from a firehose into
the drain. Those iciclesare about four feet long, and that is over the edge of the MLP deck.
Next chart.
(Slide.) IR,.I -' z7 I,_l
You need to turn that one over.
Okay. This is the cha).'t of what are called water troughs within the SRB flame holes to pre-
vent overpressure. They are filled with the 6,500 gallons, roughly, of water and antifreeze. The
antifreeze was put in for this launch as part of our freeze protection plan.
The water was protected against freezing down
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to 16 degrees Fahrenheit. And this chart over on the right-hand side, the first four or five water
bags, you can ,see that there is ice on the surface. This picture was taken after we had begun to
remove the ice with, let's call it, a f'tsh net. We actually broke the ice up and dipped it out.
The next chart.
(Slide.)[R,.t.z z7-l,l
This again isthe left-hand SRB flame hole, and itshows the amount of ice we have taken
out. Itshows a littlebit of ice that is leftin there. We did come back out after this photo was
taken and fish out most of the remaining ice that you see there. There's a few pieces stillleftin
there floating,about the sizeof your hand.
The next chart.
(Slide.) IR,.I. " -,7-,,q
This is just a repeat of what we've said, and again you can _Jee a few pieces of ice were left
in there. We felt we got a minimum of 95 percent to 98 percent of the ice that was available in
the trough. We did rmh it out.
And we did make one more attempt at T minus 20 to get out additional ice that you do see
floating around in there when this photograph was taken.
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The next chart.
(Slide.)Iu,'f-z zv-Zll
This isa typicalphoto of the ice that was taken out ofthe water troughs and dumped on the
MLP deck, where we later swept itoff.We were estimating that the water--that the density of
the ice here was approximately 25 pounds per cubic foot.It was approximately one half inch
thick.
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The next chart.
(Slide.} Im.I e z7 zz I
The two next charts are of the aft skirt on the left-hand SRB. There was a little bit of
water--or a little bit of water had gotten on the aft skirt of ,he SRB as a re,'ult of the overflow
from the eye wash basins, and that water had turned to ice.
If you could zoom in on the blue ring on the bottom. The little white that you see on the
blue ring is the ice we were referring to. We did remove that ice as best we could.
The next chart.
_Slide.)Im.i z _,7:,.q
This isa closeup of the same area. We had decided in the early meetings that icein the area
and ice in the water trough was unacceptable for launch, and that isthe reason we went back
out a second time and
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attempb_l to remove all of the ice in the area of the flame hole.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you explain that a bit. You decided earlier what, that that
was unacceptable 9
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. Ice in the water troughs, which we were showing, or any debris i.s
unacceptable for launch, because we have seen in the past film analysis that some of this debris
can be 'thrown up toward the vehicle.
And so we decided that we would have to remove the ice, particularly in the primary water
bags, which could become a source of debris arid impact the vehicle.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you did that?
MR. STEVENSON: And we did that. The water bags that you've seen here in these photo-
graphs are mainly what we call the secondary water bags. The primary water bags are just
below this photo, close in around the nozzles of the SRB's, and that had considerably less ice in
it, and also we took more pains to make sure we irmhed it all out.
The next chart, please.
(Slide..) Ix,a* -' z7-Zll
We put in about three charts to show the overall condition of the vehicle. We haven't talked
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much about the vehicle, but this chart does show the frost conditions on the vehicle, and this is
launch time, not T minus o. These are pad cameras, taken at launch.
And you do see a little bit of frost on the external tank. We see no anomalies with the orbit-
er or the SRB.
MR. DAVIS: If I could interrupt here for just a second. If you notice, on the right side the
frost is a little more evident on the back side where it's in the shade. You see the white on the
tank itself, and this is the kind of frost that we were seeing earlier. And you see on the side that
is next to the orbiter, it is pretty well melted off.
MR. STEVENSON: Next chart.
(Slide.) IRef. 2,27-25]
This chart is at the T _ro.
The next chart.
(Slide.)[Rer.-, Z7-"iq
This chart shows the vehicle riseofapproximately 100 feet.
DR. RIDE: What time isthis? ,
MR. STEVENSON: I would say approximately two seconds.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Chairman, could I suggest we
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have copies of that picture, please?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes. sir, I will supply you copies.
DR. RIDE: Can you pan that down just a little bit.
MR. STEVENSON: Would you pan that down just a little, please.
MR. HOTZ: Charlie, this may not be your field, but it looks like there's a little puff of smoke
off on the right hand side there. Can you describe that for us?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir. That is the puff of smoke that hem been released before to the
press and to the world. That puff of smoke in that picture is, I believe it is about 100 or so inches
tall and about five feet across.
MR. HOTZ: And what is the time frame of that picture?
MR. STEVENSON: I believe it's about two seconds. I would have to go back and check the
ti _e.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Would it pay to back up one chart? Was there smoke on that chart
previously?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, would you back up one chart.
(Slide.) im.r..,27-27]
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MR. HOTZ: Is there any smoke visible in that picture, Charlie?
MR. STEVENSON: No, sir, I don't think so. They are not sequential pictures. I took them
out of a string of photos, and they are not necessarily in the correct order.
MR. HOTZ: But this appears to be a different angle from any of the pi_ures tkat we have
seen. I wonder if you could make a sequential series of that available to the Commission.
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir. I have 130 photographs in that area.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you go back to the one where the smoke appears for the first
time, please.
MR. STEVENSON: I believe that is chart 24.
DR. COVERT: Could the operator focus the one, focus that to the left. Put the one back on
you just had.
(Slide.) Ire'r, " z7-"Sl
MR. STEVENSON: In one of those photographs, now that I've pulled the notes out, the
cloud of smoke is 36 inches by 108 inches. And then in the larger photo it's 72 inches by 130
inches.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Have any of you made any
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interpretationof these pictures as far as weather isconcerned?
MR. STEVENSON: Not as far as the weather isconcerned, no, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Have you any other conclusions on it?
MR. STEVENSON: Well, our conclusion would be speculation based on--but ifyou want
that,I will speculate.
[Laughter.]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, go ahead.
[Laughter.]
MR. STEVENSON: Engineers don't like to speculate, but based upon our photo data--and
we have analyzed allof the photos--we feelthat that is a leak. Itmay or may not be related to
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temperature, and we feel it is coming out of--the most likely spot is the joint between the aft
booster and the aft segment.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And th_s is the right booster?
MR. STEVENSON: This is the right booster, y_.
MR. DAVIS: And this is the area that I mentioned yesterday, where I was taking a shot of
that area above it, which is the white area there, where all
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of that extra frost is up there. I panned up and down that area on the tank and got the tempera-
ture readings ,arlier.
And so at that time we could see absolutely nothing that would indicate any kind of a leak
from the tank itself, and this is in that specific area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So your speculation would be the same as Mr. Stevenson's?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Armstrong.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Would you tell us again how long before the time of this
picture your last reading with the IR gun was, or any other measurement?
MR. STEVENSON: Tha_ time was 7:14. Give us chart 26.
(Viewgraph.) Im.J. z 27 2,_l
MR. DAVIS: That was almost five hours earlier than the picture we were just looking at.
VICE CtIAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: About how long?
MR. DAVIS: About five hours. We were right at noon when we launched, and that was
roughly at 7:00 o'clock.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And have you made any attempt to project what the
first--or correct your measurements to give the actual temperature of the
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seal area at the time you made the measurements, and then to project what they may have been
at launch time?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, we have. Taking the 19 degrees corrected measurement, which is indi-
cated on this chart in front of you there, and taking into account the change in ambient temper-
ature and a minor consideration, which could be a major one and completely make my guess
wrong in that it might be a higher temperature than I'm going to project, it comes out that the
temperature should have been approximately 28 to 30 degrees at the time of launch.
ViCE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you.
Is that all of the charts you had?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, this is all the ones we planned to present, and we will make these
available to you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
Mr. Armstrong.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Yes. I would like to return to your testimony of yester-
day indicating your past experience with seeing leaks from the ET, not necessarily leaks but
perhaps vents or whatever. And is it your conclusion, based upon your past experience, that a
leakage out of the external tank, either LOX or hydrogen, would in fact be visible because there
would
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be associated condensation in the air and so on, or not?
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MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, that is correct. And in fact, we have corroborating evidence of it in our
photographs that showed the purge coming out of the hydrogen to--let's see---the hydrogen-um-
bilical interface between the tank and the orbiter. You can see the condensation and see the
nitrogen purge coming out, and it is considerably warmer than the nitrogen itself would be.
We can also see the oxygen coming out of the oxygen vent system, and as it comes out you
can see it, and we have a mixture of purged nitrogen and mixed with that oxygen, and that is
dry nitrogen we are using. And so if we had a leak of hydrogen we would certainly see it, be..
cause very minutely it would give you a rather large plume.
VICE CI-L4JRMAN ARMSTRONG: And you would both see it and, if you went over that
area with your gun, you would probably see it with that. So you had two sources.
And the last time of your visual inspection of the SRB and the ET was again how long
before launch?
MR. DAVIS: T minus 20 minates, which would be about _0 minutes before launch.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Can you say that your impression is that, based upon
your visual observations at T minus 20 minutes, there was no evidence of any leak?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
MR. RUMMEL: Was the spccific charge of yours to in fact look for hydrogen leaks, or was
this done more or less in passing while you were there?
MR. DAVIS: We are not specifically charged to look for hydrogen leaks as such. We are
charged to look for any leaks, and any leaks to the substrate, through a crack or anything of
that nature in the thermal protection system.
And as part of the interface area down there, we have a possibility of a leak always, al-
though we have good seals. And up to this point we don't have a record of having a leak.
But we always make a specific inspection for that, and we make specific inspections, and I
looked personally, as well as all the other members on the team, for any indication oI a crack or
a leak or anything that goes with it.
But we aren't charged to go look for hydrogen.
MR. RUMMEL: I take it there are other means,
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then, as well? Are there TV cameras that continuously scan with respect to propellant leaks in
the ET?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, that is correct. We have them, but we don't have total coverage. We
do have pretty good coverage in the area that I'm speaking of.
MR. RUMMEL: And where is that reported? Is that in the control center? Where are the
cameras read that continuously report?
MR. DAVIS: That is the launch control center, in what we commonly refer to as the Ice
House. We have a multitude of cameras that are directable by Charlie and his people and myself
on request, to look at any particular spot. We have trained observers who watch it at all times,
so that we are really looking for this kind of thing. This is our basis for existence.
MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there any evidence at all that you have seen tha_ would suggest to
you there is any possibility of a leak in that area on this Challenger flight?
MR. DAVIS: Absolutely none.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: There have been, as you know, stories that somehow a hydrogen
leak on the external tank might have been a cause of this accident.
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But so far you've had no evidence to that effect at all?
Mr;. DAVIS: No, sir. I can't support even a consideration of it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Ride.
DR. RIDE: I have one question on your speculation about the smoke. I was wondering to
what extent you have been able to localize the origin of the smoke on the photographs? Can you
pin i_.down to a one square foot area or five square feet or 12 square feet?
Just how close can you do that photographically now?
MR. DAVIS: Maybe we should both answer that one. I can say that it loc_ks to me, my per-
sonal observation of it, that it is inboard of the connection of the lower strut between the SRB
and the ET. And I believe that is about something inboard of 45 degre_ off the centerline.
MR. STEVENSON: It is approximately 300 degrees.
DR. RIDE: Okay. I guess really my question is, how sure are you of that? What are your
error bars on that? Can you say that within a couple of feet or within a couple of inches?
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MR. STEVENSON: We will say it is within a foot of the joint, and it is at 300 degrees.
DR. RIDE: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's pretty precise.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It is my understanding that you also have as part of
your responsibilities the search for debris post-launch.
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Can you tellus what the resultsof that search were for
thisoccasion?
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. Normally at post-launch we inspect the pad proper inside,let's
say, the perimeter fence, unless we irmd flighthardware or some reason to go beyond. We have
gone as far as the beach and we have gone as far as 15, 20 miles north and south of the bea2h,
depending upon the conditions which would warrant that.
For this time, my normal inspection team was delegated the responsibilityto look inside the
pad, and insidethe pad we foundwas of this time, we have found no flighthardware or parts off
of the flightvehicle. We have not found an)_hing in the nature of facilitydebris that would
cause damage to the flightvehicle.
GENERAL KUTYNA: May Iask, there were sotrTM
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new doors on this launch pad that were supposed to slap down after launch and I was told they"
were fairlylarge springs that slap those doors down, and those springs are missing. And the last
time I heard we hadn't found them.
He ve you found them yet?
MR. STEVENSON: One spring was found on the MLP deck by holddown post number one.
The other three springs are stillmissing. The springs have a.plunger mechanism. We have
found two of those.The other two are stillmissing.
The two we four.d were approximately 1200 feet north of the pad, next to the perimeter
fence.One was on the inside of the fence and one was on the outside of the fence.We feel that
the other two are out in the lagoon and under water.
GENERAL KUTYNA: So no speculation that the_e might have bounced off the orbiter or
something?
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MR. STEVENSON: We have--we are in the process of doing a film analysis, and the film
analysis shows that the doors to reach their 60 degree or 57 degree position, the timing is such
that the vehicle was what we consider to be far enough away that when those spring.,s could
have come out _._d the plunger, that the vehicle would be in a safe position.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: To follow my previous question, had there been ice im-
pacts on the orbiter tiles, 7or example, and damage to those tiles, would you normally expect
that you would be able to find some evidence of that in your post-laanch inspection?
MR. STEVENSON: I fee! that, number one, if we had any damage to the vehicle during
liftoff, the high speed film, launch film that we take, in all likelihood would show us that.
Secondly, if we had lost any flight type hardware--and we have done that in the past.--we
would have found it, and we have found it in the past.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: For example, losing tiles, for example, you would expect
it?
MR. STEVENSON: The time we lost tiles, we found nearly every single one.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Colenel Kolczynski, could you characterize for us the
nature ot the Cape weather and the difficulties that you encountered as a result of having to
meet the launch and recovery criteria, since there are so many weather constraints on both of
those areas?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKi: I perceive that as two questions cf a generic sense. To answer
the first one, anyone that has taken an aerial photograph of the Cape
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knows full well that we are surrounded by water in that particular area. We have got the Indian
River and Banana River to the west, and of course the Atlantic Ocean and several lagoons
around, to provide enough moisture source.
Consequently, in the winter time in early mornings we run into problems with fog. In the
summer time we encounter convection thunderstorm rain shower activity, which unfortunately
oftentimes builds up directly over the Cape and KSC.
As far as the second question, I believe was--
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: What difficulties or how fast, really how fast does weath-
er change_ and what difficulties does that provide you in being able to meet the launch and re-
covery criteria that are associated with those?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: If we could become specific with 51-L, for example, the frontal
system, that frontal system seemed to move rather well as it came i_','.,'e_d the Gulf and even
midway through the Gulf. Once it got toward the Florida peninsula, it suddenly siowea down
and, as you very well know, we had better than anticipated cloud conditions.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Better being?
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COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: There were scattered clouds, le_zs clouds than anticipated, right
about launch time.
And so I guess what I'm trying to say is it's very difficult to hold continuity, especially 12
hours in advance on a system which is moving even as rapidly as this one was. There are occa-
sions where you're going to miss the timing a little bit, and of course we were off a little bit on
the timing this time.
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Aboutan houras! recall,in termsof the relationshipof all of the criteria that n.,_edto be
met.Asyouwellknow,we,theAir Force,areresponsibleupuntil the launchof a vehicle.Sowe
wereresponsiblefor the launchforecast.
Theforecastpost-launchup to and includingthe landingof theshuttle,whetherthat beat
Edwardsor at Kennedy,is the responsibilityof the SpaceflightMeteorologyGroupdownat
Johnson.Theyare theNationalWeatherServicepeople.
Sowecoordinateeveryforecastthat goesout to the MissionManagementTeam,to the
launchdirector,to the flight director,with Johnson.We havea very closerelationshipwith
thosepeoplebecause,asyouwell know,and asdepictedin the brochurethat I've givenyou.
therearelaunchcriteria whicharedifferent
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,,eratheRTLScriteria.
Oftentimesthe weatherlooksextremelygoodoverthe Capefor launchin winds,for exam-
ple,sothat wedon't havea windconstraintper sefor launch,howeverwecouldhavea cross-
windat theshuttlelandingfacility, whichwouldhaveto beconsideredbythemanagementasto
whetheror not wewouldfollowthoseguidelines.
Soyes,thereare,asyoupointout--andof course,we'vegot the trans-Atlanticabortweath-
er criteria which haveto bemet, andthe oncearoundabort criteria, bothat Edwardsandat
WhiteSandsSpaceHarbor,that haveto bemet.
Andsowehaveto meldall of thesetogetherin a cooimnatedforecastwhichencompasses
all of thoserequirements,sothat wecangivethedecisionmanagersa betterpictureofwhat the
weatherlookslike eve,'wwhere.
VICECHAIRMANARMSTRONG:Canyoucharacterizewhetherthat is a difficult taskin
termsof beingsufficientlyableto accuratelyprojectthe weatherconditionsat launchtime in
orderto meetall of the constraints?Is it difficult, or doyouhavea highdegreeof confidencein
that ability?
COLONELKOLCZYNSKI:I believethe peopleon
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mystaffandthe peopleat theJohnsonstaffandthe weatherteamdoasgoodor betterjob than
anybodycando in predictingtheweather.But anyonethat hasdonean analysisof forecastir=g
knowsthat the fartherawayyougetfrom anobser_-ationi termsof time,the lessprecise,accu-
rate,your forecastis,andit dropsoff veryrapidlyafteraboutsix hours.
Sowhenyou'remakinga 12-hourprojection,the likelihoedof being100percentaccurateis
relatively--or is slimmerthan it wouldbe if youweremakinga three-hourforecast.But with
theequipmentprovidedbyNASAandtim kind of peoplethat wehavesupportingthe missionin
termsof the weatherpeople,I think, as1saidbefore,wedoasgoodajcb asyoucanget done.
DR.RIDE:The weatherat KSC,of course,is very dynamic.Doyou feel that there are
maybetimesof yearat the Capewhereit is difficult for you to projectevensay30minut_.s
ahead,asyouhaveto dofor anRTLS,or anhourahead?
COLONELKOLCZYNSKI:That isespeciallytrue of thetwo situationsthat I broughtu_ to
your at_z_tion.As you well know,whenyou get into a situationof very light winds in the
winter timemorni,gs,yougetveryclosedewpointdepression.Does
1785
everybodyunderstandwhatthat means?
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Sothat theatmosphereis relativelywet. If the winds g:_ very light, we zould get a fog con-
dition, which is a problem for RTLS. And so that is a situation where one has to very cautiously
watch the weather and watch the temperatures and winds.
The same thi_:g with thunderstorms. Because of the dynamic nature of the weather at Ken-
nedy, we can actually have storms build up right over Canaveral or Kennedy itself. We are
doing a lot of--we are acquiring a lot of equipment to try and get a better handle on that.
We are getting equipment which ,rill tell u5 about the vertical motion of the al:. If we see
an area where the air is moving in toward the center, we know there is only one place it can go
add that s up, and tha¢ is a place that we can look far for potential storm development.
And so we're trying to get a handle, for example, on hour or two or even 30 minu:es, for
that matter, ahead of the storm developing, to be able to tell the decisionmaker, we know ye're
got a developir_g system right here, it may or may not cause us problems.
Does that answer your question?
DR. RIDE: Yes. Roughly what time scale have
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you seen storms, thunderstorms in particular, develop? C;:u you see tb, e+_a? Do they pop up
within an hour of when you weren't expecting them, or is h--do you have an hour's warning or
two hours warning?
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COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: Basically, if they are going to pop up inside an hour or 30 min-
utes, we have a relatively unstable atmosphere, and we would anticipate that we ",_ill have
storms in the area, at least rain showers, and probably thunder storms. Otherwise, we have a
relatively good handle on the fact that storms will occur within the area, and when I say within
the area, within 50 nautical miles, perhaps, of the Cape, at least six hours and sometimes even
24 hours in advance based upon the flow patterns that occur, based upon the atmospheric condi-
tion, whether or not we have a frontal system in the area, the stability of the atmosphere, the
predicted stability.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Davis, in the performance of your duties, were
you called upon to make a recommendation about launch or no launch as far as weather is con-
cerned, either one of you or both?
MR. STEVENSON: Normally that is ba.,_ upon the weather predic+,ic,ns. We, when the
weather is bad, we will go to mmnagement and say _,,e ale totally out of it, there is no reason to
try to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What happened this time on 51-L _
MR. STEVENSON: For this particular time, the weather, the conditions were such that we
were
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predicting that we would have frost on the vehicle, and therefore we had no reason to say not to
load the tank with cryo.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But do you go to someone and tell them what your recommendation
is, or your v :.ew on it?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir, starting a day to two days before launch, we start _o do that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what about the day of the launch? Did you have the occasion to
make a recommendation on that day?
MR. STEVENSON: On the day of launch, whe ..r we launched or not, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And to whom did you make the recommendation?
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MR. STEVENSON: Well, as we have testified, once we came on station that night, which
was roughly around midnight, we immediately began to see that we had a problem with the
facility, and tbat was brought to the management attention starting with my Director of Engi-
neering. It went on up the loop.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To whom?
MR. STEVENSON: Up through the management chain, and for the next ten hours prior to
launcb, we spent approximately four hours on the pad as a result of
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conf'ontations with management and our concern and their concern for what was going on out
ther.,, and we also spent approximately three or four hours in discussion with the management
system discussing the resu!ts of our findings on the p_ t.
And so I think they are very responsive.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What was the result? Now, you've told me the system. What did you
finally say to somebody at that point?
MR. STEVENSON: In the last meeting we presented the subtotal, let's say, of all of our
findings. We were able to say that the facility ice, which we were all concerned with, would stay
within the 16 feet or so of the FSS. We expressed concern for the effects of aspiration, which was
an unknown, and we left it at that. We were not worried about the ice that would fall off the
facility if we could be assured that the ice would stay within the 16 feet of the FSS and not be
drawn into the left hand SRB flame hole and thereby become debris and be ejected into the
vehicle.
The management system again wrestled with that for quite a while and made phone calls
and finally decided that it would not be a safety of flight issue to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you made that
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recommendation yourself, that there would not be a problem as far as safety of launch was con
cerned?
MR. STEVENSON: Once th2 opinion had developed that the aspiration would not draw the
ice into th? SRB flamehold, we had no problem with saying that it was okay to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you make that recommendation, and if so, how did you make it,
orally or in writing.
MR. STEVENSON: Orally.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To whom?
MR. STEVENSON: To--well, sta_ng with, let's see, Jesse and Arnie.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Moore and Mr. Aldrich?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And was the same thing true in your case, Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, it was. In fact, my suggestion that if we were going to fly, that we should
do it as early as possible, was picked up. Mr. Moore specifically stated that he felt that that was
true, too, and the)" proceeded that way.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you were both satisfied there was no safety problem as far as
this launch was concerned?
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MR. DAVIS" As far as the ice was concerned, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Or any other weather problem, related problems, or did you just
concern yourself with the ice conditions?
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MR. DAVIS: Well, in this particular case we were only discussing the ice, but I saw no other
thing that would have caused me to bring up anything else.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In those discussiotas, did anyone express any doubt about the wisdom
of flying this launch in view of the weather conditions?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS. Who did that?
MR. STEVENSON: Rockwell.
DR. RIDE: I think it may be important to point out here that the ice team is basically
coming back and reporting facts, reporting what they have seen, and then acting in an advisory
capacity, and you are not really in the decisionmaking chain for the launch.
MR. STEVENSON: We make recommendations based on what we found.
DR. RIDE: Ar',d you really don't do the analysis of what could happen to the orbiter tiles if
the ice hits. You just calculate the trajectories of the ice that yeu have seen is that right?
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MR. STEVENSON: And again, based upon size, we know what damage would occur, yes.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: What wa_ your reasoning in recommenchng the earliest
possible launch?
MR. DAVIS: I believe I mentioned it yesterday, but I will go through it again. Sunlight, first
of all, is pretty transparent--ice is transparent to sunlight. The substrate underneath it in the
case where we are talking about here is a dark gray, and it is rather rough, and so it absorbs
sunlight and turns it into heat energy right at the substrate between the ice and the mobile
launch platform, for example, and th':s is the part I was specifically referring to, and also the
handrails that had the icicles on it. So the sun makes it turn loose at the bottom, so to speak,
and it makes the sheet be loose so it could literally be picked up and sucked into the flame tran-
sient and flown up.
So we made every effort to get all of the even partially loosened ice off of the deck and to
make sure that there is no loose ice out there.
So the longer you wait after we have done our job, obviously the longer yeu would have to
absorb solar energy and turn some more ice loose.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: The question was,
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your conclusion was that the earlier you launched, the less loose ice there would be, is that cor-
rect?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Stevenson, you just referred to the fact that you heard Rockwell
raise some question about the weather.
Would you tell the Commission what you recall about that and who said it and what they
said?
MR. STEVENSON: Rockwell expressed concerns, they did not express a strong opposition to
launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who? Mention names if you are able to.
MR. STEVENSON: I believe it was Bob Glaysher.
CH,: IRMAN ROGERS: And what time was that?
MR. ,_'EVENSON: That was after the T-3 hour walkdown.
DR. R.'DE: Was that the meeting at about 9:00 in the morning, or was that before you went
out for the _ast time?
MR. STEVENSON: That was about 9:00 in tbe morning.
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MR.DAVIS: It was the same meeting we had _he meeting before we went out the last time,
and w_. discussed it at 9:00 o'clock also.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much. We
1794
appreciate your testimony
DR. KEEL: Mr. Petrone, Mr. Glaysher, Mr. Cioffoletti and Mr. Martin, please.
(V; itnesaes sworn.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Gentlemen, will you be seated and give your names and your
presen£ employment and what your jobs are?
¢
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TESTIMONY OF ROCCO PETRONE, PRESIDENT. SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
DIVISION, NORTH AMERICAN SPACE OPERATIONS. ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL:
BOB GLAYSHER, VICE PRESIDENT AND PROGRAM MANAGER, ORBITER OPER-
ATIONS SUPPORT, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL; MARTIN CIOFFOLETTI, VI¢;E
PRESIDENT, SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, ROCKWELL
INTERNATIONAL: AL MARTIN, SITE DIRECTOR, LAUNCH SUPPORT OPERATIONS,
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL
(COMMISSIONER ACHESON RECUSED HIMSELF FROM THE HEARING DURING THE PRESENTATION AND
QUESTIONING OF THE ROCKWELL WITNESSES. )
DR. PETRONE: Mr. Chairman, I am Rocco Petrone, President of the Space Transportation
Systems Division of Rockwell International, located in Downey, California. I have been employed
by Rockwell for five years. I have been in my current position for the last two years, and in the
prior three with Rockwell held enior ma:lagement positions in the Space Shuttle program for
which Rockwell is responsible. Prior to joining Rockwell I served with NASA from 1960 to 1975.
My division is responsible for the design,
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testing, certification and manutacture of the Space Shuttle orbiter, and we provide operational
support to the delivered orbiters to NASA. The division is also responsible for integration sup-
.port and for cargo integration into the Space Shuttle System.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank yau.
MR. MARTIN: I am Al Martin. I have been with Rockwell 33 years. My present position is I
am the site director for Rockwell located at the Kennedy Space Center, and our organization
provides technical advisory support to NASA, also logistic support and configuration manage-
ment support. I have worked on the Shuttle Program for 13 years. I have been at the Kennedy
Space Center four years, and prior to that I was the Chief Program Engineer for orbiter develop-
ment at our plant in Downey, California. I also worked on the Apollo program fo. ten years, and
one of my assignment, s there was Launch Director, director of launch operation for Rockwell for
the Saturn S-II stage at the Kennedy Space Center.
MR. GLAYSHER" I am Robert M. Glaysher. I am Vice President and Program Manager,
Orbiter Operations Support for the Space Transportation System Division, Rockwell Internation-
al, based in Downey, California. I joined Rockwell 13 years ago. I have worked on the orbiter
project for that entire time in various
lOiO
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management capacities. I have been in my present capacity for approximately two years. My
responsibilities as program manager are to provide operations support direction to delivered (_r-
biters and also to provide logistics support activities in support of delivered orbiters.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. CIOFFOLETTI: I am Martin Cioffoletti. I have been with Rockwell for 20 years, ap-
proximately 13 years on the Space Shuttle program, and I am Vice President of System Integra-
tion a:_d Cargo Integration, and the responsibilities there are to provide systems engineering
support to the Level II Program Office at the Johnson Space Flight Center for both integration
and cargo.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Petr_ne, you and I had a brief discussion on the telephone about
the Rockwell participation in the events leading to the launch on January 28. The Commission
would like to have you, in any order you care to, explain the participation of you four gentlemen
in that process, with particular reference to the weather, who was at the meeting, what was
said, because as we understand it, there was concern on your part as to weather. We would like
to know exactly what was said and how that concern was
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expressed, and to whom.
DR. PETRONE: I had been at the Cape since Friday, and Monday afternoon after the scrub
on that morning, I returned to Downey. I left at the Cape my two program managers you have
heard from Bob Glaysher and Marty Cioffoletti, and I told them that I would be in our Mission
Support Room in Downey for the launch scheduled for the next morning. A1 Martin is our site
director and is normally stationed at the Cape, whereas the two gentlemen here traveled with
me for this particular launch and supported it.
I first heard about an ice concern ab,_ut 4:00 a.m. Pacific Standard Time. I had gotten up
and went to the support room to support :.!_ launch. We have people monitoring consoles, and i
checked in, and they told me there was a concern, and when ! arrived at about 4:40 a.m. PST, I
was informed we were working the problem with our aerodynamicist and debris people, but very
importantly, we would have to make an input to Kennedy for a meeting scheduled at 6:00 a m.
our time and 9:00 a.m. Florida time.
We had approximately an hour of work to bring together. The work had been under way
when I arrive,t and was continuing.
At that time I got on the phone with my two
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program managers just to discuss background of where we were, how things stood, and what
their concerns were locall),. They described what they knew in Florida, and we also in Downey
did television input, and we could see some of the ice scenes that were shown here this morning.
We arrived through a series of meetings to a top level discussion at approximately 5:30 a.m.
PST, from which we drew the following conclusions: Ice on the mobile launcher itself, it could be
debris. We were very concerned with debr_, of any kind at the time of launch. With this particu-
lar ice, one, could it hit the orbiter? There was wind blowing from the west; that appeared not to
be so fast, that ice wouldn'" hit the orbiter but it would land on the mobile launcher. The second
concern was what happem o that ice at the time you light your liquid fuel engines, the SSMEs,
and would it throw it around and ricochet and potentially hit the orbiter.
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The third aspect is the one that has been discussed here of aspiration, what would happen
when the large SRM motors ignite and in effect sack m air, referred to as aspiration, and ice
additionally would come down, how much unknown.
The prime thing we were concerned about was
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the unknown base line. We had not launched in conditions of that nature, and we just felt we
had an unknown.
As to specifically that trajectory the ice might fly, one can make estimates, but we felt that
it was an unknown condition.
I then called my program managers in Florida at 5:45 a.m. and said we coula not recom-
mend launching from here, from what we see. We think the tiles would be endangered, and we
had a very short conversation. They had a meeting to go to, and I said let':" make sure that
NASA understands that Rockwe:l feels it is not safe to launch, and that was the end of my con-
versation.
And with that, I would like to turn it over to my program managers and my site manager.
MR. GLAYSHER: Let me pick up. I was also alerted to the ice problem about 4:00 a.m., but
this is Eastern Standard Time. I received a call from the base ezplaining the condition that ice
was on the fixed service structure, i then made sure that the necessary wheels were in motion to
get the proper people in Downey brought in so that they could evaluate the ice. That was also
done through Mr. Cioffoletti. I then called about 6:00 a.m. and verified what was happening,
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and was informed there was a meeting going on on the subject.
I got to the base myself at about quarter to 8 Eastern Standard T_me and then discussed
with our Chief Engineer, Vice President of Engineering our position, and as Dr. Petrone men-
tioned, with him and developed a t'osition that Rockwell would take at the 9:00 o'clock meeting
that was scheduled.
At the 9:00 o'clock meeting, the ice debris team presented their report on the status of the
ice. Following that, various peopm were asked their reccmmendations and their positior.s. When
I was asked Rockwell's positio_, I reiterated that there were three major unknowns in evalua-
tion of the ice. As Dr. Petrone indicated, the first event _,_as aspiration effects. The second was
ice that would ricochet from the fLxed service structure and head toward the vehicle. And the
third category of unknown ice was ice that was resting on the mobile launcher platform at
engine ignition.
The fourth category of ice, which was ice in the trough, had already been discuss_ and re-
solved once the debris team had removed that ice. Those three categories of ice that I men-
tioned, however, we have no data base on which to base judgments of that. This is the first time
it has cccurred. It is not a design
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condition for the orbiter.
We therefore fek that since we were in an unknown condition and were unable through any
analytical techniques to predict where the ice would go or the degree of damage that would
result should that ice strike the orbiter TPS, I then gave the following recommendation to
NASA in which I said _hat Rockwell could not assure the safety of flight, or let me give you a
bet_r quote, if you would.
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Yes, my exact quote was--and it comes in two parts. The first one was, Rockwell could not
100 percent assure that it is safe to fly which I quickly changed to Rockwell cannot assure that
it is safe to fly.
We then had a discussion about what that meant and the data base that we didn't have in
effect. They then moved on to Mr. A1 Martin and asked for a position or an opinion from him.
So I will ask A1 to pick up there.
MR. MARTIN: In the 9:00 o'clock meeting, Bob Glaysher was our spokesman, but I was
asked also if I had anything to add, and statement_ that I made in the meeting _'ere that I made
a statement like it has a|ceady been said, meaning that Bob Glaysher had stated the Rockwell
position. I also added that we do not have the
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data base from which to draw any conclusions for this particular situation with the icicles on
the tower, and also, we had no real analytical techniques to predict where tne icicles might go at
lift-off.
The other thing that I did was review the fact that prior to each launch there is great care
taken to make sure that there is no debris out on the launch pad. A day or two before launch a
crew goes out and they walk down the entire tower and walk down the mobile launcher surface,
and also the concrete apron around the launch pad for the purpose of removing any debris such
as nuts, bolts, rocks or anything that might be there.
And I drew the corollary that the icicles in this case could very well become debris, that
they might become dislodged from the tower when the SSMEs ignite a few seconds before liftoff,
and they could impact on the mobile launcher surface and then become debris when the solid
rocket motors lifted off, and we had no way of predicting that.
So I was drawls, _ a corollary between the care that is normally taken for debris and paint-
ing a picture, that .tie icicles appeared to me to be in that same category. And so those were my
only comments in that meeting.
MR. CIOFFOLET'rI: SinSlarly, I was called in
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and told about the problem and came into the C:00 o clock meeting which you heard about a few
minutes ago, and at the conclusion of that meeting I spoke with Mr. Dick Kohrs, the I_eputy
Program Manager from Johnson Space Flight Center, and he asked if we could get the Downey
fu,_s _o look at the falling ice and how it might traverse toward the vehicle, and also, did we
have any information on aspiration effects.
So I did call back to Downey and got the John Peller folks working on that problem, and
they did, as you saw from Charlie Stevenson's sketches, predict that the ice would travel only
about halfway to the vehicle, free falling ice carried by the winds. So we felt that ice was not a
problem. However, it would land on the mobile launch platform. That we considered a problem.
We also investigated the aspiration data base we had, and we had seen the aspiration effect on
previous launches where things were pulled in to the SRB hole after ignition, but we had trover
seen anything out as far as the fixe-] surface tower. So we felt in fact it was an unknowL We did
not have the data base to operate from on aspiration effects.
At the 9:00 o'clock meeting I was asked by Arnie Aldrich, the program manager, to give h_m
the results of our analysis, and i essentially told him
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what I just told you and felt that we did not have a sufficient data be_e to absolutely assure that
nothing would strike the vehicle, and so we could not lend our 100 percent credence, if you will
to the fact that it was safe to fly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When Mr. Petrone made his statement, he didn't use le words 100
percent sure, I suppose. Nothing is 100 percent suce
MR. CIOFFOLETrI: I didn't use those words either. I just paraphrased that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't you testify what you said, please.
MR. CIOFFOLETrI: I said I could not predict the trajectory that the ice on the mobile
launch platform would take at SRB ignition.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And?
MR. C]OFFOLETrI: And that was the end of it.
CHALRMAN ROGERS: But I think NASA's position probably would be that they thought
that you were satisfied with the launch.
Did you convey to them in a way that they were able to understand that you were not ap-
proving the launch from your standpoint?
MR. CIOFFOLETTI: i felt that by telling them we did not have a sufficient data base and
could not
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analyze the trajectory of the ice, I felt he understood that Rockwell was not giving a positive
indication that we were for the launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Glaysher, did you make it clear that you felt there was a safety
aspect and that you were not app_._ the launch?
MR. GLAYSHER: Yes, we actually discussed our position and I stated more than once
during the meeting Rockwell's position that we could not assure that it was safe to fly. It was
stated when I first was asked to give our position, and it was also my last statement at that
meeting, as the meeting wound up. I also reiterated the statement several times.
A _d so we felt that we had communicated Rockwell's position and that we felt it was unsafe
to fly.
DR. RIDE: Had Rockwell ever taken t_t position before on previous launches when the
launch had occurred?
MR. GLAYSHER: No, this was the firsttime where we had been in a position where we
really had no data base from which to make a judgment, and this was the firsttime that Rock-
well has taken an unsafe to fly position.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Dr. Petrone, you'vc got a lot
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more experience than I have in thisbusiness, but the few launch conferences that • have been in
on the quastivn isvery simple. Are you "gc" or are you "no go" for launch, and "maybe." isn't
an answer. I hear all kinds of qualifications and cautions and considerations here. Did someone
ask you are you go or no go? Was that not asked?
DK PETRONE: At this particular meeting, I was not in Florida, and so I cannot answer
that. It had been done at earlier meetings. This was a technical evaluation of a series of prob-
lems, and we talked about debris hitting the TPS and the tiles,end the long series of reviews
that we had done that morning and allled us to a conclusion that they were not safe to fly.And
we transmitted that to our program managers along with the technical evaluation quickly of
why we had arrived at that.
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So much of itishow the question gets raised because earlierwe had aspiration work, rico-
chet work, a number of things which .,'edid, and then we came up with our reco._ nendation.
CHAIRMAN ROGEP, S: And your recommendation now you say itwas, itwas unsafe to fly?
DR. PETRONE: Correct, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much,
1808
gentlemen.
Let's take a ten minute recess.
(A briefrecess was taken.l
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission wil!come to order.
I would like to ask Dr. Petrone to take the stand, please.Dr. Petrone, just a couple of ques-
tior_.
Did you or any of your az_ociatesas far as you know make any phone callsafterthe discus-
sions that were referred to just before the recess?
DR. PETRONE: I received a phone call from my program manager back to me. I had no
talks with NASA that morning. I was transmitting through my officially designated representa-
tives, my two program managers.
CHAIP_N ROGERS: But as far as you know, did they have any fmther conversations
with the NASA people after the one that was testi_ed to?
DR. PETRONE: There was one conversation that went on, I guess, while the meeting was
going on. The meeting had started, apparently_ but had not ended, where my chief engineer re-
ceived a phone call in Downey from a NASA counterpart in engineering.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS And what was your man's name?
DR. PETRONE: John Peller.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And do you know the substance of that conversatio,:,-?
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DR. PETRONE: Really not. I could only hesr just a little _r_ of it. I did not participate in
that particular phone call. I just could hear a little bit of it, say on one side.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, without getting into the specifics, just generally Sl_eakin_ what
was the topic of conversation?
DR. PETRONE: Mr. Peller is here today, and if yot, care to have that it would be far better
for him to talk, _ir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes. We will have him wait here. Mr. Aldrich asked to h_ve the op-
_unity to testifynext.
Do you have any other question_ Mr. Armstrong?.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Were you or your program managers informed of the ac-
tivitiesthat were going on at the Cape during the interruptions to the count and the resump-
tions to the count?
DR. PETRONE: My two program managers were at the Cape.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: You were informed, I assume, of the resumption of the
count?
DR. PETRONE: Yes. After the meeting I
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received a phone call from Bub Glaysher, who sat here this morning, and then followed by an-
other phone call a few minutes later from A! Martin, in which he told me he had made his input
at the meeting, I believe called the 9:00 o'clock meeting, and told me that it looked like NASA
was going to go ahead, and we knew that was within a few min,.ites of the loading of the crew
proceeding.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Now, clearly when they resumed the count you knew
tnat your recommendation essentially had been either considered and overruled or dispositioned
in some way?
DR. PETRONE: That's right, sir.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And subsequent to that point in time, were there any
other--did you take any other opportunitie, through yourself or your people to express your
opinion again?-
DR. PETRONE: Mr. Armstrong, I felt we had expressed cur opinion to the pro.ver level, on
the proper occamon of the meeting that had been set up for it. I felt I had done all I could do.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you.
DR. RIDE: Did it surprise you that NASA picked up the count?
DR. PETRONE: I was disappointed that they
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did, yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Have you had any discussions since that time with NASA people
about it?
DR. PETRONE: O_ly one, sir. Mr. Aldrich gave me a call reflecting on what time--had I
made a later phone call, i believe was the question he asked me. And I said, no, after the input I
made through my program managers at that meeting, I made no further calls. And that was the
question he had posed to me.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I see. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Petrone. I believe that's all.
Mr. Aldrich?
(Witness sworn.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I might say that we have a somewhat different schedule of wit-
nesses, but Mr. Aldrich asked if he could testify next, and of course we said f;Jae.
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TESTIMONY OF ARNIE ALDRICH
MR. ALDRICH: Well, Mr. Chairman, if this doesn't please yoor order, I would be perfectly
happy to gc in any sequence that suits the Commission.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No, that's free. I just want to be sure that it is understood that we
are acceding to you,"wishes, and I think itis a perfectlyproper request and an actual request,
and I think itfitsin in a consistent manner with what I said at the beginning of these hearings,
that at any time anything is said that requires an answer, or at least appears to require an
answer right away, we try to provide it.And I think this isa perfectexsmple of that.
I think you should testifynow about your _.-_ollectionof the events that we talked about
here just a mcment ago.
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Aldrich, you've already identifiedyourself and have testified
previously,and we know about you and your background. We know that you're--I guess it'syou
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and Mr. Moore are the two key people in the final decision whethei to ,aunch or not to launch
the Challenger.
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir, we are. I would say that, in a different category--that is, the
launch
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director proceeds with all condit ions normal by the documentation, and all of the procedures and
guidelines and constraints that are built into the launch process, and Mr. Moore and myself deal
with unusual situations or concerns of the kind that the Commission has been discussing.
And we frequently have those on many launches. In fact, I would like to refer to some of
that in my testimony.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Please go ahead.
MR. ALDRICI-I: I had prepared a discussion that started at the beginning of the period lead-
ing up to thislaunch on the L minus one day. I think the interesthere probably isto respond to
the pre_ous testimony on the ice team and to the--
CIL_dRMAN ROGERS: Yes, we would like that, because we plan a little later in the day
maybe to have you and Mr. Moore and others testify overall on some of these matters. But for
the moment, and pa_icularly to continue the proper sequence, ff you could confine your re-
marks to the ice problems and the testimony that we just heard from the Rockwell people, I
would appreciate it.
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir. I will do that. Then let me pick up at the point o, the scrub of
January
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27th. We scrubbed on January 27th after dealing with the problems with the crew hatch, on
closing that hatch and then removing the ground support equipment, and then the requirement
to realign the inertial measuring units delayed our launch several hours from the planned
launch time.
An._ during those several hours, the crosswinds, which have been mentioned prev_ ),rely, the
high winds following the weather front, arrived at Cape Kennedy ar, d were outside our guide
lines for landing at the Kennedy launch facility. In the event of an RTLS abort, we have a re-
quirement of crosswinds to be less than 15 knots for the orbiter to land, and they were in excess
of that.
And so we scrubbed and immediately had a Mission Management Team meeting. Perhaps in
later testimony I can discuss more of what was discussed in tha': Mission Management Team
meeting, but basically there was thought to be no problem with clearing the hatch condition for
the following day, that is to launch on January 28th, and there were no other system or complex
issues, launch complex issues.
The weather was forecast to continue to be clearing and the crosswinds to subside. So that
all parameters appeared to be good for a launch of the
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following day, on the 28th, except for the additional weather forecast that now behind the cross-
winds was coming the clear sky, the clear air, and the very cold weather which has been dis-
cussed in some detail.
Ir fact, as was discussed here earlier, in that Mission Management Team meeting it was
quickT.y determined that the only issue was in fact the cold weather that was coming, and it was
predicted to be 23 to 27 degrees Fahrenheit at the coldest part of the night, and then rising into
the thirties at launch time.
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We then askec--this is a Mission Management Team meeting, and I might refer back to
what the Mission :Management Team is.The Mission Management Team is an assemblage of
government manag, er_, NASA and DOD, who have-'responsibilitiesfor various aspects of the
shuttle system. And we utilizeitboth during this pr_launch p_.riodand we use it after flight
ald launch.
We have regular Mission Management Team meetings in Houston while these flights
p_)gress, right up to the landing. And itisour policyafter the L minus one day meeting, which
i_ a broader meeting, to deal with questions closer into the launch or as the launch slides in
what iscalleda Mission Management Team meeting.
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It i_quite _ large representation and most often not allof the people that are members are
actwdly in att_ndance. Given what the subjectisand the content of what's being discussed,par-
ticularlyhere isa decision to revert from a scrub on the 27th and issues with picking up with
the various el_ments for the launch on the 28th, and the projectpeople from the various centers
that were per :inent to that were in this meeting.
But there are other Mission Management Team members who were not there and we would
not have expected to be there.
We also have to consider whether at the cros&Atl&ntic siteswfor this mission we had trans-
Atlantic abort into Dakar and into Casablanca, and particularly D_kar had been very trouble-
some for its launch weather acceptability t_ allow us to launch so that if we had an abort we
would _)me in there.
However, they were also in a go condition for the January 28th time period as p'_li_ by
the weather forecast. So the only issue was the temperature, and we asked each of the projects,
the Kennedy launch and landing project, the orbiter, the external tank, the: solid rocket boo_
ers, and the space_ shuttle main engines, how they felt about launching with/_mperatures
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as predicted in this ML_.sion Management Team meeting.
And each of them listed the concerns and constraints they might have with temperatures
that I have just described. They each did so list, and the one major concern thaz came out of
those lists--and I would be glad to go through those with you, either now or later--is the fact
that the launch facility was going to experience cold temperatures, and in fact that could give
them problems with their water systems and perhaps some of the other systems on the launch
complex.
As has been pointed out in previous testimony, the STS 51-C launch in January of 1985 was
attempted on a very cold night, and in fact we did have launch lines break and ice and freezing,
and the conditions w re such that the launch complex was not able to proceed. It had enough
problems that it precluded consideration to proceed with the launch, and so that was a known
problem.
Over the ensuing year, a freeze prot,_t.ion plan had been put in pla_ at the Kennedy Space
Center to deal with specifically that kind of an issue, so that we could proceed to launch under
tho_e conditions.
Kennedy reported in this Mission Management Team meeting that the freeze protection
plan was going
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to be put in process that dealt with draining the fireX water systems that are up on the fixed
structure, the fixed support structure that Charlie Stevenson referred to a few minu_.'.sago.
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They would be drained back to the first shutoff valve and then allowed to dribble, to drain, the
way you might do in your home on a cold night to keep wal r pipes from freezing.
_,.ey also said the eye washes and the showers that are up on the fixed support structure
would bt, allowed to drain into their drains to keep them from freezing a_.d bursting, and it is in
tact the_; drains that were allowed to run during the l_ight that mused the ice that we saw in
the pictvres.
Yhis ice didn't come from the climatic conditions themselves or from an unknown condition.
T_,ty came in fact from the procedures that were taken intentionally in order to protect the
facility and to enable it to do its job to proceed with the countdown.
They also indicated that they would be required to put the antifreeze in the sound suppres-
sion water troughs that you've seen pictures of to keep them from forming ice, because ice under
the vehicle when it ignites is an issue.
Other issues were discussed with the KSC and with the orbiter and with the SRB and with
the ET.
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There were no issues on the space shuttle main engines. All of them were thought to be well
manageable.
And at the end of that meetil,g--I should say that I am the chairman of the Mission Man-
agement Team meeting. However, when Mr. Moore is in attendance, I make the decisions at
that meeting and conduct the meeting, but I yield to him for the final decision. And collectively
he, following my recommendation, agreed that we should proceed to _k, with the decision to
launch on January 28th.
However, we asked all members at the Mission Management Team meeting to continue to
consider and review the situation of the temperatures and to bring any additional issues that
arose to our attention.
We then left that meeting, and in mind at that time I was clearly concerned about the ice
on the facility as a constraint to launch, because I knew that we would be dealing vith that as a
problem on the following day, after we had gone through the cold night.
The next input that I had with respect to the conditions at the launch pad came at 11:30
that evening at the motel. There was a call from Larry Mulloy and Stan Reinartz and one of
several KSC console operators, and the report that I would make is identical to the one
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you heard yesterday.
That is, they discussed the concern with the recovery ships dealing with the high winds. The
same winds that had given us the problem for the crosswind at the landing site were causing
high seas and the ships were off station.
And Larry discussed how we dealt with that, and I could say some more about that at an-
other time ff you would like or now. But my concern was first for the ships and then whether
that should be a constraint that would cause us to stop tanking, and I felt we should proceed to
ta_ and we would discuss it at the following day if it was continuing to be an issue.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: At that time, did they tell you that there had beer serious concerns
expressed by Thiokol and Thiokol engineers, and that they had had a l_ng teleconference on the
subject, and that first Thiokol had recommended against launch and secondly management, in
the person of Mr. Kilminster, had changed its mind and Thiokol then had _ecided to recommend
launch?
Did you know any of _mt sequence at all?
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MR. ALDRICH: None of that was discussed, and I did not know until after the 51-L launch
that there had been such a meeting.
.,?o
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. ALDRICH: However, there was a second concern discussed in that telephope call, and
that was really raised by Larry Mulloy, but also by the KSC people who were on the same call
with me, and that was that they were beginning to experience the ice that we had expected on
the launch pad.
It was not specifically identified at that time as to the various locations, and they knew that
that was going to be an issue for them during the night. However, the countdown was proceed-
ing normally at that time.
We had a secovd call during that morning. We had a call at 3:00 a.m., and that was made ,r-
Mr. Richard Kohrs, who is my deputy, who stays in the same motel I do. And that report was to
say again that the countdown was proceeding, but that they were one hour behind schedule and
they had had problems with the formation of ice and the temperatures of the facility, but the
delay was caused in fact by electronics problems with the console.
And they were calling to notify us that everything the next morning would be one hour
later than we had allexpected.
I arrived at the firing room about 4:30 a.m.
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on January 28th, and in fact the countdown was proceeding normally, satisfactorily at least,
with no new problems that the ones I just discussed. In fact, the offshore winds had subsided and
at that time they had predicted that the recovery ships would be on station and would be able to
provide support.
The ice team had been at the launch pad from 1:30 in the morning until 3.00 in the morning
to assess this icing condition. They weren't there doing their normal job, looking at the external
tank. They were in fact assessing the facility and the launch vehicle in general, because the
conditions were different.
They had come back and made a full report to_ the engineering teams that they report to,
and I will tell you who those teams are here in just a minute. They made that full report, how-
ever, and that is not a standard time for them t_ go out. That was a unique ina_-_tion and a
unique report and a unique set of cor_siderations.
I talked to the launch director at that time when I arrived, and that was in fact the issue we
discussed. And we bcth agreed that the proper thing to do was to let the engineering teams
assess what had been found by the earlier ice inspection and to allow the normal T minus three-
hour ice inspection to proceed, the
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_,e we do every flight, and get some additional data on the conditions as we came into the day-
light time period.
The ice issue that wc were concerned about is the one that has been discussed, that is
damage from this ice to the thermal protection system of the orbiter, such as it will cause it to
have a problem later in flight during the re-entry phase if there is significant damage to the
thermal protection system. It is not other issues related to the ice.
I don't know of--I think all of us were talking about that as the singular issue about this
icing condition. For most launches, we do send this ice team out to assess the condition, primari-
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ly the external tank, at T minus three hours. In fact, the ice team was created for that purpose
very early in the flight program.
We found conditions--we expected there was icing on the tank, and that clearly could be a
threat to the orbiter, deper.ding on how it manifested itself and how thick it was, and some very
specific plans and procedures and techniques were put in place so that every flight the ice on the
tank isinspected and characterized and reported to the engineering teams, assessod, and deci-
sions made.
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They have a very detailed process for doing that, much more than we went into here today.
The icing starts when you put liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen into the external tank and,
depending on the humidity and the temperature and the wir.ds, you can get a wide variety of
patterns of ice or no ice on the tank. And having the coldest day doesn't necessarily represent
the most concern or issue for the ET.
In fact, this was a particularly good day for the external tank in terms of generating ice on
itsexternal surface.
When the ice team finishestheir report, they actually can report,as you heard, as they're
in process over the loops,and sometimes over televisionthey can make extensive reports while
in progress,or they can wait untilthey come back and report in detailon the loop to the respec-
tiveengineering teams that are in place.
There is an engineering team in place in Florida in an alternate firing room. It's adjacent to
the one that is controlling the launch, and in it are engineering managers for each of the
projects: externai tank, orbiter, main engines, solid rocket boosters. And they have with them
key technical people who are there specifically for analyzing unique problems or possible
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failure modes that corse up while we're going through a countdown that weren't anticipated as
being part of a normal count sequence.
Particularly the orbiter team and the external tenk team are well aware of threats from ice
and icing, and they listen in detail, as does the Kennedy engineering team, to these reports and
determine whether there are concerns and if so how to assess them.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I notice you e_cl,lded the boosters in what you just said. You said
there was attention paid to the effect on the orbiter and the external tank. Wasn't the same
attention paid to the boosters, too?
MR. ALDRICH: I was discussing the way the process worked in the past, and it is probably
not different particularly for this countdown. There was not an icing question or concern known
to me about icing on the solid rocket boosters. They don't normally form ice.
And in this case, as was reported by Mr. Stevenson, there was some ice found on the skirt of
the left SRB, but that was removed by the ice team specifically for the cGhdition I will talk
about later. But in a normal launch, it is a concern with the external tank and with the orbiter,
and checks for
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things like leaks and propellant line interconnections also. But the ice part of the job deals with
those two elements of the launch system.
In support of the orbiter team is an engineering team in Houston, in a facility called the
mission evaluation room, and back there there is more extensive engineering available t them.
They have many of the loops that are available at Kennedy Space Center, or at least some of
them, and they also have data live real time from Florida.
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And at certain points during the countdown, they have television.So the key people that
are in Florida in thisalternate fring room communicate with the c,rbiterpeople that are at that
location in Houston and in support of the orbiterpeople in Houston.
I can'tremember what Mr. Petrone, what Dr. Petrone or Dr. Glaysher mentioned, but there
isin Downey also a mmsion support team there on engineers at the contractor's facility,that
also works with these engineering teams and has data to deal with questions and decisions of an
engineering nature.
On the external tank side,there isa support facilityin i-!.untsvillecalled the Huntsville op-
erations support, HOSC, Huntsville operations support cer,.cer.And there also are key engineers
for the external tank,
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solid rocket booster, space shuttle main engines, who have live data from Kennedy and have
loops from Kennedy so they _ communicate in detail.
The ice team reports are made to these engineering teams, and those reports are assessed
and issuesor lack of issuesare determined based upon those assessments.
I sit in the firing room for launches with a number of other key managers who you've
talked to and heard about. I sitin a place that iscalled the operations support room. Itisa little
corner of the primary firingroom that looks down on the fnd_ngroom.
In there isMr. Moore, Mr. Mulloy, Mr. Reinartz, Dr. Lucas. I can give you a complete listing
of who is there. I am trying to give you a feel for the kind of people who are there. Also Mr.
Richard Colonna, who is the orbiter project manager from JSC, is there. In fact,he sits right
beside me. Mr. Richard Kohrs ismy deputy; he sitsbeside me. And a number of other people we
could go into as you want to fred out more about that.
About 8:30 in the morning, about the time that the ice team was returning from the launch
pad from their stand_rd inspection,Mr. Colonna, orbiter project manager, reported to me the
assessment ofthe
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engineering team was that th__ icingcondition on the launch pad they believed was looking very
favorable to proceed with the launch, and they were waiting for the final report of the ice te_n
afterthey returned fron_ their visit.
But they had been analyzing the previous reports and data and feltquite good about it.
However, they also reported that Rockwell might have some concern with that recommendation.
As I previously reported, although the normal channel is for the orbiter contractor, Rock-
well,to report to Mr. Colonna, itiswhat we callLevel IH, and we have been through quite a lot
of that in previous discussions.Mr. Colonna reports to me for the orbiterat the Level H.
My concern about this ice had been going on since 2:00 o'clock the previous day, and I
wanted personally to fnd out what the situation was and to get a detailed feel for it.And so I
called what I would refer to as a partialMission Management Team meeting, told Mr. Colonna
that I wanted to review the ice team report and the engir.eeringassessments with respect to it.
And we went out of the firingroom area into a conference room that isone floor up in the
launch
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control center, but very close at hsnd, and scheduled that meeting for 9:00 o'clock.I believed
that that meeting was necessary, not because of the icing conditions that had been assessed that
were on the launch vehicle itself:but specificallyto deal with the ice that had forme-q on the
fixed servicestructure and on the mobile launch platform itself.
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We convened in that meeting.Itwas quitea largegroup ofpeople,and we have not to this
datemade an efforttoidentifyeveryone who was there.There might have been 20 or 30 people.
_re have identifiedwho the key management peoplewho were there,and I have that listing,
and perhaps we willdiscusssome ofthem, and Ican giveyou who allofthem were_
We startedthe meeting by having a discussion,a reportby the iceteam, and Mr. Steverlson,
who you have heard from previouslythismor,ing, made that report.And he was reporting
about specificoncernsin threedifferentareas.
One was the launch vehicle,primarilythe externaltank. Second was the mobile launch
platformdeck,the deck thatthe orbiter,thatthe spaceshuttleisstandingon.And thirdisthe
fixedservicestructurethathas the--thatgoesup one side,the sideofthe spaceshuttle,and had
much ofthe iceIwas
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concernedabout on it.
His reportI willsummarize,as follows.His reportsaid the icingconditionson the flight
vehicle,primarilythe externaltank,were okay and they feltthere were no concerns in that
area.They statedthatthere had been sheeticein most of the sound suppressionwater troughs
under the solidrocketboostersand spaceshuttlemain engines,but thaticehad been broken up
and removed.
__neysaidthatthe residualicethatwas existinginthe water troughsand on the MLP deck
was okay in theirview.That is,there was no*.very much ofitand itwas not in the vicinityof
the launchvehicle,and theydid not believethateitherwas a threattothe orbiterTPS.
On the fixedservicestructure,however, the fixedservicestructurchad varyingamounts of
icebetween the 95 footleveland the 215 footlevel,and you'vesee_ some picturesofthathere
thismorning. However, therewas no iceexistingabove the 255 footlevel.
I say,ithad ice,varyingicebetween 95 feetand 215 feet.Above 255 feet,therewas no iceat
ali.The fixedservicestructure,north and west sideshad very largeamounts of iceand icicles.
The east
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side, toward the orbiter, had significantly less ice.
At that point, we went into a detailed characterization--
MR. HOTZ: Excuse me, Mr. Aldrich. Could I interrupt for just a moment. Did Mr. Stevenson
at that time repo_ to you anything about the extremely low temperatures they were recording
on the solid rocket booster_?
MR. ALDRICH: No, sir, he did not.
MR. HOTZ: Thank y_m.
MR. ALDRICH: The detailed characteristics of the ice on the fixed service s_:racture were
then discussed in quite an amount of detail for all of the team that was a_embied. And this was
not a teiecon at this point, this was the engineering people who were there in Florida, and spe-
cifically the director of engineering for Kennedy Space C_nter was there, Mr. Horace Lamberth;
Mr. Richard Colonna, who is the director of the orbiter project, was there.
And there were some other people, and perhaps you w_uld like me to tell you who they
were. For the ice team, Mr. Stephenson was there, and in fact his boss m Mr. Lamberth, who
was there. From JSC, I was there; Mr. Richard Colonna, the orbiter project m__nager was there.
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From Marshall, Cecil Houston, who is the resident manager for the Marzhall projects, was
there; and also Mr. Davis was there. And from Rockwell, Mr. Cioffoletti and Mr. Glaysher and
Mr. Martin was there.
During the eour_ of the discussion, 4r. Jim Eingsbu_,, who is head of enginee,-ing at the
Marshall Space Flight Center, came in, but he was not there for the entire discussion. And Mr.
Richard Smith, who is the director of the Kennedy Space Center, also came in late in the dica:us-
sion, but did not hear all of it.
And as I will tell you in a minute, I also placed a telephone call personally to Mr. Thomas
Moser, who's the director of engineering at the Johnson Space Center, and discussed some of
this situation with him, and I will tell you about that.
Following the discussion of the acceptability of the ice threat to the orbiter, based upon the
conditions described in detail of the trLXed service structure--and some of that you've seen here
portrayed well this morning--I asked the NASA managers involved for their oosition on what
they felt about the threat of that to the orbiter.
Mr. Lamberth reported that KSC engineering had calculated the trajectories,as you've
heard, of the fallingice from the fixed servicestructure east side,
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with current ten knot winds at 300 degrees, and predicted that none of this ice would contact the
orbiter during its ignition or launch seqaence; and that their calculationseven showed that if
the winds would increase to 15 knots, we stillwould not have contact with the orbiter.
Mr. Colonna, orbiter project manager, reported that simila: calculations had been per-
formed in Houston by the mission evaluation team there. They concu_ed in this assessment.
And further,Mr. Colonna stated that, even ifthese calculationswere.significantlyin error,that
itwas their beliefthat fallingice from the fLxed service structure, ifitwere in fact to make it
way to the orbiter,itwould only be the most lightweight ice that was in that fallingstream, and
itwould impact the orbiterat a very oblique angle.
Impacts of this type wouid have very low probability of ca,_ing any serious damage to the
orbiter,and at most would resultin post-flightturn-around repairs.
At this point I placed a phone callto Mr. Moser that I bna previouJly mentioned, directorof
engineering at the John,_nn Space Center, who was in the m issir,nevaluation room, and he con-
firmed the detai,_I agreeraent w_'_hl_._r.Lamberth and Mr. Colonna's position.
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From these discussions_well, let me say, in addition to the discussion_I don't have it in my
notes, but I remember it in more detail. We had some discussion of the falling ice, if it would hit
the orbiter after it was on the launch pad; was ,_.here in fact an issue from that ice coming back
up and hitting the orbiter.
And both Mr. Lamberth and Mr. Colonna repor_..odthat their assessment was that the time
ittook for the ice to fall,to hit the nrbitJw and to rebound, and the location of the fixed service
structure on the MLP would not cause that ._cein their view to be a concern to rebound and
come up and impact the rear end of the _,rbiter.
Following these discussions,I asked for a position,_1_ardingproceeding with the launch. Mr.
Colonna, Mr. Lamberth, and Mr. Moser allrecommended that we proceed.
At that time, I also polled Mr. Rob .rtGlaysher, the vice president, orbiterproject manager,
Rockwell International STS division,at.d Mr. Marty Cioffoletti,shuttle integration pro)ect man-
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ager,RockwellInternational STS division. Mr. GlayshL, r stated--and he had been listening to
this entire discussion and had not been directly involved _'ith it,
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but had been party to this the whole time.
His statement to me as best I can reconstruct it to report t_ you at this time was that, while
he did not disagree with the analysis that JSC and KSC had re_orted, that they would not give
an unqualified go for launch as ice on the launch complex was a condition which had not previ-
ously been e,_perienced, and thus this posed a small additional, but unquantifiable, risk. Mr.
Glaysher did not ask or insist that we not launch, however.
No other comments or recommendations were offered by the !arge group assembled with
respect to the concern--with respect to concern for proceeding with t_:e launch.
At the conclusion of the above review, I felt reasonably confide] t that the launch should
proceed. However, I was concerned that during the ensuing time perhxi between when the ice
temn had been out at the launch pad, starting at 6:30, and the time that .:he launch would occur,
now roughly 11:00 or 11:30 in the morning, the conditions at the la inch pad might have
changed.
Thus, I asked for an additional ice inspection team visit to the pad to be performed as close
to launch as possible, to include a full assessment of any
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significant changes in icing conditions; for the removal of any additional ice froL_ the MLP deck
tha.*, might have fallen; and for the removal of any new ice from the water trough
At this point, I returned to the operations suppo_ room in the launch com21ex, where I
revieweO ¢he context of thi_ meeting with Mr. Jesse Moore, the associate administra,_or for space
flight, who was seated at that time with Mr. Philip Culbertson, the NASA general n-anager. In
that summary, I clearly indicated the qualified position taken by Rockwell International, recom-
mended that the launch proceed unless the ice team identified a significant change i_, launch
pad condition on their final visit to the pad.
The report of the ice team following the final launch pad inspection indicated no significant
changes, although several pieces of ice were swept from the MLP deck and some additional ice
was removed from the water troughs.
Now, you probably wm_t to ask questions. I have some more I would like to say, too, and I
would like to say that with respect to TPS damage, if I could, and perhaps I could say that now,
or you might want to interrupt me.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You're anticipating
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questions?
MR. ALDRICH: Well, that is part of my rationale.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I want to do it whichever way you want. I guess that you have sort
of answered the question that I had in mind. That is, you acknowledge, then, that Rockwell did
t_ke a poeition as described by them this morning, which essentially said that they couldn't
_ure that it was safe to fly, or another version was it was an. unsafe to fly position? Was that
yt_ur understanding of their position?
MR. ALDRICH: Let me describe that, and that leads into what I wanted to say in addition
aboat the 'ITS damage. In any discussion of damage to the therm_l protection system on the
orbits.r, tl'.ere is the implication of safety to the vehicle in flight during the re-entry phase
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There is also strong implication of damage to the vehicle ?hat is of a repair category, and
that damage would be required to be repaired after the orbiter ret'3rned. On every flight of the
STS system, we have had d_mage to the orbiter TPS system from various situations during
flight, and upon return those :_lJairs have had to be made.
In most instances, they have not been
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extensive and they have not interrupted the turn-around. On a few conditions, we had quite sig-
nificant damage to the TPS and there have been more extensi','e repairs.
Let me say in fact about TPS damage, early in the program when we first began to fly this
system we experienced quit. _ a bit of damage t_) the bottom of the orbiter from ice from the ex-
ternal tank, and that led to some of these ice team activities that we have talked to you about
today and previously.
During the period of the first four to six flights in the program, there was an extensive
effort working with the Marshall Space Flight Centel to make modifications to the thermal pro-
tection system on the external tank, to remove the conditions that created ice by changing the
ir_tallation, removing certain lines, and finding other ways of mechanization, to give a more
comt_lete protection so that ice could not form from the atmosphere during the countdown.
Tlmt in fact was a $40 million program and it stretched over a significant period of time
Durin_ that period of time, however, we continued to fly the orbiter with those conditions after
caref_l a_essment, and continued to experience some damage to the orbiter from tank ice
d_,nage to the TPS.
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Decisions I thh_x were carefully made at that time about+ the risks and the choices to pro-
ceed were carefully made.
Also, during the early flights we experienced a lot of damage from the launch platform itself
from debris and loose items that had been left there, and procedures had to be instituted at Ken-
nedy Space Center for more complete cleanlineas of the mobile launch platform area, to be sure
there was no debris there of a kind that could come up during the ignition seq_._ence c,nd damage
the orbiter.
Again, while those concerns were going on and assessment, s were made that that had been
completed, we still continued to fly the orbiter. And we have had TPS damage that couldn't
probably be directly cc_,_!.--d to incomplete cleaning cf the launch pad during that time, but
might have been prec.iude,1 by further action later in t__,e program.
In fact, one of these areas, the four holddown posts for each of the so!id rocket boosters are
covered or were ,nitially in +.he program covered with a heavy layer of hard rubber to protect
those posts from the exhaust of the solid rocket boosters, so that they would not be damaged and
would be readily reuseable for the _,hoequent launches.
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And we found thot during the early flights much of that rubber--it is a whi_ hard RTV--
was being t[,rown up from the flame pits and impacting the orbiter and causing quite exuensive
damage. We undertook a program of reduction of those conditions, but initially it was a concern
that we could not remove all the RTV, and we went through a series of taking off more and
more of the RTV and seeing how much damage was still--or how much debris was still created.
During the time that we were flying with RTV still on those holddown posts, we did not
delay or defer shuttle launches. We carefully assessed the _amage and made determinations
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that what we were seeing was acceptable to proceed, although we had post-flightTPS damage
repair.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Arnie, can I interrupt just a ,Jecond?You mentioned this_:bber that
covers the holddown posts,and on launch this stuffbounces up and could possibly hit the orbit-
er. Why do you rule out the possibilitythat the springs that we lost on the holddown posts,
which are in the same place,didn'tbounce up and hit something?
MR. ALDRICH: Well, I willget to that.That isa good question and itfollowsdirectlywhat
I was going to say next.
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What I was going to say next was, eventually we did remove all of the rubber, because we
continued to see this material coming up on our pictures and continued to have orbiter TPS
damage, some of which you know exactly what itcomes fro.vand some you aren't sure.
And so we institutedthe trap doors that have been telked abuut earlier,the doors on the top
of the holddown posts,so that when the solidrocket clears _he door will flap down and the boost-
er rocket plume will impinge on the top of the door instead of on the holddown post.
And the change for the springs and the plungers that we talked about earlierwere a recent
adcbti_ to those trap doors, and they have been lostduring this 51-L launch and that has been
a concern of our investigationor our anal)-_isof things tha: could have contributed to the prob-
lem, to the STS 51-L ia_h.
GENERAL KUTYNA, So you l_.,,_.n'truled them out, i_that what you're saying?.
MR. ALDRICH: I have personally not ruled them out. Now, I'm not directlyinvolved in the
task force currently and not day to day current with what ,_Jiof our _nalvsis shows, but that
one ofthe items that is
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in 'work at KSC in their engineering department.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As you go thrcugh this history,which is interestingbut a littlebit
beside the point for the moment--
MR. ALDRICH: I'm sorry.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's all right.I don't want to prevent you from giving itto us. But
has there ever been a tune when a prime contractor or any otl_ercontractor voiced objectionsto
the munch when you went ahead and overruled them?
MR. ALDRICH: Let me--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS" Maybe "'overruled"isn'ta fairword, but where you went ahead not-
withsta',ding the objectionof the prime contractor in thiscase.
MR. ALDRICH: My interpretation of the input that was made to me in the Mission Manage-
ment Team meeting that I described isthat a concern was voiced,and itwas not an objectionto
launch. And I think the people that were in that meeting from Rockwell intended to offer me
that concern, but they did not intend to ask me not to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we will get to that.That is,when you finish.
Itseems to me that that is,at leastto me,
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the important point. Ifthe decisionmaking process is such t.ut the prime contractor thinks he
objected and says, testifiedunder oath that they took a position that itwas unsafe to launch,
and you say, that was not our understanding, that shows us serious deficienciesin the process.
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PMR. ALDRICH: Well, let me explain to you, while I'm talking a___ut these previous TPS
damages, what I'm going to lead up to was a diseu__on of another condition we had on the ex-
ternal tank this past year, here several of he external tanks had material coming off them,
their insulation material, and damaging the orbiter during the launch phase.
And that was _f great concern to the program, and corrective actions were taken. But we
continued to fly with tanks with that condition, with the repmr f'LX.And during those discussions
and discussions on the previo,m conditions I talked about that have led to damage to the orbiter
TPS, the Rockwe!l team has been involved in all of those discussions. They have been extremely
and rightly conservative about the risk to the orbiter because of these kinds of deb:-is.
And in my past experience in working these, problems directly with Rockwell, they have
taken positions very similar to the ones that -the cne that
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they reported this morning with respect to whether we should proceed with a known potential
for debris on past flights.
None of those have been that close to launch as the ore that we're talking about here on
firs 51-L, but I feel both the nature of the threat and the risk--that is, is it safety or is it turn-
around damage--and the kind of input that RockweP made in that meeting, that is, we hm,e a
concern, we can't be completely sure that 's going to t)e satisfactory, but it is your decision, is
consistent sdth the way that they reported to me m the past
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's fine. Why don't you go ahead, because I think it would be
helpful if you could give some exvmples of cases where Rockwell has been too conservative and
you've gone ahead anyway. I think that is very relevant, so why don't you proceed.
MR. ALDRICH: Well, you said too conservative. I think it is appropriate for Rockwel! to be
conservative.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, you expressed the view that on previous occasions they had
I_n what appeared to you to be conservative and expressed their views, and then you went
ahead anyway. I say those experiences would be very. relevant to our discussion here today, I
1846
think.
MR. ALDRICH: Well, I have been describing soLae of the experiences, and it would be im-
possible for me to recall the specific conversations from one, two, and three years ago. The most
recent is the one in fact where, on a series of four or five external tanks, the thermal insulation
arota.nd the inner tank--it is the structure between the oxygen tank and the hydrogen tank--in
fact had large divots of insulation coming off and impacting the orbiter.
We found significant amount of damage co one orbiter after a flight and weren't sure where
it came from. And on the subsequent flig'at we had a camera in the equivalent of the wheel well
which took a picture of the tank after separation, m,d we determined tb.at this was in fact the
cause of the damage.
At that time, we wanted to be able to proceed with the lauach program if it was acceptable
and utilize the tanks that were in Floridp_, _hat were built with the same configuration. And so
we undertook discussions of what would be. accept_able in terms of potential field repairs.
And during thc_e discuesions, Rockwell w_ very conservative because, rightly, damage to
the orbiter TPS is damage to the orbiter system, and it has
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a very stringent environment to experience during the re-entry phase.
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PAnd I can't say more specifically direct correlation between their reports to me on the
morning of the 51-L launch and what was said in the activities leading up to those earlier
launches, and for those earlier launches Rockwell definitely gave a go for laanch at the flight
readiness, _t the L minus one review, following more lengthy deliberations than perhaps we
were able to have during the morning of the 51-L launch.
But it was a very familiar kind of a report and discussion to me.
DR. WALKER: How large were these pieces of materiM that ,:ame off of the external tank?
MR. ALDRICH: The external tank, some of them were quite b.6. And it is fairly dense mate-
rial. And maybe I shouldn't say that. We ought to have a specific report to tell you the density.
Some of it is nc,t dense.
There are quite large piece&
DR. WALKER: Well, a foot square or how big?
MR..M_DRICH: Half a foot square or a foot by half a foot, and some of them much smaller
and localized to a specific area, but fairly high up on the tank. So
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they had a good shot at the orbiter underbelly, and that is where we had the damage.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I just want to express a personal unhappiness with this develop-
ment, because we have been dealing with NASA now for some time, two or three weeks, and we
asked everyone to be forthright, to tell us anytbAng that they knew that might relate to this in
any way, whether it was damaging or not.
And I--maybe through some fault of the Commission, we hadn't heard about Rockwelrs po-
sition until a few days ago. And I'm a little surprised that that wasn't volunteered, because cer-
tainly they are the prime contractor and their testimony this morning, whether you accept it
exactly as stated or not, still is very significant testimony.
I'm really _urprised and disappointed that we didn't know about it earlier.
MR. ALDRICH: Mr. Chairman, I've discussed this subject of the ice team with the Commis-
sion on three occasions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Bu_ not about Rockwell's position.
MR. ALDRICH: On the second occasion in the Executive Office Building, on the first closed
hearing_ I, in fact, reviewed in much briefer summary this meeting,
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and I believe you asked if someone from Rockwell International had expressed a concern with
the launch, and I reported the situation precisely so. That is, Rockwell had a concern with t _at
issue.
And I believe General Kutyna--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I reread it and I chdn't get the impression that they had taken as
strong a position as they did. And maybe I will reread it again.
MR. ALDRICH: I intended to convey it exactly in the manner I have done here. Of course,
we did not put that amount of time on the subject in that meeting.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Going back to their testimony, do you accept the testimony they
gave as factually correct, or is your position that they waffled more than they suggested this
morning?.
MR. ALDRICH: I don't recall such an extensive discussion of safety as was reported this
morning. However, I will fully admit what I said earlier, and that is any discussion of damage to
the TPS has to be considered in the context of safety.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Try to state what you thought their position was.
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MR. AL£)RICH: 1 tried to do that and I tried carefully to reconstruct that, and I will say it
again. And Mr. Glaysher made the statement when I polled him at
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the end of the meeting, and I thought the first statement that I believe he made represented a
key input to me in this regard.
I've just described for you the assessment that KSC and JSC engineering reported on their
feelings about the situation at the launch pad, and Mr. Glaysher reported that he did not dis-
agree with the KSC and the JSC analysis, which they drew the conclusion to recommend go.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you think that meant that he agreed with the go position?
MR. ALDRICH: No, sir. I thought that meant that they did not have any additional factual
material or ha-d analysis that could contribute to a better understanding of the situation,and I
think that iswaat they reported this morning.
DR. RIDE: Did you have an assessment f_m the Rockwell engineering group out at
Downey?
MR. ALDRICH: I did not have an assessment from the Rockwell group at Downey. However,
Mr. Moser reported that he had been in contact with the Rockwell group at Downey. And m
understanding how those organizations operate, I fullybelieved that the JSC organization would
fully reflect and understand any specific issues that were re)resented in the Downey
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mission support room.
DR. RIDE: So you had the impression that the Downey engineering position was in concert
with JSC=s engineering position?
MR. ALDRICH: I had the impression that , n any specific data that could be presented or
discussed or calculations made, that there was no disagreement and that this was a question of
judgment and a question of decision on the launch, which I felt was my decision.
And I would like to have the opportunity some time to describe some of the other launch
decisions which we are required to make each flight with respect to weather and threats to the
orbiter vehicle in flight, because I consider this to be a very similar kind of an issue.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: The report included some concern about unknowns of as-
piration. Would you clarify your own thinking, which I understand aspiration has to do with airs
or flows that are induced because of the engine exhaust?
MR. ALDRICH: I may have missed the discussion of aspiration in that meeting. To my
knowledge, the discussion on drawing ice into the orbiter and SRB plume at ignition was dis-
cussed in the context of drawing ice from the MLP deck into the orbiter, and that led very
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clearly to the situation of how much ice there would be on deck and where it would be located,
and the conclusion of the ice assessment teams that the ice had been removed and my reaction
that we should go back to check and see ff no more ice had fallen or was in a threatening loca-
tion to the orbiter.
The specific term "aspiration" and that consideration I don't recall being addressed as an
issue in that meeting.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: If I could ask one other question. The amount of ice that
we saw on the pictures, which was a result of the freeze protection system implementation,
seemed an unusually large amount.
1030
Idon't have any other experience that leads me to understand wby that happened. Was that
freezeprotection system carefullyanalyzed and designed, and did you expect this amount of ice,
and didn'tthe facilityin itsoriginaldesign have the abilityto handle some of that ice?
MR. ALDRICH: Apparently the facilityin the original design did not have protection for
thiskind of consideration,although itmay have been intended, and I think the freezeprotection
plan that was put into place was expected to be able to handle the conditions with much
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leas free water than was found as a result of going through that experience for the first time
under real conditions.
VICE CHA!RMAN ARMSTRONG: Perhaps I should make my question more specific. It
would seem that to keep the pipes unfrozen reasonably small amour.ts of water are req, dred,
even though I recognize these are large pipes. But if there were large amounts ot water required
:_ keep from freezing, you would think there would be some kind of containment and two lines,
ho_e_, _r that sort of thing. And was the freeze plan not incorporating those kinds of things or
were they not implemented?
MR. ALDRiC_i. I was not a party to the development of the freeze protection plan, nor un-
derstanding really how well it would work. We did ask that one be put in the program. That was
accomplished and, as you point out, it does not appear to be the kind of a complete program that
you would like to see for these kind of conditions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Aldrich, I think in fairness to everybody, particularly to you,
because I may have overstated what happened in executive session, let me read it.
Dr. Ride said: "Well, l guess the question is
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whether at the end of the meeting Rockwell wa_ _aying, we don't want to launch."
And I said: "That is exactly it. If Rockwell comes up in a public session and says, we advised
NASA not to launch and they went ahead anyway, then we have got a hell of a problem." And I
guess I shouldn't have said that.
But on the other h_nd, if there is no dispute about the facts and it is conveyed to everybody
and everybody, after consideration, everybody agreed to i_--and then Dr. Wheelon said, "What
position did Rockwell take?"
And your answer was: "Every, r_z at that meeting--and I just told you who they were, Ken-
nedy facility people at *_he meeting--everyone in that meeting voted strongly to proceed and said
they had no dissent, except for Rockwell. The comment from Rockwell, which was not written
specifically to the exact word and either recorded or logged, was that they had some concern
about the po_ibility of ice damage to the orbiter, although it was a minor concern. They felt
they had no experience base launching in that exact conf_uration before and therefore they
thought we had some additional risk of orbiter damage from ice that we had on previous meet-
ings or from previous missions."
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did they sign off on it or not?
MR. ALDRICH: We don't have a signoff at that point. It was not maybe 20 minutes, but it
was close to that. It was in the last hour of launch. But they still objected. They issued what 1
would call a concern, a less than 100 percent concurrence in the launch.
And you indicated "less than 100 percent concurrence. They did not say, we do not want to
launch, and the rest of the team overruled them. They issued a more conservative concern. They
did not say don't launch."
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testimony that was given, and I think it states your position a little better than I states it a
moment ago.
Is that your recollection of the testimony?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir. And of course, that was my first discussion of that meeting in that
context.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Very well.
MR. ALDRICH: Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take mcre time at this time if it's not your
pleasure, but I would also like to describe for you at some other
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point tlr^ other kinds of decisions I have had to make during the last six launches in terms of
marginal conditions and weather threats to the orbiter in flight,and how I believethis kind ofa
decision couples rather closelyto the kind of decisions that I have to make for launching with
rain clouds in the area, launching with the potential for low ceilingsor cro_winds at the RTLS
landing siteand overseas.
And in my mind, what I did in this regard was my responsibility_and I executed itin the
same manner as I have on other flightsfor other conditions.They were also a threat and also
_oarginally acceptable or unacceptable, based upon specificassessment of the conditions at the
time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think you will remember that we said at some of our other meet-
ings that we recognize the difficultyof your position and we respect itand respect you. So that
our questioning isreallynot directed to that.
Our questioning is directed to the process. Does everybody know what everybody else is rec-
ommending? Does everybody have the facts? And obviously, your interpretation of what Rock-
well said this morning is somewhat different than Rockwelrs interpretation of what they said,
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MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir.
CH__IRMAN ROGERS: That is the part that is very troublesome. I mean, nobody--I don't
think anybody questions the terrible responsibility you have, you and Jess Moore have, to make
the decisions. But we are very seriously concerned about whether everybody has the facts avail-
able that they should have.
MR. ALDRICH: Could I say one more point in that regard?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Surely.
MR. ALDRICH: One of the other reasons that I asked for an additional ice team inspection
is that I had in my own mind that there was some concern expressed in this meeting and I
wanted to give the team time to think further about what we were proceeding to do and doing.
And as I have said previously, I have worked with the Rockwell team closelyfor a number
of years and I fullyexpected that I would receive a callfrom one of the key officialsat Rockwell
ifthey feltthat my decision,based upon the kind of input they gave me, was a problem to them.
When the situation has been resersed on previous launches, I feltfree to call Downey, Cali-
fornia,and talk to a key officialthere to get him
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to tell me directly his opinion when I thought there was some question in a decision. And I
would think that it was more than reasonable that, if someone were still concerned that this was
a very bad judgment or a bad action to take, that they would call me. And I left every opportuni-
ty for that to happen.
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xCHAIRMAN ROGERS: I suppose it is unfair to ask you, but suppose that call had been
made. Is it conceivable you might have changed your mind?
MR. ALDRICH: If Rockwell had told me that they were no go, t would have rep_)rted to you
in the same manner that George Hardy reported in discussion. I would not have overruled a no
go discussion from the Rockwell team.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It might be appropriate to get this on the record,Arnie.
There has been a lot of discussion about the launch time and itsappropriateness, and we heard
in testimony this morning that the ice team feltthat it would be advantageous to launch as
early as possible.And we've heard in previous testimony that some people were supporting the
idea o¢ launching laterin the day, at higher temperatures.
CA)uldyou just review for us what the general
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nature of the launch window was for 51-L and wh,_t your considerations were in selectinga time
within that launch window?
MR. ALDRICH: The 51-L had a three hour launch window. Itwas really constrained by the
amount of time that we could go through the whole process of putting the crew in the cabin and
having them wait through the count and then wait through the hold. And so we established a
time of 9:30 to 12:30 in the morning.
I mentioned the problem they had at Kennedy Space Center early in the morning that lost
them an hour, and _o our window then became 10:30 to 12:30.And during the course of the
morning, informally there were some discussions about how rapidly the conditions were warm-
ing and that itmight be warmer during the day at noon than we predicted,and perhaps launch-
ing at the end of the launch window would be the most opportune time because we would have
more melting opportunity.
Following this meeting which I discussed on reviewing the ice,I did get the input from Mr.
Davis that there was a feelingof the ice team that perhaps melting was not going to be good and
you might get more material to falland be down at the bottLm of the FSS and that we should
proceed to launch as quickly as possible.
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I wanted to proceed with the final ice inspection,and also because of the delays we incurred
we put the IMU's back into a recalibration sequence, which takes an hour. And so the earliest
time we could launch, based upon that discussion,was 11:30 a.m. And we would have had the
optior,to go to 12:30 and had more melting ifwe had chosen to,but we did not.
The ice team did finish in that amount of time. And the only other thing I ought to say
about that, it was discussed earlierthat Je_ Moore was in that discussion,and I don't believe
that was brought to his attention,but ifso only casually.
I discussed the exact time of launch with the launch director.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Aldrich, are we correct in am_ming that in all of this discussion of temper-
ature and delay until latein the afternoon or whenever, there was no discussionof the consider°
ations of temperature on the sealsof the solidrocket booster?
MR. ALDRICH: No, sir.Up until the events following STS 51-L, I was not aware of tempera-
ture concern with the solidrocket booster seams or seals.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: If I could get back to the launch window, was there a
requirement to have
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Dakar in daylight, and what set the thing to _ 9:30 to 12:30? Was it TDRS considerations?
MR. ALDRICH: I think it was crew duration and crew day. We had lights at Dakar and that
was go, but we could not go later in the day because of the schedule we had set the launch crew
and the flight crew on. There is a limit of the amount of time that we agree that they will stay
in the cockpit in the position they were in, and I think that is what ended at 12:30.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I guess what I'm getting at is, couldn't it have been 12:00
to 3:00?
MR. ALDRICH: It coald have been if we had planned it much earlier in the day. The launch
team, of course, plans the countdown. They are in the countdown. They are in the countdown
with a series of holds, but they pick up the count and proceed to tenk the launch vehicle based
on a given launch time.
And also, several days before launch we put the flight crew on the sleep-wake cycle that
supports them to be in the right configuration for launch that day and do a full work day in
orbit. We would have been able to go a three hour launch window in the afternoon if we had set
that in motion several days prior to that time.
But _z,! couldn't change in the middle of the
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night and say, well, we will just adjust them around by some number of hours, because there are
too many constraints and additional problems that that creates.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Aldrich, you sa: ] that, in referring to previous flights, that
Rockwell had been conservative in your opinio n m some of their discussions. In this case there
were the worst ice conditions, I guess we have heard testified, on the launch facility. Have *.hey
ever said no go before and then you have overruled them or gone ahead anyway?
MR. ALDRICH: No, there has never been a time when Rockwell said no go and we have
overruled them and gone anyway. There have been times when they have said no go and we
have agreed with them.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Say something less than no go? Has there ever been a time when
they expressed concern of the type expressed here and you have gone ahead anyway?
MR. ALDRICH: This is a unique kind of discussion with Rockwell, I think. I dor.'t recall an
equivalent situation. Some of these other activities we have with respect to launch weather with
other parts of the team, the launch team in Houston, and the weather people, we frequer,.'ly
have discussions about the weather conditions and their threat and their potential fo_
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violating a rule or not a rule, and you get the same sort of a qualification on an acceptability
from one area or another about whether they feel the launch is a good choice.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Any otl',er questions?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Suppose we take a recess until 2:00 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was recessed, to recon-
vene at 2:00 p.m. the same day.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION
(2:15 p.m.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order, please.
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Mr. Lucas.
(Witness sworn.)
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TESTIMONY OF DR, WILLIAM LUCAS, DIRECTOR, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT
CENTER, HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Lucas, would you identify yourself, please..
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission.
I am the director of the Marshall Space Flight Center, located in Huntsville, Alabama. I
have been director there for about eleven and a half years. Prior to that time I was deputy direc-
tor, and prior to that I was director of an element called program development, devoted to the
feasibility studies and the development of new programs. I have had about 34 years of experi-
ence in rocketry and space flight.
The Marshall Space Flight Center as an institution reports to the associate administrator,
office of space flight. But we do work various projects for each of the other four associate admin-
istrators, program associate administrators, and headquarters. We have assigned to the center
some six or seven major projects and severM others, 35 or 40 smaller projects.
We implement those projects by the delegation of authority to program managers, senior
program managers, who are held accountable by the director of
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the center for the exercise of their programs,
One of the progr_ that wv have, of course, is the space shuttle programs that have been
under discussion here, specifically the external tank, the space shuttle main engine, and the
solid rocket booster.
Is that adequate, sir?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes.Thank you.
And Mr. Reinartzand Mr. Hardy and Mr. Mulloy allwork foryou?
DR. LUCAS: Well,in a fashionthey do. Mr. Reinartz isthe only one ofthe threewho re-
portsdirectlyto me. Mr. Mulloy reportsto Mr. Reinartz.Mr. Hardy isthe deputy directorofthe
scienceand engineeringdirectorateand as such reportstoMr. Jim Kingsbury,who isthe direc-
torof thatdirectorate.That isthe directoratethatcontainsthe preponderance ofour engineer-
ing talent.
Itservesas our in-houseengineeringarm that isappliedacrossthe variousprograms as-
signed to the center.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you have a prepared statement?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir,I do not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Allright.Well,we wanted
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ask--the Commission wanted to ask a few questions,particularly_!atir.gto the testimony
thatwas givenyesterdayand some today.
Would you pleasetellthe Commission when you firstheard about _he problem of $,heO-
ringsand the sealsinsofaras itinvolveslaunch 51-I,.9And I don'twant _ou to go way back,but
go back towhen you firstheard.Iguess;.twas on January 27th,was it?
DR. LUCAS: Yes,sir.Itwas on Claeearlyeveningof the 27th,Ithink about 7 p.m,,when I
was in my motel room along -_-ithMr. Kingsbury.And about thattime,Mr. Reinart,t.and Mr.
Mulloy came to my room and toldme that they had heard that some members of Tniokolhad
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Fraised a concern about the performance of the st,lid rocket boosters in the low temperature that
was anticipated for the next day, specifically on :he seals, and that they were going out to the
Kennedy Space Center to engage in a telecon with the appropriate engineers back at Marshall
Space Flight Center in Huntsville and with corresponding people back at th_ Wasatch division
of Thiokol in Utah.
And we discussed it a few moments and I said, fine, keep me ".'nformed, let me know what
happens.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And when was the next time you heard something about that?
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DR. LUCAS: The next time was _bout ._:00a.m. on the following morning, when I went to
the Kennedy Space Center and went to the launch control center. I immediately saw Mr. Rein-
artz and Mr. Mulloy and asked them hov,, the matter of the previous evening was dispositioned.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You had heard nothing at al! in between?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So from 8:00 o'clock that evening until 5:00 o'clock in the morning,
you had not heard a thing?
DR. LUCAS: It was about 7:00. I beliew, sir. But for that period of time, ! heard nothing in
the interim.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you familiar with the concerns that had been expressed in the
previous year, and in fact previous years, I guess, about that problem?
DR. LUCAS: I was not informed of the temperature problem. I had been aware of a problem
with the seals on the solid rocket motor--that is, the case joint seals--since the beginning of the
program. I believe it was in STS 2 where we first had some evidence of either minor erosion or
blow-by in the seal, and then
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subsequently we have had that repeated several times. I think it is about six times in the case of
the case joints, and maybe 15 or 16 times in the case of the nozzle joint.
And that _s been considered and dispositioned on each and every succee,'ling flight readi-
ness review. So I am familiar with that part and have never considered the s_als, however, a
safety of flight issue.
There was a less than the best situation, but in no case that I am aware of have we ever had
any penetration or perforation of the seals.
About April of last year, I think it was, April of 1985, when we had the erosion on the sec-
ondary nozzle seal,iswhen we became very concerned because that followed,itseeraed to tm--I
think it was the only time, in fact,in the program we have had that, and so we did become
concerned and began to accelerate ways of improving, increasing the margin that we have on
that seal.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Lucas, I'm surprised you hadn't heard about the safety ques-
tions that have been raised about the seal untilApril of the yeal before.
DR. LUCAS: No, sir,ifI said that I misspoke. I said I had never considered ita threat to
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the safety offlight.I was aware that the sealswere CriticalityI in terms of the program, as well
as many other things.But I had never considered the seals as a threat to flightsafety,because I
thought adequate margin was available.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you familiar with SRB criticalitems liststhat were signed on
December 17th, 1982?.
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DR. LUC._S: Yes, :sir.
CHAIRMAn: ROCERS: Anti did;_'t that indicate to ytu that there wa_ a serious problem of
flight safety?
DR. LUCAS: It inai_ ated to me that if--as I underst_, 5 the CIL, it indicated to me that if
we had a failure of tl',e primary O-ring after the rotation o7 the joint and the secondary O-ring
had not--bad opened up and didn't seal, that there would be .a problem.
But never in our experience that I'm aware of had that happened.
CHAIRM#N ROGERS: WeJl, I was just commenting on your testimony you nevei consid-
ered it as a matter of flight safety It seems tc me the critical items list and the waiver goes
directly to that. It says "actual loss, loss ,_f mission, vehicle and crew due co metal erosion, burn-
through, and probable case burst, resulting m fire and deflagration."
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I mean, I don't see how you could say that didn't involve flight safety.
DR. LUCAS: Well, if it happened it would involve flight safety My conception was that it
was a reasonable risk _o take in Criticality 1.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why did they remove the R fr._m that Criticality 1 list?
DR. LUCAS: As I understand it, the re,_uscn they removed Criticality 1 is that they discov-
ered, after doing the structural tests, that there was a rote, tion of this joint which would lift or
remove the pressure on the primary and perhaps _econdary seal after about 300 or 400 millisec-
onds, when at any rate, when we had built up to the ignition pressure or full pressure within
the rocket motor itself.
As I understand that CIL as it has been explained to me and as I have read it, I believe that
it is still Criticality 1R until ignition occurs, after which it becomes a Criticality 1.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, when they took off the "R" from that, what was the rationale?
DR. LUCAS: The rationale was, as I understand it, the recognition that after ignition and
the buildup of pressure in the solid rocket motor that there was a rotation of the jcJint that could
remove the redundancy,
1872
and therefore after that time it was Criticality 1.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But the redundancy was removed, as I read this, and I think it is
accurate, that whoever did this was of the view that the redundancy was not going to be avail-
able on this joint.
Now, I don't think it makes _.l that much difference whether it's the first second or the
second second or the tenth second. The fact was that the Criticality 1 was the way it was listed.
It was not Criticality 1R. Isn't that so?
DR. LUCAS: I don't think so, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let's go back. What was the condition before this change?
What was it called, Criticality 1R? And now, what did that mere'l?
DR. LUCAS: That meant that one had a redundant seal throughout the whole period of
flight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, when you t'_ke off the "R" as they did here, what does that
mean to you?
DR. LUCAS: Well, if you only looked at the 1 versus the 1R, it would mean it's Cliticality 1.
But if you read_
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let's just stick to that. That is the change, as I understand it,
that was made, and I think that it was con_trued ,'o mean that there was no redundant seal
after this change was made.
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GnewasCriticality 1Randthenthe changewasmadeandthe "R" wasremoved.
Now,doesn'tthat _uggestthat whoevermadethis decisionwasof the viewthat youdidn't
haveredundancyon that seal?
DR.LUCAS:That is not the understanding of the people who were preparing this, I believe,
and it is not my unders -tanding from readinF,. My understanding from reading it is that one still
maintained IR until after ignition.
CHAIRMAN RCGERS: So what happens after ignition? Th, m there's no redvndancy, is
there?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir. But what the experience has been, that after the seal has extruded into
that gap of about one-eighth of an inch, I believe, there has never been any problem that I'm
aware of, never. The erq_ion that has occurred _n the seal has not haI:pened, to my knowledge,
except on that portion of the O-ring that is not extruded into that joint.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I guess, if I understand y_,ar testimony, that the decislon that
was made to take the redundancy off this seal really was meaningless. There was no change at
all, according to your testimony.
DR. LUCAS: No, sir, that is not what I mean
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to imply at all. It is Criticality 1, as I understand it, after ignition, after the ignition transient
has occurred.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So after ignition there's no redundmlcy, right?
DR. LUCAS: That's the way ! unders_nd it, after the ignition transient and you have built
up to chanlber pressure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, after ignition then there is no redundancy?
DR. LUCAS: Well, if you define the ignition as being after what is built up, the pressure in
the chamber--this was discussed by people who know far more about it than I do, and they indi-
cate that dvring the first 200, 300 milliseconds, one is building up the pressure very gradually,
and you get up to a point at which the pressure is sufficient to extrude the O-ring into the seal,
and then it seals.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you here yesterday when Mr. Sutter asked questions and he
said that it was clear from his standpoint that this was a very tender joint and it had been so
considered by NASA for three years? Do you disagree with that?
DR. LUCAS: Well, I don't know what his meaning of "tender" is. I would agree that--
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, put it this way: It's dangerous. I mean, you started out saying
you didn't consider this a flight safety problem. It seems to me from all the t_timony that we
have received so far there is a very serious flight safety problem. You don't agree with _hat?
DR. LUCAS: I think it is a problem, and that when we understood the principal nature of
the problem about a year ago in April, that we undertook immediately to corree_. But when I
said I didn't think it was a problem, had I believed it was a serious risk I would never have
agreed to committing to flight. And I, along with all the other people, the senior people in the
agency, did commit to ._,lghts after STS No. 2, with the problem that it was experienced on that
vehicle.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Beginning in April 19,35,did you then begin to think itwas a prob-
lem of flightsafety?
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DR. LUCAS: 1 did not think it was a problezn sufficient to g-ovnd the fleet. I thought it was
a problem more serious than I had thought earlier.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Of course you d_dn't, apparently, because you continued to 0y. But
didn't you think it was a serious problem, so that if the weather conditions were different and a
lot of people
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sounded alarms, that that would have caused you to have some concern about the safety of the
flight?
DR. LUCAS: Well, if many people sounded alarms, that's true. But I was not aware of the
alarms that had been sounded, that we have heard testified this week. That w_ completely new
information to me.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And if you had heard those alarms you would have b_en concerned
about flight ,_afety, I presume, wouldn't you?
DR. LUCAS: If I had heard the alarms that have been expressed in this room thin week
before the flight, I certainly would have been concerned, yes, sir. __n,_e is right.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you heard Mr. Reinartz say he didn't think he had to notify
you, or did he notify you?
DR. LUCA,S: He told me as I testified, when I went into the control room, _hat an issue had
.been resolved, that there were some people at Thiokol who had a concern about the weather,
that that had been discussed very thoroughly by the Thiokol people and by the Marshall Space
Flight Center people, and it had been concluded agreeably that there was no problem, that he
had a recommendation by Thiokol m launch and our most knowledgeable people and engineer-
Lug talent agreed with
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that. im_vLSo from my perspective, I didn't I didn't see that as an issue.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: ._md if you had know that Thiokol engineers almost to a man op-
poeed the flight, would that have changed your view?
DR. LUCAS: I'm certain that it would.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So your testimony is the same as Mr. Hardy's: Had he known, he
would not have recommended the flight be launched on that day.
DR. LUCAS: I didn't make a recommendation one way or the other. But had I known that, I
would have then interposed an objection, yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I gather you didn't tell Mr. Aldrich or Mr. Moore what Mr. Reinartz
had told you?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir. That is not the reporting channel. Mr. Reinartz reports directly to Mr.
Aldrich. In a sense,, Mr. ReLuartz informs me as the Lustitution_ manager of the progress that
he is making in implementing his program, but that I have never on any occasion reported to
Mr. Aldrich.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you had subsequent conversations with Mr. Moore and Mr. Al-
drich prior to the flight and you never mentioned what Mr. Reinartz had told you?
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DR. LUCAS: I did not mention what Mr. Reinartz told me, because Mr. Reinartz had indi-
cated to me there was not an issue, that we had a unanimous position between Thiokol and the
Marshall Space Flight.f_enter,and there was no issue in his judgment, nor in mine as he ex-
plained it to me. _"
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But had you known, your attitude would have been totally different?
DR. LUCAS: Had I had the:. advantage at that time of the testimony that I have heard here
this week, I would have had a different attitude, certainly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In view of the fact that you were running tests to improve the jeint,
didn't the fact that the weather was so bad and Reinartz had told you about the questions that
had been raised by Thiokol, at least, didn't that cause you serious concern?
DR. LUCAS: I would have been concerned if Thiokol had come in and said. we don't think
you should launch because we've got bad weather.
CHAIRMAN RCG--RS: Well, that's what they did, of course, first. That is exactly what the)"
did. You didn't know that?
DR. LUCAS: I knew only that Thiokol had raised a concern.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you know they came and
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recommended against the launch, is the question.
DR. LUCAS: I knew that I was told on the morning of the launch that the initial position of
some members of Thiokol--and I don't know who it was--had _ecommended that one not launch
with the temperature less than 53 degrees Fahrenheit.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that didn't cause you enough concern so you passed that inf.',v-
mation on to either Mr. Moore or Mr. Aldrich?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir, because I was shown a document siomaed by Mr. Kilminster that indi-
cated that that would not be significant, that the temperature would not be--that it would be
that much lover, as I recall it
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you see the document telefaxed?
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What in the telefax convinced you not to mention it to anybody?
DR. LUCAS: The whole document says that the assessment is that if the primary seal--well,
let me see. It says: "Morton Thiokol recommends proceeding on January the 28th, 1986. SRM 25
will not be significaptly different that SRM 15"--which was the one that we had launched ap-
proximately one year
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earlier.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you see, though, that they said: "The temperature data was not
conclusive on predicting primary O-ring blow-by."
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir. I saw that. I had a little tro,able with the term "co_.zlusive." I think as
it was explained to me, "conclusive" might not have been the word, but "co;mistent."
I saw, as I recall it, three data points: one at about 100 degrt_es, another at 50 degrees, and I
think 75 degrees. And the way this was explained to me was that the eresion had not been a
function of temperature in a eonsL_tent way.
CHAIRMAN ROGEP__q: Do you know how they happened to sho,_ this telefax to you?
DR. LUCA_: When I at_ked what had been the resolution of the concern.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you knew then that the original recommendation was not to
launch by Thiokol?
DR. LUCAS: 1 knew ".hat some members of Thiokol, I do:ft know who, had expressed reser-
vation against launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Didn't you ask who?
DR. LUCAS: No. sir, I did not, because I did not know the Thiok_A people well enough to
make a
1040
'/C,
ORmmN.
POOR QUALrrY
1881
judgment.
I do know Mr. Kilminster. Mr. Kilminster is the person who participates or has participated
in all of our flight readiness reviews. He is a man I respect and believe to represent the position
of Thiokel. I had no reason to question that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No[_dy told you that the engnneering greup was as a whole, was
against the launch?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir. No one _old me that. As a matter of fact, I didn': know that until this
week. I, in previous testimony before _h)s Commission, I got the impression that a substantial
number of the people were opposed to th_ launch. I heard this week that all of the engineers
virtually were.
But that was information that I did not have.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And who gave you this teiefax?
DR. LUCAS: This particular copy I have, or who showed it to me?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes.
DR. LUCAS: It was I believe Mulloy. I'm not sure whether itwas Mulloy o- Reinartz. Both
of them were there,and I think itwas Mulloy who showed itto me.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did he indicate bo_ long ittook them to ta_k this over and finally '_
come up with this telefax? !
DR. LUCAS: I don't kPow tha t he said specifically, and I can't say now whether I gained
that subsequently or at that time. I was of the opfnion that t took a substan_tial amount of di£-
cussion, which is not surprisihz.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you know, I guess, based ,.pon the testimeny, had it not been
for this telefax that flight would have been delayed?
DR. LUCAS: You say do I know that? No, sir, I don't know that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, Mr. Hardy said that if he had known what the engineers had
recommended unanimously, he would not have recommended the launch.
DR. LUCAS: In that context, then, I think _ha* that is correct. As director of the center, I
have to rely upon my experts, and I consider "Whiokol to be. the expert in solid rocket motors.
And I have great respect for Mr. Hardy and the engineers who work with him, and when those
two groups agree then I don't have a basis for recognizing an _ssue.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I guess as we pointed out yes_rday, a,: argument could be
made maybe because of this piece of paper that Mr. Reinartz lived up to the hock, but there was
no application, as far as you can tell, of common sense. I mean, this obviously was a very serious
matter, and by insisting that this piece of paper was gicing everybody the blessing of Thiokol,
the fact was that the top people who made the decision never knew about _ hat happened L- this
long telecon and didn't know that the decision to launch, recommending a launch was ma_e
really by just a couple of people, Mr. Kihainster and Mr. Mason, and maybe one other.
I mean, the fourth gentleman, Mr. Lund, said he was in a position where he couldn't prove
._ that it was not safe, and._refere he put on his management hat and changed his mind.
So this piece of _hich really resulted in the launch was made by just a couple of
I people, and apparent!_, of you gentlemen knew about it.
DR. LUCAS: I did not know that it was made by a couple of people. As I s_id, I recognized
- Mr. Kilminster as the senior Thiokol individual for the space booster programs.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, maybe I am a little---maybe I am not being conservative
enough.
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It was Mr. Kilm;nster, Mr. Mason, Mr. Wiggins_ and I think the fourth one was Mr. Lund,
but Mr. Lund said--well, I will read you what ne said because I think it illustrates the whole
problem.
Here's his testimony. Mr. Lund said, and this is his testimony, "we got ourselves into the
thought process that we were trying to find some way to prove to them," that is, NASA, "that it
wouldn't work. We were unable to do that. We couldn't prove absolutely that it wouldn't work.
That is the kind of boat we got ourselves into that evening."
That was his testimony.
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir, I heard that testimony, but that was testimony that I had this week. I
didn't know that at the time. I have never had any mason tc suspect that the representation of
Mr. Kilminster was not a carefully considered company position taking advantage of all the ex-
pertise that Thiokol had. I have never found it necessary to poll Thiokol to say now, Mr. Kilmin-
ster,did everybody agree with you? I have assumed as a responsible _anager he did have suffi-
cient agreement tojustifya position.
MR. HOq_: Dr. Lucas, did you know that Mr. Kilminster earlierhad formally recommended
against launch and then had reversed his position?
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DR. LUCAS: The testimony I heard was that based upon the engineering evaluation or some
engineering evaluation where the engineer says we don't propose to launch ifthe temperature is
lessthan 53, chat Mr. Kilminster said,well, I can't go against my engineering and something to
the effect,letus now have a caucus and discussthis.
Itis not unusual in our system for one or more engineers to raisea concern and then have
those concerns discussed and threshed out.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Lucas, that'snot the testimony, though. The testimony was they
had a long teleconference,and Thiokol made a formal recommendation against the launch. It
wasn't just casual conversation; they had a chart there. The chart said we recommend against
launch. I mean, itwasn't what you said at all.It was something quite different.They made a
formal representation, no launch, and then they had a long off-the-recordor off-the-telephone
conference caucus, and itturned out that Mason, Wiggins and Kilminster apparently supported
this document, and allthe engineers were against it,and Lund said,well, I'm chicken, I have to
go along. I can'tfigure out a way to prove that it'snot safe.
DR. LUCAS: Mr. Chairman, I heard that
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testimony thisweek. I did not ,havethat testimony, though, at the time thishappened.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No, but you're describing the telecon as though itwere just sort of
one of those ordinary things,and I don't believethat isaccurate.
DR. LUCAS: That was my perspective of itat the time. I would conclude also on the basis of
what I have heard this week that itwas not an ordinary situation.
CHA/RMAN ROGERS: We!l, in any event, at no time did you pa_s on the hfformation you
had, even ti_ugh itwas sketchy, to either Mr. Moore or Mr. Aldrich.
DR. LUCAS: No, sir,I did not. As I indicated,the channel the project channel isfrom Mr.
Reinartz to Mr. Ald,qch, and Mr. Reinartz I did not on the b_ of what he and Mr. Mu!loy had
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told me, I didn'tconsider itan i_:e. I considered itin line with the kinds of decisionsthat had
already been made relativeto the launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You had occasion, though, to talk to both Mr. _,IdrichaILd Mr.
Moore before the launch?
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS And whether itwas in the
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line of authority or not, you had ample opportunity to pass on the information that there has
beep serious concern about the seal, isn't that right?
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir, I had the opportunity to talk to them.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. I have no further questions.
DR. WALKER: Dr. Luc_-., I have a question.
Perhaps you recall that on Tuesday Mr. Boisjoly read a memo into the record which he had
sent to his mar, agement. I think it went to Mr. Lund through Mr. Boisjoly's supervisor, which
indicated that he had a very serious concern with the safety of the seal and indicated that catas-
trophe could result if this problem was not addressed, and Mr. Lund set up a joint working
group, and they proceeded to deve!op some procedures to try to improve the seals.
The question I have isdo }ou thir.kthat the Thiokol management should have taken some
additional actionssuch as warning Marshall, your project,of this very seri,_usconcern and sug-
geeting that one should c_nsider stopping launches for a period of time until the problem was
solved?
DR. LUCAS: As I recallthat memo, and I have not seen it,I have only bpard itread I think
ti_isweek
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in which one member ofThiokol had written a lettersaying that we should delay launch, ifthat
information had come, I think itshould have come to the Marshall Space Flight Center.
DR. WALKER: No, that was Mr. Thompeon's memo. There were two memes, actually.Mr.
Thompson wrote a memo ac_,uallyexplicitlysaying that launches should be stopped. Mr. Boisjo-
ly'slettermerely warned of catastrophe. But indeed, you are right,there were two memos.
DR. LUCAS: In either case,I think that information should have been communicated to the
Marshall Space Flight Center directly and immediately, and I think it should have been men-
tioned in the proc_s of flightreadiness reviews, of which there have been three or four since
that time.
DR. WALKER: Is there some procedure for a manufacturer to respond in a systematic way
to these kinds of concerns that their engineering staffhas in terms o:?relaying information to
NASA, or do you think that isjust a matter of their initiativewhic_ they should take upon
themselves to carry out?
DR. LUCAS: I have always considered the contractor people that we deal with to be reliable,
professionalpeople and have counted on them to bring
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their concerns to us ifthey have them. That has been the NASA mode of encouraging people to
speak up and to express concerns ifthey have ti,cm.1 don't know of any reason at all why they
would not, and they have certainly had tha*,opp_rtrnity ifin no other way, when we have had
our flightreadinem reviews, and to be dealing wilh the claim that somebody made that we
ought to ground the vehicle and not pass that on, iti_very difficultfor me to understand.
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We have motivated, I believe, our contractors to be conservative, particularly so in the case
of Thiokol with an incentive contract that has substantial pen,.lty for flight failure. Tbere is no
motivation that I know of for contractors to take risks of the nature that would be implied by
those memos.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Lucas, in view of what has transpired here, do you feel now that
Thiokol should have gotten in touch with you or somebody else to make it clear how much con-
cern there was on their part about this launch?
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir, I do indeed. I'm surprised, if there was the degree of concern ex-
pressed this week, that it didn't come to my attention. I heard Mr. Reinartz on at least two occa-
sion° during the countdown poll all the elements of his program, if they
!8_
were ready to launch. That involved the Marshall elements and the contractor elements, and in
no case did I hear any reservation expressed about readiness to launch.
And so, if the contractor as such or any member thereof should have had these reservations,
I was available and it could have been expressed.
DR. WALKER: Who was the Thiokol person involved in these two polls that you are speak-
ing of?.
DR. LUCAS: i can't recite all of the persons involved. The poll at the Kennedy Space Center
went to the Firing Room II, as has been mentioned earlier, and it's my understanding and belief
that Mr. McDonald was at the co_le along with our people in that firing room.
In the HOSC, the Huntsville Operation Support Center, Mr. Boyd Brinton was the senior
Thiokol person now there, and I don't know if others were there or not.
DR. WALKER: Could you ask Mr. Reinartz to document that information for the Commis-
sion?
DR. LUCAS: That the whereabouts----
DR. WALKER: Those polls and who exactly responded for Thiokol.
DR. LUCAS: I don't believe anybody responded
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for Thiokol. The response was whoever was on the console, which I believe was a government
person, but the contractor person was there and he can document for you whether or not that
person participated in that.
DR. WALKER: I would very much like to receive that.
MR. ACHESON: Dr. Lucas, were you present at the review conducted in Washington in I
think August of 1985?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir, I was not.
MR. ACHESON: Was the result of that review regarding the joint seal reported to you by
the pe:ple who were there?
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir, it was so, and action was taken, already being t_ken, as a matter of
fact, at the time of that report.
MR. AC_N: Was there any suggestion made to you that temperature, low temperature
might be related to the performance of the seals?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir, I don't recall that it was.
MR. ACHESON: Thank you.
C_zLa,IRMAN ROGERS: So the wea*Jler and the fact that it was cold weather didn't cause
any ala_'Tn as far as you were concerned in connection with the seals?
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DR.LUCAS:Noton thebasisof myknowledge,no,sir.
DR.RIDE:Had you beenpresentat the--I think it wasthe 51-EFR wheretherewasa
presentationon thesealproblemthat hadbeendiscoveredafterthe 51-Claunch?
DR.LUCAS:Yes,Dr. Ride,asI mentioned,the 51-E,which I believe occurred in April of
1985, was the occasion first insofar as I knew, the only occasion where there was erosion on the
secondary seal of the nozzle. That was the one that got our attention and indicated that the
problem might be more serious than originally thought, and therefore we did move out to im-
prove our margin.
DR. RIDE: I don't have a copy of the presentation here, but as I recall, one of the statements
in that presentation wa_ that the low temperature may have contributed to the problem with
the seals, and it appears that that concern wasn't carried through in the August presentation at
Marshall.
Do you have any recollection of that temperature being mentioned at the 51-E FR?
DR. LUCAS: I can't say yes or no. I just simply don't recall.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The occasion, I guess, was
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51-C where the weather was the coldest.
DR. LUCAS: I think I misspoke. I said 51-E. 51-C I guess was in preparation for the 51-E FR.
I guess that is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And 51-42 was the coldest weather and the worst blow-by, wasn't it?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir, it was the coldest weather, but I don't think it was the worst blow-by. I
think the worst blow-by was at a temperature higher than _9 degrees, and I'm not sure.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Dr. Lucas, I think you are wrong there. The worst blow-by was on 51-
C. It was erosion.
DR. LUCAS: I'm sorry.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The worst blow-by was oil 51-C, and that was in the coldest weather,
and it is surprising that there wasn't a correlation between 51-C and 51-L, the Challenger flight,
in your mind.
DR. LUCAS: Well, as this indicates here, this Thiokol position was that ")',ere wouldn't be a
substantial difference between those.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you're relying solely on Thiokol now.
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir. I have to rely on Thiokol. They are our experts.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you put the total responsibility on Thiokol?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir, I do not. I indicated earlier that I listened to two sources. One is the
Thiokol prime contractor, and the second is our own engineering personnel, some of whom have
testified, George Hardy and several others, that are knowledgeable engineers, and I rely upon
them also.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I don't have any other questions.
Dr. Keel?
DR. KEEL: Dr. Lucas, just one further question on your awareness of temperature concerns.
There was a July 2, 1985 briefing by Thiokol to Marshall personnel.
Were you not in that briefing?.
DR. LUCAS: I don't recall having been at that brief'rag.
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DR. KEEL: That specifically did talk about O-ring resiliency and temperature effects, and
that was the basis, it is my understanding, on which Marshall and Thiokol then briefed head-
quarters in August 1985.
DR. LUCAS: I don't recall having been in that briefing, and I don't say this as a matter of
excuse, but as you know, the Marshall Space Flight Center has
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many projects for which I am respons:ble, and I don't spend nearly all my time on Space Shut-
tle. But I am sure if that meeting was there, senior people from the Marshall Space Flight
Center were involved.
DR. KEEL: Just two other questions.
You mentioned in your testimony that when you fl,_t learned about this concern at 7:00
p.m. that Mr. Reinartz and Mr. Mulloy said they had heard about a concern, but is that an accu-
rate characterization, heard about the concern? That sounds like it was second hand informa-
tion.
DR. LUCAS: I didn't intend to imply that. It is my understanding Mr. Mulloy had only
heard of the concern a few maybe minutes or an hour before. I understood that Mr. Reinartz
had had a telephone conversation with someone where that concern had been expres_.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Reinartz actually participated in the 5:45 p.m. teleconference. So he had
firsthand knowledge.
Did you know that Mr. Lovingood was concerned enough about the nature of this that he
thought there was a good prospect for a delay, and he had actually recommended that Mr. Al-
drich be given notice that there might be a need to elevate this?
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DR. LUCAS: I did not know that, no, sir.
DR. KEEL: Did you know he had asked for you and Mr. Kingsbury both to participate in the
8:15 conference?
DR. LUCAS: I did not know that, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Lucas, going back to the previous question asked about the re-
sponsibility of Thiokol, you said you didn't rely solely on them. Yesterday both Mr. Hardy and
Mr. Mulloy said had they known about the position of the engineers at Thiokol, they would not
have recommended a launch, and I understood that that was your position too now.
DR. LUCAS: Had I been involved as a project manager, I would not--I would put it this
way. Had I beer/told that all of the engineers at Thiokol recommended against the launch, then
I certainly would have interposed an objection.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which I guees is another way of saying that the responsibility really
lies with Thiokol.
DR. LUCAS: Well, I would think that--I don't recall that we have ever, that I have never
knowingly overridden a go/no-go decision by a contractor.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So the responsibility rests
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with Thiokol?
DR. LUCAS: The responsibility rests with Thiokol, but I'm not trying to shake the responsi-
bility of the Marshall Space Flight Center. Thiokol reports to us. But I do rely upon the contrac-
tor, the pr_mae contractor, to recommend launch.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But as you know, the Commission is considering the decisionmaking
process, and if I understand the testimony of you and Mr. Hardy, and Mr. Mulloy, it was to the
effect that had Thiokol recommended against the launch, the flight would not have occurred.
Am I correct?
DR. LUCAS: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. We have no further questions.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Moore, Mr. Aldrich, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Smith.
_Witnesses sworn.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think maybe that Mr. Moore and Mr. Aldrich are clearly identi-
fied. Mr. Smith and Mr. Thomas, you might say a word for the record about your present em-
ployment.
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STATEMENT OF JESSE MOORE. ASS(X'I%TE AI)MINISTRATOR FOR SPACE FLIGilT.
NATIONAL AERONAI'TICS AND SPACE : DMiNISTRATION HEAl)QUARTERS: ARNIE
ALDRICH. MANAGER, SPACE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMS, JOHNSON SPACE
('ENTER: DICK SMITH, DIRECTOR. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER: AND GENE
THOMAS, DIRECTOR, LAUNCH AND LANDING OPERATIONS, KENNEDY SPACE
('ENTER
MR. SMITH: Yes. I am Director of the Kennedy Space Center, and I have been there since
September of 1979. The year preceding that I was the Deputy Associate Administrator for Space
Flight,which would correspond to Mr. Jesse Moore's deputy at that time. It was actually John
Yardley. Previous to that I was the Deputy Center Director at Marshall Space Flight Center and
had spent all my career since 1951 at the Center, starting out in design and going up through
the ranks of increasing responsibility.
MR. THOMAS: I am Gene Thomas. I am presently the Director of Launch and Landing Op-
erations at Kennedy Space Center and report directly to Bob Sieck, who reports to Mr. Smith,
and I am also,in that capacity, I serve as a launch director for the Shuttle launches and have
served in that capacity for the last fivelaunches. And I started with NASA in 1962 as a systems
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engineer, and worked on allthe manned programs to date.
My lastexperience before coming _o the Launch Director position was as a Shuttle project
engineer for all elements ofthe Shuttle, and I was the launch directorfor STS-51-L.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
By way of a question, could I ask, did any of you gentlemen prior to launch know about the
objectionsof Thiokol to the launch?
MR. SMITH: I did not.
MR. THOMAS: No, sir.
MR. ALDRICH: I did not.
MR. MOORE: I did not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So the four,certainly four of the key people who made the decision
about the launch were not aware of the history that we have been unfolding here before the
Commission.
MR. MOORE: That iscorrect.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Turning to another subject--and I am not sure which one of you
gentlem_n wants to referto it--we have had a lot of discussion about the CriticalItems List,and
particularlythe decision that was made in December 17th,or on December 17th, 1982.
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Would one of you or a combination of you attempt to explain what this is and what it's
significance was and whatever regulations apply to it in connection with the launch?
MR. MOORE: Let me try to give you a general feel, a_d then I will ask Mr. Aldrich and
maybe Dick if he would like to comment on the Critical Items List.
a,s has be_n reported here, Mr. Chairman---
CHAIRMAN ROC, E_.S: Do you have a copy of this, and would you like one?
MR. MOORE: I do not have a copy of that at this point in time.
As has been reported, there are a lot of critical items in the Space Shuttle Program, and I
think i,: the Category l's there are about almost 1,000, maybe 900, something on that order.
When I look at Criticality 1 items is they have to do with flight safety, and they put kind of a
special flag on the various issues associated with Criticality 1 items, be they 1 or be they 1R, and
you are concerned about flight safety, and they are then iss_es related to those need to be appro-
priately dispositioned in the program as they come up from time to time. In other words, they
should be raised all the way from the contractor, if they're at the contractor plan, to the respon-
sibility of project
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management, to the respop.sible Level II management, and then to the responsible Level I man-
agement. And so they raise a flag in terms of having to do with flight safety, and there are
issues that come up from time to time on a number of the flights, not only in the SRB area, but
things that could happen that have to do with flight safety, for example, and those get supposed-
ly dispositioned in detail at the various levels of the program until they reach my particular
level.
And so that is what the Criticality 1 thing in general means to me.
And maybe, Arnie, you would like to pick it up from your perspective at Level II.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Being a little more specific, I gather that prior to this date this was
a Criticality 1R item. Now, on this date a change was made, and so the R was removed.
Would you explain why the change was made and after it was made, what did it mean, what
was the significance of the change?
MR. MOORE: I can't explain why the change was made. I read this Criticality 1R, or this
Criticality 1 item, as it got unfolded post the 51-L--I have not read all the Criticality 1 particu-
lar items, but what it means to me is it means that you are losing an element
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of redundancy, and as has been reported here, that during the ignition transient of the SRB,
during the early part of that phase, there is some thought process that you do not have redun-
dancy at that point in time. But after you get that ignition transient, the pressure builds up, you
do have redundancy, but that i_ a critical time. And to me the change from Criticality 1R to 1
means that it should be paid very, very close attention, that you have an area here tha*, you
need to watch very, very closely, and it says you do not have redundancy during all the periods
of times you would like to have redundancy, and therefore it needs, again, very, very close atten-
tion.
That is how I read the change from 1R.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Does anybody know why it was made at this time?
MR. MOORE: That was before, I think, this, as you stated, was in December of 1982.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, December 17, 1982.
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MR. MOORE: Well, I joined the Space Shuttle Program in Febr',ary of '83 and so I do not
have the history nor the background on this.
CHATRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Aldrich, can y_u _n_':,'._ that?
MR. ALDRICH: I can comment about the failure
1903
mode and t _fects analysis, and Critical Items List.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But if you could, though, just on this, do you know why the change
was made at this time?
MR. ALDRICH: No, sir, I have not studied this Critical Items List item on the SRB in de_ail.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Once the change was made, what is different about it?
MR. ALDRICH: Well, I can explain my intetpretation of 1 aad IR.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Good.
MR. ALDRICH: A case where you have an item that is Criticality 1R, it means that you
have an item which, if all similar items would fail at the same time, it would be cause for loss of
vehicle and crew. However, there is a redundancy involved in that you have two similar items,
like the two O-ring seals, and that unless you had a failure mode where they both failed or both
did not work at the same time, then you in fact have redundancy.
But if you had two O-rings that had the same cemmon failure, then it is really a Criticality
1 item, and you would expect they would both fail at the same time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I don't understand that.
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Why the change, and what was the result of the change?
MR. ALDRICH: I can't describe the solid rocket booster Criticality 1 and 1R items. I have
not reviewed those in detail. I review very many of th_se items for the orbiter vehicle, and the
description I just tried to make is my understanding of those criticalities as they have applied to
other systems that I have worked on.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let me try another tack.
After you make this change and you issue this piece of paper and it circulates and every-
body has to _ more careful, what in fact happens? Is there a different treatment of when you
get ready to launch of these items, or is this just paperwork?
MR. ALDRICH: Let me try to explain that.
Each project in the program is required to do a detailc<l failure effects analysis ot their
hardware down to the component level to determine the criticality, if that component were to
fail, what it would mean to the system that it is in, and then to the vehicle and the flight condi-
tions that it sees, each project being, each contractor is required in the contract to do that analy-
sis.
As a part of that analysis, some items turn
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out to be critical. That is, they create failure mo(ies that have significant consequence to the
safety of the vehicle or to the success of the minion in which it will fly, and these are extracted
as the total FMEA process proceeds. And they are highlighted and formally documented in a
separate document. However, both the failure mode and effects analysis document for each
project, and fhe critical items list for each project is submitted to the NASA project involved.
For instance, the SRB would be submitted to the SRB project organization at the Marsha
Sp,J':e Flight Center. Those are reviewed and critiqued by the NASA engineering counterparts
for the people who have made those analyses, and the intent is that there becomes agreement
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that these things are correctly analyzed, correctly documented, but the contractors "know this
hardwace Jn much greater depth and familiarity, and so they start the process by providing full
documentation. However. the critique is made by both govetnment and contractor to reach com-
plete ag,'eement that what has been documen_-_d to the best of everyone's knowledge is accurate
technically.
The Criticality 1 items are categorized, and you mentioned 1 and 1R. There is al3o 2 and 3,
and they are less critical as you go up that chain. The
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Criticality 2--and 411 of these items, all of these criticality items in the Criticality Items List are
reviewed by the contractor. In fac'., the contractor is required to prepare and submit them by
the contract, reviewed by the project at Level III for accuracy and correctness, and then they are
submitted to my organization at the Johnson Space Center, the Level II program, again for
review, understanding, critiq,,e and approval. The Criticality 1 and IR items deal with safety of
the vehicle. They take one more step. They are forwarded to the Level I organization at NASA
headquarters, again for critique, review and approval.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So if I understand what you are saying, that meant that you and
Mr. Moore would be very conscious of this problem because it was a Criticality 1 item, is that
right?
MR. ALDRICH: I would be very conscious of it if it had been brought to my attention.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, what requirement was there to bring it to your attention?
MR. ALDRICH: The requirement on the project is that these items be fully documented ane
tully approved, and this one--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you know, that doesn't really mean much to me, Mr. Aldrich. I
mean, the people
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that have testified here, say they are Level III, they didn't have _o do anything except get the
pieces of paper and handle it at Level III, and I am asking, did this require something else, that
because the criticality nature of this and because it says that the loss of mission and vehicle and
crew will result from it, did that put added burden on the people in the process, decisionmaki_,g
process to notify you people at the top about it?
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MR. ALDRICH: The people at the top of the program were notified in 1983--and please let
me f'mish. As you mentioned, there are a large number of these Critical,:ty 1 items, and they are
not each individually and uniquely reviewed for each launch. Changes to these criticalities in
terms of the rationale, the underntanding of how the system performs, or any failures that oc-
curred are highlighted and it is the responsibility of the projects, the contractors, to notify their
project office at NASA and up the chain of changes to performance of the equipment or to the
rationale that applies to the category of these Criticality 1 items.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did that mean, then, that in 51-(: you were all notified about what
happened on that and the fact that it was the coldest day and the most serious blow-by? Did you
know that?
MR. ALDRICH: Well, this Criticality 1 item was not brought up for attention to my level,
that there was a change either in the engineering assessment of how the system performed or in
the flight experience that would change the rationale that is documented here that caused this
to be a Criticality 1 item.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let's go back to my question. Did you know about 51-C and the fact
that it
1909
was the coldest launch and you had had the most trouble with this _.i?
MR. ALDRICH: I knew that 51-c was launched under cold ccaditions. I knew--I do not
know--i did not know at tile time that '42 had had the most blew-by or the most erosion, if
that in fact is true.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: None of you did, I gather.
MR. MOORE: No, sir, neither did ! [ did not realize that, and ! did not have a correlation of
temperature with that. I kne_ that 5142 was a cold lauach becau._e I remember we scrubbed the
da" or. the 5142 flight b_ause of excess ice on the external tank, and we were worried about the
thermal protection system again that we ;_.alked about this mo" nmg.
But I did not recall any correlation between temperature and the -rosion experience that we
had seen on 5142.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Jess, if I could interrupt, y¢-u know there was a briefing brought up
in August that had three bullets about concerns, one of which was resiliency, which is tempera-
ture-related. How was that dispositioned in headqu._rters?
MR. MOORE: That particular review, General Kutyna, came about as a resultof the memo
that Mr. Davids had written to me expressing .-,ameconcern about
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case-to-case erosion and also nozzle-to-case er._sion on the previous flights. It also, the memo, re-
sulted from a visit that Mr. Davids of my off:ze an_ Mr. Hamby of my office went down to Mar-
shall, and the memo said he was goi-_g to set up a briefing to headquarters _o go over the situa-
tion in some more detail.
That particular activity started in our own thinking after the 51-B flight, and the 51-B
flight, as I recall, was on April 29 of 1385, and at that time we experienced for the first time
secondary erosion in the nozzle joint. And I think we got--we got a little bit more concerned
about the erosion problem at that time. \
I assigned an action item to my deputy for technical matters. Then that led to the trip down
to Marshall with Mr. Davids and Mr. Hamby. And following that was a meeting that Mr. Weeks
in my officeand Mr. Bardos had at Thiokol discussing this particular problem. Mr. Bardos then
wrote a memo for the record,I guess, afterthat particular meeting.
And then on August 19 the briefing was set up where the Marshall folks and the Thiokol
people were coming in to headquarters. It was on my c_!endar on the 19th--it was on a
Monday--until about three or four days before the actual briefing,and at that point in time I
was workk_ temperature sensor failure
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problems that had occurred on the July flightand I was not able to attend tkat particular brief-
ing.
And so Mike, Mr. Weeks, I should say, attended that briefing,along with--_et'ssee,I'vegot
a listof the other large number of people that attended that briefing.Mr. Weeks, Deputy Dir_-
tor,Deputy Associate Administrator in my office;Mr. Winterhalter, who was Shuttle Propulsion
Division Acting Director at that time. Mr. BillHamby was the STS program integration Deputy
Director.Mr. Paul Wetzel, who was the solidrocket booster programs chief;Mr. Paul Herr, who
was the solid rocket motor p:_ogram manager; and Mr. Harry Quong, who was the reliability,
maintainability and quality assurance directorof the chief engineer's office.
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Those were the group of people at NASA headquarters who attended the meeting. Mr.
Mulloy of Marshall Space Flight Center, who was a solid rocket booster program manager, at-
tended; and Mr. Bob Swinghammer of Marshall also attended, who is the materials and process-
es laboratory director at Marshall. Thiokol had a total of six people there, including Mr. Mason,
Mr. W;ggins, Mr. Kilminster, Mr. McDonald, and Mr. Speas.
That briefing was given on August 19
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and then Mr. Weeks came back a day later or two days iater and reported back to me that he
had heard the briefing and that he thought the data basically supported continuing to fly. He
did not think it was an issue that we ought to ground the fleet. We lid need to press on to get
this thing fixed, as we had already started some activities back in the April time frame.
He cited the Titan experience, something that he thought was relevant to his conclusions,
and he also mentioned to me that he had talked to Mr. Hardy, I guess, at Marshall about this
whole thing. And so that was how that particular briefing was dispensed, disposed of at head-
quarters.
And at the same time we had had going on at that time this program leading to the Qual
Motor-5 firing in February of this year time frame. That was to do some of the tests on some
changes in the particular solid rocket motor that might be implemented in the shuttle flight
program.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Moore, since the waiver from 1R to 1 was executed in late December
1982. why did intensive program to restore the redundancy of the seal not begin until April or so
of 1985?
MR. MOORE: There was planning going on, to my understanding, Mr. Walker, in terms of
doing some tests
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and analysis as early as 1984. In the spring of 1984, I believe, was when Marshall and Thiokol
began some initial in_ractive discussions relative tc putting a plan together for understanding
and characterizing the O-ring situation.
In fact, there was ae. actien item, as I rec.all, out of the S,_S 41-C flight readiness review that
was assigned, I believe it was assigned to Marshall to go arid look at the characteristics of the
sealing process and procedures to ensure cortsistency in terms of the mating of the joints, and
that actually followed 41-C, where I believe we saw some erosion at that point in time.
An action was given out of that flight readiness review, so during this period of time some
tests and analysis were under way. And then we saw the 51-B flight in April of 1985, and then
tb.,_t was the first experience we had seen on the secondary erc.sion, secondary O-ring erosion on
the secondary seal, and that is when we accelerated moving out on some changes, potential
changes, in this thing leading up to the QM-5.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In view of all of tl_at, it didn't occur to any of you to ask the ques-
tion about the weather and the seal problem prior to launch?
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, let me tell you my
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thoughts on the temperature situation. I had remembered in my own mind the Launch Commit
Criteria, and that has [_en cited here before. But that says that all systems should be able to
operate between a 31-degree ambient temperature and a 99-degree ambient temperature, and
that was what was fixi:,_g temperatures in my particular mind as far as the overall temperature
relationship.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But at the time this wa_ considered a Level IIImatter, thisseal,and
the weather-related questions related to the seal,so that was all considered a Level If! matter,
so nobody seemed to think itwas important enough _o take to Level IIor Level I;isthat right?
MR. MOORE: Well, itdid not come up to our level,obviously,during this particular count,
and in the past,over the past years of thisprogram, that I have been involved in this program, I
had never personally associated any temperature va,iation with respect to the sealing perform-
ance ofthese O-rings
So ithad not been brought up to my attention during this particular process.And, as I have
said,I was looking at the Launch Commit Criteria,which went from the 31-degree ambient tem-
perature up to the 99-degree ambient temperature. :rodthat iswhat I was boxing in in terms of
an operating plan.
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And itwas my assumption that the hardware was qualified to operate under those ¢ind of
conditions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And the same thing was true, Mr. Aldrich, in your case, when you
had all ofthe discussionsabout the weather and the ice and allof that--the fact that you in the
back of your mLnd had heard about the seal problem and the possibilitythat the seal was harder
when itwas colder?
MR. ALDRICH: I had not heard any of that information that you are commenting on, Mr.
Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You hadn't heard any of that?
MR. ALDRICH: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And Igather the others--
MR. SMITH: I h_d not heard that information.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Armstrong.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: If I could ask several groups whether or not they
thought some aJditions to the Launch Commit Criteria might be required, because clearly we
were in this 51-L case apparently inside the Launch Commit Criteria,and yet we had groups
saying that they didn'twant to fly.
So would you explain to us how changes in the Launch Commit Criteria are incorporated
and why they should or should not hav_ applied to this situation?
MR. ALDRICH: Well, let me tellyou my
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understanding of the Launch Commit Criteria.It isa formal document in the program. It isa
document we spend a lot of time on to try to make it.rightso that the launch team can in fact
make the proper decisions without having late close-indeliberations on things that might be
complicated to understand, and each project in the program--the same as I talked ab<,ut the
FMEA and the CIL--each project in the program isresponsible for specifying conditions which
they can support or constraints that they must levy on the launch system.
The fact that there isnot a constraint in the Launch Commit Criteria,in my view, is not
that itwas overlooked. In my view, the Launch Commit Criteria correctlyreflectsthe program's
understanding of the certificationoi the solidrocket booster and other elements, which say that
they have been certifiedto operate between 31 degrees Fahrenheit and 99 degrees Fahrenheit
ambient temperature at the _,.'meof launch.
And that isa complicated thing to say because itimplies prior conditions and length of time
in different temperatures. But in fact our program spec does levy that on the projects,and the
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projectsareobligatedto cometbr_'ardandidentityL'onditi.onswhereth_ydonot me_tthecondi-
tionsthat theyare requested
I917
to be. designed for.
My understanding in gener_ is that the SRB project has certified to those conditions, and I
think we can provide to you a documentation trail that we believe indicates that. And, in any
event, in the launch environment I certainly rely on wha,_ we have put extra effort and time
into in the Launch Commit Crizeria to tell us what consCrain_ we kav_ to honor and what
things are acceptable.
And by reading the Launch Commit Cri.*_eria for weather and finding no constraints on the
solid rocket booster I don't imply that something has been left, out by accident. I imply that the
projects agree, with those constraints as stated, and I would have said that the night before
launch, and I would say it again today.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: OK. But how do we correlat_ that -ruth the Thiokol rec-
ommendation that they not !aunch outside their experience?
MR. ALDRICH: I cannot understand some of the reports in that regard that we have heard
based on the kind of certification program that I believe is in place in the program that has gone
on for almost 20 years and was very thoroughly done over the certification phase. That track
nee_dsto be understood by all of us.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG' Do I understand you
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to imply, then, that someone should have initiated amendment to Launch Criteria so that they
would be willing to approach a certain limit that was not currently in the
MR. ALDRICH: I believe---well, yes. My belief is that the SRB project by all of the prior
participation in the project was committed intentionally to the 31- to 99-degree temperature
range, and if in fact there was some conce1_ with that, large or small, they would be required to
submit additional Launch Commit Criteria to us that says for the given parameter or given
system on the SRB that aystem in fact has a temperature range :hat is somewhat different, and
the launch team must honor that constraint, and we would honor that c_nstraint.
We might elect to make some change to try to correct that situation, but we would honor it.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Did anyone submit such amendments?
MR. ALDRICH: No, sir, not to my knowledge, and certainly we don't have it in the record
today.
MR. THOMAS: I might point out that for each missio:'_ we have an amendment to the LCC
that picks up changes, some of them as late as the day before, and history has shown that Mar-
shall is the most conservative, that they cover everything. Their history
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shows that they cover everything with an I.GC when it is required.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I assumed that. That is what Mr. Mulloy scolded Thiokol for trying
to do, was to change the Launch Commlt Criteria on the eve of laur_ch; isn't it?
MR. MOORE: Well, I can't speak for the rationale, i just heard the comments yesterday and
so torth.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I gather that is what Thlokol was saying. We think now that we
should not launch, or at least the engineers did. We don't think we should launch in this tem-
perature. And Mr. Mulloy, according to the testimony, said well, you can't do that. You can't
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change the Launch Commit Criteria on the eve of launch. This is Friday night; you can't do
that.
MR. MOORE: I'm not sure ,,hat he meant by that. I think you would have to ask him his
intention there. But, as Gene said, there are .Launch Commit Criteria that are changed.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we heard him yesterday. I think he is sayirg the same thing
Mr. Aldrich is. But, as it turneJ out, Thiokol, however late in the game, then apparently said we
don't think
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the criteria is right. We think it would be dangerous to launch at this temperature. That was
their first recommendation.
MR. MOORE: You certainly can raise objections to Launch Commit Criteria. I mean, there
is nothing Jn the program that says if someone has a problem with the Launch Commit Criteria.
Until it is T-0 you can raise an objection to it and so forth.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Aldrich, you have just said that you believe the Launch Commit Criteria
is 31 degrees to 99 degrees.
MR. ALDRICH: Y_ sir.
DR. COVERT: I _ ' v'esterday, I believe, that there was discussion of the certification of
the solid rocket moto_ 40 to 90 degrees. There seems to be something here that I don't un-
deratand completely. Coul_ ,, : help me out with that, please?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir. I ha'¢e here the Launch Commit Criteria document that was in
effect--only the pages for weathe'-. It is quite a thick document and there are many other pa-
rameters besides weather. In fact, some of the parameters have unique red lines and criteria for
each individual measurement.
The general specification for the entire launch vehic'.e is 31 to 99 degrees Fahrenheit, and
that
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is cJeariy b;_c':_,_l. There is a special criteria on the solid, ,__ket booster bulk propellant temper-
ature and I believe that ia the other parameter that you were referring to. I haven't looked at
that here immediately, but let me see if I can find it on the document.
DR. COVERT: I believe you are correct.
MR. MOORE: I think it is mean bulk temperature of the proI_llant ':.': *.he scl':d.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. ACHESON: A question for Mr. Moore or Mr. Aldrich. When a contractor has raised a
red flag on a Criticality 1 item, as in this case the contractor d_,.'d initially with regard to the
seal, what reporting channel or procedure would you expee*_ to follow within the NASA organi-
zation, and would you expect it to be different from that i011oweO in a Criticality 1R item?
MR. ALDRICH: I would think if a recognized concern existed in a Criticality 1 or 1R system
that represented a change in thought, rationale or concern from what might have been reviewed
thoroughly previously that it would be r_ to all levels of the program.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is there a rule to that effect?
MR. ALDRICH: We have been looking for some of
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our language in this regard in our NASA management instructionsand our program directives
at Level IIwhich guide the progr_-_,,and I believethere islanguage of that type. However, itis
somewhat general a:d interpretiveand itcertainly requires the projects to make that interpre-
tation.
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But the implicationisclear:that acritical problemshouldbereportedupthechain.
MR. ACHESON: But, as I understand you, there would then be some ambiguity as to what
was a new concern.
MR. ALDRICH: Well, it has to be interpreted, clearly.
MR. MOORE: Let me just add, if I can, to that. All of our major contractors participate in
our flight readiness reviews and in our Launch-1 Day Reviews. They are all polled individually.
A senior member of' that contractor team is polled individually to s,__e if they are ready to
launch.
At our mission management team meetings that Mr. Aldrich chairs--and I attend as many
of them as I ca_--the contractors are not represented at the mission manageme,it team meet-
ings, and we look to the project elements then to raise any particular issues. However, I would
like to point out that there is nothing
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in the program that says if a contractor has any problems that he could not pick up the phone
and call me or call Mr. Aldrich or get a message to a particular concern.
And at that point in dine our response will be we will take that concern and have it dis-
cuss_, and those issues.
MR. ACHESON: I understand that. But, of course, what I'm wondering is if at Level III,
when the Level III manager thinks that he has disposed of it, if it is a Criticality 1 item, should
he really see that it is reported all the way up, as opposed to a 1R?
MR. ALDRICH: That is a hard question to answer because it is interpretive and the lan-
guage that requires critical problems to be reported doesn't refer specifically to the Critical
Items List or to Criticality 1 as a terminology. And so I think the inte_nt of reporting problems
up in our documentation is proper. It requires interpretation and you have heard some of the
interpretations that were made in this case by other pe _ple involved.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: There is judgment, toe The trouble with so much pa_rwork is you
eliminate the good judgment and common sense. I can't imagine why some of these people who
knew about the seriousness of the
1924
problem didn't pick up the phone themselves and call you, not just the contractor.
MR. MOORE: Let me say that in the past, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission,
there has been no shot*rage of issues discmnsed, I guess both at the flight readiness reviews, the
Launch-1 Day reviews, and even after that in terms of launches_ And if you look at the past
mission before this, where we scrubbed something like five or six times, I guess, there were all
discussions of this type that cook place o_r. whether or not our weather ceiling conditions were
being violated or whether we had a technical problem that we could work around and so forth.
So the issues, there are opportunities to bring up the issues and so fo_h, and we attempt to
get th,_m properly dispositioned.
"4ICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Could you give us a description of the functional differ-
en ces between the Levels I, II and III?
MR. MOORE: Well. I will star,, Mr. Armstrong, and try to tell you. I think I tried to present
a pict,:re maybe it w_,s the first day of the public hearings of this Commission to try to show
how _he boxes tier down. _¢ou know, my office and the Office of Space Fl:'ght has a number of
additional responsibilities in
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additionto thespacesl-_uttleprogram.Wehaveresponsibilityfor upperstagesandexpendable
launchvehiclesandSpacelab.Sotherei2a broadrange.
My officehasbe_nbrokenup intoel_ment_that lookafter specificpartsof the shuttlehom
what I would call a p-_icy objective or resource and a top-level program mar.agement point of
view, trying to set the _,_jectives for the program, try to make sure the program is managed
properly, trying to make sure the resources, the proper resources, are applied to the program.
That in turn tiers down into essentially three NASA centers, with the Kennedy Space
Center having the responsibility for launch and la_ding operations, with the Marshall Space
Flight Center, as Dr. Lucas repolted, having responsibility for the space shuttle main engines.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Excuse me for interrupting, but I am not asking for the
organizational differences. I am asking for the mnctional differences between the levels.
MR. MOORE: Well, the functional difference between the levels starts out at my level,
which is called Level I, and all the issues that are not properly resolved to everybody's level of
satisfaction in the program are brough_ up to me. Arnie will bring those up
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and I will look to Arnie, Mr. Aldrich here, to make sure that the other project elements and so
forth all feel responsible or have all resolved all their issues in their particular program.
And then he in turn will look down to the various program elements, proje_ elements, I
should say, at the various NASA centers to make sure they are all ready from a functional
_tandpoint. Each project element then will have their budgeting responsibility, their own man-
agement responsibility. And when we get into a launch situation we pyramid ourselves up in
terms ot the laur.ch decision prc, ceas.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I would interpret that to mean if they could solve it at a
lower level it doesn't come up, and I am wondering if that is really the truth.
MR. MOORE: Well, I think that agair._ it is a judgmental kind of a thing, Mr. Armstrong,
and issues that people are serm_tized tc that, for exam! :e, reflect flight safety, reflect other
major concerns in the program, they should be properly brought up to the approp_ate levels.
DR. RIDE: Would you have expected this problem to have been brought up to Level II?
MR. MOORE: Well, I will answer from my
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perspective. I th,_nk, looking back on everything and the amount of discussion that went on, even
though the people decided that it was judgmental and they thought it had been put to bed, I
would have thought it would have been brought to Level II, if you want my honest opinion.
DR. RIDE: And I guess maybe there are two parts to that question. We had two different
aspects to it, I guess. One is zould you expect any new concern about a Criticality 1 item to be
brought up to Level II?
MR. MOORE: Well, I think a new concern on Criticality 1 items I think should be brought
up to Level II. And I think at this point in time in the program I believe Level H is our reposi-
tory for CIL items in the program and handled the Critical Items List. So yes, any ch_zlges and
deviations and so forth to that I certainly expected to be brought up to Level II.
DR. RIDE: And I guess the other aspect is would you expect to hear that a contractor had
originally given a no-go and thcn subsequently given a go? Would you expect to be informed of
that?
MR. MOORE: Well, again that is hard to say, I would hope that I would have been informed
of those kind of things, but I am not sure that the people who
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figured thgy had made a judgment on this thing,Dr. Ride, had satisfactorilyresolved this whole
thing.I have nothing in the program that says itisrequired.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why? Wouldn't that be the easiestthing in the world to put into the
program? Ifthe contractor recommends no launch, please advise us.
MR. MOORE: That would be very easy to do.
Let me just add one more comment to that. I have never feltthat anyone in the program
has been reluctant to speak up, and therefore I was operating under the ground rules and princi-
ples that people who had issues in the program or in the process of reviews '.ouldin factspeak
up and raise those issues.
And I think we have all tried to bAevery open about it, and I think repay, many reviews we
p,.,-ticipate in we have very lengthy discussions on various kinds of issues involving not only the
headquarters people but the field center people and the contractor people.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Moore, I would like to return again to the August briefing. At the time
of that briefing, Morton Tbiokol had in fac_ received, or management had received the two let-
ters that I spoke of earlierfrom their expert engineers, one suggesting termination of flights
until the seal problem was remedied, and another discussing the po_ibility of
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severe catastrophe.
! know you were not at that briefing,but could you tell me how strong a concern about
safety Morton Thiokol expressed at that briefing?
MR. MOORE. I can only relay to you what Mr. Weeks relayed after that particular assosw
ment. He sat through the entire briefing,and I think he came back and said that we ought to
press on with our QM-5 testingand get the test under way, but that there was not enough con-
cern to ground the fleet.For example, we wanted to build margin of _ffety arid eliminate allof
the erosion. We were not happy v_:tbthe erosion.
And. as has been expressed earlier,erosion had been seen as early 8_ Flight 2 on the par-
ticularshuttle,and in the case-to-casejoints--thatwas the worst case, I guess--erosion that had
been experienced. And so I was not of an opinion, based upon input f¢<lback to me, nor did any
of my other people feel,that the fleetshould be grounded because of the experiences to date, but
we should get on with a program to eliminate the concern that we were expressing with the O-
nngs.
DR. WALKER: Would itbe possibleto get copies of the briefing chart_ that Morton Thiokol
presented at that briefing?
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MR. MOORE: Yes, I think we have already provided the Commission a full set of documen-
tation on the August 19 briefing.I think we provided that to the C_mmiesion two or three days
afterthe Commission was formed. So you shovld have a copy of that.
DR. WALKER: All of the briefing charts of Morton Thiokol would be in what you have
given us?
MR. MOORE: Well, I'm not familiar with any additi:hal briefing charts that Morton Thio-
kol may have presented. This was a pacl,age brief'w.g,as I laterlooked at it,that _vasdocument-
ed and put into a bound volume, an" I think we provided the entire document to this Commis-
sion. That is all the data that I am aware of was presented at that August 19 brieEng, Mr.
Walker.
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7DR. RIDE: Mr. Weeks was the person who signed the CriticalItems List for this l_irticular
item and was also the one who attended the August briefingas your representative on the joint
and the seal problem?
MR. MOORE: Yes.
DR. RIDE: When he presented the resultsof that briefing to you and he discussed with you
the problems associated with seal erosion and then the problems associated with the joint,did he
put itin the context of we have got a problem with a Criticality1
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item and we are s_Istainingdamage or some erosion to something that isconsidered a Criticality
i ltd..m?
MR. MOORE: I don't recall itbeing put in that context, but I had participated,as I have
done in the past, Dr. Ride, in a flightreadiness review that was held on July 2 where we were
dispensing of an item of secondary e,xmion that we had seen for the firsttime. And the chart
that was presented and discussed in that flight readiness review had flight safety, and so I knew
that it was an area that was concerning flight safety.
But I don't think Mr. Weeks expressed it in those exact terms.
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MR. HOTZ: Mr. Chairman, could I have a question for Mr. Thomas, please?
Mr. Thomas, you are familiar with the testimony that th_sCommission has taken in the last
several days on the relationshipoftemperature to the seals in the solidrocket booster?
MR. THOMAS: Yes, sir,I have been here allweek.
MR. HOTZ: Is this the type of info_Tnation that you feel that you should have as Launch
Director to make a launch decision?
MR. THOMAS: If you refer to the fact that the temperature according to the Latmch
Commit Criteria should have been 53 degrees, as has been testified, rather than 31, yes, I expect
that to be in the LCC. That is a controlling document that we use in most cases to make a deci-
sion for launch.
There are some other judgments that we make based upon the clock, the hold times that we
have remaining, the window for the day, other thing8 like that that are not normally in the
LCC, we get that information from the program elements late in the timeframe before launch,
but most of the no-go criteria are the go/no-go criteria we ex __ to see in the LCC.
MR. HOTZ: But you are not really very happy
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about not having had thisinformation before the launch?
MR. THOMAS: No, sir.I can assure you that ifwe had had that information, we wouldn't
have launched ifithad been 53 degrees.
MR. ACHESON: A question for Mr. Moore.
Mr. Moore, there have been some implicatic,ns in the press, and I am sure you have seen
them, that there might have been an unusual degree of eagerness to get on with the launch
schedule in the case of 51-L that. might or might not have changed the balance of caution.
Would you comment on that, please?
MR. MOORE: Yea, sir, I would be happy to comment on that.
As a matter of fact, I would like to review, with the permission of the Chairman, some of my
thoughts on the evening or so leading up to the launch, a couple of evenings, which will get into
the question of pressure.
1059
._,
As we have talked about before, we held our normal launch minus one day review on the
25th of January, I think about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. We were all go. Everybody polled
said they were ready to support the launch. We did have a concern about weather, and that
evening we met to discuss weather for
!934
the next morning, which was on the 26th. It was a launch opportunity, and that happened to be
a Sunday morr, ing. As you heard from the Air Force person talking about the weather, we did
not get a very positive forecast, and I think our m;ssion management team was unanimous in
saying we probably should not try a launch because of the weather problems that were likely to
occur on Sunday morning. Also we were told that afternoon that we had an awful lot of digni-
taries in to watch the launch. We had people here from the Feople's Republic of China and sev-
eral Congressmen, and a large number of other ,,utsideL-s, as well as we understood that after-
noon that the Vice President was possibly going to stop over on Sunday morning to view the
launch, and so forth, and that was on Saturday afternoon.
Nevertheless, we decided to scrub the launch as a result of the weather forecast at 9:30 p.m.
that night, and as a matter of fact, to my knowledge, no one had any political pressure whatso-
ever to try to get the launch off, and that was the case through the entire sequence on this
flight, and that has been the case on every flight that I have been associated with.
We have got roundly cliticized in the press as a result of the flight just prior to this about
all of the multitude of delays starting in the December 20
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attemp*, I guess. We shut down the week of the holidays to give our team a rest and so forth,
and then we had four or five additional scrubs before we finallygot itlaunched, and we also
waved offthree times at the Kennedy Space Center trying to get itlanded at Kennedy.
So we have not been under any politicalpressure. This program operates on launch-by-
launch basis.We try to make sure all launches are safe,all issues are put to bed, and worry
about downstream schedules later.You always have to lay o:,._downstream schedules.
I have got schedules going into the early '90s,but yJu take them one at a time, and that is
the philosophy by which the Shuttle team operates_ and you worry about how you adjust your
downstream schedules after you have safely launched and safely landed the particular mission
you are concerned about.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I am going to ask this question to Mr. Smith, and I asked
itearlierto Mr. Aldrich, and you are reallybetter qualifiedto answer itas ithas *.odo with the
facilitydesign and whether itwas designed to handle freezing temperatures, a:id ifnot, why it
Wasll't.
MR. SMITH: Nell, early in the program it was
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recognized that we were not equipped, coming out of Apollo, to handle freezing conditions in the
water systems on the pad.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: But why would that be? I mean, certainly any civil engi-
neer knows that he has to handle the normal environments where he is building his building.
MR. SMITH: Well, the answer to that would be yes, except the history in the past ten or
fifteen years, freezing pipes in Florida in that area has been a very rare thing. The decision was
made to not implement insulation and so forth on the water system_ that would preclude rup-
ture of lines, that the risk, the cost was not justified.
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We had the experience then in January '85 flight, and we could not support the launch be-
cause of damage to the facility. And since that time we had implemented the plan by which we
felt we could minimize the damage, could keep the firing systems and all and the safety systems
up in the functional state and support, fully recognizing that doing that we would have to bleed
the systems, so we would have ice on the structure.
So I think we went into that evening fully knowing the* co,".dition.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: L_ me follow that with the other question I asked Mr.
Aldrich, or a variation of that.
At this point in time do you think that the freeze protection scheme that was implemented
is an adequate one?
MR. SMITH: No, I do not, and we were not satisfied with that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Keel?
DR. KEEL: Mr. Moore, did you know that consistent _ith the testimony this morning, that
Rockwell had apparently said that "Rockwell co_ id not assure it was safe to fly?"
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir, I [:ad some indicmton of that from a report that Mr. Aldrich had
given me. As was mentioned this morning, Mr. Aldrich had an ice t_am meeting, and with the
various project elements around to discuss the impact of ice on the possible damage to the ther-
mal protection system.
Following that ice meeting, which lasted about an hour or so, an_ I did not attend the par-
ticular meeting, Mr. Aldrich came back and _aid--reported to _,e that he had given that very
careful consideration. Ite had talked about both the Kennedy people and the Johnson people had
taken a look at :.t and a lot of
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m ysis on it, but l_ckwell did have a concern. He did not indicate that that was a safety of
flight concern, and it was more indicated i_ the thermal plotection system which might have
some damage that it might have to be ft.:paired and cause some delays to turnaround, and he
said that he had tagged up with everybody and he felt that it was all go, and he recommended
that we hunch, and I accepted _ recommendation.
DR. KEEL: Let me go back to the beginning, though.
I said "Did you know that Rockwell said Rockwell cannot assure it was safe to fly." And you
said, "Yes, sir."
MR. MOORE: Well, I knew that Rockwell had made a comment. I did not have Rockwell--
knowledge that Rockwell had talked abo_ b_ing safe to fly. I knew Rockwc!l expressed some
concerns as relayed to me by Mr. Aldrich, and he put those in the context of TPS issues, things
that would have to n -ybe possibly affect turnaround time. But I did not have a feeling that they
had expressed an_thing concerning f, ight safety.
DR. KEEL: Just one final question.
Based upon all of that, did you think Rockwell was saying go or no go?
MR. MOORE: I didn't really think, from a
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Rockwell point of view, I knew how thorough Mr. Aldrich had worked this problem, and I knew
he had a lot of people in that particular meeting, and that I looked to Mr. Aldrich for a go on
that particular flight. But the thought did not cross my mind that, for example, Rockwell was
saying no go. No.
DR. KEEL: Thank you. 1061
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MR. SMITH: Might I add something to that, please?
I came in on the latter part of that meeting, Mr. Aldrich conducted on that morning, and I
heard the statements made as Mr. Glaysher stated this morning, and as I understood that, we
could not give 100 percent assurance that there wa_ no safety concern. It was my opinion at the
end of the discussion that the consensus of the group, including the Rockwell people, that--and I
put this in my words, now, and it wasn't st _ted this way--that the probability of damage from
the ice on the structure was no greater than we would normally expect from ice on the external
tank during a typical day, and I left that meeting fully convinced that everybody had signed up
to the launch. I did not hear any rec.ommendation that said Rockwell does not support launch.
DR. KEEL: I guess the question, though, is
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did you hear any recommendation that said Rockwell does support the launch?
MR. SMITH: No, they did ne_ make that recommendation. They did not non-concur, and I
have heard people non-concur. I have heard Rockwell non-concur on things.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess that illustrates one of the things that obviously has to be
addressed. I mean, there are a lot of maybes. A lot of people have been voting maybe or I don't
voW. It would seem to me that the decisionmaking process would require people to take stands,
and you should have a record of it either in a recording or a piece of paper or something to
make it clear. I mean, the Rockwell people clearly think that they indicated that they have been
concerned to the point that they did not recommend launch, and apparently that was the first
time that they had done it. Apparent. y +.hey had not taken that position before.
And so they I think believed that trey were saying we do not recommend launch. But you,
on the other hand, were saying that it was ekay to launch. And it seems to me that if you are
going to have a deci_ionmaking process with key _-_eople involved, that it ough_ to be clear where
they stand. Otherwise a lot of second guessing.
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In .any event, let me say that I think the Commission is going to---we are going to have one
more witness because he flew up here at our request, Mr. Powers, and we want to complete his
testimony today.
But insofar as vn,j gentlemen are concerned, let me say that I think we have finished with
this aspect of the investigation in terms of the decisionmaking proce_. At least we have finished
it as far as pul_lic testimony is concerned. We will probably want to get some additional informa-
tion to complete the record. We can do that by deposition or by letters or in other fashions. I
don't think it is necessary to continue this discussion on the decisionmaking process.
You will remember that I did say at one point that we thought the decismnmaking process
may be flawed I believe I am speaking for the whole Commission when I say that we think it is
flawed. And I think probably you gentlemen would agree with us on that, that the process as it
worked in this case was clearly flawed because the recommendations that were made were
either not fully understood by you or not conveyed to you.
Be that as it may, we appreciate very much the cooperation we have received from all of
you, and it has been 100 percent, and you have provided everything that we have asked for. You
have been available to testify,
1942
and we appreciate that. And we want to also express our appreciation for all of the things you
have done over the years, and we hope you understand that in order to conduct this kind of an
investigation, we have to ask a lot of tough questions, and it is not intended in any way to be a
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reflection on any of you. We all appreciate what you have done for this country, and we will be
in touch with you. We assume that you are working on improvement of the decisionmaking
process, and we look forward to further space flights and manned space flights and womanned
space flights, and we will l ok forward to working with you.
And we again appreciate very much your cooperation. And thank you.
MR. ALDRICH: Mr. Chairman, could [ make one brief corr_tion to my testimony this
r:lorning? I understand this is the simplest way to do it.
I indicated that Mr. Kingsbury from the Marshall Space Flight Center was in the ice meet-
ing that I conducted, and in fact, that was an error. It was Mr. Mindeman from KSC who v,a_
there part time during that meeting.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Stevenson made one correction, *_o, about Jesse Moore was not
in a meeting that he said he was.
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Do you want to correct the record on that?
MR. MOORE: Yes, I wou.]d like to correct the record that Mr. Stevenson indicated thks
morning that I was in the Ice Team meeting proper. I was not in the Ice Team meeting, and Mr.
Arnie Aldrich came back and reported to me the results of that particular Ice Team meeting.
CHAIBAL_N ROGERS: We will try to make testimony available for you so that you can
make any corrections you want to the testimop.y.
Mr. Aldrich?
MR. ALDRICH: I have one other correction on Mr. Stevenson's t_._timony. He indicated that
I was in both the review of the Ice Team results about 3:00 in the mooning and at the meeting at
9:00 a.m., and I was not in the earlier meeting, but I understood the people who were.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, gentlemen.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Powers?
(Witness sworn.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Powers, would you give your name and your present employ-
ment, please?
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TESTIMONY OF BEN POWERS, ENGINEER, STRUCTURES AND PROPULSION
LABORATORY, MARSHALL SPACE FL] GHT CENTER
MR. POWERS: My name is Ben Powers. I work at Marshall Space Flight Center. I have
been working at Marshall in the Propulsion Laboratory for approximately 20 years. I have been
recently working in the Solid Rocket Motor Branch for some 14 years. My responsibilityisin the
design,development and qualificationof solidrocket motors.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you here yesterday when testimony was takel, from some of
your colleagues from Marshall?
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you took part in the telecon on January 27, 1986 that was re-
ferred to yesterday?
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir.
_i
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And do you want to recount for the Commission your recollection of
i that telecon,and particularlyyour participationin it?
MR. POWERS: I would be pleased to,sir.
There wa3 quite a lengthy telecon, much longer than a normal type thing, and we were
called in lateat night.The charts were being prepared real tin_e,and we [Ref.z/14-3] I063
It_ I_ i i
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were discussing data even before we were getting the chars in, and the engineers at Morton-
Thiokol were presenting their case, and J specifically rememt_er Brian Russell going over his
charts and Arnie Thompson going over his _d also Roger Bo_sj0)ly going over his charts.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And they recommended against the launch to begin with?
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And do you remember what was said by Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Ha.rdy?
MR. POWERS: I remen _er some of the things that Mr. Hardy said, mo6tly because I was
sitting with him. Mr, Mulloy's remarks, really, he was not there, and I can't remember hi_ re-
marks as well, but I do recall Mr. Hardy's remarks pretty well.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you want to describe them, please?
MR. POWERS: He was probing the data, which is typical, trying to ascertain if there was a
v_lid concern with the temperature as it would affect the behavior of the seals at the joints, the
field joints, not the nozzle, just the field joints.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And there was testimony yesterday that he at one point said he was
appalled, and Thiokol people thought he was appalled at
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the decision. Mr. Hardy said he was appalled at the data that was presented.
Were you appalled by the data or the decision?
MR. POWERS: Sir, I fully supported the Thiokol engineering position and was in agreement
with it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: _And )_oumade that known to Mr. Hardy _
MR. POWERS: No, sir.I report to Mr. John McCarty, and we were caucusing, and I also
reported itto Mr. Jim Smith, which isour chief engineer, and this would be a typicalthing that
we would do. I would report to my boss and to my associate projectmanagement in Engineering.
I don't want to confuse this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you report,too,that you agreed with the Thiokol engineers?
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To whom did you repo_?
MR. POWERS: I'm sorry.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who did you report that to?
MR. POWERS: Mr. John McCarty. He ismy--well, he isnot my immediate supervisor. He
ismy deputy lab director,but he was the senior man in line
1947
at that time, and I reported to him that I thought that the temperature would reduce the
margin of safetyfor the joint performance.
CHAIRMAN RGOERS: And were there others in that telecon that agreed with you, that
you know of?.
MR. POWERS: I can't identifyanyone joining me in that position,sir,! cannot make that
statement.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And have you talked to them since,any of the peopie ttla_,,c,ein
that telecon,to fred out how they stood on the issue?
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir,I have.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what did you find out?
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MR. POWERS: Some of the engineering people have mentioned that they, too, were con-
cerned, primarily with the temperature effect on the O-ring resilience, the spring-back ability of
the O-ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was there anybody who agreed with Mr. Hardy or Mr. Mul!oy, as
far as you remember, on that telecon?
MR. POWERS: There was no dissent with Mr. Hardy, to my knowledge, other than the dis-
cussion that I had. I was the only dissenting engineer.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But the others remmned quiet, T assume?
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir.
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DR. COVERT: Mr. Powers, yesterday we were talking with Mr. Hardy about the effect of
iongtime squeeze on the resilience of the O-rings, and their performance if they had been com-
pressed for a substantial period of time, and he 3aid that he had seen no evidence that this was
an effect, and in fact, some motors had been stacked for a y?ar and still worked properly.
What is your experience with O-rings that _ave been compressed for a subsrantial period of
time and then are caused to react by a change :n the geometr] in whJcn they f'md themselves?
MR. POWERS: Sir, I find that to be not a [roblem. I think that they are talking about set,
and I am talking about resilience, and they are two different things, and we fully accounted for
the fact that we did not think that compremion set would be the problem. We were zeroing in .)n
two factors which were resilience and durometer.
DR. COVERT: Do you think that there i,_ an effect upon set? This had been stacked for 28
days, remember, and it had been hot, cold, hot, cold.
MR. POWERS: We accouct fully for that, sir, and I have no concern with compression set
for that configuration.
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DR. COVERT: How do you account for it?
MR. POWERS: We find that that particular selection of O-ring material is one of the very
best materials that one could select for a compression set performance, and I do want t_ make
sure I differentiate the difference between set and resilience. Resilience was a concern. I don't
want to come across wrong. I would like to l_ understood, and I was concerned about resilience.
DR. COVERT: I understand what you are sa)ung. Set is the permanent deformation or reluc-
tance to change its shape.
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: And resilience is the sort of a short term spring back, I guess.
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir,which would be affectedby temperatvre.
DR. COVERT: Yes.
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir,and that was the concern.
DR. COVERT: How do you account for set?
MR..POWERS: We have data that we have collected,and on this specificcompound of O-
ring material for hours versus the effect,and we have that characterized,and that data isavail-
able,and we do
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take that into account, and we degrade the performance of the O-ring accordingly for the charac-
teristicdata that we do have for set.And we are"very confident that we urderstand compression
set,sir.
I065
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WDR. COVERT: So that the performance of the O-ring is apt to be poorer after 21 days in the
stack than it would be after three days in the stack?
ME. POWERS: Ye._, sir. If it were one hour versus 1,000 hours versus 10_000 hours, as time
increases, set will degrade the performance, yes, sir, that is correct
DR. CO%_ERT: Thank you very muc,
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir, thank you.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Powers, I realize that you agre_,,_d with the conclusions of the Thiokol
engineers, but do you think they made a convincing case? Mr. Hardy and Mr. Mulloy have said
that the data they pr_ented in their view was not convincing, tbat the data. was inconclusive.
Do you think that the Thiokol engineers made a good case for their view that temperature
was a _mous problem °
MR. POWERS: Now, that is hard for me to quantify, sir.
DR. WALKER: I u:aderstand it is an opinion.
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MR. POWERS: I would say that the data that they presented was clear to me because I am
very familiar with that data. I would think that vice versa, other people that were not as famil-
iar with that data would be somewha*, less appreciative of the effect.
Did that answer your question?
DR. WALKER: ! think that is a very good answer.
What you are saying is that someone without your background in the subject might be con-
fused or unpersuaded by the data?
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir.I think the data would be more difficultto follow unless someone
were working with that data, and it isa technical issue,and being familiar with it,then I was
easilype_uaded that the temperature was something that would degrade the margin.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were the other people working with you that you say may have the
same poir, t of view?
MR. POWERS: I don't understand.
Which people, sir?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I asked you whether there were others at Marshall who
agreed with you, who agreed with Thiokol, and you said yes, you thought there
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were some.
MR. POWERS: Do you mean at that telecon, or later on?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Later on.
MR. POWERS: Yes, sir, I understand the question, later on, okay.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And are there a number of such people? And I don't want you to
name them. Just tell us are there a number of such p_ople?
MR POWERS: There are some that share my opinion, sir, ye_, there are. I would not say
that I am--I represent the majority report.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I understand. But you indicated that you think you have had more
experience in this field than some others, and the others might not understand.
Are there others like yourself who have quite a lot of experience who would agree with you
-_ now?
i MR. PO_EILS: Yes, sir.
MR. ACHF__ON: Mr. Powers, were you familiar at that time, January 27, with the work of
the Thiokol task force,on the O-ring problem back from the summer of '85?
I066
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MR. POWERS: Yes. I was not on that task force,I was not assigned to it,but I am familiar
with
1953
it,sir.
MR. ACHES( _:Can you tellus how far,and particularlyhow far up in your organization,
that educational product was spread or was passed along?
MR. POWERS: Itwas certainlypassed allthe way through our engineering.
MR. ACHESON: Was Mr. Hardy famlliar with that work?
MR. POWERS: I would certainly think so, sir.I can't answer that specifically,but we were
working vigorously,and I don't see hcw itcould have escaped him.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Powers, the emphasis on temperature which characterized the meeting
on the 27th seemed to have been considerably more than the emphasis when the task force was
started and during the task force activities.
Do you understand why the Thiokoi engineers did not emphasize the role of temperature
more before this particular occasion arose?
MR. POHrERS: No, sir, I can't explain that to you, sir.
DR. WALKER: Do you think, however, they did have the understanding or at least the in-
formation?
MR. POWERS" Without a doubt.
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DR. WALKER: And that information was apparently not emphasized in the briefings they
gave to Marshall until this particular occasion of 52-L?
And I am trying to understand how well the information about the temperature concern as
opposed to the general concern for the seal was emphasized.
MR. POWERS: I would say the temperature concern was not placed in the front row seat, if
I might use that word. The data was there, it was presented. I would say the emphasis was not,
and certainly in hindsight, and it is not fair for me to talk at this time. I would say that it
should probably be emphasized mo:-e, but here again, I want to emphasize that that is speaking
todsy.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I would just like you to characterize for is the nature of
your concerns in terms of what things might cause what consequences with whic_ you would be
displeased in the sealing process.
MR. POWERS: First of all, I would have to say that the extremely cold temperatures that
we just heard the testimony about are certainly outside of the norm, and we don't expect to see
that very often at KSC, and it is not something that you are working with often, and I was
concerned that those temperatures, as I understood
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them, were outside the data base.
So that would be my first concern, that one would prefer to launch within his data base, snd
as I understood the presentations from the Marshall--or excuse me, from the Thiokol personnel,
that the resilience would degrv_ '_ the O-ring springback force, and that it would also increase
the durometer, and of course, the_ _ is the stiffening of the grease, tl_e O-ring lubricant that we
pack into the joint. And as you know, it is very critical for us to achie_.e due to the rotation and
dynamics of the hardware, to achieve a rapid seal. And we would like to see that achieved at 100
psi,certainly no more than 200 psL We would like to see a hand seal achieved at 200 psi.,A_d
those are talking 100- and 200-millisecond timeframes. Those are fast.
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And the degradation of temperature on the performance of the timing was a concern to me.
and I don't know whether I've met you head on there or not.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: That's exactly what I wanted to know. Thank you.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Powers, just a couple of questions to put this in context.
How long have you been concerned about temperature?
1956
MR. POWERS: I was alerted to this problem some 6 months ago, and there was work that
was ongoing and was coming up to speed.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And the two briefings that we have talked about in the last two days,
there was a briefing in July which had a great section on resiliency, which means _emperature,
and then the briefing in August that went clear up to NASA headquarters had as its filst bullet
on the concerns chart again resiliency.
MR. POWERS: I might have missed it by a couple of months, sir, but yes, sir, those are tbv
times, that is true.
GEN'ERAL KUTYNA: But how can you say that NASA was not aware at the higher levels
of the conce:m with temperature if those briefings went forward?
MR. POWERS: Well, I'm n_; saying that NASA wasn't aware of the concern. I don't think
this was a thing that was highlighted in terms of center stage. We were more concern_-_d, I would
thi,lk, about at the time of the very heavy erosion that we were seeing on the no_.le joint, and
that was a very serious concern of ours at that time.
DR. WALKER: One more question, Mr. Powers.
Were you aware of any concern about the
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temperature properties of the putty and its loss of resilience at low teml:_._rature?
MR. POWERS: Sir, I consider the putty totally plastic.
DR. WALKER: Even at the low temperatures where this launch occurred?
3|R. POWERS: Sir, I have no data at very low temperatures or had not the:: data at that
time at a very low temperature that would have concerned me other than I wotdd think *hat it
would slow down the process of pressurization. T would certainly have to agree that the putty
would be slowed down with the low temperature.
DR. WALKER: Are you saying that this launch was outside of the temperature range for
which there was information on the putty?
MR. POWERS: I don't know of any data that we were working with that was below the like
40 degree range.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Powers. We appreciate your coming
on such short notice. I hope we didn't ruin your day.
MR. POWERS: You are mere than welcome, sir.
CHAIg,_MAN ROGERS: And we will recess now, and we have not decided when we will have
our next public
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session, but probably It wl]l net be next week. It certainly will _et be Monday. Tuesday, and
Wednesday, and maybe not next week at _AI.
So we will make an announcement later on.
Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 4:15 o'clock p.m., the Commission reces_ ,_, subject to the call of the Chair.)
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PROCEEDINGS
STATEMENT OF COLONEL EDWARD O'CONNOR, USAF, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS,
6655TH ASTG, ESMC
CHAIRMAN" ROGERS: Will you please give your name and present assignment and a little
bit about your background and what you're presently doing here at NASA.
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Edward O'Connor. I'm a Colonel in the United States Air Force. I'm
assigr_ed to the Eastern Space and Missile Center. Currently I'm acting as director of search and
recovery operations for N_.SA on the bl-L accident.
I've been involved in this activity since the day of the accident. Prior to that, I was director
of operations in the 6555th Aerospace Task Group, where we put together the payloads that fly
on the shuttle. And I've worked in different shuttle missions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All right, you may proceed, please.
COLONEL O'CONNOR: First c.'_wt, please.
(Viewgraph.) [R,.r.3 7-11
Immediately after the accident,we went about establishingthe search blocks so ve could go
out and recover components, We were able to use our radar
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opticaldata that'savailable from the r_ge instrumentation cameras and the range radars. We
were also a_)leto use visual sightings obtained by some of the aircraftin the area to identify
those areas where the majority of the shuttle components impacted the water.
Since that time we've also usecta trajec_ry calculationfrom our radars and opticalsensors
to better improve our location of debris on the ocean bcttom. Since that time, we've also had to
modify our search areas based on the Ic_._tedcomponents that we have recovered, as well as
additional sonar contacts thai we have obtained through the Navy assets.
The second chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) {Ret. 3'7-"1
Tl_,e first box in our sew'oh area I would like to point out to you is a ten nautical mile by 25
nautical mile search box, the lower side of the chart. That particular box was initially estab-
lished in the days immediately following tlle_,-cident.Since that time, we have added that top
section,8.5 nautical miles on the eastern edge, three nautical miles on the western edge.
That was added because it was feltthat the majority of the right-hand SRB components
should be
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located in that area based upon trajectorycalculationsand opticaldata.
Next chart,please.
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In order _) indicate the difficulty of the recovery activity we are engaged in, I would like to
go over vcry quickly the oceanographic conditions that we were experiencing in the area. We are
quite close to the Gulf Stream axis in the search box and we are experiencing--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you move your microphone up just a little bit closer?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: At this time we have a search box that is very close to the axis of
the Gulf Stream. Therefore, we are experiencing currents of the level of four to five nautical
miles. We are experiencing a littleseasonal variation as we progress toward the summer in the
position or the speed of the Gulf Stream.
So this isa constant factor we're going to have to deal with during the whole recovery. The
depth in the vicinityof the SRB's we feelisbetween 220 feetand 1200 feet.This has been estab-
lished by some of the videos we have taken on the ocean bottom and some of the recovery action
we have taken to date.
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The remainder of the search area, the area where we expect to find the majority of the or-
biter,as well as the orbiterpayloads, isin a search depth of approximate]y 90 to 220 feet.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref.3/7-4]
The at-sea operations are being directed by the United States Navy Superintendent of Sal-
vage. The most experienced salvage team that has been put together in a long time. The assets
we have employed at thiQ.time in the search and recovery activityare eleven ships,one manned
submersible, two remotely operated vehicles,seven sonars, and 41 divers
This isa fairlyconstant number of ships and assets that we are involving every day, seven
days a week in the recovery.
Next chart,please.
(Viewgraph.) Im.r. :_7 _1
In order to maximize the utility of the use of these assets, we have broken them into three
basic tasks, the first being the SRB recovery as being the highest priority recovery. We are using
right now the submarine NR-1, which is a small nuclear-powered submersible that the Navy
use_ for underwater submarine search and rescue. We are using this as a sonar
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platform to map the SRB area.
We have also rented the STENA Workhorse, which is a dynamically stabilizedoil support
ship that has been used in the Gulf during high winds and during high currents. Itisvery suita-
ble working closeto the Gulf Stream for these types of recoveries.
We are also using the Seward Johnson, which isa support ship for the submersible Johnson
Sea Link If.This isa small four-man submarine that letsus get outstanding video and photogra-
phy of pieces on the bottom, and in a few moments I will show you a piece of video from that
particular submersible.
The shallow water recovery, we're using basicallydiving teams. We're diving off the United
States Navy vessel Preserver t xl the United States naval vesselSuP.bird.
We're also using the Independence, which isone of the Thiokol SRB recovery vessels,which
has a sonar platform.
We are also engaged in a wide area sonar search. We're going to search with sonar, side-
scan sonar, the entire search areas that were indicated in that initialchart. That i,_approxi-
mately 350 nautical square miles, a significant piece of ocean to be covered, and it is going to be
a laborious process to 1071
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recow,r that.
Next chart, please.
IViewgraph._ I_,'_ :_7 "1
Of the 350 square nautical miles that we have to cover, as of today we have covered 190
nautical mil_. in this 190 nautical miles that we have searched, we have bad 227 sonar contacts
that have to be verified.
The ones :hat we have verified to date give us 17 shuttle components, definite pieces of the
51-L mission. We have 25 non-shuttle components. These are things such as geology on the
bottom, rocks, oil drums tnat have been discarded by shil_ pa_ing through the area previous to
the accident.
We have 185 sonar contacts that have not been characterized, as sl,vttle or non-shuttle at
this time We are working as quickly as po_ible to characterize tho_e, to corrplete our sea:'_h
and start the recovery of those items.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Colonel, when ynu say 227 contacts made, what does tl_':t mean?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: That means that as our sonar shipe were going through the search
area they had hard contacts, acoustic returns off of objects on the bottom. The objects, we don't
know what it is. We know
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it is large enough in all cases, probably something the size of a 55 gallon drum or larger, that we
need to go out and iook at and characterize visually.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you have identified 17 shuttle components that you feel confi-
dent are part of the shuttle system?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Yes. We have those components. We have videotapes and still pho-
tography of those components. We take _hat verification photography and video from some of
our remotely operated vehicles.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Have you any way of knowing which of those 25--or which of those
17 might involve the SRB?.
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Yes. A few charts down, I will have a chart that identifiesthe com-
ponents on the bottom that we will attempt to recover shortly
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine.
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph) !_=" _7 7 i
We have estatAishec_, a recovery priority list of the things that we feel that are important to
the analysis of tt'e f_,ilure of 51-L. Naturally, the most important item is the right SRB aft com-
ponents, those comp,-r.ents in the vicinity of where the suspected fallu.-e occurred.
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We al_o would like to obtain significant portions of the leR SRB aft component so that we
can use that, if you would, as a witness plate, so that we can compare the effects of the range
destruct action and the impact with the water and also be able to look at other components to
see if they experienced similar types of failure mechanisms that we may find on the right-hand
components.
We also feel it is important to obtain some external tank to SRB attach struts. Part of the
breakup n__hanism had to involve failure 3f some of these structural elements, and we want to
recover those so that we can better unde_d that failure mechanism. And the crew compart-
ment is al_ a priority recovery.
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Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) Im't :_ ; _l
As of today, we have located small portions of the right-har, d SRB. We have the aft skim
assembly, which contains the thrust vector control systerr _ the nozzle, and a few other compo-
nents from the aft of the SRB.
We also have some portions of the aft segment some ca_- _mponents. In the case of the left
SRB, we have the aft skirt assembly, almost the entire skirt assembly, and a larger number of
aft segment
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components.
We also have a forward dome igniter from the top of the SRB stack. We have not bee__ able
to recover that at this time, nor can we characterize whether it be right or left.
I would like to show you some video now. This particular video that you will see was taken
by the Sea Link II on a dive in the area that we have now identified as the right-hand SRB.
Roll the video.
(A videotape was shown.)[Not published]
COLONEL O'CONNOR: There we are looking at part of the aft skirt assembly, and also the
rear portion of the aft segment. As you can see in the video, here are some particles drifting by.
That is characteristic of the water conditions we have in 1200 feet of water.
We're experiencing about a half a knot of current on the bottom at this time. As we go up
through the water column, the current begins to increase up to about four and a half knots. It
makes it a difficult recovery activity because we have to work all of our tools down through that
varying curre.nt.
I also have some photographs which show more clearly the components that we have locat-
ed.
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(Slide.) [R°'r- :_ 7 _,j
These photographs were taken at the same time that the video was taken, also by the Sea
Link II. As you can see, we have broken-up aft components. Most of this damage we feel prob-
ably occurred at the time of water impact of the components.
We have multitudes of parts on the bottom that must be recovered.
Next picture, please.
(Slide.) IR,.r. :_ 7-ml
In this picture you can see part of the clevis joint. This is not the joint that is suspect at this
time. It is what is referred to as a factory joint, something that was fabricated at the manufac-
turing plant.
There is no indications of failure on this particular joint, although you can see towards the
center right of the photograph some O-rings that are out of the groove and hanging down in the
water. Naturally, it is important that we bring all of these O-rings and this clevis material up to
the surface.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [rel. :;7-! I]
This sketch is indicative of the right-hand SRM hardware that we have identified to date. At
the
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left, upper left, is the top of the case, the joint area that we are trying to locate at this time. The
shaded portions indicate those portions of SRB case that we have located and feel that we can
recover in the near future.
As you can see from this chart, we are not very close yet to that particular field joint. We
have been impeded by some severe weather conditions, as many of these fronts have been going
through the area, which impeded dive operations, and we hope to have improving weather condi-
tions shortly so we can make--
DR. FEYNMAN: Could you explain a little bit better which end is which and how big this
is? This isn't the whole booster, it's just a piece?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: No, this is the aft segment. This is the segment as it is brought
from the fac*_ory to Kennedy for assembly with the rest of the SRB segments.
DR. FEYNMAN: And it has a s]"._ around it?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: It has a skirt at the bottom, at the tower right-hand corner, and the
nozzle is attached to the circular opening you see also in that lower right-hand corner.
DR. COVERT: Colonel, do you think that that mid--nection forward of the critical joint is
going to be
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in roughly the same neighborhood as the after section?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: We had initially hoped we would fred it very quicldy after we found
these components. So far we have been unsuccessful in locating it. We have used the NR-1 to do
wide-area mapping around this particular point.
At this time, we're also trying to improve our radar and ballistic studies, so that we can
have a better idea of where to locate these components. We are hoping that it is in the near
vicinity and we just haven't found it yet.
DR. COVERT: We wish you good luck in this enterprise.
COLOI :EL O'CONNOR: Thank you.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph._ Im.r. a 7-1., i
In view of the critical nature of the SRB components to the investigation, we have put to-
gether a team to go and develop detailed procedures for the recovery, so that we can maximize
the benefit of the recovered material.
We're going through a very methodical process of getting the engineering people involved,
both from the manufacturers as well as from NASA design centers. We're getting metallurgists
involved so that we can do
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on-site examination of the components before we attempt any lift, and they are also characteriz-
ing those components we're finding as to whether they be critical to the investigation or not.
Therefore, we can prioritize the recovery.
Guidelines have been also thoroughly established and briefed to the task force on what re-
covery priorities we need to have, what o*,her guidelines they feel are important to the investiga-
tive process.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) Ir,.r. :_ 7 l:q
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I would like to now briefly cover some of the components we have recover_i. These compo-
nents were recovered both from the surface immediately following the accident, as well as some
few parts that we have already recovered from the ocean bottom.
In the case of the orbiter, the significant items that we have found are a multitude of pieces
of exterior skin with thermal tile. We now have the majority of the main propulsion system, the
power heads, expansion nozzles, and turbo pumps.
We have located on the ocean floor but have not recovered major portions of the thrust
structure of the aft part of the vehicle.
In the case of the SRB, we have both
1973
frustums, the forward part of the SRB, the left drogue chute, some gyros, a hydraulic reservoir,
and some systems from the forward skirt, as well as those components that I have previously
shown you on the other charts.
On the external tank, we have 60 percent of the inner tank skin. This is of high signifi-
cance, showing burn patterns and some of the failure mechanisms.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) IR,.r. :_ 7 t q
In order to maximize the benefit associated with the recovered components, we are directing
a detailed development implementation of handling documents, procedures, for all of the compo-
nents that we have in hand.
We are taking these components, running them through metallurgical analysis, chemical
analysis, and reconstructing as best we can the failure mec_nism and the breakup modes that
the vehicle experienced at the time of the accident.
After we have correlated the thermal and blast effects and determined probable breakup
patterns from the metallurgists, we will use these particular scenarios and this evidence to go
back and attempt to validate the
1974
conclusions that the rest of the NASA task force teams are putting together as far as what they
feel from telemetry and optical data was the breakup failure mechanism.
In order to maximize the benefit of this procesB, we have brought an individual aboard of
great experience.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) I_'r. :_ 7 I._I
Shortly after the accident occurred, the National Transportation Safety Board was contacted
so that they could provide us some of their expertise. They have released to tm Mr. Terry Ar-
mentrout, who is the director, Bureau of Accident Investigation, of the National Trarmportation
Safety Board.
He is giving us his expert assistance in directing the activity that will reconstruct the flight
components that we have recovered and direc' the analysis of the failure mechankms. He has
been temporariJy assigned to NASA and released from his other duties with the National Trans-
portation Safety Board. He has also been granted permission to bring whatever other assets he
feels necessary from National Transportation Safety Board.
He has been of great benefit to us.
1975
Next photograph, please.
(Slide.) I_ _t. :1 7-1qij
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This is a photograph of the orbiter components that are now located in the NASA logistics
building. Mr. Armentrout has directed the development of a grid system for placing all of the
components i_ their proper geometric relationship so that we can best understand the breakup
patterns, the flame patterns, the other failure mL_:hanisms that might have been incident and
collateral to the breakup of the vehicle.
Next chart, please.
(Slide.) la,,r,:_7 17l
This photograph indicates where we are mc_king up the external tank components. As you
can see, we're using the same technique, gridding the floors, arranging the components so they
can be available for review on both sides, and putting them in the proper geometric relation-
ships to fully understand the breakup mechanisms.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) Im.r. :_7 I_l
As a result of the review of the components we have to date, we have some pre]iminary
estimates of what we feel the orbiter experienced and how it broke up. With approximately ten
percent of the orbiter now
1976
located, the metallur_fi _1 and chemical teams feel that we had a catastrophic in-flight breakup
due to a combinBtion of blast effects and aerodynamic overloads.
Basically, there is no evidence of anything exploding or igniting within the orbiter itself,
from the evidence that we see. The external tank mockup, where we have approximately eight
percent, also indicates a complete in-flight catastrophic breakup due to structural overload
forces applied to it at angles and at velocities and at levels that are not normally experienced by
an external tank.
We have no preliminary identification of the SRB components. We just don't have enough at
this time.
I would like to also restate that these are preliminary estimates, based upon a relatively
small amount of debris that we have recovered to date.
DR. COVERT: Colonel, are these loads on the external tank primarily internal loads or ex-
ternal loads?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: There appears to be a combination of both.
DR. COVERT: Are there places where you _ identify differences?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Yes, there are, and there
1977
are places on the external tank where we can detect impacts from the right SRB.
DR. COVERT: So these are consistent with the pictures that we have seen, then?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Yes, they are.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you have any idea of how long the process may take? And I real-
ize it's difficult to predict, but can you give us snme idea of how you think it may progress?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Seeing that we're putting the maximum available assets to work on
it, we're hopeful that within another few weeks we will have completed our mapping effort,
hopefully by the 1st of April.
And at that time we will be able to characterize all of the sonar contacts we have on the
ocean floor. I would like to be able to say that we would have all of the parts of interest up
within a week. I think a more likely case would be it would take us at least a month or two
additional to locate and recover significant portions of the right-hand SRB.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So that you would estimate that--and I realize that this is just your
best guess. I gather you would think, then, that within
1978
three months you might have completed your work?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: I would hope within three months that we would have recovered all
necessary components to let us complete the analysis, and that the analysis at that time would
be fairly far along, and that we would be doing an extensive set of cross-correlation with the
other NASA design centers to understand and validate their conclusions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERSi Commission members were shown some of the reconstruction yester-
day, and it really is truly remarkable the work that has been done, and I congratulate you and
all of the team that have worked on it.
I notice that--what is the name for the SRB rocket, the frustum? I notice that you found
both the right and the left.
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are you in a position to make any comments about the iact that the
right one is quite severely damaged and the left one is not?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Not at this time. We really need to have some more of the right-
hand SRB to more fully understand that mechanism. We're also taking some Dhotegraphy and
we're enhancing that photography at this time.
1979
It is quite likely that some of the damage to the right-hand frustum might have been the
impact damage on the external tank, but we really can't confirm that at this time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I guess the other possibility would _,e on the ocean, when it
struck.
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Yes, that's also true. It could be on tbe ocean, and we need to do
quite a bit more work in that area before we can define that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. Thank you very much, Colonel. We appreciate it.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Lang, Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. Barsh.
(Witnesses sworn.}
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TESTIMONY OF: ROBERT LANG, SHUTTLE OPERATIONS, MECHANICAL SYSTEMS DI-
VISION, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER; CARVER KENNEDY, DIRECTOR, VAB OPNS,
?_ORTON-THIOKOL, INC., KSC; AND BILL BARSH, ENGINEERING MANAGER, EX-
TERN 4_1, TANK/SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER OPERATIONS, LOCKHEED SPACE OPER-
ATIONS COMPANY, KSC
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Gentlemen, will you identify yourselves and make reference to your
present assignment and anything else you care to tell us about yourself before you start the
presentation.
MR. LANG: My name is Bob Lang. I'm with NASA here at Kennedy Space Center. I have
been here for the past 19 years.
My present position is chief of the mechanical systems division and shuttle engineering. I
have been in that position for the last eight months. Prior to that I was in the fluids division of
the same directorate.
MR. KENNEDY: My name is Carver Kennedy. I'm employed by Morton-Thiokol. My
pr_ent position is as director, vehicle assembly building operations, for the shuttle processing
contractor. We perform this work under
1981
subcontract to Lockheed Space Operations, who is the SPC.
MR. BARSH: My name is Bill Barsh. I work for Lockheed Space Operations Company at
KSC. I am the engineering manager for the ET/SRB operations. I have been involved in SRB
stacking since 1977.
MR. LANG: Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do is have Mr. Kennedy present a brief
overview of an SRB segment stack operation, and I will follow that with a discussion of this
particular joint on the right SRB to point out any anomalous conditions that we noted during
the processing, if that _ okay.
CHkIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, that is ff-le. Thank you.
MR. KENNEDY: What I'm going to do is, utilizing charts, is take you through a standard
flow from the _ime the segment arrives here at KSC and is turned over to the shuttle processing
contractor until the completion of the making of the joint betweeu the at_ segment and the aft
center _gment, which is the one in question.
_Viewgraph.) [R,_f. :_/7-t._ I
The first chart here, reading from left to right, the segments arrive by rail car. They weigh
approximately 2_50,000 pounds_
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can i interrupt to say, is this just a general description or are you
talking about 51-L now?
MR. KENNEDY: Both. This is the process that 51-L followed and _t's also the general pat-
tern that we follow throughout.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. If you can, when you present it, make reference tv 51-L so
that we know the difference between the general procedure and what happened in that case.
MR. KENNEDY: All right, sir.
The segments arrive by rail car. They are brought into the building, which we call the rota-
tion processing and surge facility, or the RPSF. The rail car cover is removed and, utilizing two
cranes in the building, we remove the segment from the rail car, rotate it from a horizontal
position *,o a ve_ical, and place it on a support stand.
At that point, there are two heavy metal rings, one on each end, which completely enclose
the joint, the clevis and the tang ends of the segment, and those heavy rings are used to tie the
segment to the rail car during shipment.
After putting the segment ve_ical in the stand, we remove the bottom ring. In _he mean-
time, we
1983
bring in an aft skirt assembly, which _s furnished by USBI, completely assembled and delivered
to us. We place it in what we call the buildup stand.
We then pick up this aft segment and mate it to the aft skirt assembly, aa shown in section
6 on this chart. While we have the aft segment suspended, we do an inspection of the tang,
which is the lower end, before we mate that to the aft skirt nssembly.
Following the mating to the aft skirt assembly--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can I ask, who is responsible for that mating? Who certifies that it
is properly done?
MR. KENNEDY: That is performed by the Morton Thiokol technicians. It is signed off by
Mor*_on Thiokol quality, and in some cases, depending on the operation, there is a NASA quality
buy in addition.
This particular operation, this joint right here is not a pressure vessel/joint. This is a struc-
tural joint between the aft skirt assembly ard the aft segment. It does not see the internal gases
from the rocket motor. It is strictly a structural attach between the skirt and the segment itself,
the first aft segment.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But the ultimate
1984
responsibility for seeing that that is done properly is with Thiokol?
MR. KENNEDY: Yes, that is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Kennedy, is this joint usually quite concen*_ric and the mating proceeds
without any necessary procedural modifications to ensure a fit?
MP,. KENNEDY: Generally. Sometimes there are problems, but generally it proceeds fairly
routinely.
DR. COVERT: What fraction of the time are there problems?
MR. KENNEDY: I cannot answer that without reviewing the data, sir. I'm sorry. This par.
ticular joint being a mechanical structural joint, we do not have those data.
DR. COVERT: Is it a normal procedure on 51-L, with no exceptions?
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MR.KENNEDY:Yes.
DR.COVERT:Noexceptions?
MR.KENNEDY:Wehadnowhatwecall problem reports written against that one.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. KENNEDY: Following the completion of that structural joint, the components that are
attached to the aft segment of the solid rocket motors, which
1985
consist of some electronics components, a structural external tank attach ring, and struts--and
at this point there is a nozzle extension cone installed. It is shipped separably from the plant in
Utah because ofitslength and size.
The nozzle itselfisattached to the aft segment at the factory.We receive that here already
attached. We installan extension cone after itarrives here, which isshipped separately.
Following the completion of this work, the completed aft assembly is picked up from the
buildup stand and placed on what we call a transportation pallet.At that point, the top han-
dling ring,which isstillin place, having been on there since we came off the railcar, the top
handling ring is removed and the clevis portion of that segment is inspected. That is the first
inspection it receives.
It is inspected for any shipping damage, pitting, scratches, so forth, particularly in the O-
ring areas. This is the clevis area that has the two O-ring grooves.
That completes the processing--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who does that inspecting?
MR. KENNEDY: We also do that. Morton Thiokol does the inspection, and I believe it is
signed off also
1986
by a NASA inspector.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were any anomalies found in that process?
MR. KENNEDY: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As far as 51-L Js concerned?
MR. KENNEDY: :No, sir.
MR. LANG: Mr. Chairman, let me restate, if you would. What Carver was doing was basical-
ly running through a standard type process. I was going to follow that up with a detailed discus-
sion of any anomalies, we found on the 51-L proce_os.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, fine.
MR. KENNEDY: The answer is still correct. We did not find any anomalies on the O-ring
grooves.
May I have the next chart, please.
DR. FEYNMAN: These rings you're talking about, are they very. strong? Do they keep th_
shape of the thing wtAle it is on the car?
MR. KENNEDY: They are a weldment of steel, a one-piece weldment. They interface with
the joint configuratior_ cf the end of the segment. They would offer some suI, port, because they
are strong enough to tie xhe segment to the rail car, and so they take the normal shipping loads
and restrain it.
1987
And of cot,rse, they are net flight weight thickness. They are heavy sections.
(Viewgrw_h.) iR,'t. :_ 7 2o I
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This chart shows a similar process, again in the same building, for the center segments and
the forward segments that are rec_eivc<l. The main difference here is that we attach nc hard-
ware, nor do we attach any other parts to the center or forward segments.
It is unloaded in a similar manner• The rail car cover is removed, the segment is removed, it
is placed on a stand. The bottom ring is removed, it is moved to a transportation pal!et. The top
ring is removed.
At both of these times when the shipping ring is removed, there is an inspection made of
that particular end of the segment, looking for shipping damage, pitting, rust, et cetera. We do
that with the segment suspended from the crane for the bottom part or the tang end of the seg-
ments. We do it after we remove the ring on the top end, just prior to moving the segment into
the surge building.
At the completion of those inspections, the segments are moved into what we call the 3urge
facility, which is--
DR. FEYNMAN: What do you inspect for? What
1988
do you look for? Scratches, broken pieces?
MR. KENNEDY: We have a criteria which looks for pitting, scratches, contamination, dirt,
rust.
DR. FEYNMAN: How much do you allow?
MR. KENNEDY: We have a specification which allows visual blemishes which are not de-
tectable by a five thou_ndths piece of shim stock or fingernail check. If it will not hang up a
five thousandths shim stock--now. I'm being very general, because there are various and sundry
inspections for various parts. Thz is the most critical one. That is the sealing surface on the
tang.
MR. WALKER: Is there any gre_ e on the tang at this point in time?
MR. KENNEDY: We remove the grease prior to inspection and re-apply it afterward.
MR. WALKER: It is shipped with .grease and then that's cleaned off and inspected?
MR. KENNEDY: Yes.
MR. WALKER: Are there photographs made at this point in time?
MR. KENNEDY: Not at this point.
MR. WALKER: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I ask a question about who does these inspections. Are these
long-time
1989
employees of yours, and do the same people do the same work all the time or do you change
them around often?
MR. KENNEDY: Generally, the inspectors are assigned to SRB, and they will do the inspec-
tions on any of the SRB activities.
They are our employees. They have been employed either by Morton Thiokol or by the pred-
ecessor USBI in most cases.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission has heard reports that some of these people are
overworked because of the pre,_ure of getting these launches off, and that therefore they may
not be as capable of doing their inspecting jobs as they might otherwise be.
Have you any records of whether they are overworked or not, or whether they have normal
days of activity?
MR. KENNEDY: Well, they have normal days, and they do work some overtime. It depends
on the activity. For instance, when we--and we're getting ahead of the presentation, but when
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we do our stacking operation we do that around the clock. We have propellant exposed. It is a
hazardoas operation and we continue around the clock until we complete the job.
And both the personnel, the supervisory and inspection and technical personnel, do work
around the
1990
clock, and they will work some overtime depending on what the particular stack requires.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you have any reason tc believe that any of these inspectors were
not capable and not able to perform their duties efficienzly?
MR. KENNEDY: No, sir, I do not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. RUMMEL: Can you explain the fingernaii check? Is this a process where the inspector
is supposed to feel an imperfection?
MR. KENNEDY: The normal techniqtxe is tc use a piece of a five thousandths brass shim
stock. The specification which is placed on us here permits inspection by either method to deter-
mine whether there is a detectable imperfection in the surface.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you provide the Commission with a report ef the inspectors
who did this work or_ 51-L and how long they have been employed and whether they were over-
worked or not, how much time they had been given to do this responsible work?
MR. KENNEDY: Yes, sir, we will do that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. RUMMEL: I'm still not clear on the fingernail check. How does that enter into this
inspection procedure? I3 the surface examined 100
1991
percent with fingernails, or is it visual and when he finds something he sees with his eyes then
he scratches with his finger?
I just don't understand.
MR. KENNEDY: It is a visual inspection. Any visual blemish is then inspected with shim
stock or fingernail or both, the visual inspection first.
MR. RUMMEL: Fingernail sounds unscientific. That is why I was asking.
MR. ACHESON: Mr. Kennedy, are you going to discuss the frequent loss of roundness phe-
nomenon in your presentatlcn'.'
MR. LANG: I was going to cover that.
MR. ACHESON: Very well.
DR. FEYNMAN: This surface where, on the tang, "#here the O-ring is in contact ,viththe
tang, the question i.qhow flat,how smooth that is,how deep. Isthis the lasttest that we make?
What experience do we have on that?
MR. KENNEDY: I'm sorry,I missed your question.
DR. FEYNMAN: This isn'tthe lastinspection?
MR. KENNEDY: No, this isthe receiving inspeclion as itarrives on railcar, to detect any
anomalies that have occurred during shipment or that may
1992
have been shipped from the plant, to detect--this is the first inspection. They are inspected
again before stack operations.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: What is the experience oh _hose inspections? Have you
found rejections?
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MR. KENNEDY: On reused hardware, which is the majority of the hardware we see now,
we do see some what I would call arrested corrosion. That is, it has been immer,_ in salt water,
but it has been arrested, detailed, and used and sent back. It has been inspected at the plant and
approved for use and sent back.
The inspection here, if there is any question about any of them, we take dental mold impres-
sions and have it inspected. There is a criteria which comes, which is applied to us here at Ken-
nedy, that we're nc, t allowed to have any imperfections of certain dimensions and certain sizes,
depending upon locations.
11 there is any question about that, we take dental impressions and have it inspected and
measured to see if it meets the criteria or not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You may proceed.
MR. KENNEDY: May I have the next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) I_,.,. :_7 --,I1
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This chart shows the process used in the vehicle assembly building. This is the large build-
ing where we actually assemble the solid rocket boosters. The segment, the aft segment, is
brought in first by a transporter on a transportation pallet in the vertical orientation.
It is brought in and placed in place in front of the particular high bay that is to be used in
assembling the vehicle. The lifting beam is attached. The segment is picked up, transported up
into the high bay, and placed in position on a mobile launch platform.
At that point we install four holddown studs, which is the stud used to retain the entire
assembly and to hold it to the launch pad until the time for launch. And we conduct a tension-
ing operation, which is an operation where we tension the stud and then run a large nut down
to retain it, so we ,rill retain the tension on the stud that is a compressive load between the
skit*_ and the mobile launch platform.
This is typical of both sides, this operation. That is called placing the aft--placing the aft
booster and tensioning.
May I have the next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) iR'''. :_ 7221
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The aft center segment is brought in from surge in a vertical orientation, placed in position,
lifting beam is installed. That segment is lifted off the pallet, and at this point again the lower
end or the tang _nd of the joint is cleaned. It has been previously greased. It has been in storage
with grease.
It is cleaned, it is inspected again for pitting, corrosion, scratch, nicks, damage of any sort,
contamination. It is an inspection by a company inspector, followed by a NASA inspector.
DR. FEYNMAN: How irregular is the surface of the tang? How many wiggles and how
many scratches? How deep are they?
MR. KENNEDY: I'm sorry, sir?
DR. FEYNMAN: How good is the surface of the tang? How deep are scratches and so on?
MR. KENNEDY: Well, they are controlled by specification, and there is a myriad of those. I
would be glad to furmsh the exact specification, depending on the location.
For instance, in the pinholes where the re_aining pins go through there is a criteria. There
is a criteria on the O-ring sealing surface. There is a criteria on the non-sealing surfaces at those
points,
1095
1995
andthat isa fairly detailedsetof specifications.
DR. FEYNMAN: Are all of these criteria checked when you mate these?
MR. KENNEDY: Yes, they are inspected for that series of criteria.
MR. ACHESON: How !¥equent is it to find imperfections that are serious enough so that
that particular segment is recycled or sent back to the factory for further processing?
MR. KENNEDY: I don't believe we have sent one back to the thctory, There is a procedure
by which blemishes or pits or scratches can be blended out and re-inspected, and that happens
occasionally.
That reauires what we call a problem report aPd what we call a material review board
action if one of those is developed, which means it has to go back to the development center and
the manufacturing plant for approval. And they provide the information on how they want it
repaired or done.
MR. RUMMEL: Have you had any such cases in the ring grooves that you can recall?
MR. KENNEDY: Where we had to rework the O-ring grooves?
MR. RUMMEL: Yes.
MR. KENNEDY: I cannot answer precisely, but I
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suspect there may have been one during ",he program at least. I cannot recall precisely.
MR. RUMMEL: I would be quite interested in knowing that if you could find it out.
MR. BARSH: We have had some scratches in the O-ring grooves that we got concurrence
with the design agency _e go in there and polish them out using a fine-grit sandpaper.
MR. RUMMEL: I assume there are specific tolerances?
MR. BARSH: Yes, there is.
DR. COVERT: Are there detailed instructions on how you remove the results of the fine-grit
sanding? Do you blast it and then inspect it with a magnifying glass?
MR. BARSH: After we use the sandpaper, we then go in with a cleaning solvent and take
away all of the grit and wipe it clean, and regrease it again.
DR. COVERT: How far on either side along the length do the instructions ask you to clean
it?
MR. BARSH: I would say that the groove is very small, and you have got to try and put a
piece of sandpaper in there, and you sand it in a circumferential motion. You probably go about
a foot on each side.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. KENNEDY: Following the inspection of the tang--and the segment is hanging from a
crane in what we cal! transfer aisle--measurements are taken at six locations around the tang
end 30 degrees apart, to determine the diameters in those planes.
In the meantime, the s_.-_rnent which is on the MLP--that is, the aft segment with the clevis
end up--is similarly inspected .again and similarly measured in the same planes.
These measurements are compared and, assumirig that we are within our criteria or our
own self-applied criteria for successful mate, the segment is lifted over and placed. The putty is
installed on the aft segment end or the clevis end.
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The O-rings are emplaced, the segment is mated, and the pins are installed The leak test is
conducted and the closeoat or the installation of the retainer band, and the external insulation
is applied over that, on that particular joint.
And that is the standard flow. That is the flow that the 51-L right aft segment and the right
aft center segment followed.
MR. LANG: Now I would 'ike to back up. if you will, and address each of the general areas
that Carver
1998
talked about, and starting with the aft segment operations in the processing facility.
IViewgraph )[ RpL 3 i-23]
As ha _tated, we didn't have any anomalies of any kind on that particular segment in that
facility, but ! did want to mention--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are allof your remarks going to be directed _, 3!-I._
MR. LANG: Yes, sir.In fact,all willbe directed to the two segments on the right side boost-
er,the aft and the aft center.
On the aft center or in the aft booster nssembly, part of that operation involves,likeCarver
said,liftingthe handling ring off the ._--ment. That went nominally on this segment. And I do
want to point out, originallyin the processing of the segment intended for 51-L, the original
booster--excuse me. The original segment intended for the leftside forward center segment,
there was an incident where the procedure was not properly followed.
The cle_d.s end was damaged in the lifting operation. We took steps to correct the procedures
to clarify all of thc operations.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you be a l!tt!e more specific "_ We have heard about this, but
now it would be
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helpful if you could be real specific about this particular incident: What happened, who did it.
what was the result, and so forth?
MR. LANG: I didn't bring !ot cf information with me, but basically what happened, in the
hanaling ring as delivered from Thiokol is in two pieces, two general pieces. One is the solid ring
that the crane hooks actually attach to. That is bolted to what we call a segmented ring that
actually is--it is like an elbow shape, that fits down inside the clevis of the segment.
The procedure is intended to loosen all of the bolts between the solid ring and the segment-
ed ring, and then to slightly lift up on that solid ring to relieve the load so the pins can be
removed from the segmented ring. The segmen*._ed ring is the part that fits down in the clevis.
For whatever reason--and I can't give you the answer right now, but I can provide you a
copy of the repo.'. _--the bolts between the solid ring and the segmented ring were not loosened,
so therefore tl',ere was no slop or tolerance in between those two particular rings.
We had a second thing happen to _ts, naturally. The lifting operation, the guys who were
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running the procedure, running the crane, were using a load cell to determine how much lift
they were lifting up on, how much load they were lifting up on.
As it turned euL the particular load cell had failed. The operator was trying to lift a certain
weight, thinking he was just lifting the ring. The load cell wasn't giving him indication, so he
kept lifting. And at that time we had all but 31 of the pins removed, and he kept lifting.
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AALld what happened was, he wound up trying to lift the total weight of the segment on 31
pins, and most of those pins were in the same quadrant. So it was just an unbalanced load,
t_'ing to lift too much weight on too few pins.
The damaged area was restricted to the segmented ring. One of the segments actually broke,
physically broke, and I think it was two or three0and Bill, :orrect me if I'm wrongwof the
clevis pinholes were slightly e',ongated, therefore damagei
That segment was moved aside and another segme_ _ put in its place. All of the procedures,
by the way, were modified such that all of the segrner as that flew on 51-L had had their rings
removed with the modified, updated procedure. And _ve will be glad to provide you whatever
,details you would hke.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Wha_ happeued to the ejected segment?
MR. LANG: T thinl, it's still here. We have a team from rhiokol coming down to do z full
inspection to determine flightworthinesa. I don't know the results of that inspection. Bili or
Carver. if you know--
MR. KENNEDY: I don't think we know here. The segment is ,_till here in storage.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is G'i_re any possibility that that incident contributed at all to the
accident of 51-L?
MR. LANG: No, sir. We rook special steps _o go back and review that incident, the correc-
tions to the procedure to prevent that kind of an incident, and all of the segments that flew on
51-L had been handled ,vith the modified pre_edure. And we are very confident that that did not
contribute at all.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So none of the damage that was involved in that incident could pos-
sibly have affected the 51-L launch?
MR. LANG: That is correct.
DR. RIDE: Just to _e perfectly clear, the segment of the soli,_ -_ket that was damaged was
not used on 51-L, so no damaged hardware from this incident flew?
"_'!'02
MR. LANG: That is correct.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Lang, are yot going to talk about whether or not this had any ,:n_quence
on _.he stacking of the right-hand _ter?
MR. LANG: I can mention that. It had an influence in this manner: The booster that was
damaged, like I said earlier, was the left side _o_vard center segment. And I don't understand
the propulsion match from !ct'_ side to r_ght side. It is a performance matching that maybe
Carver can address.
But to match the performance characteristics of the left side booster to the right side, the
right side aft center segment, which is one of tbe segments that form the aft joint, was swapped
out. And we did at that time bring in another booster, another segment, to be used for the right
aft center ,_egment for 51-L.
DR. COVERT: Would this require unstacking anything?
MR. LANG: No, sir. We had not at that time started the stacking operation. We were still
just handling the segments off of the rail car and preparing them for transfer into the VAB.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. RUMMEL: When you speak of matching, are you speaking of burn rate?
1098
2O03
MR.LANG:Like I said,I really don'tunderstandtheperformance matching, b_t I waa told
that wa_ the reason for swapping out a right side segment.
DR. FEYNMAN: The variations in the propellant from different batches of making explo-
sives is relatively large, and so what happens is two segments are poured from the same batch so
that one will go on the right booster and o_e will go on the left booster, and they will burn at
the same rate.
Then when the next pair of segments is put in they may burn at a different rate, but they
will be the same on the left and right, so that both rockets will go always the same.
So if you have some trouble with one of the segments on the left side, it isn't right _o leave
the right one in because it may burn at a different rate, and it is better _ take the other seg-
ment which was poured from the same explosive batch as the one that you just _poiled and use
that on the other side with the new one that you put on the right side. And that is why it is
done that way.
MR. LANG: Tnat was the extent. There were no other anomalies, then, on the handling of
the aft segment.
The aft center segment that we wound up moving
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into stack for 51-L, in its process, like Carver explained the inspection, we found two things in
the detailed inspection.
One, we found a de-bond between the rubber insulation and the metal case on the lower
end, the tang end. At thai time we picked up a problem report and measured the depth of that
de-bond area. The criteria is we are allowed to have de-b_rms, by the way, up to five thousandths
deep--excuse me, 50 thousandths deep.
We measured that particular de-bond and it was greater that 50 thousandths, and so -.re
followed a standard repair procedure for that tyl_ of anomaly. We packed that de-bond area
with an epoxy sealant, covered it with putty to protect it. And in parallel with that, we took a
sample of that epoxy sealant, set it aside for cure test later on.
And I might note that that type cf de-bond anomaly is fairly common. We have seen several
on individual segments before. I think probably everT stack has had one or two of those type
anomalies. We have seen depth of de-bond areas much greater than I think this pa_icular one
was, .109 inches deep. And we have seen de-bonds much greater than tha*
So we followed the standard repair procedure
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and packed that de-bond area with sealant and continued on with the rest of the inspection. The
discussion that we just had about the tang inspection, there was in the area of between circum-
ferentially 252 degrees to a little more than 300 degrees, there were pitting. There was pitting
noted in that area of the tang at the O-ring sealing surface.
We did apply the criteria of us;pg a five thousandths shim stock to see if we could tell any
feel at all. Any feel at all would bare driven us to, number one, a problem report condi*_ion"
number two, mold impression to actually measure that depth.
In this case, there was absolutely no feel with the shim stock, with the five thousandths
shim stock, and so we noted it in notes and comments in the processing log as an obse_ation
that met the criteria. It was not a problem report condition, and so we again pleased on.
MR. RUMMEL: Was the de-bond and the repair in the area where the smoke was seen to
come out or some other location?
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MR. BARSH: The de-pond was located between 165 degrees and 168 degrees.
MR. RUMMEL: And how does that relate?
MR. BARSH: Pardon me?
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MR. RUMMEL: How ooes that relate to the area where the initial smoke emission was ob-
served?
MR. LANG: We think the area of concern is in the area of 300 degrees.
MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: _ that mean that there was no burnishing or other
finishing of the imperfections in the tang in this case?
MR. LANG: That is ,'orrect
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Could there have been on prior occasions, prior inspec-
tions or prior uses of this segment?
MR. LANG: Of this same segment? We researched that and we couldn't find any evidence of
any documentation showing any anomaly in that or any other area on that tang. We went back
through the data packs.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: If there was i'mishing or burnishing, it would be recorded
in the paperwork?
MR. LANG: I can't he sure of that. We think that it should be if they did any kind of what I
would consider rework, but I am unsure of this. I probably shouldn't say it, but we think that at
Thiokol they are allowed to do certain minor polishing, cleanup, if you
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will, without calling it rework. And therefore, if that was the case it would not appear in their
re,york records.
DR. FEYNMAN: You say you took an impression of this apparent place?
MR. LANG: No, sir, we did not. I didn't mean to imply that.
What we would have done had the shim stock caught or given us an indication of feeling
something, we then at that time would have taken a mold impression to actually measure the
depth of the anomaly. But we did not feel anything and so we did not take a mold impression.
DR. RIDE: Do you know he,::common itis to note pittinglike this,that isless than your
criueria?Has that happened on previous _iights,or have you had a chance to go back to the logs?
MR. BARSH: Yes, ithappens quite often that itis less than--I mean, it is an acceptable
criteria.We had pittingin six locations,six degree locationson that tang.
DR. FEYNMAN: In the handbooks about O-rings and the conditions in which they're sup-
posed to be used, they talk about surfaces having something like,they say, 64 RMS. I don't know
what that means. And I would
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like to know how much RMS, or however you describe the character of the surfaces that you
have on the tang that the O-ring isin contact with, so Ican compare itto normal practice.
But I need to have some way of converting. I don't know what the "64 RMS" means, and £
don't know wh_t itmeans that you scratch with a fingernailor a piece of shim stock and find no
fivethousandths. I can't convert one number to the other.Can you help me?
MR. BARSH: Well, our inspection criteriadoesn't require us to check the surface finish.We
have to look at for visual imperfections, visually only. And ifwe see something like this,in the
case of the pittingthen we willuse the shim stock method to try and determine ifthat isa new
pit or ifitisa pit that has been there and reworked.
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DR. FEYNMAN: Okay. Now, _vhen you rework it and you have some sandpaper, which, as
you said, very fine or whatever it is, and you polish it away, that five thousandths thing that
you discovered, then you've created a surface with some kind of an RMS. What is it?
MR. BARSH: I don't know, sir.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Lang, could you descril_e--
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you cut a little piece of shim stock. At the time you use it, is it sort of pointed or rounde_], just so
I can have a feel?
MR. LANG: I'll let Mr. Barsh describe tha_ He's witnessed that before.
MR. BARSH: It is a piece of shim stock, probably about a quarter of an inch wide, and it has
a rounded tip on the end. It is not a pointy tip, but it is a rounded tip, and--
DR. COVERT: How lo g is it?
MR. BARSH: Probably four or five inches long; just something tc be able to hold il, your
hands. The inspector can hold it in his hands and also to get down into the O-ring grooves if
they see something in that area.
DR. FEYNMAN: What do you do, move it along and see if it gets caught?
MR. BARSH: That's right, see if you snag. If you have a pit, that is like a little crater, and if
you snag the shim stock against the crater then you have a problem. But if it runs across there
smoothly, you don't have a problem and it is an acceptable condition.
DR. COVERT: Is there a relation of the roundness of the edge to the maximum acceptable
pit size?
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MR. BARSH: I don't know, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Go a_,ead.
MR. LANG: Okay. The rest of the handling in the processing facility of that segment went
well. We completed--we moved it to what Carver described as the surge facility, which is the
storage facility, on November 26th.
On December 5th, we were then moving it into the ":AB to begin the stacking operation. We
have a safety requirement that says we can't have more "han two segments in the VAB at one
time unstacked--only one allowed in the transfer out, ex, ,se me. We had one in there, and so
we left that segment outside for a day.
What we were doing--and I will get to this in a little bit--we had a problem with the right
side aft segment, mounting that on the mobile launch platform. We had a problem with the
holddown post, and I will d _,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_cribethat in just a minute.
But what we did, we left that right aft center outside for a day. It got caught in a very
heavy rainstorm, and we noticed water coming out from underneath the plastic cover on the
lower end of the segment.
At that time we picked up a problem report, removed the cover, cleaned up all of the water
from all
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of the visible accessible areas, cleaned up the tang so that it was perfectly dry, did the same
thing to the top end, cleaned any water off the insulation and the clevis, cleaned it out, and
clceed 1he problem report as cleaning up the water.
DR. COVERT: What day was that?
M1R. LANE.: I think that was December 5th, was the day we moved to the VAB. ! think the
next day was the 6th, was the day we discovered the water and cleaned it up.
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DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. LANG: Okay. Now, getting back to putting the aft segment on the MLP, typically what
we do, we alternate left to right side each segment, aft, aft. aft center, aft center, and on up the
stack. We had a problem in this case.
When we mounted the right side aft segment to the holddown posts--those are the four
posts that the booster sits on and actually gets bolted in place--the holddown post number one is
the post that is most inboard and on the orbiter side. It is inboards toward the tank, and ot_ the
orbiter side, on the right side booster, we had a problem.
We have to tension the bolts so that the bolts are loaded such that they will not relax, even
through
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all of the orbiter mating operations, the external tank servicing, and even through SSME igni-
tion. You've heard of the twang concept. When the main engines start before booster ignition,
the bolts--the load on those bolts, holddown posts, will relax as the vehicle rotates.
And the requirement is to make sure the tension bolts, the stud tensioning bolts, and the
holddown posts never slack, so there's always a positive tension in those bolts under all those
conditions.
We measure the tension of thooe bolts with an ultrasonic transducer. The number one hold-
down post had a transducer that failed, and so we had to go and replace that booster--or that
holddown post assembly or that portion of the holddown post assembly, the stud, the washers,
the nuts, or the nut, that whole assembly.
Because of that work, we went ahead and stacked the entire left booster. It doesn't have any
bearing, but it is just something _,hat is different in the process. We normally rotate. In this case
we stacked the whole left booster and then came back to the right side.
DR. RIDE: Had you ever done that before?
MR. BARSH: Yes, we have done that before.
DR. RIDE: Which flight? Do you know
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offhand?
MR. BARSH: Not offhand, I don't.
MR. LANG: Okay. We went ahead and put the right side, replaced the number one hold-
down post hardware, had no other problems with holddown post re, tubers one, three, or four.
Holddown post number two, however, we couldn't achieve the total desired tension on the
bolt. The process is, we put a tensioner device, hydraulically operated tensioner device, on the
end of the bolt, onto the stud, and pull it. And I don't know the forces off the top of my head.
I'm sure Bill has them here, but pull it such that we get the maximum load in the bolt, and then
torque a nut down to hold that bolt, and then relax the tensioner, and the tension between the
head of the stud and the nut remains at a high load.
Well, it appeared we couldn't--then, by the way, we measured the transducer to see what
that result in tension is. We couldn't, after removing the tensioner from the end of the stud,
read the kind of tension we were shooting for.
We did, however, have a load in that stud that was more than adequate for actual stacking
the boostc:. But we felt we were marginal for the rest of the loads on through SSME ignition.
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What we decided to do, however, was go ahead and stack that booster all the way up with
that bolt tensioned to a good enough load for that stack, and after the stack was over we came
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back and replaced that bolt. We _elaxed the tension on it, replaced the bolt, the stud, the nut,
the washer assembly, and re-tensioned it.
MR. RUMMEL: When you replaced the bolt, didn't tilat place a sizable eccentric load in the
stack?
MR. LANG: No, sir. The load in the stack stays the same. The load in the bolt--the stud is
there just to squeeze the skirt of the booster to the holddown post.
MR. RUMMEL: In other words, it's sitting on the surface and the bolt simply holds it down?
MR. LANG: Yes, that is correct. And again, we've done t_his operation, either replaced or at
least de-tensioned bolts, I think on four previous occasions.
Okay. Let me then go through the rest of this, the mating. We went through the putty ap-
plication and I think all of you saw what that putty application looks like on the aft segment.
We--this _ime frame now is December 7th.
We li.fted the right aft center segment in the
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VAB in the transfer aisle, and there was a picture on the screen of that lifting operation.
(Viewgraph.) [ Ref. 3/'_-24]
The initial lift, as you can see, is what we call a four-point lift. There are four--just that,
four points on the top of the segrnen_ that equally carry the load. It is at this point we do our
initial what we call rounding measurement, the circumferential checks. And we have a criteria.
We have a criteria that says the outer diameter of the tang cannot exceed the inner diameter of
the outside leg of the clevis by more than .25 inches.
I think at this point if I could get chart 7 up, I would like to show that before I go into the
use of the rounding tool, just in case there is any--and zero in, if you would, please, on the top
half of that.
IViewgraphA [ Ref. 3_7-25&26]
What I've slaown here is the tang OD with relationship to the clevis, what I will just call the
clevis ID, and you can see it's the outer leg of the clevis. That particular measurement we would
call zero. The tang OD and the clevis ID are the same dimension and therefore that would cer-
tainly fit our criteria and we wouh" go ahead and mate that.
And by the way, we take this dimension, this
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measurement, six places, six locations around the circumference of the segment.
If you would go to the lower one of that page, please. Here I tried to show what we would
call plus. Again, if you look at the right side, the tang OD and the clevis ID are coincident, be-
cause we measure from the same point every t"me. But in this case the tang ID is slightly great-
er than the clevis ID, and that would be a plus and our criteria--let me back up.
I said our criteria is .25. That is our goal. Our requirement criteria really is to find that
there is no fiat metal on flat metal. And the way I drew this, ironically, it turns out I showed it
flat on flat. If you can look at the left side, the bottom horizontal face of the tang, if you brought
that straight down, would be fiat on top of the upper flat level of the outer clevis leg.
That would violate our criteria. We would not mate that in that condition. As it turns out,
that is a condition we had on this particular segment. We want to--now could you go back to
number 5, please.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/7-25&26]
MR. SUTrER: How far out was it?
MR. LANG: We had a delta, if you will, of .512 inches of tang exceeding the clevis ID.
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MR.SUTTER:And thelim!t was.25?
MR.LANG:Thatis correct.
Sowewentto anoptionthat wehaveusedmanytimes,whatwecall the two-pointlift. If
youcansee--howto describeit? Thelowerright andthe upperleft legsof thefour-pointattach,
thosearehydraulicallycontrolledsuchthat wecanput a manin a boatswain'schair,or I guess
we usea High-Rangeror a Condor,andrelievethe hydraulicpressure,atthosetwo points,so
that wearenowha:lgingthetotal loadbythe othertwopoints.
And what that doesfor us,exl_,rienceshowsthat asthe boosteris han_ng,all of the pro-
pellantweightandmasstendsto sagthesegment,and theexperienceshowsthat--youcansee
the left sideof the booster,the line running up anddown,is the 90degreepoint.That is the
cabletray.
Whenthe boosteris shipped,that portion is up. The90degreesfrom that seemsto be,in
our experiencebase,the ellipticalpart that the boosterseemsto cometogether,formsomewhat
of an ellipse.Andsowhatwedo,wehangat the zeroand90degreepoints--I'msorry,zeroand
180.Andtheothertwosidestendto sagin andcomein together.
Now,with thetwo-pointlift wetookthree
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setsof mePJarements,andthebestwe could do is improve to a .334 positive difference. At that
point, if you go to the next chart, please---
(Viewgraph.) IR,.f. :_ 7.37]
--we installed what we call a rounding tool or what I call a rounding tool. The guys call it a
circumferential aligr:ment tool. But the intent of this tool is to put a squeeze on the segment
itself and try to deflect, bring the segment back into a dimension that will match up with the
clevis.
We've used this type of tool six previous times, and the first time we used it we had a design
that was strictly a manual mechanical design. It didn't have--i_ was not a hydraulic system. It
was just a rod with nuts on both ends, and we would twist the nuts and just measure the deflec-
tion.
We had a criteria not to exceed a half-inch deflection using the rounding tool, and in this
case we, like I said, we started off with the dimension of .334, and with the rounding tool in
place we were able to deflect an additional .236 by squeezing in with the rounding tool.
MR. SUTTER: So in effect you changed from .51 down to almost zero?
MR. LANG: Actually, we changed from .51 down
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to .098.
MR. SUTrER: So about .4,roughly?
MR. LANG: That iscorrect,a totaldeflectionof about .414,I think itis.
MR. SUTTER: What could this do to the bonding and the insulation?You had some de-bond.
Would this bring on any more de-bonding?
MR. LANG: Our experience has shown that ithas not, and the Marshall designers and Thio-
kol designers agree that that isnot going to be, that isnot a concern.
MR. SUTTER: What does cause de-bond? _ ittransportation loads, or does anybody know?
MR. LANG: Idon't know.
MR. KENNEDY: I think you would probably best ask that of the Morton Thiokol plant
design folks_Itisnot an uncommon phenomenon in these segments to see.And these are minor.
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These are two or three degrees in arc, 100 thousandths or so, and it is probably related to the
method of manufacture of the internal insulation in th_ case
But I'm not qualified to answer that question.
MR. SUTTER: I was wondering, though. Something starts it. There must be some kind of a
load,
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and would that load change if you take it out of round from .5 to .4. I was just curious. You
started out with some de-bond, and then you had to move the joint roughly four tenths of an
inch, and that has got to put some kind of a load, and could it effect--could it bring on more de-
bonding?
Itbuilds a load in there that wasn't there.It has to.
MR. KENNEDY: I don't feel,since I'm not familiar with the design of that rocket motor,
that I'm qualified to answer. I could get the answer for you on that particular subject.That
requires s,Jme propellant mechanics and some bonding expertise that we don't have here at Ken-
nedy.
MR. SUTTER: To change that joint four tenths of at, inch and do itall with, say, the hy-
draulic unit,ifyou did itall with the hydraulic unit,what would be the load pushing on the side
of the case? Do you know that?
MR. LANG: We have a conversion, reading the hydraulic pressure, a calculatior,that says
1200 psi hydraulics on that, on the piston,would equate to 3,000 pounds force ink the segment.
Thiokol has stated we could go as high as 5,000 pounds force on the segment with no problems.
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MR. RUMMEL: For clarification,on the quarter-inch limit,does that mean that ifyou hav_
a differentialdimengion of a quarter inch between seg__nen_ that you go ahead and mate? Is
that the correctinterpretation?
MR. KENNEDY: No, that's not exactly correct. A quarter inch is a self-imposed criteria.
Based on experience, we know that ifwe are within a quarter of an inch interference fit,ifyou
will,that the chances are we can successfully mate that segment to a cleviswithout reaching
the, ifyou will,the flaton flat,which isthe actual controllingcriteria.
The criteriathat are placed on us in allof these cases we keep talking about are placed on
us by a design agency, and we're not allowed to have the end of the tang, the flatend metal end
of the tang, contact the flatend ofthe outer clevisleg.And that isthe controllingcriteria.
The quarter inch isa factorwe have develer_d here with experience, saying that ifwe have
no more than a quarter, an apparent quarter inch interference,we can in fact avoid a flaton
flatcondition and attain a successfulmate.
MR. RUMMEL: One more question on this line.The one unit was 512 thousandths out of
round. Isthere
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a limit as to the maximum out of roundness that would be acceptable,beyond which you would
not try to squeeze itback into shape? Isthere no limit?
MR. KENNEDY: No, sir.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Kennedy, ifyou have this thing within a quarter of an inch and then the
beveled part of the tang slidesinto the clevis,there isa metal on metal action at the time that
thismating takes place.
MR. KENNEDY: Yes. I105
__ . _,
DR. COVERT: Is it possible that ch, _s or cracks ¢_'r scratches result from this, and that ulti-
mately might affect tbe surface s'noothmss .,,o that it would exceed the 46 micro-inches?
MR. KENNEDY: The section we're t fiking about right now, of ccurse, is the outer clevis leg
and the tang, wbich is--
DR. COVERt That gets cL>vere<l up by that shim anyway?
MR. KENNEDY: Yes, that has _ shim _toplied there. And keep in mind that both compo-
nents are greased when the) are assembled. They have a coating of grease of beth clevis and
tang components.
DR. FEYNMAN: How much is that--when I look at the picture of the tang, I .see there's a
kind of a
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beveled edge. That is not a sharp corner of the tang.
MR. KENNEDY: ',t does have a chameer on it, yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: How deep is that? That is, how far does it come in from the wall? Do you
know?
MR. KENNEDY: The length, as I remember from the drawing, is .34, the length. That is up
the length of the tang, and the angle ca]led out on the drawing is 25 to 35 degrees. And so I
believe mathematically--
MR. LANG: We calculate it comes out to .196, if you assume a 30 degree angle.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Has your expe_ence been that the major axis of the
ovality tends to be predictable based upon shipping considerations and so on?
MR. LANG: Yes, it does.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Car. you identify what the tendency is?
MR. LANG: The tendency--if we could go back to number five, please.
(Viewgraph.) lU,.t. :_ 7-2_1
MR. LANG: The tendency is that, since the cable tray, as you can see on the left side of that
photograph there or sketch--the vertical line is the cable tunnel. It is shipped up, and therefore
that is
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at 90 degrees. And our experience is ai zero and 180 is the major axis.
And so while it's on the rail car with the 90 degrees up, it tends to flatten somewhat, if you
will, and that has been our experienc._.
MR. SUTTER: How many times have you had to use a load of as high as 3,000 pounds to get
your roundness criteria? Do you hm'e the records on pre_ri, ous segments?
MR. BARSH: We have always laad to go up to the m_'_timum 1200 psi on the pressure gauge,
each time. The deflection may be different, depending upon that particular case and propellant,
but we pump it up to 1200 psi.
MR. sUTrER: And how mauy times has that happened? How many cases have you handled,
and what percent of the time do you go that high?
MR. BARSH: Well, we've used the round;ng tool six times, and every time we've gone up to
1200 psi.
MR. LANG: Let me back up. The first I think three or four, we didn't even--we weren't able
to measure anything except deflection. It was all twist the nut and squeeze the case. So we actu-
ally couldn't measure any force at all.
And the criteria, the only criteria we had at
1 106
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that timewasthemaximumallowabledeflectionofa half an inch.
MR.SUTTER:Well,whatpercertof thejoints haveyouhadto usethis technique?
MR.LANG:It's sixoutof howmany?It's a lot.
MR. KENNEDY:I wouldlike to calculatethat, becaasetherearesix joints pet assembly.
andI needto gobackandseethefirst assemblythat weusedit on.Wehavenot u_edit since
the be,_inningof the program.It hasbeenin usesinceapproximatelyDecember1984.Thefirst
useofthe roundingtoolassuchoccurredin December1984.
MR.SU_ER: It's a little pit unusual,then.That is whatI amasking:is it unusualor not?
MR.KENNEDY:Wedon'tuseit everystack,that is co-rect.
MR.LANG:Bill hasgotsomeexperiencearlier in the flow;beforewehada roundingtoel,
wherewewouldhanga two-pointconfiguration,trying to let the propellantweightand mass
bring it into round.Anddidr_'t_-ehavesomefairly lengthytwo-pointhangtimes?
MR.BARSH:In theearlierpart of the program, we had a different lifting beam than what
you
2026
see on the monitor there. It interfaced with the handling ring, which stayed on the segment
until after we stacked that segment, and then we removed the handling ring.
We had four lifting eyes on the handlin_ ring, where we could take this two-point lift and
switch axis in order to mz_ke the segment round in the way we needed to mate it. That was quite
frequent, that "we had to ao that switch from a zero-180 axis over to a 90-270 axis in order to get
the segment to egg out.
MR. SUTTER: As you started the program, you had new units, and now the units have been
used one or two times. Have you noticed any difference between new a_,d used units on having
to use this technique?
MR. BARSH: I really can't answer that.
MR. KENNEDY: We would have to go back ar.d look at the pedigree of the segments a_d
which ones had new and which ones had used parts and which ones we used the roundi_,g
system on. It is not uncommon. As Bill said, it is not uncommon to have to shift from a tbur-
point lift to a two-point lift and remain suspended from the crane for som_ number of hours to
allow the mass of the segment to realign and bring it closer into the conformance to tk._ clevis
we're trying to put it in That is, just about every flow we do that.
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MR. ACHESON: What is the longest it has taken, that you can recall, to achieve enough
roundness to assemble?
MR. KENNEDY: That is probably before the rounding tool was developed, and it may be
that the rounding tool was developed as a result o_ a situation like that, where it had hung a
number of days and would not round up. And I would have to say, that would probably be in the
neighborhood of days.
MR. LANG: We will have to find a good answer for you, because I think that data is avail-
able.
DR. FEYNMAN: You've explained that you can't ; e the tang OD bigger that about .25 in
your experience, to avoid metal contact. On the other s_de, suppose the tang OD is too small. Is
there some criteria about how much too small it _s before you get into trouble again on the other
side?
MR. LANG: Could we have chart number 8, it is please, l 107
_Viewgraph.)IR,.J_: -'_*J
I havealreadyshowedyot_the zeroandthe positive.Yourquestionwouldbethe negative
sideof that samemeasurement.Thetophalf thereshowsa casewherethe tang OD is in fac*_
smaller, like your described, than the outer ieg of the clevis ID.
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Now if you would go to the lower, what I showed here is what we would consider a case
where the negative number would be such that the inside, if you will, of the tang, it actually
comes down in the same line, the same surface of the outside diameter of the inner clevis leg.
DR. FEYNMAN: What minus i$ that?
MR. LANG: Well, that minus, that depends, of course, on the actual dimensions of the tang
and clevis in question. What ! did on my own, I took the numbers off the drawing, took the
worst case tang, the thickest tang by design allowance, and the narrowest clevis opening.
And I don't remember those precise numbers, but that dimension as shown there with the
worst case tang and clevis would be a .320 negative difference.
DR. FEYNMAN: I understand it was minus .393, actually, when you went to mate these.
MR. LANG: That was our largest negative number recorded, that is correct.
DR. FEYNMAN: In other words, the situation that you have drawn, it is even worse.
MR. LANG: Well, it may be. But aga;n, 220 is based on the worst case tang and clevis _i-
n-iensions. I don't know the exact dimensions of this particular
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joint, although if you assume they are the worst case tolerances then that 393 would have been
this case, that is right.
DR. FEVNMAN: In other words, this piece will come down and push directly on the O-ring
as it is coming in.
MR. LANG: And it will squeeze the O-ring as it comes in. The chamfer of the tang would in
fact ride the O-ring side and push it into the O-ring groove.
DR. RIDE: Is there a ,:hance it could have come down metal on metal on that side?
MR. LANG: We don't think so, although it is hard to see, because you can see it is on the
inside as the segment comes down. To actually get metal cn metal, again, if you will take the
worst case, the 320 worst case of those surfaces coincide, the chamfer on the t_ng, if we say .2 is
the correct dimension, it is certainly close to that.
Add that to the 320. What is that? Five something, and all that says is you're going to ride
down at minus 5 something, you will ride down the chamfer, just like we do on the outside.
Metal on metal I think would be a larger number, and I don't know what that would be. We
could probably calculate it or something close.
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DR. RIDE: Could you tell us where roughly circumferentially the minus .393 occurred?
MR. BARSH: It was at !20 degrees, 120 and 300.
MR. KENNEDY: I don't think we answered all the questions. I think the first question that
started this discussion was do we have any criteria placed on us on a negative. We do not.
And this segment, by the way, was not the maximum negative we have assembled.
DR. FEYNMAN: It's possible we would have some rubbing and produce some metal shav-
ings in ther _y che rubbing of one piece against another?
MR. LA. ,G: I don't think we can say that it is impossible, but the surfaces are inspected for
any kind of metal deformation, raised metal that might cause scraping. And certainly, like
Carver stated, the surfaces are greased, and our experience has been, taking them apart--and
1108
wehad--like Carversaid,weknowwe'vehadseveralcasesbiggerthan rhis.andwehavehad
probablyquite a few that had metalon metal,not quite this bad,if we assume393wasbad.
But westill haven'tseen,taking the boostersapm_,that kind of evidenceor that kind of
damage.
MR.RUMMEL:Doyouknowhowmuchout of
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roundness occurred in this particular joint in 51-L after the shims were applied?
MR. LANG: I'm sorry? Say again, please?
MR. RUMMEL: Do you know how much out of roundness existed after the shims were ap-
plied to this joint?
MR. LANG: No, sir, we don't have any way to measure that.
MR. RUMMEL: One of the purposes of the shims is to help to keep it round, is it not?
MR. LANG: It's my understanding it is to help the squeeze on the O-ring_, that is right, that
is its priIaary purpose.
MR. ACHESON: When you have this condition, have you ever, after seating the upper seg-
ment, have you ever lifted it off again to see what the effect was on metal to metal contact or on
the O-rings?
MR. LANG: The only time we have pulled a segment apart is if we had--if we failed a leak
check of the C'-rings, and I think that has happened on three different c<.casions. And es far as I
know--in fact, I can state that there was no metal damage.
MR. ACHESON: Have you examined--where you had these extreme out of roundness prob-
lems, have you examined the segments that have been recovered to
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ascertain metal to metal damage or damage to the O-rings by the tight fit?
MR. KENNEDY: The inspection of the recovered hardware is all done at the Morton Thio-
kol plant in Utah. We don't do any of that inspection here, and that data would have been re-
corded and examined there.
I am not aware of any indication of a,,y damage. But their post-flight reports would have
indicated that if they found it.
MR. ACHESON: During the stacking process, the inspectors who initially in:_pect the work,
I take it these are Thiokol direct employees?
MR. KENNEDY: .Tnspect the tang and the clevis, yes.
MR. ACHESON: And in fact inspect each stage of the assembly process?
MR. KENNEDY: That is correct, until the joint is made.
MR. ACHESON: Now, Thiokol being respensible to Lockheed, Mr. Barsh, perhaps you can
tell me, does Lockheed then have its inspectors inspect that work, or do they accept the Thiokol
inspection?
MR. BARSH: They accept she Thiokol inspectors, and there are certain places in the proce-
dures where a NASA inspector has also got to buy
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that step.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Ride.
DR. RIDE: Have you had a chance to gc back and talk to che technicians who were watching
the mating process, watching the tang go into the clevis, to find out whether they have--actual-
ly were able to witness any anomalies?
MR. LANG: Nu, we have not. 1109
®
DR. RIDE: How many people do you have stationed around the circumference during that
process?
MR. LANG: I think we have a requirement that says four minimum. Normally there m _ s_×
or seven. I think in this case, Carver, you said six?
MR. KENNEDY: I believe that there would be at least six technicians alone. There would be
an inspector. There would be probably some representative of what we call the LSS. which is an
oversight group from Morton Thiokol plant. And a NASA inspector would be there.
DR. RIDE: Do you think that they would have been able to see around that area at either
120 degrees or 300 degrees, to, wa:ch the tang as it went in avd see whether it affected the O-
ring or the inner surface, the sealing surface?
MR. KENNEDY: I would ha_ e to say that, the
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emphasis being on not reaching a fla_ on flat condition on the outer leg, the concentration on
watching the outer leg is focused there. And that is where most of the attention is.
However, since the inner leg is higher than the outer leg, there is a step in the procedure
that is, as you come down you must center the tang, so that it does not--so that it is not eccen-
tric to the clevis. That is, you look--it is implicit that you look to see that you're not going to hit
the tang on the end of the inner clevis leg.
And if you are, in fact there are instructions in the procedure of how to direct the crane to
move the segment so that it is centered over the clevis. But insofar a_ being a step in the proce-
dure to look for flat on flat on the inner leg and the clevis, there is no step in the procedure.
The requirement it places on us is on the outer leg.
DR. R!r)E: Is that area around 300 degrees, is that an easy area to see? Is that something
that, if t._.z-y were looking there, they probably would have noticed that?
2viR. KENNEDY: You can walk completely around the clevis There is nothing else there
except the
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platform. You can walk around the platform 360 degrees.
DR. RIDE: Do you have plans to go back and talk to those technicians?
MR. LANG: Yes, we do.
DR. FEYNMAN: Technicians have a certain amount of trouble with a pa:-ticular fact that
the procedure is unsatisfactory. If you have decided that six diameters are correct, you still don't
know that it will fit.
Let me sul_pose, for example, that the bottom is an exact circle, so the six diameters of the
bottom of the clevis are all equal, that then the tang could be a figure something like this, which
has six diameters, if you figure it out, all equal; and yet, it wouldn't fit iL because it is more
triangular
And they find this from time to time, and have given it a name and triea to fix it _,at there
is no fix-up up and down between the gays who are doing the work and the people who have
written the procedure to discover thaL they have this difficulty frer_ time to ti_ne.
MR. LANG: Well, again, that c_me, I guess, that you drew could be true some time, some
day. But the criteria, again, is ne flat on flat, and that is
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carefully inspected all the way around
MR. KENNEDY: That is a 360 degree requirement, not just at six lo_ations.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: When you have a difficult fit, do you forward that infor..
mation back to the plant so that on their post-recovery inspection they can con'elate their in-
spections to those pre_flight difficulties, stacking difficulties?
MR. KENNEDY: The information is forwarded to the plant. I do not know what use is made
ef that, but the information is for,_arded. In fact, as I said, they have a group here called LSS, a
representative group here, and they actually prepare that report. They prepare a summary of
each stack and furni._h that information back to the plant in Utah.
And it covers other things other than this dimension. It covers all of the activities on the
SRB's.
CHAIRMAN RC_ERS: Mr. Lang, does that complete your presentation?
MR. LANG: I had a couple of more points to go over.
CHAIRM,S,N ROGERS: Why don't you go ahead.
MR. LANG: We, as discussed, wound up meeting the criteria of no flat on flat, and--well, let
me
2037
back up a minute. : .,'
While
we were in the process of those final dimensions, we proceeded with the O-ring instal-
lation. I wanted to mention particularly the O-ring installation and the O-ring inspection crite- |
ria because it _s become ol_viotm to most people we do not inspect the O-_ngs per se here at
Kennedy Spac_ Center. i '
At one time in the program, we did. That inspection took place prior to installation up on |
the platform, up on the level. And subsequently in the greasing process, it was a long-term--not _. .
a long-term, but a handling process.
It was decided that the inspections would take place back in the Thiokol plant. The O-rings , _
would be greased there, packaged very carefully,and all we would do here at Kennedy Space
Center is inspect the bag for any damage and then remove it from the bag and install it. i
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When was that chvn_:_ made? l
MR. LANG: That was--I don't have the date for this. I promised I _vould do that and I
didn't. That change was made for the STS-13 stack, and it has been that way ever since.
CHAIRMAN ROGEPS: So you've had a lot of launches since then.
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MR. LANG: Yes, we have.
April 1984, I'm told. In this case, in this particular segment, the first two O-rings that we
took out of the box to install we rejec_ted because the inner bag had some problem with it. I'm
not sure--we have been trying to find the exact nature of that. We think it was merely the bag
was not thermally sealed; it was folded over and ,,r_apled.
But at any rate they were rejected.We got two new O-rings out. The bags were very care-
fullyinspected and opened and installed.
We then went through the process of then lowering, after the rounding tool was removed, of
course, then lowering the tang into the clevis.That operatiop_was completed, the pins installed,
and of course the pin retainer clips,as they're called,were installed,and we performed the joint
leak check.
between the two O-rings, and followed by--and that 200 psi,by the way, ismaintained through-
ou_ a 1_minute time period,constantly maintained such that ifthere was a leak of any kind we
wouldn t see it,because we maintain the source.
ARer the 15-minute wait, we vent that _ - ¢...[ l lll
_,," q) I .>:.:_=--: - _ '
UP
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pressure down, leteverything settlefor a 15 minute stabilizationperiod,come back up to 50 psi,
isolatethe source at this time, and do a 50 psi pressure check for ten nlinutes.And our criteria
_swe are allowed one psi decay from the 50 in ten minutes, and this particui_.rjoint,itdidn't
indicate any leakage at all.
Now, that leak check procedure, by the way, has had some modifications,too.We started off
initiallyin the program through STS-7 just pressurizing _+to 50 and doing a leak check For
STS-8 and 9, the procedure was modified to pressurize to 100 psi for-just momentarily come up
to 100, and Ithink some number ofseconds--was iteight seconds?
And we were told that the rationale there was to make sure that ifthere was a problem
with the O-ring the flow,the GN-2 flow would go through that O-ring,through the putty,so that
when we turn around and pressurizeto 50 to do the leak check putty would not mask an O-ring
leak.
STS-II, that procedure was again modified, to increase that initialpre,_ure to 200 and to
maintain itfor 15 minutes, likewe did on thisjoint.And again, the primary reason was to make
sure that the putty did not mask a faultyO-ring.
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That isthe history of the O-ring leak check procedure. And I was just going to say, that is
allwe had planned.
_CVrIAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Lang, I gather you've been head of the SRB joint group investi-
gating?
MR. LANG: Yes, I have been, that'srigh:
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And how large isthat group?
MR. LANG: About 12 people,roughly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can you give us some idea when that--when your investigaticnwill
be completed?
MR. LANG: Actually, we are fairlyclose,I think, to completing our portion of it.We direct-
ly looked at this one joint to make sure, to go f'md out everything we did to it,to uncover any-
thing at all that may indicate that there was something in our process that may have been a
problem.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you plan to have a written report?
MR. LANG: Yes, sir,and I would hope to have that report completed in maybe a couple of
weeks.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As long as that,two weeks?
MR. LANG: A week.
[Laughter.]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Good. We're making
2041
progress.
[Laughter.]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, the reason I ask, ofcourse, this Commission only lastsanother
90 days, and we're anxious to move aheaa as quickly as possible.And we would like as soon as
you _ to get a copy of your report,because we want to work with you, and we're going to have
to rely in large measure on the work that you do.
1_12
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qWe will be free, of course, to make suggestions or to make any further investigation. But by
and large, we appreciate the _peed with which you are operating, and we hope that you will gi-e
us the report as soon as you can.
Thank you very much _,r your presentation. We wi! take a ten minute recess no-v, p!ease.
Rece_s._
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Cc, mmission will come to order, please.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Moser. Mr. Littles, and Mr. Lee.
(Witnes_ sw,: :n. I
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O FORWARDHANDLING RING REMOVALAN_ INHIBITOR
INSPECTION COWPLETE
o CLEVIS INSPECTION COMPLETE
o TRANSFER TO VAB COMPLETE
5
5
6
27
27
27
27
2
l--Nlll@aTlbl
p._ RENMRKS
NOV. 85
NOV 85
NOV 85
NOV 85
NOV 85
NOV 85
I I
_O K$C
SHUTTLE
PERATION$
A_.CTIVITY
AFT CENTER SEGMENT OPERATIONS
o GRAIN INSPECTION COMPLETE
o OFFLOAD & TANG INSPECTION COMPLETE
o FORWARD HANDLILNG RING REMOVAL & INHIBITOR
INSPECTION COMPLETE
o CLEVIS INSPECTION COMPLETE
o MOVE SEGMENT TO SURGE
o MOVE SEGMENT TO VAB
DATE
20 NOV 85
23 NOV 85
23 NOV 85
25 NOV 85
26 NOV 85
5 n_ 85
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SUMMARY OF KS[ SEGMENT ASSEMBLY OPERt,TIONS
RH AFT (SRM-25) TO RU .FT CENTER (SRM-26)
SEGMENT STOCK SEQUENCE - 7 DEC 85
ACTIVITY
o POSITI_J RH AFT CENTER SEGMENT IN TRANSFER AISLE
o LIFTINt BEAM CONNECTED
o JOINT PUTTY APPLICATI?N COMPLETE
o FIRST PqUNDNESS MEASUREMENT - 4-POINT LIFT
o FIRST POUNDNESS MEASUREMENT - 2-POINT LIFT
u SECOND ROUNDNESS MEASUREMENT - 2-POINT LIFT
0 THIRD POUNDNESS MEASUREMENT - 2-POINT LIFT
o COMPLEI!! RH AFT CENTER TANG INSPECTION
o COMPLETE PR REPAIR, CASE TO INSULATION DEBOND - TANG
o INSTALl JOINT ROUNDING TOOL TO _ANG
0 "0" RI_IGS INSTALLED
o CLOSEOISF PHOTOS TAKEN
o REMOVE TOOL AND TAKE ROUNDNESS MEASUREMENT
o TANG [I;;AGE[
o FIRST PIN INSTALLED
o LAST PIN INSTALLED
o LEAK CI'!CK COMPLETED
TIME
2300
0100
0!?0
0!45
0300
0354
0415
0500
0500
0910
09]5
0935
_]15
i020
1030
]220
REMARKS
6 DEC 85
UNACCEPTABLE
UNACCEPTABLE
UNACCEPTABLE
UNACCEPTABLE
NO PROBLEM REPORT
PR-SR-RAC-050-O001
016 ° - !96° LOCATION
ACCEPTABLE
0._ PSI DECAY
iRef. 3 7-2:_:_ of 3j
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TESTIMONY OF: THOMAS MOSER, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISrRA£OR FOR SPACE
FLIGHT, NASA; DR. JERROL WAYNE LITFLES, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR ENGI-
NEERING, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER; AND JACK LEE, DEPUTY DIREC-
TOR, I_4SFC
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Moser, will you go ahead and identity each of you and your
present __ssignments.
MR. MOSER: Okay, Mr. Chai_aaan, members of the Commission.
I'm Tom Moser. I'm reporting today in the capacity as the head of the failure scenario team
from the Johnson Space Center. I have held that position until just recently at the same time I
was dir-'_ar of" engineering at JSC.
I L_.*:_,_ my experience with the space 3huttle in 1969, and most o.!' that time I served in
capacities related to strength integrity of the orbiter and a_ deputy project manager of the orbit-
er it_-elf.
DR. LIq_I'LES: Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission:
My name is Wayne Littles. I am &_sociate director of engineering at Marshall Space Flight
Center, and I've been at Marshall for 18 years, and I've held my
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current position _br two years. And prior to that, i was deputy to the same position, and prior to
that, I served as the chief of the engineering analysis division in S and E.
My education is in mechanical engineemng, and I ha_e a bachelor's degree from Geo:gia
Tech, a master's d_;ree from the University of S_uthern California, and a Ph.D. from the Uni-
versity of Texas.
MR. LEE: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission:
I'm Jack Lee, deputy director of the Marshall Space Flight Center. I nave held that position
since 1980. I have been with the Marshall Center since 1958, and since the date of the incident I
have directed the analysis of failure evaluation effort for the Marshall elements for those ele-
ments for which we're r_ponsible. That includes the external tank, the solid rocket booster, the
shuttle main engine, and the inertial upper s_ge.
MR. MOSER: Mr. Chairman, if it pleases the Commission, the next five speakers will pro-
ceed through a failure scenario beginning at the top level with the evi " _ce as we see from the
accident, and the** into the top level fault trees, and then down into th,._ detai;ed failure scenar-
ios of each one of the possible causes.
And so I will begin that.
1124
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;_nd to facilitate this, I will present an abbreviated time line this morning, i will provide to
the ('ommission, if you so desire, a detailed four-page time line. But for the sake of presentation
and clarity, I have abbreviated that for your presentation today.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I was going to ask, could you just as a preliminary" melter exp!ain
the terms first? What is a failure scenario? What do you mean by failure scenario? I t._,,,nk I
know, but it would be helpful.
M.R MOSER: And you will see that in one of our presentations here. Basically, the fault
tree that you will see on the presentation--
CH MRMAN ROGERS: First you used the term "failure scenario." What is that?
MR MOSER: Failure scenario is a detailed analyses of a fault tree as to why the various
elements of the failure events could have taken place. It is using a model of a failure, a theory
for a failure, and then the analysis to substantiate or to deny that each element of the failure
model is in fact correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Am I correct that a failure scenario is a hypothesis of something
that might have
2045
happened, and then you consider each aspect of that to see whether it in fact did happen?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And then you draw conclusions from that?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir, and we verify or deny or disprove each one of the steps of that. And
today as we proceed through this, we will show you that some of the _'eps in the failure scenar-
ios indicate that it is not a viable cause, and I think that will become very clear as we proceed
through.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When you get to a fault tree, would you explain what that is, too, so
the listeners understand what it is?
MR. MOSER: Okay, sir.
If I could have the first chart, please, M-l.
(Viewgraph M-1.) _m-a :_7 :_"t
This is--what I've shown here on M-1 is an outline of the investigation process, beginning
with the incident. The description of the incident is captured by the evidence from the flight
data, the physical data, and the photographic data. It is factual as c)est we know it, and I will
present that to you today, along with the time line. That is the given for the problem, if you
will.
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The next level is what could ,have cau,¢_:l this accident, and that is the--please leave M-1 up,
please, on the screen. If you could go back to M-I, please.
The second block per se is the fault tree development. It is what could have gc,ne wrong and
caused the accident. It could have been the orbiter, it could have been the externa T tank, it could
have been any number of things which caused that failure. It could have been the weather con-
ditions.
Those, it is the anomaly and the vehicle for the failures which constitute the fault tree.
From those possible fault tree elements, we then establish and gather data to either substantiate
or deny any one of the branches 1 - that fault tree, and we will have a detailed fault tree for
you for each one of these things by tLe other presenters.
To support that, in the middle of that investigation process, the incident data bases _-e de-
rived, both from the evidence which has been measured, which we document as given up in the
first block, and also there is data which is derived by test and analysis, looking at records, the
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type of t ngs which you gentlemen--the gentleman just spoke to you on on processing the hard-
ware ant the checkout. This is what
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is then used to verify or deny parts of the failure process and analysis.
All of that then, with the de'_ils of the failure analysis which l:_stulates the sequences, the
causes, and the special tests and analysis which is conducted, which we will talk to you about in
detail, are then fed back and the entire loop is iterated back and forth until we finally decide _n
those events which are still possible or probable and work those until we can either prove or
disprove them, hoping to ccme out with conclusions as to what the causes were or findings.
And today what we're going to present to you are some findings, and I think some of these
elements, we are going to show that there is a very, very low probab ity that they contributed,
in all probability they did not, they are not probable causes.
Others, we're going to report to you on the status of our analysis and investigatio_r_.
If I could have the next chart, please.
(Viewgraph M-2.1 IR,.t. _ ; :_Jl
This is the beginning of the abbreviated. If you can scan in on the left-hand side of that
ct.art if you will, please.
The time line that I have shown here begins
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before T-zero. It begins with the SSME start command. As I stated earlier, I have abbreviated
the time lines and the events just for the _ake of clarity, and the start of this event in this time
line is for the launch itself.
As we develop possible failures which were caused by any one of the elements that require
that the time line begin earlier than this, during the checkout and processing of any one of the
elements, that is shown with those particular scenarios.
I will now present to you evidence as we know today to be factual--it is not der_,ved dat_
that I am going to show--that goes with each one of the events of the time line. And so this is a
given to any one of the detailed failure scenarios that you will see.
Starting with the SSME startup, that _s the main engine startup, that begins at approxi-
mately 6.6 seconds before T-zero, which is the ignition signal to the solid rocket booster motor.
Subsequent to that, at about one-half a second, .531, we saw--and if I could have chart M-3,
please.
(Photograph M-3_) Im.l_ :_ 7-:_"1
We saw a puff of smoke at the aft field joins of the solid rocket booster motor. We have
deduced from photogt-aphic evidence from multiple camera positions that
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the puff of smoke is coming, originating from between the s(,lid rocket booster and the external
tank. It is in the quadrant that is to the right of the picture as you see it there and on the far
side of the solid rocket booster.
That smoke was evident from .5 _,econds up until a little less than four seconds. There are
some photographic observations that indicate that that smoke and gases can be seen as late as
12 seconds. That is still under investigation by enhanced photo,,'raphy.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: At what point in the time line do you think the smoke occurred?
MR. MOSER: It occurred at .531 seconds after ignition signal to the solid rocket booster.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: About a half a second after liftoff?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir.
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CttAItCMAN ROGERS: And bow closely have you identified tb,_ source of the smoke:'
MR. MOSER: What we have done is we have identified it to t)e originating in the quadrant
of the solid rocket booster, to the right-hand side of the solid SRM as you see it there, and __-
tween the SRM and the external tank.
We have not pinpointed trom our enhan, _d
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photography the exact location of the source of the smoke yet, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How clos_ are you to doing that?
MR. MOSER: I can't answer th ,: right now. We thought ;re were about there about ten
days ago, and that photography enhancement has not panned out and woven that yet, sir.
One of the cameras that had a better view of that was non-functional at the time of launch.
So we are having to use some other techniques, and I don't know that we will be able to, with
the data that we have, to pinpoint exactly what the source is.
We have concluded, however, from the photographic data that it is not coming from the ex-
treme, in this photograph, from the extreme right-hand side of the solid r_ket booster, which is
where the check port, the test port, is located.
DR. RIDE: Can you put limits on the circumferential arc?
MR. MOSER: No, only to zay that it is within that quadrant, Sally
DR. RIDE: Between about 3t, q degrees and 210, is that the quadr-_mt?
MR. MOSER: From this t hotograph, we can't get
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it very close. From one of the other photographs that we have during the ascent we can get
closer, and I will show you that here in a moment. But that _s a different event.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It must have been an earlier photograph, thougt_, _han this, because
the smoke is pretty far up on :.his photograph.
MR. MOSER: There could have been one, yes, sir. I have chosen the sequence of phot_
graphs to best describe it..There is one--we ha,_e _me photographs that are earlier than _his
and that are later than this, but this is just indicative of that.
We can provide you with all of the photographs of every frame of this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think Mr. Stevenson gave us photographs in Washington which
were prior to this one, which showed with a little more delineation exactly where the smeke
initially came from. Am I correct in that?
MR. MOSER: The photographs that I remember seeing were about from this same angle,
the same camera, as a matter of fact, I was just advised. Yes, sir, the same camera.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Moser, where vertically does the smoke first come out? You talked about
the angular
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position. How about the longitudinal position?
MR. MOSER: It comes out from, in the proximity of the aft field joint.
DR. COVERT: And that's close also to that ring there that we can see there?
MR. MOSER: Pardon me?
DR. COVERT: We can see a strap going around with some cork insulation or something
under it, and that is reasonably close?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: And that is also reasonably close to where the external tank attaches to the
solid rocket motor. 1127
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MR. MOSER: That is correct, sir.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
DR. FEYNMAN: Isn't it, so is this the black smoke you're talking about at .5 seconds? Isn't
it true that in even the first few frames immediately after the ignition that you can see scme
white smoke earlier?
MR MOSER: From comparing the color of that smoke to this smoke, it appears to be a
lighter color, yes, sir. [ think there is some disa_'reement as to what the color actually is, wheth-
er it is less dense or whether it is the reflection._.
DR. FEYNMAN: I'm not wcrried about the color,
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but the time. It see Red to me that it was an extremely early incident in the pictures that could
see that.
MR. MOSF,.R: I don't believe it would be before a half a second, though, sir. That is the first
visible evidence that we see.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which is tLe first visible evidence? How would you describe, b_d
on the first photograph _hat you've seen, the first visible evidence was what? Was it white
,_moke or black smoke?
MR. MOSER: It was a lighter colored smoke, and I don't want to say it's white. It was not
white like the SRB is white, but a greyish colored smoke. That is the way it appears in the pho-
to.graph
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that preceded what appears to be blacker smoke?
MR. MOSER: Yes. sir, that is correct. It appeared to be--it appeared to be continuous from,
certainly from a half a second to about 3.375 seconds it was continuous. After that, it is very
difficult to interpret the photographs as to whether or not there is a continuous stream of any-
thing coming out there. In some viewers' eyes and based upon the ")hotographs that we have
today, it appears to last as long as 12 seconds. But that is not conclusive at this time.
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What I'm trying to do to set the stage here for _ _e of the other detailed work is to tell you
what we know to date with a lot of confidence,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, just to conclude the thought as far as I'm concerned, would
you say that in your observation of the photog_,aphs the first thing you noticed was smoke that
appeared to be white, and right about the same time some black smoke?
MR. MOSER: After that--first of all, it is a light colored smoke, and then it gets darker, as
you see it here, and then it begins to dissipate and leave, espec,ally as the flow around the vehi-
cle begins and the vehicle begins moving. And so it begins light and then it gets darker.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But would you conclude it all came from the same area?
MR, MOSER: Yes, sir. It appears to all come from the same area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Thanks.
MR. WALKER: Mr. Moser, have you verified that this phenomenon was not observed on
any previous launch?
MR. MOSER: I'm sorry?
MR. WALKER: Have you verified that this phenomenon was not observed on any previous
launch?
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MR. MOSER: We have--I have, to my know'ledge, we have not seen that event on any previ-
ous launch. There was a report at one time that they thought that an anomaly -xas seen attar an
i128
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SRB separation, but there has not _q any signs of black smoke or any type of anomalous vent-
ing of the SRB's on previous launches
MR. WALKER: Tlmnk you.
MR. MOSER: Proceeding on in the time line. at alyuut 20 seconds is _,here the solid rocket
booster begins to decrease its thrt:st in getti,_g ready f_r maximum dynamic pressure during
ascent.
If I could have chart M-5, please.
iViewgraph M-5.1 I_:,.t :1: ,::_1
What I have shown here i_ some data we have acquired from telemetry, which is a presenta-
tion of the pressure, chamber pressure of the right-hand solid rocket booster motor verst,s time
Everything appears to be nominal at the right-hand solid rocket booster as at about 20 some-
thing seconds, 21 seconds, when it begins to (lecrease the chambet pressure. As it goes into the
maximum dynamic pressure, everything is nominal essentially during that time.
If ! could have chart M-6, please.
(Viewgraph M-6.1 IX,., :, 7 :_'l
2056
This is again going back to the time line. Everything is proceeding well ip the time line. It
goes through the end of the thrust bucket, where it experiences minimum chamber pressure in
both left and right-hand solid rocket boosters, and then the pressure begins to increase again, as
was shown on the previous chart.
Shortly after that, about four seconds, we see our first evidence of the hot gases of the
plume coming from the right-hand solid rocket booster. If I could have chart M-7, please.
(Slide M-7.) Im., :_ 7-:_=,{
In this photograph you can see the bright spot on the right-hand solid rocket booster, and
what we have done to try and enhance our understanding of where things are occurring on the
vehicle, we have generated computer-aided graphics of the entire launch vehicle and overlaid
them on the photograph so they are to the same scale.
This has enabled us to pinpoint as accurately as we can, with the accuracy of the photo-
graphs and the fide!ity of the photographs, what the source is from this photograph.
_nd if I could have. M-8 up now, please---
(Slide M-_ i_,', :_ 7 :'"l
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which is a computer-drawn version of that same view. We have isolated that bright spot to
be again in the quadrant, as shown right here, on the right-hand solid rocket booster. And that
is the first indication of a visual plume coming out of that booster.
This we bare been able to--Dr. Ride asked if we could identify it specifically, and this we
have isolated to be at 45 degrees on the circumference, plus or minus ten degrees; and in the
longitudinal direction we have isolated it to be at the field joint, within plus or minus one foot.
And the reason we cannot get any clo6er than that is just because of the granularity of the
photographs, and also because of the angle of the vehicle to the camera.
DR. RIDE: Where are you taking zero degrees?
MR. :4OSER: Zero degrees is on the bottom of the solid rocket booster, so it would be just
about where hat arrow is on the Z axis.
DR. RIDE: Say again what the foot measurement was, what you were referring to? You've
isolated it within t,: _ area of one foot square?
MR. MOSER: In _e longitudinal direction, we have isolated the plume which you see in the
previous
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photograph to be in the plus or minus one foot of the aft fieldjoint.We cannot tellany more
accurately than that from our photographic data; and circumferentially around the solid rocket
booster motor, to be 45 degrees from the Z axis or, in this view, the bottom of the solid rocket
booster motor,
We _;_ proceeded into maximum dynamic pressure, and if I could have chart M-9 up,
please.
!Viewgraph M-9._ lm.r :_ : _Tj
At 59 seconds we experienced maximum dynamic pressure on the vehicle, which _as about
720 pounds per square foot of aerodynamic load. In comparison to other flights, this is less than
some of our previous experience. It is well within the design nominal value of maximum dynam-
ic pressure expected.
And the reason--I should point out also on the scale of time line, below the time in seconds
shows the throttle profile for the main engines. At thi_ time we had just gotten back up to 104
percent of our maximum thrust out of the main engines. We had been down as low as 65 per-
cent, and that is to keep *_his maximum dynamic pre_ure to the levels that I just reported.
Within about a second after that, at a little over 60 seconds, we experienced a divergence in
the solid rocket booster chamber pressure. And if you would
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display chart M-10, please.
(Viewgraph M-10.)Im'l. :_7 :_l
If you can zoom in just to the lower right-hand part of that That's good. Thank you very
much.
Here you can see a deviation in the chamber pre_ure, and that is the internal pressure _f
the solid rocket bo_ter, to that of the left hand. This is--before this time they md been track-
ing well within our experience base of comparing pressures between these two motors.
So we are beginning to see evidence here that that plume is consistent with a decrease in
the measured pressure.
The next thing that we see is evidence of the plume deflecting. And if I could have chart M-
11, please.
(Photo_aph M-11.) IR,.r. :_ 7 :.q
The plume has grown in size. It is now being deflected because it is impinging on the exter-
nal tank or because it is being deflected by the aerodynamics. It appears to us now to be deflect-
ing because of impingement of the external tank.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I couldn't quite hear the last part of your sentence. What did you
say at the
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end?
MR. MOSER: It is impinging on the external tank,
Then at 64.6 seconds, there is, we see with the next chart, which would be--no, I'm sorry.
Let me just tell you verbally what we do.
We see a change in the possible LH-2 tank leak at ,hat time, because the pre_ure--the
pressure is decreasing. And that is on chart M-13.
(Photograph M-13.) [ Ref. 3/7-40]
DR. COVERT: Did you say, Mr. Moser, that that time corresponded with the pre_ure
dropped in the hydrogen part of the external tank?
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MR.MOSER:I'm sorry?Repeat,please?
DR.COVERT:Yousaidat the sametime the p!umechanged character you had evidence
that suggested that the pressure drop in the hydroger_ tank or the pressure in the hydrogen tank
w'as dropping; is my understanding correct?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir. And I will show that to you. Fm serry I got cut of sequence here. I
wanted to show you the visual evidence that we a;'e seeing of change in the plume characteris-
tic, which L_ :hought to be from the leak, which :_ thought to be a leak from the hydrogen tank.
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On chart--in viewgraph M-13 is--what you see there, that is a plume characteristic. If you
will go to M-15, please, and look at the top part of that plume, you'll see a change in character.
(Slide M-15.) Ir,'l. :_ 7 lit
So that it is deflected more down, or appears to have more of a definite node at the top, as
opposed to a rounded condition. That is occurring at the same time as M-17, which is the pres-
sure profile. If you would put M-17 up, please.
(Viewgraph M-17.)Ir,.i :_ ; lZl
This is the pressure r,'otfi. _ of the liquid hydrogen tank. This is where we see that the de-
crease in the rise rate of _he ullage pressure, that is the gaseous pressure in the liquid hydrogen
tank is changing over what it had been.
It had been cycling up to that time as the demand required, and the characteristics of those
cycles md been consistent within our experience base. Here we see a change in that pressure
rise rate which is indicating that something anomalous is going on, li e a leak.
And so when I coupled this with the change in the characteristic of the plume coming from
the right-hand solid rocket booster, that is two strong
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pieces of evidence that we do have a leak at that time in the liquid hydrogen tm=k. And I will
show you some other supporting evidence to substantiate that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: At what time was that conclusion that there was a leak in the exter-
nal tank?
MR. MOSER: That was at 64.64, and that is on chart M-16, at the lower right-hand side, Mr.
Chairman.
(Viewgraph M-16.) IRef. :}7 _:_1
That is when we see the change in the plume characte_tic, at 64.64. And about three-
tenths of a second after that is when we can determine from the measured pressure data that
we are seeing a change in the pressure rate.
The data rate of the pressure m about five samples per second.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If you can conclude at that time that there was a leak in the exter-
nal tank, can you also conclude that up to that point there had not been a leak m the external
tank?
MR. MOSER: With some degree of rough granularity. There could be a small leak, I think
like eight-tenths of an inch in diameter.
DR. LrI'rLES: About four pounds per second of liquid hydrogen _.'ould Imve been leaking
without detection.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: During the whole 60 seconds?
DR. LYFrLES: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what would be the size of that leak?
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DR. LITI'LES: it would be about a .8 inch diameter hole. I will discuss that in some of these
scenarios that ! will p_esent.
CHAIRMAN ROCERS: FiDe. Thank you.
MR. MOSER: I would like to add--or to tell tbe Commission that we will provide them with
color photographs of all cf the copies that you have in there today. Logistics kept us from doing
that, so that will be provmed to you today.
DR. FEYNMAN: I got .-onfused in interpreting your charts and in what you stud. You saw
the changes in plume shape as 64.7 or so, and you see the pressure decrease in the rate of rise at
66.7. So it must be. about two seccnds between, is that right?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir. I'm sorry, I did state that incorrectly, yes, sir. Thank you.
The next chart is M-18, please.
(Viewgraph M-18.) IR,'t :_ 7 111
"I_en at a little greater than 72 s(_onds into the flight is where we see motion of the right-
hand solid rocket booster to the rest of the launch vehicle,
2064
and that is shown on chart M-19, wherE, here I display the rotation--
(Viewgraph M-19.)I m''- :_ ;-t_l
--of the pitch of the right-hand solid rocket booster to that of the left-hand.
Not shown on this data is the fact lhat the left-hand solid rocket booster rate gyro is track-
ing exactly with that of the orbiter, an:l that is the way all three of the elements or all fcur
elements--the orbiter, the external tank, :a',d the two SRB's--have been tracking up until this
point.
It is 72.201 seconds, we see a deviation from the right-hand solid rocket booster. It is our
indication that something has failed in the aft attachment of the solid rocket booster to the ex-
ternal tank. and i will show you more of why we have concluded that.
If I could have chart M-20, please.
(Viewgraph M-20.)I_,.I :_ 7 ,"l
This is a computer-drawn picture of the launch vehicle looking down on top with the solid
rocket booster released from its lower link. T[,e evidence that we have is that we have lost the
load pad at that link. If that results, then the right-hand solid rocket booster then is free to
pivot about its forward
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attachment point and one of the remaining aft attachmer.t points.
This is consistent with maintaining a data source from the solid rocket boosters, because the
integrity of everything going on in the solid rocket boosters, the data flows through the top aft
link. What is hypothesized here, and is supported by the analysis, is that the lower 1,_ft-hand or
the lower link has failed, the solid rocket booster has both rolled about that new hinge line so it
has a new pitch a_d yaw attitude.
That is what we measure from the flight data. When it does that, it impacts the in.mr *ank
region, as shown here on this drawing, between the LOX tank and the hydrogen tank there. It
impacts it just at the lower portion of the frustum of the right-hand cone of the soJd rocket
booster.
If I could have the next chart, please.
(Viewgraph M-21.) x,.l. :_ 7 _7 I
In a different view, we _ that the SRB has moved up toward the orbiter at the aft end.
And the next view, please.
(Viewgraph M-22.) [U,',. :_ 7 _sI
I132
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This is a view which looks at that same configuration from the forv, ard end, and here you
can get
8
!
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a better feel for how it ires rotated about its new hinge line. This impacts the tank_ as I s_,id,
causing the tank to load up, rupt_rin_; the ff rward LOX tank the hydrogen tank, and at the
same time probably causing the aft bulkhead of the hydrogen tank to rupture.
DR. FEYNMAN: In order to determine the motion of this thing, of the right-hand booster.
you have gbn'os :hat determine its orientation?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: Do you also have inertia measurement to tell whether it moves forward or
back?
MR. MOSER: No, sir, just the rate gyro, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: You don't have any inertia measurement?
MR. MOSER: No, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: _ there's no way to determine the absolute position except to guess that
the upper support hadn't slipped yet, i$ that right? That is how you did that?
MR, MOSER: That is correct, sir, yes.
And then that is pa,'t of the continuing photo analysis, too, is to verify that it is in fact still
attached there. We did not see any other motion, and I don't knew that it is a sufficier t solution
to look at the rate of change of both pitch and yaw, given that the
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fixed geometry, okay, of rotating about those points, all of that data supports itself.
And then !ooking at the times at which the SRB rotating would have bot:omed out and in-
duced high loads in the tanks, is when we see changes in the pressure and also see physical
evidence, visual evidence I might add, from the tanks, where they are beginning to lose liquid
hydrogen and liquid oxygen.
And so we have about three pieces of data which supports that.
MR. RUMMEL: The aft rupture in the ET is after the explosion, due to explosive force? On
what do you postulate the cause to be_?
MR. MOSER: I'm sorry, Mr. Rummel. O_uld you repeat that, please?
MR. RUMMEL: I think you mentioned that after the LOX tank and the hydrogen tank and
the inter-tanl¢ area had been damaged, that was followed by a separation in the ah end of the
hydrogen tank. Did I understand that correctly?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir. Let me verify that. We first see that, the spillage of the aft dome of
the liquid hydrogen tank, at 73.137 seconds. We see--that is visually, and I think I'm going to
show you a picture of that in just a moment.
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MR. RUMMEL: WeD, my question--perhaps you're coming t_ it_is the cause of the aft rup-
ture. It appears that *_he SRB didn't hit the tank in that area. Was this due to overstressing
from the rapture for,yard?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir. The aft attachment is connected, the remaining aft attachment about
which it is rotating, is connected right at :he seam of the aft bulkhead to the cylindrical portion
of the tank. And as soon as it rotates over and interferes with that region, then it loads it up in
an out-of-plane load for the tank, and so it should rip the tank right in that region.
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Plus, the :_olid rocket booster is rotating about 40 degrees per second at that time, and _ it
fits with the analysis that we have done that says that it should have in fact tore the tank in
that reg:on.
MR. RUMMEL: So you're postulating the failing of that part of the attach fitting that is
attached to the ET at that point in time?
MR. MOSER: That is correct, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
CH._,IRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Moser, yesterday we looked at the debris and the right frustum
ks badly damaged. The left one looks as though it's not damaged at all. The right one seems
totally consistent with
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this photegraph.
Have you seen that debris? In other words, the right frustum has darnage which would be
almost totally consistent with that photograph.
MR. MOSER: It was reported to me. I have not physically seen it myself, but it was reperted
to me what it appeared, and it does appear to be consistent with our failure model here, yes, sir.
DR. RIDE: Do you think that the contact between the SRB and tho upper portion of the
tank, the LO_ tank, is what caused the LO2 tank to rupture?
MR. MOSER: Yes.
If we could proceed on to the next chart, please, which would be M-23.
(Viewgraph 1_-233 Ira',. :_ 7. I:_I
Here, I have already described the time of events of when we see the ullage pressure drop.
Go to M-24, please.
(Viewgraph M-24.) [m,r. :3 7-_o]
It is--and I'm going to repeat myself somewhat here. At 72.564 seconds is the point you see
here on the ullage pressure of the liquid hydrogen tank. It can now not keep up with the de-
mands, with t_,o flow control valves open.
Up until that time, the pressure had been
2070
decreasing, but it had been maintaining its pressure. Now it can no longer do that. And Dr.
Ride, that is when we think that the forward--we have lost the integrity of the forward end of
the hydrogen tank.
DR. FEYNMAN: Si:, i hate to interrupt you. While we have the chart up, I notice that the
decretme coming down earlier--and we're talking about something earlier and so I'm interrupt-
ing-from 64 seconds, the decrease is slower than the previous decreases.
Can we interpret that in some way?
MR. MOSER: I don't think i can give you an adequate di_ussion of that. We had seen, I
think if we go all the way back in the pressure profiles, that that was not uncharacteristic. But I
will verify that for you.
DR. FEYNMAN: Thank you. I'm sorry to interrupt you.
MR. MOSER: No, that's quite all right.
if you would go tc chart M-25.
(Viewgraph M-25.) I_,'f. :_ 7-._!1
Here we see the actuator motion from the right-hand SRB, and that is very simply the flight
control system trying to respond to what the rate gyro from the SRB is telling it to do. And so,
that tells us our flight control system is still behaving properly a_
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that time.
It is--
VICE CHAIRMANARMSTROI,:G:Is the rate _'ro packagea two-gyropackageor three?
MR.MOSER:It isa thre_g_'opackage--excuseme.Twoaxes,twogyros.OnchartM-26--
!ViewgraphM-26.)Imp::_7.52]
--now th, _boththe LOX andthehydrogentankshavelost their pressure,weseethe inlet
pressureto the SSME'sdropping,andthat will bediscussedmoreby Mr. Hopsor,onwhat that
eventmeansto themainengines.
(ViewgraphM-27.)IR,.t.:_7..5:q
M-27is thesametypeof datafor theLOXpump.
If youwouldgoto M-28,please,backto thetimeline.
(ViewgraphM-28.)In,.r.:_._5t I
This is where I pick up, at 73.137 seconds, the vapors near the "::her tank region, and that is
shown on chart M-29.
(Slide M-29.) ix,., :_ 7 55 I
It's going to be very difficult for you to see the vapors in the inner tank region. If you can
scan up
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just a _,_tle bit on that, you can barely detect it. This photograph in _he display here is not ade-
quate, but that is our first ipdication that we can see vapers coming from the forward.
Also, at this same time there is spillage from the aft region beginning to initiate. Then in
M-30--
(Slide M-30.) Im._. :_ 7 5, t
--we can see the increase in the vapors coming from forward, and here you can see it along
the side of the external tank, just a few tenths of a second later. And then M-31, pleaso.
(Viewgraph M-31.)IR,'I :_ 7 57 I
Again, _ Jth the overlay from our computer-aided drawings, that is about the characteristic
of the vapor coming from up forward.
M-32, please.
(Slide M-32.) [m.r :_7 5_ I
We now see a bright flash between the orbiter and the external tank, and what that is is an
apparent--and we can't prove this conclusively, but it appears to be now that that is a reaction
or a burning of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. They have now mixed sufficiently in that
region as they flow back m flash. Up until that point, it had just been vapors.
And then the next chart, please, M-33.
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(Slide M-33.)Im'r. :_7-5_q
And that same type of thing propagates forward, and continuing to burn.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph M-34.)[x,.r :_ 7 .o i
That is jus*. a highlight of where this rupture initiated with the LOX tank.
M-35, please.
(Viewgraph M-35.)Im,I :_ 7,,I I
i
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WhatI havedonewith thetime line,asbestI can,is to sortoutan)_h,ng...._e try to haveit
asfactualandtrue to feedinto theotherfailure mode]analyses.Wehavecategorizedor--
GENERALKUTYNA: Mr. Moser,beforeyoustart on thai I wonderif I couldpursueone
pointon thew'indsandair turbulence.Wesawdownat Marshal.tkat the flameappearedon tbe
sideof the solidrocketat 58seconds,andwehadour maxaerodynamicpressureat 60seconds.
sothat wasafterthe flame.
However,I think it is important,asyoutold usbefore,that it wasquitea bumpyride prior
to that time. Therewereair currentsor wind changesthat causedthe flight controlsto react
considerablymore than we had seen in the past. While it was not out of limits, there was more
activity _,han you had seen.
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Could you characterize that for us?
MR. MOSER: Yes, I will do that. I do not have a detailed discussion for you today, _,ut as the
plume emanated from the solid rocket booster we have gone back through simulations and anal-
ysis to try and correlate the vehicle response.
GENERAL KUTYNA: No, prior to the plume, as you're going through.
MR. MOSER: P_ ior to the plume?
GENERAL KUTYNA: Yes. Could you characterize that? You said the nozzles were working
harder than they had before.
MR. MOSER: That region, we have reconstructed all of the loads and the dynamic response
of the vehicle from liftoff up until that point. The max dynamic pressure region we have not
completed yet. I will give you my view of where it is at this time.
Everything appears to be okay, but we have not recreated all of the trajectory parameters.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Jack, do you know what I'm driving at?
MR. LEE: Yes, General, I believe I do. I believe we reported at that tium that, even
though--well, you characterized it as a rough ride, with some wind shears. They were within our
flight data base.
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Now, what Mr. Moser is referring to is the Max Q region. We do not have that completely
reconstructed yet to be able to relate all the vehicle activities to that.
I would like to point out, General, that even though you mention Max Q at 60 seconds, Max
Q really is kind of a region, say from 58 or so. It is not sp_._ifically a point. So we do relate the
first evidence of hot gas emanating from the solid rocket motor as being in the region of Max Q
for our analytical purposes.
GENERAL KU_'NA: But the point I was t._4ng to make, and see if you agree with me,
there was quite some load, although not out of lirr_,its, but there was some load on that vehicle
prior to Max Q, from 40 to 50 seconds, that might have given it some stresses. Not out of limits
again, but it could have given it some stresses that could have caused something.
MR. LEE: Yes, sir. At about 40 seconds we did see some wind shears that gave us about a
two degree rate, which is not out of our data base again, but it is not exactly nominal.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Would you like to comment on the TVC limit cycle in
that time?
MR. LEE: As it relates to that, the 40
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seconds?
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Yes, whe, o the limit cycle reached.
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MR.LEE:CanI refer that to Dr.Littles?Doyou know that?
DR. LIT'rLES: ! don't believe that the limit cycling" at that point in time was really anoma-
lous. I have heard it referred to as we were working them hard and that kind of thing, but I
think that is a qualitative assessment,
I think the data we were getting was within the experience base. It is true that at Max Q we
were seeing the loads that those may have had an impact, for instance, on the joint if we had
something anomalous in the joint already, is what we bel:eve
The loads don't look to be near design limits at any point in time during there. We do still
have some work to do, but the work we i _.ve done to date doesn't indicate that the loads are
anomalous. We do, however, have more work to do iaoking at the 51-L loads, specifically as they
apply to the joint for 51-L and as they might relate to some potential anomaly in the joint. So
we do have some work to do there.
MR. MOSER: Thank you.
I think it is important for this, too, it
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really appears now that everything is within the design limits, but what we're trying to do is
reconstruct from the actual data and the best estimat_t winds and trajectories and everythl,.
else what the load is. And even if it is 30 percent of the design load, we want to know ezactly
what it is, to see if it is in fact contributing to already weakened joint.
And so it will be--I think that that analysis will be completed, perhal:*s this week--:'m
sorry, next week is I think the schedule we are on for that.
DR. FEYNMAN: We ought to say wha. "Q" is. It is the resistance, the force of resistance for
moving through the air, or the combination of the density of the air and the speed squared, i
think, that you move through?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: As it goes faster, it is increasing, but as you go higher the density is de-
creasing. So it reached a maximum and then falls off as we go into the vacuum of space further
up.
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir, right.
DR. FEYNMAN: It's just worth explairAng.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Does that complete your presentation?
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MR. MOSER: Nor sir. On chart M-35, what I have done is I have categorized the anomalies
as we know them, and that is our category A, and those are the events that I ha,Je just gone
through associated with the time line.
There are other possible anomalies, conditions, that we also know of that can be contribu-
tors to this accident. For instance, the temperature or the water in the joints, the dimensions at
stacking, and on and on.
Now, all of those things then are picked up by the specific element which that can effect its
failure and whether it could have caused it, and so that is our category for possibles. And we
will have another list of anomalous conditions, those which we have derived, and so we hope to
put those in the appropriate basket.
On chart M-36--
(Viewgraph M-36.) [ Ref. 3/7-621
--this chart will serve to introduce the very top level of the failure analysis, starting with
the explosion and then the external tank breakup, which we know, and then we want to get it.co
unknowns of the causes.
Tke colorcodethat you_ hereis green,a greenindicationalongthe analysispath, indi-
catesthat
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it is irr_probable
Todaywe wiil talk to youabout--if youwill movethat, your camera,over to the right,
please--wewill talk aboutthe orbiter,themain engine, and the cargo, the IUS, as being improb-
able to have caused the accider_t.
To the left, the things which are still possible are the exterllat tank; and probable is the
solid rocket booster.
And I would now introduce Dr. Littles, who will talk about the failure analysis associated
with the external _ank.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Moser. before you do that, may I have the pictures that we are
referring to? I think we referred to them as 35. Can we show thet first?
And the reason I want to do this is because there is so much discussion about a white flame
first, or white smoke before the black smoke, and there's been all kinds of articles written about
it, and so forth. And the photographs really don't show it.
Can you see this?
(Slide.) [Ref. 37-621
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir, That in contrast--the lighting changes here, too, I think, with the
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reflections and the intensity of the engines, and so that is one possible expianation for that
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But we're all talking about the same smoke?
MR. MOSER: Yes, we're all talking about exactly the same thing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is what I wanted to get straight for the record, because there
has been a lot of discussion about the white smoke and black smoke, as if there were two differ-
ent accidents or incidents. This suggests there's just one
DR. LITTLES: I think it is just one instance, but I thin:-, if you look at different cameras and
with different shadings you can get different impressions of' t_: e color. There is a black and white
camera that we have some photographs of, and if you look at that--or when I look at it, and I'm
not a photographic expert, but when I look at it _he first smoke that I see does look more white,
and then later it gets dark.
So I think you get different impressions from different films.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Does everyone agree it's all the same smoke?
DR. LYI'rLES: I believe everyone agrees it is all the same smoke, yes.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
DR. LITTLES: Could I have L-l, please.
(Viewgraph L-1.) [Ref. 3!7-63]
This chart continues where Tom left off, and in his chart he had the external tank and the
SRB in a circle, and so I am picking up at that point and carrying to the right a little more
detail at this point the items that we have been investigating and some that we are continuing
to investigate.
There are some things which we have ca_gorized as improbable and shaded green, both , n
the external tmlk and the solid rocket booster. Would you come a little closer to the right top sc
I can see the blocks a little more clearly. Thank you very much. That's good.
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Okay,coming down from the top, the damage at liftoff and going over to the right, the pad
debris. Tb, ose we i-ave shaded yellow at this point and I will discuss those later within other
scenarics I won't go any further with tha, this point.
Now, premature detonation of the li__. shaped charge has beer ruled as being improbable
That is based upon physical data. the hardware that has been recovered. We have recovered por-
tions of the linear shaped charge and they weren't detonated, and so we know
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that wasn't the cause of the explosion of the external tank.
A structural flaw, I will discuss also later that line, so I will leave that one for now.
Now, structural overload, we have touched on that in the last few minutes. We have looked
at the loads. We have a complete reconstruction now of the liffoff loads, and we see nothing
anomalous there. "[he loads are well below design.
We have done a lot of work already on the Max Q and the other phases of flight and, as Mr.
Moser said, we haven't completed that, but the data that we already have indicates tha_ that is
not a probable cause. W_ are going to continue to do that reconstruction, and we shouiA finish
that within the next I think week or ten days and rule that one out.
DR. COVERT: Dr. Littles, when you say you have ruled it out or potentially ruled it out, do
you mean as a single cause in and of itself, but initially there could be other events that took
place so that tha¢ combined with thence loads could in fact be a potential cause? Do I understand
you correctly?
DR. LYI'rLF, S: Yes, sir, that's absolutely correct. As I mentioned a minute ago, we are still
particularly interested in these specific loads for
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51-L, for instar.ce as applied to the 51-L joint. And so there is continuing work in that area and
will be even after we look at the final reconstruction of the loads. I will discuss that as I go
through some of these other scenarios.
But we are doing some work in that area m_d we will continue to do that for awhile.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
DR. LiTYLES: We have lost our screen. I will continue from the chart, then.
All right, then. To the right of structural overload, the block is the thermal protection
system on the external tank. We think that to be an improbable cause far initiating the failure.
We have done analysis assuming that we have lost TPS in various places on the tank and
through the flight regime that we had progressed beforp, we had the problem and the failure
beginning at 59 seconds.
We didn't see any areas that would be overheated _o the point of having a failure. We also
have photographic evidence and don't see anything there, and so we don't believe a loss of any
pm-t of the thermal protection system on the tank initiated the failure.
Coming down then to the solid rocket booster,
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_.he same comments that I made relative to the external tank apply to the structural overload
and to the liftoff and flight loads. But again, a,: Dr. Covert points out, we are still interested in
those loads relative to other potential failure modes.
Relative to the item on the bottom, the premature linear shaped charge det_anation, we
know of course that the range safety system operated properly when we gave--when the range
gave the booster, s destruct at roughly 109 seconds. And s_ we've ruled that out, or we think that
is an improbable cause of failure.
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Now,casemembraneanomaly,to the bottomright, that is coveredin oneof the scenarios
that I will address,andsoI will coverthat onelater.Andalso.the SRMpressureintegrityand
thejoint seal,thosearethe primary :te :s in :he scenariosthat I will present,andsoI'!! cover
thosein the next fewcharts
Going then to L-2--
_Viewgraph L-2.)[Ref. 3 7-64]
Whrt I have on this chart is all of the scenarios that we are pursuing for _he hot gas leak I
will step through these one at a time. The line that I will be pursuing is highlighted in red, so
you can
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follow it through.
What I will do is describe for you the failure mechanism which is hypothesized for each one
of these lines. I will mention to you the work that we are doing, the analysis and the tests that
we have going on to assess that hypothesis, and then I will give you a summary of our findings
to date. And if we think we can say it is not yrobable, I will indicate why.
Okay. The first one, then, as you see in this chart is the solid rocket motor inhibit ?r flaw.
Could I have chart L-3, please.
(Viewgraph L-3.)I_,.) _ 7 "_l
Okay. This is a schematic representation of tile joint. I think you have seen this before. The
failure which is hypothesized in this particular scenario is that we could have possibly had a
flaw in the inhibitor.
Come in a little closer, please, just at the top. Move it up to the right, please.
Okay. you see the indication there of the molded inhibitor. If we had a flaw i:a that inhibi-
tor-and it would have to be fairly large, something like ar inch in diameter If you had a flaw
there and you started burning, getting hot gas through that flaw and igniting the propellant and
had the propellant started
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burning back toward the case membrane, then you could create a situation where in the time
frame near 60 ,oeconds you could get a burn-through of the membrane.
In this particular scenario, as you see, it ts not dealing with the joint itself on this leg. It is
dealirxg with the potential of a case membrane burn-through someplace other than the joint.
We have done a humber of things in looking at this. We have reviewed the build records
and process papers for 51-L, the right all segment inhibitor. We have reviewed ou- experience
base with these inhibitors, and we have done some analysis to determine whether by analysis
that failure mechanism is possible.
One thing that we know is that the molded inhibitor is lind up, it is eight plies of rubber
which are vulcanized together. Now, having eight plies of rubber vulcanized tog-ther, it is not
likely that you would have a flaw in eight pieces. So that is against having th's particular sce-
nario be true.
We have bad no previous problem with this inhibitor. The problems in this area are not in
our data base. The analysis of that, as I mentioned, iudicarcz that in order to get the burn-
through or the burn-back of the propellant and the burn to th ". insulation and burn through
that ir:sulation and do that
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in the time frame of 59 seconds would require about two and a half times as much heat transfer
as you would expect to get at a maximum there.
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So that doesn't make it look likely
There are a couple of things that are positive It could--as Tom mentioned, we saw a pres-
sure change at 59 seconds in the motor In order to have a failure somewhere it_side the motor
with anomalous propellant burning, you have to get it at a piace where it won't allow the _res-
svre to ci_ange in that motor Normaily, if you had a crack in the propellant which came from
the middle down, you get a higher burn rate You would _ a higher pressure
In this particular area, since you're burning back and beneath the propellant, you wouldn't
see an increase it, pressure It would be very slight It would be less than the bit change on
pressure, and so that would support t.
But all of these things taken togeti ,r--oh, another thing, too, of course, is that this would
not be consistent with the smoke puff that we see initially. This would happen some time later
in fligh t And so, taking all of these things together, we don't think this is a probable scet,ario.
and we have listed it as not probable•
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Could I have L-4, please.
(Viewgraph L-4.) [Ref. 3 7-66]
On this particular one, I'm going to discuss two routes of a scenario together because they
are very- simiiar. This one hypothesizes what was mentioned a minute ago, the small hydrogen
leak which you could have and not detect it with instrumentation, and that, as we mentioned a
minute ago, is four pounds per second.
If you had a leak of four pounds per second and it leaked and ,he hydrogen ourned and
impinged either on the area of the joint, the aft field joint, or on an area of the membrane and
hea'_ed it up enough, you might generate a failure, and that is what L_:is hypothesis is.
Okay The failure mechanism again is you have to have either an undetected flaw in the
structure of the tank or you would have to have debris or some foreign object strike the tank at
or near liftoff and cause the hole to create the leak. And then. as I said, the hydrogen burns and
impinges on some location of the solid rocket motor and overheats either the joint or the mem-
brane to cause the failure.
I have mentioned that we have established the size of that hole that is within the limita-
tions of the instrumentation. We have reviewed all of the tank build
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records and we are reviewing ar, y potential for pad debris.
We have done analysis to determine what kind of heating we would get if we had burning
hydroger_ mpinging either on the joint or the membrane. And we are also conducting tests to
characterize hydrogen burning against the foam thermal protection system on the tank.
DR. FEYNMAN: Is this to explain also the black smoke?
DR. LI2"rLE, S: It could explain the black smoke, yes, because if you had the hydrogen ignite
and burn on the TPS, you can get black smoke from smoldering TPS. So it could explain that if
you had the hydrogen at ignition.
What you have to hypothesize is that actually, of course, the ice team went out, as has been
reported, previously to the mission, about 20 minutes prior to launch and they didn't see roW-
thing that would indicate a leak. And I believe if there had been a leak there at that point in
time, they would have see_-, some indication of it.
And so the leak somehow has to occur between tLat point in tit _ and a half a second after
ignition to be synonymous with the black smoke. So yoa're talking
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about debris c.r either some o_erload during the ignition transient. And as I will tell _ou _n a
minute. __ ve ai:eadv _a]ked _b_mt _he load thin_, • and we don't thb,k that the lo'_d is it.
g_ _t really boils down to a debris or something else causing th_ hole in the _ank.
DR FEYNMA,"_: Butmr,a hydrogen making the smoke would not be visible as a flame or a
light in the photearaphs'.:
DR LITTI,ES Well, it depends UlXm where it is. You know. there is a considerable area
that we can't see between the external tm:k and the SRB. and so it could be burning in an area
wher_ we don t have photographic coverage, possibly.
The smoke that we _e initia!ly, it is indicated to be somewhere between zero degrees
around toward the i.ank. It could be burning in an area where those cam "as even can't see it,
and it could be emanating from the back and coming around. It is hard to say.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: On the hypothesis, though, don't you have to conclude that d_zbris
nit the external tank and caused the leak. and that then caused the--what, it would cause some
damage to the right booster..ad a of this within a half a second?
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DR. L!TTLES: No, sir, not all of that within a half a second. If you have the hydrogen burn..
ing from the tank--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: On that hypothesis, though, what would cause that? What do you
think would cause the leak in the external tank at that point?
DR. LI'VrLES: Well, it would have to be debris. You would bave to have debris or something
from the outside, we think. It could of course be a flaw in the structure which is overioaded and
leaks
CtIAIRMAN ROGERS: And you've looked at that and excluded it?
DR. LITTLES: We haven't completely excluded it, but it is becoming remote. We are going
back through all X-rays and all build records. We have had at least three different people review
all of the X-rays and so far we've found nothing in that area that i_ anomalous.
We haven't quite completed that yet, but it is--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Continuing with the hypothesis, though, about the debris, suppose
there is debris there. When would that have hit the external tank and caused the leak?
DR. LI_I'LES: Well, in order to be consistent
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with the puff of smoke initially, it would have had to have been at that time or slightly before,
some time before that time, to be consistent with the puff of smoke_
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Is there any evidence at all of any debris that might have
caused _hat?
DR, LITrLES: We haven't found ar.ything yet. That is still being looked into, but we have
no indications of anything apomalous there. That is still something_
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But it is at ieast a possibility?
DR. LITTLES: It is a possibility, yes, sir. But it is not something that we have seen on photo-
graphs or the movies that we can point to. I wouldn't say personally that it is a strong possibili-
ty.
"VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Dr. Littles, if there were a hydrogen leak that you had at
T-zero or approximately and it was ignited immediately, how long do you think it. would take for
it 1;o heat up scme area, to make black smoke?
lla2
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DR. LITI'LF_: We have done that analysis and I'm going to discuss that now. We start,.,_l--
this analysis is an iteratlve process. We started assuming that we had hydrogen burning with
complete combustion
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somewhere on the tank and flowing down by the tank within the boundaD" layer and heating up
the joint.
That type of heating on the joint did not give us enough heating of either the joint or the
membrane to cause a problem. We then went to the assumption that _'e had a jet of hydroget:
coming out of the tank and impinging directly on. over the distances tt "e, impinging directly
on the joint or the membrane.
DR. FEYNMAN: By "the membrane," do you mean the metal surface of the rocket?
DR. LITTLES: Yes, sir. It is a little thinner than the joint. If you move down just a few
inches, it is a thinner cross-section
DR. FEYNMAN: About how thick is it?
DR. LITI'LES: I have that on a chart here. I never can remember the numbers. It is .479
inches, the membrane itself
h :,ou make that assumption, if you assume that the hydrogen is leaking from the tank and
impinging directly on the surface, and if you assume that you have complete combustion--that
is, you have ali of that hydrogen mixing wo!l with air--you get a stoichiometric mixture and it
burns.
You can get temperatures under those conditions that w_ ld create some problems, for
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instance, on the joint. You could have a temperature of approximately 900 degrees. If that hap-
pened for roughly 60 seconds, a 900 degree temperature on the joint would open the gap enough
to unseat the O ring, and you could get leakage coming out of there.
During that same period of time, with the same assumptions, you might heat the membrane
up to 1300 degrees. No,*', those numbers, however, let me quickly add, are unreasonable from the
standpoint that we assumed complete mixing to get that. We did that as a test case, to see if we
could just put it to bed and forget it. These numbers say that we have to do more work, so what
we're doing now is we're going back and doing some jet mixing, get a more reasonable combus-
tion in there, and see what more reasonable numbers will do.
Now, we are also going to do a test. In fact, we have already started some testing where we
take a hydrogen tank with a hole in its side, ignite the hydrogen as it flows out, impinge it on a
surface with a thermocouple, and get some physical evidence. And so we are doing both of those
things to try to put this one to bed, and that is the direction we are going at this point in time.
r)k, y, could I go to L-5, please.
( Vmwgraph L-5.) Ira.t :; 7 ,i71
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The next six sc_.na_ "--
• ,n sorry. Five out of the next six scenarios all deal with the joint
"_ii. Before I move into those, we have been looking very carefully at both the left and right-
hand boosters for 51-L. We of course have three joints on each vehicle, and we have looked very
carefiM!y at similarities and differences between those joints, because of cour_- we had oi_e
anomaly on one joint, we had none with the other five as far as we know.
And if you look at the temperatures on all those joints, you find that there really is not a lot
of difference in the type of ranges that we're talking about.
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Could you come a little closer to the center so that we can see the temperatures, please.
What you see there is, on the right-hand booster the aft field joint, the temperatures around the
booster circumferentially range from 28 degrees to 52, and that is about the same temperature
that you had at the top.
Now, I'm quoting nominal numbers an0 these are--we have been through the reconstruc-
tion that was discussed ear'ier with the IR sensor and those have been played into the analysis,
and these are nominal numbers that I'm quoting in both cases just for corr.parison purposes
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On the left-hand boosters, you see roughly the same kind of t,emperatures, and _o the tem-
peratures were roughly the same for all of the joints.
In terms of the loads, the on-pad liftoff loads, where we caw the puff of smoke, the maxi-
mum load is not at the aft field joint. The maximum load is at the center joint. The maximum
load, however, at Max Q is at the aft field joint, but at the lift_ fe case, we first saw the puff of
smoke, the maximum load would be on the second joint.
If you will move to the right, please. There's a note on the right relative to joint rotation
which we will discuss in some following scenarios, and the subjezt of a lot of discussion.
If ynu look at the joint rotation that you get on the various joints, the lowest join rotation
that you get is on the aft field joint, because the rotation is a strong function of pressure. As a
matter of fact, the pressure is the major driver in that, and you have a lower pressure in the aft
field joint than you do at the forward two.
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The pressure at the aft field joint is about 760 psi. By the time you get to the forward field
joint it's about 900 psi. So the rotation is lower at the aft field joint.
Would you scan to the bottom and pick up the two notes. There are two things that we have
discovered that are unique relative to this aft field joint on the right. One of them is, in a sce-
nario that has been discussed somewhat this morning, we did have to use the rounding f:xture
which was described earlier to mate those segments.
And the note here that I have says this was the maximum reslaaping to date. There is some
new data which was mentioned to you this morning, which we just found out yesterday. When
we made this note what we were referring to was the data that we had 'ooked at at that point m
time.
The first thing we did when we started looking at this data base--and we are continuing to
do that--we picked all of the segments which had beer_ subjected to this rounding tcoi, thinking
those were probably the population of the worst data and this is the worst one out of that group
where the rounding tool has been u_d.
And there are some others that we will have to look at, but it was anomalous in that data
base, in that
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if ygu took the six where the rounding tool had been used, this one would have been at some-
thing like a three sigma extreme relative to the amount of rounding that had to be done on _t.
So itstood out from that _tandpoint.
We also have anothe," thing that I will discuss, in that on this particular mating, the aft
fieldjoint,we have a photograph which indicates a suspect O-ring in the aft fieldjoint,and I
willdiscuss that later
And so there are some similaritiesbetween the joints,the things like rotation going in the
wrong direction,_empera:ure isabc.u_the same.
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Oh, one thing that I omitted to mention is that if you look at squeeze on the O-;ing--and
those numbers are on the chart. The squeeze on the O-rings on the right, on the joints on the
right booster, are roughly the same, and they are a iittle lower on the !eft-hand bocster, and so
there is nothing there that stands out.
DR. FEYNMAN Excuse me. About the squeeze, this is a single numbor, but as you go
around the circumference I presume the squeeze must vary The two pieces don't fit absolutely
perfectly. There are stresses and strains.
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So the question is what was the maximum squeeze or the minimum squeeze? How does it
va_, as you go around? Can we say an_hing?
DR. LI'I'rLES: Well, you are right. You're absolutely right. What we are quoting here is the
minimum squeeze, and you get that minimum squeeze by assuming the maximum eccentricity of
the joints and considering the actual dimensions, the measured dimensions of the tang and the
clevis for this joint.
Now, you can have cases, I believe, where you can have probably metal to metal on one side,
with almost complete squeeze of the O-ring, and then the other side it depends upon what these
dimensions are. And so you're right, you're absolutely right, you could have a large variation
around the circumference.
DR. FEYNMAN: And that can have an effect, because the thing is cold and it is squeezed
very hard, and then due to stresses or with the pressure it changes the dimensions and leaves a
little gap because it doesn't have the resilience on account of the lowar temperature.
That is an interesting possibility, so that it is important to think about the variation of
squeeze around the circumference.
DR. LITTLES: Yes, sir, that is correct. As a
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matter of fact, relative to resihency, the maximum squeeze i'm suie is worst case. That is abso-
lutely true.
So you have to consider both. But on the other hand, if you ;9ok at these numbers you can
see that the maximum--the minimum is about the same, so the maximum is probably about the
same as ;veil. But you are correct.
Okay, could we move on now tc L-6.
tViewgraph L-6.1 [Ref. 3:7-681
Okay. L-6 is the scenario that deals with the topic that was discussed this morning alnd
which was one of the notes on the prior chart, and that is the potential damage to the primary
and/or the secondary O-ring at assembly.
Due to the out of round condition, the matir, g process has been well disc-'_sed this morning
and so I won't go into that at all. And I've ol_ready mentioned that we've made the comparison
with some other data and we find this one to be a little anomalous.
We are doing some additional things to evaluate this condition. We are going W do some
tests to simulate the conditions, which I will discuss in a moment, that we had on this particular
joint. We have a partial segment that we are going to simulate the right
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conditions and mate and de-mate with O-rings in there, and see if we can induce some damage.
We are also going to simulate defects in some O-rings to see if we can get past the leak
check, b_ause if you damage an O-ring during assembly--and this one did Fas_ the leak test--
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youhaveto haveit in a positionsomewaywhereyou can pass the leak test and still get per-
formance.
We are also requesting, and I understand that it is going to be done, that we de-stack STS
_;!-G. STS 61-G is one of those _hich has had the rounding fixture used in mating that joint. It is
not as bad ,is this one was, bus it is, I believe, the next worse that we have seen in use of the
rounding tool.
And _ we're going to request that one be carefully de-stacked, using very careful proce-
dures, to see if we can see any damage there.
MR. SUTTER: Can I ask a question or meybe make a suggestion? I am still in_orested in the
fact that you put a load on that one joint, and you make the note that that is one thing you're
going to study, but that load is put on there and the pre_ure check is made in the assembly hall
and then the unit is taken out and put onto the launching pad and it sits there for 28 days.
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And I know the metal isn't up to yield, but you've got the insulation and you've got the
charge, and maybe it wants to go back to where it was, and what happens in those 28 days? And
shouldn't this ar alysis be expanded to maybe look at the effects of what happens while it's sit-
ting there in th a weather for 28 days?
DR. LITTLES: Yes, sir. We have that exact thing going on. We are going to take--start with
mating, with stacking the segments, and carrying it all the way through the flow and doing that
total analysis. We have that in precess.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Somewhere along the line I guess we should take a recess for lunch.
Is this a good place to stop, or _ould you rather continue?
DR. LITTLES: It's your pleasure.
CHAIRMAN RGGERS: How much time do you have °
DR. LI'I'rLES: It might be good to stop now. It might take another 10 or 15 minutes to finish
_his one
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, maybe we should have a recess.
And are you going to talk about the possibility of ice in the joints?
DR. LITrLES: Yes, sir. That is one of the scenarios I will discuss, yes. sir.
2103
MR. MOSER: Mr. Rogers, I thir, k I didn't give you a crisp answer between the difference in
a fault tree and a failure scenario. Let me see if I can d _"that just a little bit better.
As you continue, these fault trees are the things which could have gone wrong, and the fail-
ure scenario then is the process to determine if they did or didn't, what did or didn't, or why
that did or didn't go wrong.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But then you gradually exclude different aspects of it?
MR. MOSER: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And I gather from reading this that you have, without being totally
conclusive, you have generally eliminated the orbiter, the space shuttle main engine, and the
cargo inertial upper stage?
MR. MOSER: We will present those facts to you and then present those to the task force,
but that is about _, _ere we are, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Thank you.
We will come back at 2:00 o'clock.
{Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Commission was recessed, to reconvene at 2. 0 p.m. the same
day.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION
12:10 p m._
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order
All right, Mr. Littles, would you proceed, please
DR. LI_I'LES: Ne will proceed with char_ L-7
Viewgraph L-7, ll_,., ,' r ,,,,!
We were beginning to discuss the out of roundness situation relative to a potential O-ring
damage, and again the mating situation was discussed this morning so I won't go it. to that.
The chart on the screen depicts a ,qumber of things, but among those things the dimensions
that we actually had on the 51-L right field joint, the first column of numbers. Could you zoom
in on the bottom left, please, se we car. read the numbers.
And these were discussed to some ex,-nt this morning. The column on the left indicates the
initial measurements prior to the beg,nning of the rounding, and the column on the right the
final measurements.
I talked to Bob a few minutes ago and I want to make sure that we are all together. I want
to make a correction. He indicated that the dimension was .09d inches, I believe, at the end of
rounding, and it was
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.094, but that was the dimension before the raunding tool was removed |
The dimension I have on the cha,-there, .216,isthe dimension when the mating was actual- {
ly made_ and so they are both real rumbers. Itisjust at differenttime frames.
.Aswas discussed this morning, the criticaldimensien here isthe maximum negative dimen-
siam which isin the 120 to 300 degree area of .393 inches.Ifyou wi!lgo now to chart L-_.
(Viewgraph L-8,)It,., :'_v 7o!
We have tried ta do, Dr. Feynman, something along the lines that you mentioned this morn-
ing, to get a feel for what these dimensions mean to us. This is a graphic iilu.*:ration and it is, of
course, not to scale, and what wc have done is assume that the ele,:is is completely round and
then take the dimensions that were recorded and move the tang to the outboard leg of the clevis
and look at the resulting negative dimension.
Aad the negative dimension, again, is a potential interference between the surface where
the O-rings are and the outboard leg of the tang. And what you see in doing that is that there is
a maximum interference potentially of .209 inches.
Now, that isthe worsv case,ofcourse,
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because what that assumes isthat you have metal on metal on the outside,and there _ a toler-
ance between the inboard leg of the tang and the adjacent clevisdimension of .184.
So ifyou subtract those two, you have the other side of that tolerance, which is .025.So
depending upon how the tang and the clevisare centered, you can bare a_}interference between
.025 and .209.So that isof some concern to us.
.-_ There unfortunately is no requirement specified on that negative dimension. There is the
"-_ guideline of the .25 on the positive dimension, but there really should be a tolerance on that
:_ side.But that does lead to the potential of having an O-ring damaged as you are mating it,and
:.' of course we are concerned about that and tha;: is an active scenario.
I have mentioned that we are going to de-mate STS 61-G and look at tha,:, and that we are
- , also doing some work at Marshall with some clevis and tang segments, !,ooking at interference
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mating and looking at what kii,.d of O-ring damage we might get that might affe the seal and
those kind of things.
So we are continuing with that.
DR. FEYNMAN: There's a small trivial point that is confusing me. I don't know how accu-
rate these
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c'rawings are.
DR. LI ,-I'/r_LES: They're not accurate at all.
DR. FEYNMAN: Because on the inside where the O-rings are the piece of metal in this
drawing has a 0 d_gree corner, which does cutting much better than if it had a cut on it. And
in the previous Jrawing you had a little cut off of there, and I just don't know.
Does anybody know whether that is a 90 degree piece of metal that comes in?
DR. LITTLES: You're talking about the top of the outboard leg of the clevis?
DR. FEYNMAN: Yes, because on the previous drawing it was indicated that it wasn't so
sharp, the one that was on some other speaker earlier on. And I'm just curious.
DR. LI2"rLES: There is no chamfer there.
DR. FEYNMAN: That is why I mentioned that, bec_ause I was told that, by the people who
work on it, they've seen this 90 degree sharp piece rubbing up against the curved part as it
comes up. You see, as it goes down there is a ramp, so to speak, and they look at it and it wor-
ries them. But they haven't communicated it very well up into the system.
DR. LI_7"rl,le.q- Okay. Can we go to chart L-9, please.
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•Viewgraph L-9._ [Ref. 37-71]
We are now going into a leg of the scenario which has four branches, the beginning point
for each one of those being a blow-by or leakage of the primary O-ring, and then we will address
the four branches individually.
Tne first one is the secondary O-ring defect. That defect could come from a number of
source< some damage to the O-ring in manufacture, not caught in inspection, or something else.
We have been looking at closeout photos from this stacking. We have been reviewing O-ring
records. We have been doing special inspections on O-rings.
I will tell you what that has produced, and we are going to do tests to evaluate the perform-
ance of a simulated O-ring defect and how it might pass a leak test.
Could wc go to chart 10, please.
(Slide L-10.) Imq. :_ 7 TZl
There is a closeout photo which I think you've probably seen before for this aft field joint,
which has an indication of a potential O-ring anomaly.
Could you go on to chart L-10, please, which is a closeup view of this.
(Slide L-11.) Im.f. :_ 7-731
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We have been analyzing this photograph in-house and we have had some experts from out-
side doing some work--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Before you do that, could you just explain, identify the photograph,
when was it taken and how was it taken and so ,_,_--_*,_...
DR. LI2r'FLES: It was t_ken prior to mating, after the O-ring was instaIL'_L - on the aft fie!d
joint for 5!-L.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do we know the date _
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DR.LITTLES:No,sir, i don't knowthe date.i have heard it. but I don't have it. I can get
that date for you. I don't have it in my mind.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But it was some time before the launch, though?
DR. LITTLES: Yes, sir. It was during the stacking.
CHA1RMAN ROGERS: Okay. Go ahead
DR. LIT'rLES: This is a closeup view of the same area, and the feature of interest is the
apparent increase in the distance between the edge of the O-ring and the top of the O-ring
groove. If you look at that. it looks as though there may be an anomaly in the O-ring and some
change in the aimension at that point.
The work is still proceeding and it hasn't
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been completed, but there have been two estimates of that made and they have both come out in
the neighborhood of 15 mils. But we are still working on that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What does that mean?
DR. LII'I'LES: 15 thousandths of an inch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there a deficiency in it? Is it smaller?
DR. LFFrLES: Yes, Mr, a smaller dimension than it should be. The nominal dimension of
the O-ring is .280 inches, and this would be--indicates a 15 thousandths reduction in that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Because the last time we looked at this we were told, I think, that
you were uncertain about whether it showed an anomaly or whether this was putty that was put
on, that would make it meaningiess, or grease, I guess it was.
DR. LITTLES: Grease has been one of the primary concerns in trying to interpret this data.
because of shadows it produces and because of the apparent changes in thickness due to the
grease
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, have you decided now it was not grease that made the photo-
graph look like this?
DR. LI'I'rLES: I don't think we can say it is
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not grease that makes the photograph look the way it does r elative to the streaks. That may be.
The thing we are concentrating on is the gap distance between the edge of the groove and the O-
ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other _zcrds, you think there is an anomaly now. At that time
you weren r sure; you didn't think there was.
DR. LI2"rLES: The experts at thiu point think there is, yes, sir. And it looks anomalous to
me, but there is still work going on there and we're not ready to conclude yet. This is an interim
report.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Have you looked at the other closeout photos of that ring?
DR. LI_'FrLES: The other cios_n;ut photos, as I understand it, have been looked at and they
don't see anything.
GENERAL KUTYNA: You might take a look at them. We looked at them a lot the other
day and there were a lot of areas of darkness and _paration, so that it is tough to tell.
DR. LITrLES: We will look at those again.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Have you defini_ly identified the location of this spot in
the clock?
DR. LITrLES: Yes. This is located--the quadrant of interest relative to the puff and the
plume
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is between zero and 270. zer,: being the Z axis and coming back toward the tank to 270. This
indication is not in that quadrant. It is in the quadrant right above it.
It is still in a quadrant that would be hidden and be between the SRB and the tank. So it is
in a Iocatiop where you could have initiated a puff or a leak at that point and have it propagate
arcIAnd.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Between _,.ero and 90?
DR. LITTLES: Between 270 and !80.
MR. ACHESON: For the record, does any such slight variation in the gap appear ._nvwhere
else on the circumference from the photograph?
DR. LITYLES: Well. we haven't seen it in the photographs we have looked at. General
Kutyna indicates ..... hetn,,_ _may have seen something that we should look further at, but we
haven't seen it in the things we have iooked at.
MR. ACHES,ON: What I'm getting at is, can you compare this with the remainder of the
circumference to see whether--for example, if three or four more such seeming anomalies ap-
peared in the photographs, you would wonder whether this is illusory or significant or what.
DR. LITYLES: Yes. sir, and we have not seen
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timt. But we will go again and look at those photographs again.
And Jack has pointed out, in this joint we have looked all around it and we haven't seen it.
MR. LEE: In this particular photograph, we have gone as far as we can see on each side of
both O-ring:, and we see no other such anomaly.
CHAIRMAN _:,(_)GERS: I'm not quite clear. If this is an anomaly, would it be related to the
puff of smoke or is it another area?
DR. LITTL,..;_: It could be related to the puff of smoke. As we've discussed, the exact origin
of that pL ?f o_."'.;'.'noke is not pinned down. We believe it is somewhere between the plus Z axis--
or the minus ,'.::_._xis. excuse me, and around toward the tank, around the SRB.
And we ,::.n't see--we have thv two camera locations: D-63, if this is the SRB, pointing in
• a_t ]*.his directiot,: :_E0 pointing in this direction. ,_,._ if the tank is over here, we can't really see
back in this _:l',::a.
So it cou_ : possibly be that, the puff of smoke coming out samewhere in this area and
coming around ,,_ith time. It is possible.
CHAIRM_ N ROGERS: When you say it is possible,
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but is it realistic to think it is? I mean, is there another area?
DR. LITTLES: Yes, sir, I think it is realistic to think that it could be. We're only talking
now about being 90 degrees away. I will dlSt:t,-_ later some results that _,', ve gotten from some
small subscale motor tests, where we see with aimulatea a,;cmalies and O-rings and sealing sur-
faces, we see leaks starting at one place, stopping at that place, and ti,en *tatting another place.
And so it is conceivable that you could have had a puff of smoke in a qua0ra,_ e," in a loca-
tion that would be 90 degrees aroa_d from where you finally had the bu:n-:hrough. The small
motor tests say that that is possible.
Also along the lines of po*_ential O-ring defects, _,'e have been ins_,cting O-rings and doing
some special X-ray on O-rings. X-ray of O-rings is not something that is normally done in inspec-
tion. We found two things.
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Oneis that in reviewingthe recordsc _ the inspection for the O-rings which were on all of
t}_e jgints on 51-L, on both right-hand and lett-hand SRB, we found that there were seven out of
the twelve O-rings which were not subjected to the same level of inspection
2115
as prior O-rings had been.
The sitaatlonthat occurred was chat there was an engineering change order made _o ira s-
for s_me inspection notes from a drawing to an inspection document. It was properly ai.proved.
but in the process of making the change to _he document there were zwo steps that were inad-
vertently leftoffand not caught.
Now, whether those are significantor not we are not making a judgment at this time. But
the two things that were omitted was that: one, the'rewas a requirement for only having five
joints in an O-ri_. and that was omitted and that inspection was not made at Morton Thiokol
by theA Force.
And the other is--and this one ismore interestingto me relativeto that photograph--there
isa requirement that you can only have a ten mi] or ten thouscndths of an inch offsetw_,ere the
scarfjointismade, and that i_spection was omitted.
Now, that applies to seven of the twelve O-rings. The eecondary C,-ringin this aft fieldjoint
was one of those. Like I say, we don't know what to make of that at this :,_'me,but itissome-
thing we have learned.
GENERAL KUTYNA: We },_ve been looking at that for about a week now and are closing
out that particular
21±6
item. I think there were three inspectionsthat were drol_;¢d,as a matter of fact.
DR. LITTLES: I'm sorry?
GENERAL KUTYNA: There were three inspections that were dropped when that engineer-
ing drawing was changed by Morton Thioko]. And I guess our teams have been looking at that
for about a week now.
The one th_ng we found last night, that those O-rings were inspected by someone at scme
time, either Thiokol or a sub at leastonce, and wh_t was missing wa_ the backup inspection Dy
the government.
DR. LITTLES: Itwasn't done by Thiokol, but itwas done by a vendor.
MR. WALKER: Do you have a record of where the O-ring jointsare relativeto this particu-
lar position?
DR. LITYLES: No, sir
MR. WALKER: No record ismade of where the jointsare?
DR. LITTLES: No, sir.Relative to the inspection we've been doillgand x-rayir_ O-rings,this
is something that is ongoing. Just recently,itsta_ed within the last few days, I guess four or
fivedays ago.
We have found one O-ring that ha_ four inclusionsin it.The depth isabout 25 thousandths
and the other
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dimensions range from 35 thousandth_ to 60 thou_.ndths. 'We don't know yet what the conclu-
3ion is. They're still doing chemical analysis on it.
Inclusions of this size probably wouldn't be problem, but since _ e've found one we're
any
going to continue to look and see if there might be something worse. So 're are continuing in-
and test and photo analysis i,, this scenario.spection
:151
Could,regonowto chart 12, please.
/Viewgraph L-12. i [Ref. 3 7-7_1
Okay This is the scenario that you men:ioned earlier. Mr. Rogers, relative to ;ce in the
joint, we have been looking at that from two standpoints, the first being whether ice freezing in
a joint--could you bri;lg L-3 back up, please?
The first being whether ice could freeze in the joint between the tang and the clevis--
IViewgraph L-3.) [Ref. 3 7-65]
--and exert enough force on it to cause an opening and an unseating of the O-ring; and the
second aspect of that being whether you could have water between the tang and the clevis on
the inboard side beneath the O-rings and freeze the water and have the water move up and
anseat the secondary O-ring.
We have looked at both of those things and
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we've run some tests relative to the freezing and the potential gap opening to unseat the O-ring.
The movements are very, very small. That doesn't appear to be a problem.
P,elative to unseating of the O-ring by freezing of the ice, if you have a situation where you
have ice freezing in the bottom of the clevis and drive a column of air above it, you cannot
unseat the O-ring that way be.cause you can only get about two psi on the O-ring.
However, if you had a situation wtmre you had a column of grease above the water--and
there is liberal grease applied to these tangs and clevL_s--so that you might have a situation
where you had water and had grease above it up too near the secondary O-ring, then if you
freeze the water and compress or remove the column of grease hydraulically, you might unseat
the O-ring.
So that that one is a possibility, so we are continuing to look at tbis a bit. We're going to
run some tests simulating that kind of condition and see what it does to potentially unseating
the secondary O-ring or causing a leakage by th_ secondery O-ring So this one is continuing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would _ test be very
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conclusive in this instance?
DR. LI'I'rLES: It would not be 100 percent, conclusive, no, sir. We can draw conclusions for
the test configuration that we set up, but we can't say for this particular hypothesis that you
could get that. It is a possibility, is what we can say.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are you thmiliar wl:h the other occasion when there was ice found
in the joint?
DR. LI_'rLES: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What happened on that occasio.,l?
DR. LITTLES: On that occasion, that was STS-9, and we were not aware of that until after
the instant, when we started doing investigations. We didn't know that we had water in the
joint, but there was water in *,.hat joint.
There was a significant amount of rain and they had occasion to de-stack and when they did
water ran out of the pins when they pulled them out. And of course, we had seven incbes of rain
while 51-L was on the pad.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which was about three times the normal rain, I understand.
DR. L!TTLES: Yes, sir. And so there was ample opportunity for the water to get into the
tang and clevis area. And then of eoume, with the cold weather
1152
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and the freezing,the ossibility certainNexists,if you couldhavethe configurationthat we
havehypothesized,that youmightunseatthat secondaryO-ring
And with the amountof greasethat is in that tang and clevizarea.9"oudon't haveto
stretchyour imaginationve_" far to get to the pointwhereyoucouldha_'ewaterundergrease.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Soprobablyyouwon'tbeableto excludethat a:_a possibility'_
DR.LI_ffI'LES:It will be difficult to exclude as a possibi'_ity. _,.nless the tests we run, by put-
ring cold grease: up against the O-ring, _aybe slightly unseating "it, and then hitting it with the
ignition transient pressure, if that will seal. that would t_nd to exclude it.
If that doesn't seal, then I don't think you wili by able to prove either by test or a_.,_lysis
that you can't generate this condition. So it would remain a possibility.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is likely to be an uncertain area, then, whether the rain and
the weather might have caused, ice in the _al, and thereby caused the accident.
DR. LI2_rLES: Yes, sir, unless we can prove by
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that test that that would not result in a situation that you would fail to seal.
Could we go now to chart 13, please.
(Viewgraph L-13.) _Ref. 3,7.75]
This scenario deals with a leak in the leak check port. One of the things tha: tends to put
this to bed is, if everyone agrees, is that the initial leak did not come from the leak check port.
There are a lot of people who think it did not. There have been a few people who thought it did.
We have had our experts off for the last few days working on _hat. i w's told before I came
that they are ready to report to us, and we will be taking that report ._ soo as we get back and
try to draw that concl,_sion ourselves.
But in our rvdad at this point in time, it is still a viable scenario. We hax-_ done some analy-
sis and tests on this. the hypothesis being that yoa get a leak through the lear: beck port at an
early time, like a half a second, to generate the puff of smoke, and then you c_r_ :_ _oaking
through that leak check port unto, you damage the secondaD" G-ring or you erode tn_ _r z
enough to blow the port out and then start growing the leak there.
The analysis that we have done indicates that,
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with flow rates tha= are reasonable--and by reasonabie what I mean is we have done some anal-
ysis and some tests _o establish a range of flow rates that you -qght get if you bad an O-ring, for
instance, er had a leak check port, somebody left the O-rin_ off and ipstv.,'led it, you could get
leakage.
We've established what that band of leakage is. And then assume that you have that leak-
age from zero up through 60 seconds. If you do that, what you can do is you can erode or you
can damage the secondary O-ring.
You can heat it to the point where it would not maintain a seal any more. You can get it
well above 1,000 degrees, and if you did that then you could blow by the secondary O-ring at
about 60 seconds, and that could initiate the leak.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why would the leak cheek port fail, because you hadn't put the plug
back in?
DR. LITYLES: Well, if you didn't put the plug back in, certainly that would be a direct leak.
What we are hypothesizing here is--to get the small leakages that we are talking about, what
1153
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Iwe are Y_ypothesizing is that the __k check port, the plug was indeed installed, but there wa_
some defec[ in it and it spilled out _ -hall flow.
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GENERAl, KUTYNA: I don't know anyone who thinks smoke came out of a leak port Who
do you know who thougb, t smoke came out of a leak check port?
DR. LI'VI'LES: Well, I for one, and I'm not an expert an,] that is why I asked my experts to
go off and put together a story, and come convinc, me, because when I lo(,k at the black and
white photographs I, with an untrained eye admittedly, can see what I think is white smoke
emanating from near that leak check pert.
Now, they may be able to come convince me that's not true. They may well be able to do
that.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Well, does "near" count or does it have to be directly from the port
for your scenario?
DR. LITq'LES: I think it has to come from the port for this scenario, yes, sir
DR. FEYNMAN: Might I suggest that on a thing like this the idea of an expert and an un-
trained eye as compared to a trained eye is a myth. There ks no training for this particular kind
of observation about leak check ports on a particular booster
DR. LITTLE& Yes, sir, I tend to agree with that. By "expert" I was referring to pecple that
we have who routinely, every, flight, look at all the photographs and become ver2 competent in
looking at
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these kind of deviants.
DR. FEYNMAN: When you get curious, you can do it yourself aria make up your own mind.
DR. LI3_I?LES: That is why I wanted someone to convince me. But we are still working on
that one as well.
Could we go now to chart I4, please.
(Viewgraph L-14.) [Ref. 3,7-76]
Okay, this leg of the scenario deals with the situation which has been discussed a great deal,
that being that we had a blow-by of the primary O-nng and that we had, with the cold tempera-
tures, we had a situation on the O-ring where we might have had a delay in the actuation time
and didn't get a seating.
We're doing a great deal of work on this one, and there is a great deal of work to do. We're
doing our work primarily in three areas. We're doing some additional, or have done some addi-
tional, tests on basic resiliency of the O-ring, and these data tend to confirm the data that we
had before.
It shows that, sure enough, there is an increase in the free-standing response time.
We have also done some additional teats with the O-ring at cold temperatures in a static
situation, and by a static situation I mean we don't have joint
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rotation there, but with the O-ring in a proper groove and with the proper squeeze, as a matter
of fact with a variation oe the squeeze, and then hitting that O-ring with the ignition transient
pressure to see if it would seal.
And we have quite a p-umber of tests now where we can seal down to minus ten degrees. At
minus 20 degrees, we start getting some leakage. And these data really are no more 100 percent
conclusive than the resiliency data.
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V{t is just an_ther data p:,int, h,:t :.t dot, s indicate that the O-ring Is not so hard, n(_t ._o brick-
like ti'at it won't seal It will seal ifyou apply proper pressure :o it and the joint is not rotated
at that Foint m time to the point where you have a blow-by
-_ ke_ part of the work we're doing, of course, since :_either one ot tLese thing_ are conclu-
sive. wh_.t we have to do is combine all -f the effects, the effects of" resiliency, the effect of the
pre_,_ure _ein,,' imposed on the O-ring, w_th the deformation that results frem that pressure to
move it against [_h_' seat, as w_ll as the effect o! the gap openin_ due t() the joint rotation
In order to do that, we have designed and
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built what we are calling a dynamic test fixture, which attempts to incorporate all of those
things. We have the design such that when _e appb pressure that there is a nylon sleeve which
opens and gives you the gap rotation simulation.
Anc we are also hitting it with the right pressure transient, and we are doing it as a func-
tion of temperature, at various temperatures. So that is an important test for us. The fixture is
available no_. We are beginning to do scme checkot t tests with it.
One of i.ne things that concerns me about it is that the design of this fixture is a develop-
ment effort in itself. It is difficult to get all of those features in one test rig.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If it isn't a perfect match, if zhe test really does not simulate what
actually happened, you could come to a very tragic conclusmn.
DR. LI'FFLES: Yes, sir, and that is why we're being very, very careful with that test rig. The
first thing we are doing wi_.h it, or we're going to do with it, is to make sure by calibrating the
gap opening that we are really tracking that
And in addition to that. there is some precursor work that has to be done before we are
absolutely confident of the gap opening that we zhould
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have in there. The data that have been used and quoted are maximum numbers. Those data
were derived o," r_-z) c_me from test data actually.
We have done a number of tests, hydroproof proof tests on segments where we have insert-
ed, we have measured through the leak check port, because that was the only location available
without damage to the hardware We have measured through the leak check port and estab-
lished e gap opening, and it is those data with that single data point on a segment that have
established the test data to show what that gap opening is.
We're doing some additional work on that. We have a test fixture that is now in test. We
have just sta=ted tests on it. It is a full-_ale segment, of course. We have eight holes uniformly
spaced around, so that we can get eight measurements
We are beginning to get data on that, and the initial data I have seen indicates that the gap
opening is not as much as the maximum number we have been using. And another thing that is
very key, and this is very, very key in my mind, those, cases are empty. They don't have propel-
lant in th,,rn.
Now, you're certainly going to get an effect on the rate of gap opening if you have propel-
lant in
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there or not, becausc _he propellant is going to add stiffness. And we're talking about pressure
applications. We're talking about--over a small time frame here, we're talking about millisec-
onds. The time frame of interest, as you are well aware, is between zero milliseconds and 300
milliseconds. 11 55
Soweare doing_)m¢analysison that. Wehavetwo modelsaoing,oneat MortonThiokol
andoneat Huntsville.andwesbguldbe beginning to get some results on that pretty quickly.
Could we go now to chart 1.5, please
_Viewgraph 1,-15._ [Ref. 3 7-77]
Okay. This _enario deal._ with the load exceedance We have discussed loads earlier We
have been, of course, looking at the liftoff and flight lo:,ds and Max Q loads in particular. And as
we discu _sc,ed this morning--
MR. ACHES_')N: Could I ask one question, beiore we leave the other char*" In the test.-
you're running, do you find any evidence of erratic r,_aealing oi apertures, gas !eak apertures"
DR LII_FLES: Resealing? I'm not sure I follow your question.
MR. ACHESON: Are you using regular booster fuel for your tests?
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DR. LI]"rLES: No. The static tests we are running are done with cold gas.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But you have used some five-inch motors, right, with real fuel in
them, to see what happens when you cut a gap?
DR. LI'FrLES: Yes.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Could you give us a rundown on the one that opened and closed
itself'?. Are you familiar with that one, the number of seconds that it did or did not leak?
DR. LI'FTLES: Yes. As a matter of fact, I'm going to discuss that.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Okay, whenever you get to it.
DR. LIT'TLES: Now, back to the load situation again. As we discussed this m 3rn. ng, we have
reconstructed the :iftoff loads and relative =o comparing those loads to the design ca.,_e, they're
well below that. And as I indicated, for the Max Q case the data we have ind;cates that we prob-
ably won't have any problem there compared to design.
,So we have indicated on our chart that this is not a problem. But let me emphasize that this
is relative to the comparison of the loads to the design case. The loads are still a very important
part of
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scenarios that deal with potential damage or to O-rings or o_her anomalies in the joint.
They are particularly important relative to the concept of the leak, seal leak, which has
been discu_d very often. It could be that we had some anomaly in tim O-ring, had some
damage, and then the activity that we see around 40 seconds with the winos, while they are
within the experience base, or the conditions that we see at Max Q, while they are within the
experience base, might impose enough load on that joint to cause some problems v, ith it.
So loads from that standpoint are still very much a part of our other scenarios We don't
believe, though, that ba_qic loads relative to design are out of bed, and that is why we're putting
that part of it in, but the loads stay open for the other things.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Going back for a moment to the subject we were talking about a
moment ago on the tests, m there any outside group working with you on those tests, other than
Thiok_,l and the people at Marshall?
DR. LIWI_ES: No, sir, we don't have anyone else doing those tests right now. It may well be
that we should, and we will look into that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It is certainly a suggestion
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you should consider if you're going to rely on those tests.
DR. LITTLE& We will certainly do that.
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Could we go on now _o chart 16, please
i_iewgraph I_16.1 IR_f. 3 7._8]
Thi,_ scenario deals with a slightly different pheTmmenon. As you are aware, the joint has
putty upstream of the ()-rings The understanding of" this joint relative to the putty operation
has always been that the putty does not hold the pressure off of the O-rings.
As a matter of fact, after the incident when we were developing scenarios I discussed this
with the joint experts and I was assured that the putty will not hold the preesure off the O-ring.
But we did make a scenario out of it and we started doing some tests of the putty, and our ini-
tial data--and these are not conclusive yet, and I will tell you in a minute why we don't consider
them finally conclusive, but the data does indicate that the putty in the joint configuration could
hold the pressure off of che O-ring for a long enough period of time for the joint to have rotated.
And that condition, in combination with the resiliency, could cause a problem. The data that
we have ranges between temDeratures of zero degrees and up
2132
to 70 and, as you would expect, there is an influence of temperature on the pre_ure-holding
capability of the putty.
You see it holding pressure for longer periods of time, of course, with colder temperatures.
But the important thing is that, even at 70 degrees and even with putty which has been condi-
tioned at 100 percent relative humidity, the data indicate, that you can hoid the pressure off for
long periods of time compared to .5 seconds.
One of the daU points went up to about 38 seconds. So what we have decided is that we
have to do a more sophisticated test. This initial test had the joint configuration properly config-
ured relative to the putty dimensions, but it did not have the capability to account for any dy-
namic effects of that joint.
Of course, as you apply pressure you get some slight movement, which would tend to move
the NDR insulation slightly away from the putty. And so we are building another test fixture
where we have the capability to induce that dynamic effect, and we should have that one in
tests shortly.
But this one remains _n open scenario at tL_s point in time.
DR. FEYNMAN: That means the pr__sCure is more
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than 200 psi, so that it could hold a pressure more than 200 p_i?
DR. LITI%F__S: Yes. sir, it held pressure up to the full motor pressure.
DR. FEYNMAN: Does tkat mean the test that wa_ made with the 200 psi beginning to load
up the rings i_ not going to work sometimes, because the patty will keep the leak from appear-
ing even ff there ,;;as a leak?
DR. LITrLES: Well, tbat was the first thing I thought al_out, too, when i saw t,ho_e__ data.
But that test is con_lucted, that 200 psi test i_ conducted, for a 15 minute tune frame. So you
have a long period of time for that pressure to work its way through the putty and blow
through.
And we do have data that says it does that, But it is very much a time function, and it is a
temperature function, and I'm sure it is a fur.ction, a very strong function, of humidity, the con-
ditioning of the putty.
And it" is" v,,,--^*'"_'_"a....olin _ _tronlz_ function of the layup. It is laid up, I beheve it is, in seven
strips, ,::_ there is some variation in the layup as well. 'll_ere are a number of variables in "_hat
putty. 1157
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DR FEYNMAN: How far around was it? It was a small model, wa_n t it, about ten inches or
something?
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DR. LI'IN'LES: Yes, sir
DR. FEYNMAN: And you have 37 feet of circumference in the other ca._. _ if the statistics
of any kind--of course, the 37 feet one is much weaker.
DR. LITTLES: There would be a higher probability of having some weak point yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Dr. Littles, you had said earlier that the effect of lcads and flight loads and
so forth might be important here; is that n_,t correct?
DR. L*.2_I'LES: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Might I suggest, for the benefit of us absent-minded folks, that you might add
another box onto this flow diagram indicating that you might put that input in here?
DR. LITTLES: 'Yes. sir. As a matter of fact, Jack ar'_ I were talking about that during
ranch, the fact that we have taken these loads out of th_ design load case We have to have it
visible someplace, and so I agree with that completely. We need to have it reflected., at the
proper places in these- areas, and we will do that
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
DR. LITTLES: Okay. That finishes the basic elements of th,_se scenarios. I now want te ad-
dress the
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two things---couldyGa com_ to the right of the chart, please.Move the chart to the left.
To address two elements of the scenario which we have been, along with others, trying to
explain, the firstbeing that we see a puff of smoke near zero at .5seconds and we see the plume
come out and the leak startat 59 seconds.
There are two ways that could happen, of course. One is that you have a continuous leak
after you get the puff and the joint somehow holds together until 59 seconds; and the other
being that you get the leak at that point, something makes the leak stop Maybe loads, even
though they're not outside of design loads,but the loads are increasing and maybe at Max Q it
opens the jointup.
And so the firstthing I willdiscuss is the work that we are doing relativeto substantiating
or refuting the factthat you could have a leak through that jointthat would letthe joint remain
intact be.tw.-_.n zero seconds and 59 seconds.
We have been doing s_in¢ work on that iP two different areas. We've been doing analysis on
it. We've also been doing some subscale motor tests, which General Kutyna referred to a
moment ago, and I _qll discuss those.
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I am going to skip charts 17 and 18. ::7 and 18 are photc_ of the initial puff and the plume
that emanates at 59 seconds, You've seen those in the time line already, and so I will just go on
then to chart 19.
(Viewgraph L-!9.) [Ref. 3i7.7B i or 6]
We are doing the analysis in an iterative process. Of course, it involves a flc,w analy#_, a
thermal ana!ysis_ coupled with a structural analysis. We started simply--we are gettir-'g more
and more complicated--to try to make the model fit what could have happened.
We have a two dimensional model which we hove been using for some tb'r<,, which incorr--.-
rates the flow, the potential melting of the metal, the recession of the O-ripg mater_a! NDR
,_abber, and also incorporates_ 1D spreading, one dimensional spreading. And what I mean by
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that is that you have flow which would initially be constrained bv the gap in the O-ring, if that
i._ wha_ the pr_blem is, or a flaw in the sealing surface, or maybe by a hole in :he putt), since
the putt) has to erode as well.
And as that flow goes downstream in that joint, it w_ 1 spread circumferer_tially, and a__ it
does that it decreases the amount of heat it puts into the
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metal• We started off with a 1D flow spreading model and a 2D thermal model. We have now
gone to a 3D model, which is depicted at the bottom.
We have also done some structural work to determine how much of the joint you would
have to heat up in order to have it fail with various conditions. The preliminaD' data that we
have back doesn't allow us to say that we could sustain a leak that long, but we are still doing
some work on that. I still think it may b¢ possible.
We, with the 3D model now, are showing that we would get a burn-through in 35 seconds if
wc started at time zero. But I i:asten to add that there are some things we have not included
yet. We have to look at the spreading profile some more. We have to put some better 3D conduc-
tion effects in the model. And the third thing is, that is very. important, is as you get flow
through that joint, the products of combustion are going to allow you to deposit aluminum oxide
as the hot gas flows through
And what that does, of course, is two things.." ,.'ill give you. where you deposit it. it will
give you a resistance to heating at that location, be, ,,ase it gives you an insulating effect; and
the other thing it will do is it will tend to block the flow and further
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reduce the flow rate, to reduce the heat transfer.
We don't have that included in the models at this point in time. As a matter of fact, frankly,
,t is going to be difficult to do. We are working on it, but that is going to be a difficult thing to
do.
But in conjunction w;.th this, if you will go to--no, you don't have a chart. Excuse me.
In conjunction wit/c, this, we have been doing some subscale motor tests. We are doing that
two ways. We have some motors at Thiokol which can burn--they are called five-inch motors.
They can burn for three seconds.
And we have some larger subscale motors which can go for 9.4 seconds. And what we are
doing is inducing various types of defects, either in the sealing surface underneath the O-riz g ( r
in the O-ring itself. And we have gotten some very interesting results out of that.
We have had a test with a 24-socond motor where we had damage in an O-ring. We had the
O-ring cut an eighth of an inch, and that particular one we had smoke for 9.4 seconds, but we
didn't hace any damage. We have had two eases, one where we had--we cut a--put a scratch in
the sealing surfaee of 9.0 mils without putty in the joint, and that one ran for 9.4 seconds, but
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there was significantmetal damage in that one.
We had another one where we had the same type of scratch in the sealing surface, about 20
- _ - .L^ joint. "I_.e _"**-. h.l._ _h .......... ¢r ....... ,1.,thousandths, in this case we .ha putty in _,,e
for about ten seconds, because for ten seconds we didn't see any leakage underneath that
scratch, and then for about five seconds you did see smoke come out, and then the flow stopped
again and for the remaining part of the test, between about 15 seconds and 24, there ws_ no
leakage. ii59
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And so that is qualitative data that indicates to us that you could ha_e a situation with a
certain type of flaw in there and get a flow either intermittent or maybe even continuous.
And another thing, too, is the five incl" CP motors are indicating, as you would expect, that
you can also have alum:nu_n oxide deposited at locations where you have leakage, and it builds
up and it will make the flow switch around to another area.
And this is a thing relative to whether the initial leak might have beer, in some quadrant
other than where we fina!iy saw it. You could have that initial leak somewhere else, have it stop
up, but had accumulated enough damage in the at _er quadrant for that to break loose and cause
the final failure to be in
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another location.
Could you go now to chart 16, please.
{Viev, graph L-16.)[Ref. 37-781
We will dispense with chart 21 as well. That is another photograph you ha_.'e s_n
.. This last item relates to one of the things that had been d,_scussed earlier, and that is rela-
tive to the fact that we saw vehicle rates after we had the plume coming out--we had vehicle
rates and TVC gimbal angles that were larger than would have been predicted with the condi-
tions that we knew we had.
So we have been doing a lot of work to match the vehicle conditions we had with what we
know about the plume characteristics. We have estimated forces and moments n_cessa_ "o
match the observed response. We have evaluated the plume characteristics using the film dars
to determine the vent forces and the aerodynamic influences.
And we established from that that you can get about t30.000 pound force, 130,000 pounds of
momentum in the correct quadrant, and that doing that you can recreate the vehiclo responses,
both relative to ra*_s and Tx,: C gimbal angles.
That is a very brief, cu_ory description of a great deal of very good work. As a matter of
fact, our
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people say, and I believe that JSC people agree, that this is the best match we have ever had. So
they have done a good job of matching that, and we are ccnfident nov," that what we see with
this plume did indeed cause those vehicle rates. They agree verb" well now
Could I go now to chart 22, please.
(Viewgraph L-22.) [Ref. 3/7-79 6 of 6}
This is by way of summary, i've discussed all of the scenarios and, as we have indicated as
we've gone through it, we think that the inhibitor flaw is improbable, that the loed exceedance
relative to the design load situation is improbable, and we still have work, both analyses and
tests, associated w t h those other legs of the scenarios.
That is my final chart.
--. CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
MR. ACHESON: I would like to ask, in relational, to your -_arlier testimony, I thought I under-
stood you as saying that the smoke at igr.ition could be seen in the general area of the test port,
and I thought I had previously understood from other testimony that the test port was aboat 90
degree.s of arc away from where the smoke had been see,n.
Could you clarify that, ple,a_e? oDR. LITTLES: Well, I don t belier, it is 9u
1160 (
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degrees away. The leak check port. 'f this is the tank and this is th_ SRY,, is on the bottom right
here. The plume as we see it later emanates from this location. And really, the leak co_Hd be
anywhere ir this area, because we can't see it.
Now, the question is whether with the photographic cove, _ge we nave it is coming from this
location right here or somewhere around there And again, there are a lot of people looking at
those photographs who conclude that it is indeed not from the leal_ check port, and we may well
be convinced or :hat after we get the report when we get back honle. But i am anxious to see it
because, as I said, I'm still one of those who b_ ieve I can see it from that area.
But l may be able to be convinced to the contrary.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: The simulation work that you referred to at the end, the
match, is that completed now?
DR. LI'I'FLES: Yes, sir, that is completed.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Will there be a report generated for that?
DR. LITTLES: Yes, sir, we will do that.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you think the tests that
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you are _mning would ever--and maybe this isn't a fair question--that the tests you are run-
ning •you a ever re-establish confidence in that joint and those O-rings without change, so that
sub6equen" flights could continue with the same equipment that was on 51-L?
DR. LI_'IWLES: Yes, sir, that is a tough qu_tion. I believe that the tests we have, the test
fixtares that we have, ,f they operate the way we plan for them to, will prove v, hether or not the
joint rotation is a contributor or potential contributor to that leak.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, maybe I shouldn't press it. But anyway, you're trying--the
simula: ions that you're testing, you're doing in trying to simulate conditiens, you think will be
fairly cot. _lusive. But it seems to an outsider that it's going to be very difficult to simuJ.ate these
tests with a _ of the condit_,ns that existed on 51-L in a way that would help you wath any assur-
ance in the ft, _re.
DR. LIq_I_,L "' I agree with that. I very carefully added in that statement, if they work the
way we hope they will. But as I pointed out earlier, this dynamic test t'Lxture or any test trLxture
hke that--and we have looke_! at other versions of that--is a very difficult fixture to put togeth-
er and get it to do
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what you want it to do.
I personally have some question as to whether it is going to work. It may, but it may be
another design than the one we have nov,-. It i_ not an easy set of conditions lx simulate in a
subscale test rig.
MR. SUT'I_R: These tests are aimed at trying to understand the cause of the accident,
aren't they? Isn't that their primary purpose?
DR. LYI'rLES: Yes, sir. ,That is their sole purpose.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But as my previous question suggests, the people who are running
the tests are really in the position of running tests which, if they were successful, would prove
they were right after all. In other words, the Thiokol people, the engineers, thought that, in view
of the weather conditions, that flight should not be launched, and of course your people at Mar-
shall felt the same way, and you are the very people that are conducting these tests.
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T-nat is why I suggested that if might be wise to think of some other outside independent
source to work with you on the tests.
DR. LITTLES: We will certainly be responsive to that, and of course the tests that--this
dynamic test fixture is one that is being used at
2145
Mr_on-Thiokol, and of course we have people there. And we wou_d welcome anyone participat-
ing in that or any other ideas and concepts that anyone might have re!ative to a "est fixture to
do this. We would welcome that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
DR. KEEL: I've got one question with respect to this last chart, if you will pu: that back up
on, your summary, chart.
DR. LITrLES: Chart 22, please.
(V:_wgraph L-22.) [Re/. 't!7-79 2 of 2]
DR KEEL: Let me just ask the question while they're looking for the chart. When you start-
ed off with your fault tree analysis, you had three categories of probability: probable, improb-
able, and coasible. And you labeled a fault in the external tank leading to a faalt in the SRB as
just possible.
Now, this final summary chart, though, has the leak in the external tank as .being probable.
Sc how did you get from possible to probable?
DR. LITTLES: That is as it affects the SRB. The initial chart there on the tank bad :he
ov,_-all tank yellow, with some items red and some items green. But again, this relates t,- the
impact of that on the SRB. There may be, as I think about it here, a little bit of inconsistency in
that.
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MR. LEE: If you look at the overall fault tree, the externa! tank was coloreJ yellow because
we had not completed all of the evaluation as_',essments, and I thir_k in particular th _. review o_'
records relative to structural flaws.
That makes the external tank as the failure mode, if you will, to be stlil suspect, tf you
notice, in the same fault tree there is an arrow from the external tank into the SRB, which still
is a viable potential contributor to the SRB failure. So that is the reason we painted it red or
colored it red here and yellow in the overall chart.
DR. KEEL: It still looks to me to be en inconsistency.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Pursuing that just a bit further, every time I've gone back to that,
each time that representatives from Marshall have testified they've pointed to the external tank
as the number one suspect. And I notice Mr. Lucas said that in his pr _s conference the other
day.
And yet, os_nsibly it seem_ as if the joint seems to be the number one suspect. And I don't
quite understand it.
MR. LEE: i didn't mean to imply that We don't think the external tank is the number ¢,ne
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suspe_*.. It is a potential as a cont='ibutor only. We know that the SRB failed, and until we com-
plete a_ ! of the analysis associated with things such as a potential hydrogen leak at lift, if, then
we can't close that out.
We know the SRB is the failure.
DR. KEEL: But is the only reason yoga :"ave this labeled red is because you chose just to use
red and green on this cha_? If you had used yellow, would it have been yellow?
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sMR. LEE: I could have used yellow there, you're right. But as it relates to the SRB in gener-
al, it is still red.
CHAIRMAN ROGER5: OkPy.
MR. LEE: This completes the summary of the failure scenarios and .qndings. We are now
prepared to go into th_ summary of the ether elements if yc:a like.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Ve_ good. Thank you.
(Witnesses sworn.)
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SCENARIO NO. I
E._]J.JJBEM CHANISM:
0 DEFECT I_ THE AFT SEGMF_T MOLDED INHIBITOR (HOLE)
0 ALLOWS I(_NITIONOF IHE PROPELLANT (HOT GAS THRU THE HOLE)
0 SUB-SURFACE PROPELLANT BURNING DEGRADES CASE INSULATIONAT THE MEMBRANE WALL
RESULTING IN A CASE BURN THRU AT (OR NEAR) 6G SECONDS
0 REVIEW BUILD AND PROCESS RECORDS OF 51-L RH AFT SEGRENT INHIBITOR
0 REVIEW EXPERIENCE _ WITH THESE INHIBITORS
0 ASSESS FAILURE MECHANISRS/CHARACTERiSTICSWITH OBSERVED 51-L DATA
0 DETERMINE BY ANALYSIS THE HEAT EFFECI "iNINSULATION AND CASE MEMBRANE
FINDINGS TO DATE:
0 THE MOLDED INHIEITOR IS LAYED-UP AS 8 PLJtS OF RUBBER AND VULCANITED ALONG
WITH CASE IMSULAT!ON
- LOW PROBABILITY OF A FLAW THRU 8 PLIES OF RUBBER
0 NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENC_ WITH PROBLEMS AT THIS INHIBITOR
0 ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT 2.5 TIRES NOMINAL HEAT TRANSFER WOULD BE REQUIRED TO
DEGRADE THE INSULATION AND HEAT THE CASE TO BURN THRU IN APPROXIMATELY 60
SECONDS
0 THIS FAILURE MECHANISM WOULD NOT EXI-;.AINTHE "SMOKE" AT LIFT-OFF
0 THIS FAILURE _CHAHISM IS NOT PROB_2_.E
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FAILURE SCENARIOS2A AND2B
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o OVERHEATS CASE MEMBRANE TO A BURN THRU IN APPROXIMATELY 58 SECONDS
0 DETERMINE BY ANALYSIS THE SIZE OF HOLE IN THE LH2 TANK THAT IS NOT
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FINDINGS TO DATE:
0 ANN_YSIS SHOWS q LBI_/SECLEAK FROM H2 TANK IS ROT DETECTABLE ;W
PRESSURE INGTRUMENTATION(EQUIVALENT TO 0,81° DIA, HOLE)
0 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF HEATING ON SRR
o ASSUMES COMTE COMBUSTION OF TOTAL FLOW
0 ADDITIONAL JOINT ROTATION AND O-RING UNSEATING CAN OCCUR DUE TO
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FAILURE _E(.HA.NISM:
DARAGE TO THE O-RINGS INDUCED AT JOINT ....TING Dt'_ TO OUT-OF-ROUND
CONDITIONS
ASSESSMENT METHODS:
REVIEW STACKING CONDITIONS FOR 51-L AND OTHER FLIGHTS
INTERVIEW STACKING CREW
PERFORRA DIREN_iONAL TOLERANCE STACK-UP ANALYSIS
CONDUCT TESTS TO SIRULATE 51-L RH SRR AFT FIELD JOINT RATING CONDITIONS
TO EVALUATE POTENTIAL FOR O-RING DARAGE
CONDUCT TESTS TO SIMULATE LEAK TESTS AND SEAL PERFORMANCE UNDE2 51-L RH
_'l"FIELD JOINT RATING CONDITIONS
DESTACK STS Gl-G TO ASSESS EFFECT OF OUT-OF-ROUNDASSEMBLY l_ef :}7-88 3 of 4J
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FAILURE SCENARIO 3 (CONT|NUE2_
FINDINGS_
0 DIFFICULTY EXPERIENCED IN MILKING 51-L AFT FIELD JOINT (q TRYS)
- MECHANICAL ROUNDING FITTURE REGUIRED
gORSE CASE OCCURRENCE[OF DATA REVIEt_.D TO DATE RELATIVE TO
POTENrIAL FOR 0 RING/TANG INTERFERENCE
0 DIMENSIONAL TOLERANCE STACK-UP ANALYSIS COFIPLETED
NETAL TO METAL INTERFERENCE (TANG ID t_rrIH CLEVIS INNER LEG OD -
SEALING SURFACES) WAS 0.02.5" TO 0.209" BAS[_D ON LAST MEASUREt_ENTS
PRIOR TO MATE
THIS FAILURE _CHANISM REMAINS ACTIVE PENDING COMPLETION OF PAPER
REVIEWS, CREW INTERVIEWS, AND TESTS
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FAILURE SCENARIO 4J_
FAILURE MECHANISM
PRIMARY O-RING BLOW-BY/LEAKAGE AND LEAKAGE PAST SECONDARY O-RING DUE TO O-RINC
DEFECT
ASSESSMENT METHOD
ANALYSIS OF CLOSEOUT PHOTOS
REVIEW OF RECORDS
SPECIAL INSPECTIONOF O-RINGS
TESTS TO EVALUA]E PERFORMANCE OF SIMULATED O-RING DEFECT AND TO EVALUATE
LEAK TEST OF O-RING WITH SIMULATED DEFECT
FINDINGS
0 CLOSEOUT PHOTO FOR STS S1-L AFT FIELD JOINT SHOWS SUSPECT SECONDARY O-RING
PHOTO ANALYSI3 IN PROGRESS
OTHER CLOSEOUT PHOTOS IN REVIEW
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FAILURE SCENARIO 4B
f_ILURE MF_CHANISM
PRIMARY 0 RING BLOW-BY AND ICE IN JOINT EFFECTING SECONDARY 0 RING OR _31NT.
CLEVIS D!ME.IISION
0 TESTS TO EVALUATE JOINT DIMENSION CHANGES WITH WATER FREEZING IN JOINT
0 ESTS TO EVALUATE SF_ALI_GCHARACTERISTICS WITH COLD GREASE DOWNSTREAJqOF
SECONDARY 0 RING
0 ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE POTENTIAL FOR WATER FREEZING IN JOINT TO UNSEAT
SECONDARY 0 RING
FIflDINGSTO DATE
0 STS-51L EXPOSED TO APPROXIMATELY 7 INCHES OF RAIN DURING PAD STAY
0 POST I_CIDENT INVESTIGATIONREVEALED THAT WATER WAS PRESENT IN JOINTS OF
STS-9 WHEN DESTACKED TO REPLACE AFT SEGMENT NOZZLE
0 TESTS SHOW EFFECTS OF ICE ON CLEVIS Di_NSION CHANGE ARE NEGLIGIBLE
O ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT:
- FREEZING OF WATER BENF..ATHCOLUMN OF AIR BETWEEN TOP OF PIN AND
SECONDARY 0 RIflGWILL NOT RESULT IN UILSEATING0 RING (MAX. DELTA P
APPROXIMATELY 2 PSIG)
- WATER FREEZING BENEATH A COLUMN OF GREASE REQUIRED TO EFFECT
SECONDARY 0 RING
0 SCENARIO OPEN PENDING FURTHER TEST RESULTS
{Ref. 3 7-74 1 of 21
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FAILURE SCENARIO _C
I:AILURE RECHANISR
PRIMARY 0 RING ELOW-BY/LEAY,AGE AND LEAK THRU THE LEAK CHECK PORT
ASSESSRENT RETHOD
0 ANALYSIS TO CHARACTERIZE HOT GAS LF__'CTHRU _ CHECK PORT AND RESULTING
EROS]ON/DARAGE
0 ANALYSIS/TESTS TO CHARACTERIZE LEAKAGE RATES
0 TESTS TO ASSESS EROSIOIVDARAGE WITH LEAKAGE THRU LEAK CHECK PORT
0 PHOTO ANALYSIS TO DETERMI_ IF INITIAL LEAK (SMOKE PUFF) COULD BE FR:_ L_
CHECK PORT
FINDINGS TO DAT_
0 ANALYSIS INDICATES T.qM SECONDARY 0 RING COULD BE OYERHEATED AND FA_L AT OR
BEFORE 59 SEC.
0 PHOTO ANALYSIS TO DATE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE SMOKE PUFF FROM THE LEAK CHECK
POINT - ANALYSES CONTIi_UING.
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FAILURE SCENARIO qD
FAILURE MECHANI_fl
PRIMARY O-RING BLOW-BY/LEAKAGE AND O-RING ACTIVATIO_ DEI.AYED DUE TO LOW
TEMPERATURE
ASSESSMENT METHOD
0 LABORATORY TESTS TO FURTHER QUANTIFY RESILIENCE OF O-RING V,SRSUS
TEMPERATURE
0 ANALYSES AND TESTS TO ESTAJ3LISH AMOUNT OF JOINT ROTAIION FOR 3TS 51-L
CONDITIONS INCLUDING EFFECTS OF PROPELLANT
0 DYNAMIC TESTS TO DETERMINE SEALING CAPABILITY WITH COMBINED EFFECTS OF
O-RING PRESSURE ACTUATION, JOINI ROTATION AND RESILIENCY
FINDINGS TO DATE
0 RESILIENCY TESTS SUBSTANTIATE INCREASED O-RING RESPONSE TIMES AC O-RING
TEMPERATURE IS REDUCED
0 TESTS SHOW THAT COLD O-RINGS (-tO°F) WILL SEAL WHEN SUBJECTED TO
MOTOR IGNITION TRANSIENT PRESSURES UNDER STATIC CONDITIONS
0 ANALYSES AN_ TESTS TO SIMULATE RIGHT IIANDSRM AFT FIELD JOINT DYNAMIC
PERFORMANCE U_IDER STS 51-L CONDITIONS ARE REQUIRED [Ref. 3 7 76 1 of 2]
! 206
mi_ . i i
H.-OSO
G
SRM INPIIBJTOPI
F LAW
®
I LH 2 LEAK
I< 4 LB/SEC}
®
I DAMAGE PRI. & lSEC. O--R JNG
OUE TO OUT OF
ROUND SEGMENT
®
I PRI O-RING
BLOW BY OR
LEAKAGE
SRM HOT GAS LEAK
FAILURE SCENARIOS
t _l SRM MEMBRANE
BURN THR U
® i
i J.. BORN,.,..,.oE.L_.r,O,.TOV,R..A..
--'qON.,,M,OINT I L .O-.,"G,''"
®
®
,CEINI_O,.T t (
t PORT LEAKS
(_ ___ O--RING ACTUAT "i
TIME DELAY"0 b,
LOAD
EXCEEDANCE
®
PUTTY HOLDS
PR. OFF PRI
O-RING
_._PRI & SEC. O-RI,%G
OFF SEAT (ROTA'_ iON)[
_ Eli bEC,_. 735EC
IJET _k4P_GEMENT | _73 $EC _ 10g SEC
• nONT,.,AFT I _ I'"""O'"T I
( DN-._BULKHEAD (TANK I,_BULKHEADHMEMILqRAVE |
" ILEAKAGE UNOICATEDI IFAbLURE | IBURNTHRU|
K _. iCONTINUE_iAT _ 66 SEC)
24
IR_.t'. :1 7 7(:, 2 .f 2 i
| __o;
®
MICROCOPY RE'SOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARL_ REFERENCE MATERIAL 101OB
(ANSI and ISC, TEST CHART No 2)
FA]I.URE RECHAk|S/_
INDU(_I) LIFTOFF OR FLIGHT LOADS DAI4AGEDJOINT OR PRODUCEDEXCESSIVE JOINT
ROTATION RESULTIIQG IN FAILURE
_SS#_alIT_T_D
DETERMINE LOADS [XPERIF_MCF_I)BY STS 51-L FOR ALL FLISHT [VFRTS
COMPARE STS 51-L LOADS WITH DESIGN COIIDITIOMS
CONDUCT SPECIAL JOINT DYRASIC ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE INDUCED LOADS
STS 51-L INDUCED LIFTOFF LOADS ARE LESS THAN DESIGN LOADS tIASED ON:
o _RA O_VATIOflS OF TWAIIG 80VERENT
o HOED_ POST S,?AIN GAUGE DATA
o RECONSTRUCTEDLOADS BASED ON TIIRUST BUILDUP, WINDS, THRUST
RISRATCIIES AND VEHICLE DYIIMIC RODEL
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0 _ HOI_6.1_ES_IE OFF AID PRIRAIY MD SECOIIDMY O.-Rilk;S ARE OFF SEAT
(,JOllIT GAP OPERllE COUPLED WITH RESILIENCY) WHEII PRESSURE APPLIED
ASSESSIqEIIT METHOD
0 MALYSES MD TESTS TO ESTABLISH NqOIJIIT OF ,JOINT ROTATION FOR STS 51-L
COIIDITIOIIS
0 TESTS TO EVALUATE PUTTY PRESSURE HOLDING CAPABILITY WITH VARYING GAP
DIREIISIORS, ENVIROMIqENTALEXPIRES PRIOR TO A_Y NID TEST
TF__TURES
0 TESTS TO EVALUATE JOINT SEALIIIG PERFORIm,AIICEWITH SPACE BETtY:EllO-RING
AIIDSEALIMG SURFACE
0 IMITIAL TESTS IMDICATE THAT PUTTY PRESSURE HOLDING CAPABILIW RAY BE
SUFFICI;PT TO SUPPORT THIS SCEllARIO
0 ADDITIONAL TESTS, INCLUDING DYIIM]C EFFECTS OF THE JO]NT, ARE REQUIRED
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FJANAT[IIM_ FR(XMJO[IIT AT APPROX[RATE[.Y 59 SEC, TWO POSSIBILITIES F._X[ST:
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INITIAL LIEN( CAUSED DAIMAGIETO JOINT AND L_ IMPOSED OM JOINT
NEAR 59 SEC. RESULTED IH FAILURE
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O FLOW, THERRAL AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSES TO EVALUATE JOINT CAPABILITY WITH
CORTIIIU(XJS LEAK PATH
0 SU]kS_.ALE ROTOR TESTS TO EVALUATE JOINT CAPABILITY WITH INDUCED LEAK
PATHS
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• MATERIAL STRENGTH AND FAILURE MECHANISM
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0 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND TESTS ARE REOUIRED
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VEHICJ.E RATES AND TVC GIMAL ANGI.JESWERE i_AK,IER THAN PRE.DICTED
ASSE_T METHOD
ESTIRATE FORCE (AND LOCATION) ArID ROIqENT NECESSARY TO BATCH OBSERVED
RESPOflSE
EVALUATE PLLI_E CHARACTERISTICS USING FILM DATA TO DETERMINE VENT FORCES
AND AERODYNARIC IMFLIJENCES
0 RECREATE VEH I CLE RESPONSE
FINDING T_DATE
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NINE FAILURE SCENARIOS ARE POSTULATED FOR THE SRR HOT GAS LEAK
THE SRR INHIBITOR FLAW AND LOAD EXCEEDARCE SCENARIOS HAVE BEEN DETERRINED TO
BE NOT PROBA___
0 TESTS AND ANALYSES ARE CONTINUING FOR OTHER SCENARIOS
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TESTIMONY OF: GARY COULTAS, ASSISTANT MANAGER, ORBITER PROJECTS, JOHN-
SON SPACE CENTER; AND GEORGE HOPSON, DIRECTOR, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
AND INTEGRATION LABORATORY, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
MR. LEE: Mr. Chairman, would like now to summarize the three elements which we believe
are non-contributors to this incident. If you remember the overall fault tree which Mr. Keel re-
ferred to, there were--each element was recognized as a potential contributor initially, and that
would be the orbiter, the shuttle main engine, the IUS or inertial upper stage, the external tank,
and the solid rocket booster.
We believe that, from the data that we have available to us--and we believe we have all of
the available data--that three of those elements are non-contributors. And at this time I would
for us to present to you in summary fashion the rationale for why we think that is the case.
And I would iike now to introduce Mr. Gary Coultas from the Johnson Space Center to sum-
marize for you that rationale for the orbiter.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Very well.
MR. COULTAS: I'm Gary Cou!tas. I'm the
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assistant manager for the orbiter project at the Johnson Space Center. I have held this position
for about two and a half years. I have been with NASA for 22 years, and I have been involved
with the orbiter project for a good deal of that time.
Let me startout with chart C-2.
(Viewgraph C-2.) lu,'f. :_ 7-_o1
This identifies the basic configuration of the vehicle. The orbiter vehicle started out its
career as static test article 099. We completed a test program, a structural test program, in 1979
to validate our stress analysis.
We knew going into that test program that we would ultimately make this into a flight ve-
hicle. So as we went into that test program we took great care not to overstress the basic air-
frame. We did predict as we ran that test program what we would expect from the loading that
we induced _.nto the vehicle; what kind of responses we should see. We monitored those re-
sponses and we did not exceed those during the tests.
After that test program, we tore the vehicle down, installed systems and wiring and compo-
nents, and it was delivered as a full operational vehicle in July of 1982. It flew nine flight mis-
sions from the period of April 1983 to October 1985.
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During that time period, we had a couple of problems that did not cause us any in-flight
probleras. These were turn-around issues post-mission. We had two problems with the OMS pods.
The OM,=' pods are the propulsion modules on the aft of the vehicle. We had an ice impact prob-
1214
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: lem which caused some loss of the thermal protection system in that area and also a bonding
problem on 41-G. We had to remove those pods from the vehicle for repairs and other pods were
substituted.
Also, after the 41-G mission, we lost a tile during that mission and subsequent analysis and
review indicated that we had _ problem with incompatibility between the waterproofing materi-
al til_.t we were using and t._e tile bonding material. We subsequently replaced arcund 4,000
tiles on the bottom of the vehicle.
For STS 51-L, we did go back and review all of our documentation and vehicle proce_ing
records asaociated with the Challenger vehicle, which included the design configuration, the
modification work that had been done, partial modifications that were in various stages of com-
pletion, waivers, deviations, et cetera.
We also had--the Challenger vehicle was one of the two vehicles that we were provisioning
to carry Centaur cargo and payloads later this year, and those roods, they were not totally com-
plete. We had been
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installing those over an incremental period of time. We made no rood specifically for Centaur
during the flow for 51-L and those mods and the partial configuration were certified.
The bottom line in terms of the configuration and the hardware of the Challenger vehicle
itself is that we found no anomalous conditions that would give us any concern relative to the
pre-launch processing.
Chart C-3.
(Viewgraph C-3.) I_,.f :_ 7-_ll
What I would like to do now is go through the various functional areas of the vehicle and
just give you some highlights of our findings and observations in these areas. And we have got a
few acronyms in here, and I will try to cover those, and if I fail to give you the right information
or there is still some misunderstanding, please don't hesitate to call out as we go.
These charts are set up--these next two charts are set up in a propulsion and power area.
Starting with the orbiter maneuvering system, these are the maneuvering engines which are i_
the pods on the aft of the vehicle, that take us into orbit and take us out of orbit.
We evaluated all the measurements associated
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with those engines and that propulsion system. We found nothing anomalous with the data. One
comment is that these OMS pods were originally built and used for the OV-102 Columbia vehi-
cle, and this was their first use since STS-9 in October 1983.
They had been extensively reworked, with external TPS being put on, thermal protection
system, and also the propellant tanks had been reworked since their prior use. And that is just a
note. We found nothing ancmalous in the data that would ir.dicate any contributory cause there.
The reaction control system consists of numerous engines on the front and the aft of the
vehicle that provide us with attitude control maneuvers in space and during re-entry. We re-
viewed all the measurements associated with those enginf._ and the propulsion systems, and we
also reviewed the flight photos.
All of that data again was nominal. These engine,_ oe show at around the 73 second time
frame an onset of high pressures. They are basically moniuoring or sensing the exterior pressure.
Just prior to loss of data, some of those pressure indications were up to around 200 psi, indic, t-
ing a pretty high overpressure on the vehicle.
We did have a flight anomaly. We lost a
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temperatm _ _nsor on one of the engines, It failed at liftoff. There was no mission effect from
this.
Another interest item is that we have heaters c the thruster systems to provide thermal
conditioning in orbit. We normally launch with the heaters ON on our vernier engine systems,
but they are normally OFF on the primary thrusters.
Because of the cold weather, we did turn those thruster heaters on and we launched this
way during ascent. We have done this also on the 51-C mission in January of 1985.
The reason that we turn these on is that we can, if the engine valves get cool you get
shrinkage in the valve seats and you could get propellant leakage. And knowing this was a con-
tern, we did turn these heaters on pre-launch and we flew that way.
The next subsystem is the auxiliary power unit, which consists of basically--is a hydrazine
system that runs through a turbine to provide energy for the hydraulic pumps. Again, all of the
measurements in this system are nominal. We did have--APU No. 5 did exhibit some differ-
ences, again within our experience base. APU 3 was new for this particular flight.
The hydraulic system provides hydraulic system for gimbaling the main engines, t'or the
control valves
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on the main engines, and for the aero surfaces on the vehicle. We reviewed the fluid dynamic
measurements, flows, pressures, temperatures, in that system, and again all were nominal.
We have a fuel cell system and a cryogenic storage system which supplies--basically gener-
ates electricpower for the vehicle. All measurements in that system were nominal, again nothing
anomalous.
Chart C-4, continuing with the propulsion and power system.
(Viewgraph C-4.){R,.r. :_7-n2 I
The pyrotechnic system that we have on board. We reviewed all of the measurements of the
NASA standard devices, which are the electrical initiation devices for the pyros. We reviewed all
of that data.
The orbiter to ET forward attach bolt was a new design that had a strain gauge in it, and
we went back and reviewed all of this acceptance test data to make sure that there was nothing
anomalous in that, since it was the first time we had flown that particular design.
Again, we reviewed the recovered debris and the flight photos. Our findings there were that
there were no unintentional firing commands. All the hardware that we did thnd on recovery
looked okay. We found no fired pyres, either electrically or thermally induced,
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in that area.
We also looked at the battery systems, primarily the SRB and ET, the SRB recovery batter-
ies. And again, everything there was nominal from our perspective.
Chart C-5, the avionics areas.
(Viewgraph C-5.) IR_r. :_7-_31
In the GN and C area, we had sensors on the SRB, SRB rate _fros, We had ,___sors on the
orbiter, flight control sensors. These sense the characteristics of the vehicle. That data is as-
sessed, messaged essentially through the on-board flight software. Commar, ds t'r_en are sent to
the SRB actuators and the SSME actuators, the effectors we call them, to steer t',_e vehicl-.
And that is the flight control loop, basically, that we fly the vehicle with. We reviewed a_l of
the measurements associated with that system, both internal software measurements that are
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sent down to the ground in additicn to the actual measured data from the sensors and the effec-
tors that _ :'_ msitioned, and so forth.
We also did off-line simulations to confirm that the data was all consistent, and we again
rt "dewed the flight photos. The system response for the flight
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control system for the whole stack, i'esponse is as designed.
And we have heard several discussions about transient behavior in certain pe_'iods of time,
40 seconds, 52 seconds, and near the end. In all of these areas, the flight control system was
responding to the external stimuli, either wind induced or plume i-.duced. _nd we see nothing
anomalous in the behavior of how it did. espond.
In the 62 to $5 second time period, we do have a wind-induced transient in that period of
time and as you've heard also earlier, we have a contribution from an external force associated
with the plume. We did see just before the vehicle breakup, acceleration spikes, positive and
negative, and also, as you've heard earlier, the deviation between the right SRB and the rest of
the stack in terms of ._hat the rate gyr_ were saying.
Several interest items. That has been brought out before, but let me just amplify on that a
little bit. We did have a slightly higher, two degree higher, max roll error. Now, as we're going
uphill we are basically flying, and as we get a wind-induced--as we get wind shears, the vehicle
will roll with the wind so it doesn't try to fight it.
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And in the past the most we have seen with that kind of a maneuver is about nine degrees.
This time we went up to eleven. Again, it is consistent with our flight control design, but it is
higher than we had seen before.
GENERAL KU'ITNA: What time was that?
MR. COULTAS: Around the 40 second time frame.
Also, we have what we classily here as a hot SRB, which in our guidance philosophy what
we are looking at is velocity as a function of time. And we have in our on-board guidance the
ability t_) detect whether we're running a cold performance or a hot performance, so that we can
limit the loads on the vehicle during the Max Q regime.
A_d so,because of variabilitiesin the SRB ballisticand performance characteristics,we ac-
tually monitor that in real time in the flight.And we have certain points in the trajectorythat
we will throttledown the main engines in anticipation of not exceeding our design criteriain
the Max Q regime that would occur lateron.
We would have predicted at this first throttledown point to go down to about 103 percent
from 104. We actually, because we were fast or, so to say,
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hot in this time frame, we throttled down at the first throttle point to 94 percent and eventually
down to 65 percent in the throttle bucket, and then back up again. We have seen this behavior
many times before and it was unexpected, but not anomalous.
The data processing system, the DPS, consistsof the--
DR. FEYNMAN: Do you mean you have an accelerometer so you can determine--
MR. COULTAS: We measure velocitieswith the IMU's as a function of time. We get inertial
velocityand compare that with, at a given time--
DR. FEYNMAN: It'snot rotationalvelocity;it'saboolute velocity?
MR. COULTAS: Absolute vei_ity.
DR. FEYNMAN: So accelf:_-ationyou measure?
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MR. COULTAS: Yes, we're actually monitoring acceleration integrated over time, basically,
to get the velocity. A_d we have velocity time points durit, g the ascent trajectory, and if at a
time point, if we are high in velocity, _¢e throttle down. If we are low on velocity, we don't throt-
tle down, basically to fly a velocity profile.
DR. FEYNMAN: Thank you.
MR. SUTTER: This could produce a different
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load on the mounts between the main tank and the solid rocket boosters?
MR. COULTAS: It is intended to control those loads, and so we actually take int_'_ account in
real time what the performance is of the vehicle stack, so that later on that we limit the max
dynamic pressure, and that is a measure of load, basically, on the vehicle, as we get further up
into flight.
MR. SUTTER: But I was thinking of the case where the solid rocket motors don't change
thrust much and the main engines you say are dropping thrust quite a bit. So that produces
some kind of a bending load or a shear load on the mount between the solid rocket booster and
the main tank, wouldn't it?
MR. COULTAS: Well, the main engines are designed to throttle and the whole stack is de-
signed to follow a thrust time or velocity time profile, basically. And yes, it does change from,
you might say, a nominal.
But again, the flight base or our experience base or our design base takes that into account,
and so we have an envelope that we can fly within.
MR. S_ER: I wasn't thinking of the orbiter as mach as I was thinking of what haFpens
to that structure between the main tank and the solid rocket
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booster. And we keep looking at that joint and wondering why it did perform the way it did.
This could be another item that added to changing its load.
MR. COULTAS: Well, as we are looking at, as Marshe:l and ourselves are jointly looking at
the total load profile th",,ugh the mission, and that in a reconstruction of the real loads, this is
automatically t_ ,on int_ _.ffect, the way we flew it or, the day we flew it, basically.
And a loads calculation or a loads profile all *,he way up is being developed.
kgain, the bottom line is that tho_ loads as we see them today are well within our design
base, except, and as Marshall has indicated, they need to understand, even with the low loads
with an anor,_alous joint, is there some combined effect that it could be a problem or an issue.
The data processing systems is our on-board software system, consisting of our general pur-
pose computers, and they're basically interfaced with the rest of the vehicle through what we
call MDM's. We have again the software, the operating system software which keeps our four
machines in synchronization, and then the displays, the crew, and the keyboard functions that
the crew _ put in.
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Again, in that system all the measurements were nominal. We had no errors on those data
buses and so fo,'_ch. Everything was nominal.
V_e did put in a program, a special precaution to the recovery crews that if we recovered
any computer that we would keep it immersed in salt water until we could get at it. There are
some non-volatile memory in those computers that we could perhaps preserve, and so that stand-
ing statement is out to the rec, overy crews.
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The display and control system, electrical power distribution system, are all nominal. The
communications and tracking system, again everything was nominal there. We did have a
couple of data dropouts during the flight, again not anomalous. We have seen these many times
before.
The dropout at four seconds is. we believe, due to an antenna. We have to select and de-
select antennas as we are flying, depending upon where the ground station is and also to avoid
the attenuation through the plumes.
And the one second dropout we also believe was due to plume attenuation.
Instrumentation system, again everything is nominel there. We also got a special request
out to the recovery team: Any tape recorder which is recovered, we
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have special proc, edures for recovering the tape and drying the tape in a controlled manner so
thot _ve can recover any data off of that.
Of special interest there is a data system that we have that is not telemetered, which has
got a lot of environmental data in the cargo bay and external to the vehicle. We have not gotten
those back.
(Viewgraph C-6.) i_,,r. :_ ; _ll
Chart C-6 is our structur_ area, consisting of the primary structure, purge vent and drain
system. We have to vent this vehicle as it goes, as we go into space. We have to repressurize the
structure, the cargo bay, and the wings, et cetera, as we re-enter. And we have special doors that
open up at certain times in the flight that do this.
We also h, ve included in this system all of our thermal subsystem, our tiles, and so forth.
Looking at all of the measurements we have in thesa areas, the hardware mods that we m_de
specifically for this mission, and again the flight loads, we see nothing anomalous within any ot
that data.
(Viewgraph C-7.) tK_r. :_ 7-_ I
Chart C-7, ou" mechanical subsystem area, consisting of doors, payload bay doors, the vent
doors which i mentioned, which are up and down the sides of
2163
the vehicle, the main landing gear and nose landing gear doors, the retention system--these are
the latches which hold the cargo in the cargo bay, also a latch-down for the remote manipulator
arl21.
We also have in that system, mechanical system, at the umbilicals, the large umbilicals,
feeding the propellaat into the vehicle. And we also have the hatches on the vehicle, the side
hatch and overhead emergency egress hatch.
All of the data that we can see there and the flight photos indicate everything is nominal
there. One point of interest is that all of the umb;licals between the orbiter and the external
tank and between the external tank and the right and left SRB's were all mated until the loss of
signal of all of the data. So there was no premature separation of any of the umbilical functions.
DR. FEYNMAN: I thought there was some fussing about with the hatch door.
MR. COULTAS: We had on the launch attempt on the previous day, we did have a problem
with the hatch. We have readouts that tell us whether all of the hatch latches are all down, and
we had a readout problem with one of those. And we also had a problem of getting a GSE, a
ground support handle, off of the hatch on the
2164
prior day.
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IWe have looked at that and we see nothing in that information that would cause us any
concern. Actually, we're going to fix the problem that we have had with the GSE handle, but on
the day that we did launch it was n .t :in issue.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you, Mr. Couitas. We appreciate it.
Mr. Hopson.
MR. HOPSON: Mr. Chairman, Commission members:
I'm George Howx, n For the past fGur years, I've been assigned as director of Systems Analy-
sis and Integration Laboratory at Marshall.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Hopson, would you move your microphone over a little bit.
MR. HOPSON: Prior to that time, I was assigned as director of the S),s*,ems Dynamics Labo-
ratory. My present assignment is chairman of the SSME investigation witb regard to fligh t. 51-L.
Could I have the second chart, please.
(Viewgraph H-2.) [Ref. 3 7-86]
Here are so,me of the characteristics of the shuttle main en_ne, and I wil 1 just say it is
capable of about a half a million pounds of thrust and it is
2165
throttleable down to 65 percent.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph H-3.)[_,.t. :_ 7 _7 I
Our first task on our team was to verify, based upon our ground test experience and using
the telemetry data that we received from Challenger, that we would be able to d_.scern an engine
failure. And we did verify that capability.
The data that we get, the telemetr)" data from Challenger, is 25 samples per second, and we
did verify that we could pick up, based upon our past experience, an engine problem with that
sample rate.
We reviewed all of the data daring all phases of the engine operation for any sign of mal-
function or degradation in performance, and I will report on these findings s absequently.
We also re-reviewed the records of the pre-flight condition of the enginf:s and found no omis-
sions or discrepancies.
Lastly, we inspected the recovered engine hardware to compare the condition of the engines
with what the telemetry dam had indicated, and I will report on that also.
(Viewgraph H-4.) I_,'i :; ;-_1
Addressing pre-flight, there are several
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measurements that we can use that we do monitor pre-flight, that have to do with temperature.
One thing that we are looking for in the engine compartment is any evidence of a propellant
leak, where abnormally low temperature_ "_,,,fld be indicated by these measurements that are in
the engine compartment. W_ found no evidence of any propellant leak in the compartment.
We also look at component temperatures to make sure that they are within the linfits that
tho_e components are designed and have been demonstrated to operate at. All components
within the engine compartment were within acceptable temperature limits.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph H-5.)Igor. :_ 7-,;, I
I would like to look now at the start transient. This curve shc, ws the chamber pressure
buildup for all three of the Challevger engines during the start. The outer bounds that you see
there are the chamber pressures which are acceptable as a function of time during start, and
you can _e that all three Challenger engines came up well within the acceptable bounds.
1220
Sotherewasnothingab,ormalwhatsoeveraboutthestart.
Thenextchart,please.
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(Viewgraph H-6._ Im.t :_ 7 ,,.a t
[ i--re taken a little bit different tack on this one. This is also a start transient cha_. One of
our most important measurements as far as determining the health ,_f the engine is the dis-
charge temperature from the high pressure fuel pump.
These three curves that you see on this chart are those type measurements. But rather than
being the three Challenger engines, I have picked engine number one from--they are all Chal-
lenger engines, but only one of them is from flight 51-L. The cther two are from the two preced-
ing flights.
So the message from this curve is--well, there's two met, gages. One, that performance has
been very consistent during those flights, ene flight to another; and the other is it is a very satis-
factory start as far as those t_mperatures are concerned.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph H-7.) IR,.1 :_7 ,I}
Now we want to go to---we have looked, at the transient and we want to look at the main
stage performance, that is after we get vp to power. And as it was stated earlier, we start and
we go up to 100 percent, amd we stayed at 104 percent for a while and then dropped down to,
what was it, 95 or 96 percent, and
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then down to 65, and then back out of the start bucket up to 104 percent.
Now, for the first 73 seconds we have got s,_meti_ing hke---we've got something like 115
measurements of each engine, a,d we get a measurement every 40 milliseconds, and so we get
25 z,amples per second from that number of measurements, plus we have some orbiter measure-
ments that we also look at, and we looked at in great det_ _ every measurement during not om7
this main stage operation, but the transient and naturally daring the incident.
Ev _,ything was nominal up until about 73 seconds, where this curve goes to--
MR. SU2_FER: Is this engine versus thrust time programmed? Is that automatic?
MR. HOPSON: Yes, that is a closed loop control system.
MR. S_R: How many flights other than this one did you drop down to the 65 percent?
Is that u_ua!?
MR. HOPSON: Ever)- one of them. On these particular engines, two of the engines, this was
the fifth flight. We had four previous flights, or was it six? I think we had four previous flights
on two of the engines and three previous flight_ on one of them.
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And in all cases we dropped down to 65 percent during the Max Q regime.
The next cha_, please.
(Viewgraph H-8.) I_,',. :_ 7 :,z]
Now, thfis shows, thi_ is an expanded chart and the whole ,art only covers one second, and
this again is of our high pressure fuel turbopump discharge temperature. Our red line limit, as
_t*11 (lilt "."t'. _ itili (I('_F'.'(*'- V_*l*lllg('ll. "['li_tl 1"1'_t [1111'. I[ _,_,1' ('\('('l'([ i}l_ll ['l'{I lill_' l}l_' _')lll}_*][_'l
_tlll,,_llilli,_t!]', !',',,AIY, _li|[ t'ltglll_' 'll_'_ll
And you can ee that up until--up until 73 seconds--well, in fact past 73 seconds, the data
looks very normal and that is what it is supposed to look like, what it looks like here.
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We did notice at a little bit before 7:3 seconds that we had a decrease in oxyger_ and hydro-
get, inlet pressure to the engines, and the.. about two-tenths of a second later than that, then we
started seeing things happening. We sa_ the flash between the orbiter and the external tank,
and we saw the turbine discharge temperature star_ to go up
Now, this is blank he, re, that was during the explosion of the external tank and the data
was blacked out during that period of time. We didn't get anything during that period of time,
but then we did
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pick the data up again a few milliseconds later. And as you can see. it first approaches and then
exceeds the red line.
Now, we've got indication that the way the shutdown goes, the computer makes a cycle
every. _!0 milliseconds, and so when that computer gets an indication that this red line on an
engine has been violated, that is what we call one strike. That is one indication.
The computer has got to have three consecutive indications of violation of a red line and
then it gives the orbiter a signal--or the controller shuts that engine down. So on engine
number one, we verified that we got three strikes nd that the engine had been--the shutdown
had been initiated.
On the other two engines, we got indications that at least one strike had occurred on both of
the other two engines. And so we were in the process of shutdown on all three of those engines.
and that is the way it should have been.
When you see something like this. when you see those temperatures going up to the red line
and exceeding it, what that is indicative of is a LOX-ric, shutdown. Whenever the LOX supply
gets too high, that is when the temperatures go up and that is when we burn
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the internal parts, the hot gas parts of the engine.
And we have seen this in test stand accident.s before, and so we would expect, kaving seen a
curve like this, that the engine would pretty well be gutted in the hot gas regions of the mgine.
And the nex_ chart, please.
_Viewgraph H-9._ I_,.I :_, ,:q
When we looked at the recovered hardware, that i= in fact what did happen.
I would say first that all of the engines were recovered in close proximity _o each other, and
in fact _,_ed like that they were still attached to the thrust structure and the bulkhead at
wa_r impact. The bearings, the ,timbal bearings, had failed in an overload mode and so the en-
gines and the thrust structure did appear to be together.
In other words, ;t didn't blow up and scatter the parts over a wide distance.
All of the fractures were looked at, and the fractures all had the appearance of ductile over-
load. That is, overload due to like impact from another piece of structure or impact, more likely,
impact with water; and that there was no engine explosions involved.
The engines did have burn-through damage in the hot gas regions due to these expected
internal
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over temperatures t, ll three high pressure fuel pumps were burned through.
One thing of paJ _icular interest to us, there was m>--the housing was burned through, but it
was not ruptured or burned through in the vicinity of the turbine blade. And so that told us
that the turbine blades---that there was no turbine blade came loose and __amaged anything, but
they got burned off.
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'_,_d so I guess in _ummary, we have looked at the data in great detail. The engine operated
pc,' ctly normally, well after, in fact 141/2 seconds after, flame was observed coming from the
sid, o¢ the SRB and several other events along those same lines Engine performance was per-
fectly nominal. In fact, the engines were even running after the external tank had exploded.
And so our findings are that the engines were in no way associated with *_he failure of flight
51-L.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Hopson.
Mr. Lee.
MR. LEE: Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to now discuss the inertial upper stage. I was
not the chairman cf this particular working group. The results seem reasonably straight_brward.
So with your permission, I would like to present those results.
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The approach to this investigation was similar to the ones that you have heard before. In
fact, each of these elements were almost identical, and in the case of the inertial upper stage the
team was made up of NASA personnel, Air Force Space Division personnel, the Boeing Compa-
ny, the prime contractor for the inertial upper stage, and the Aerospace Corporation.
We reviewed every technical discipline, as has been indicated in the previous reviews.
(Slide.,_ (m.t ._ ; "'1
What you see now on the screen is the inertial upper stage with the tracking and relay data
satellite attached forward. To give you an example, it is made up of really three major elements:
the satellite, the black or darker portion forward; the white portion with "USA" on it is the two-
stage inertial upper stage; and then the third element and very significant element is the air-
borne support equipment, and that is the equipment which hold the IUS or inertial upper stage
in the orbiter bay. It's very critical to the entire operation for launching and separation at orbit.
Now, to give you an idea of the dimensions, the stage is approximately 17 feet in length,
about 91/2 feet in diameter. The payload, that total IUS or the stage weight is approximately
35,000 pounds, and the
2174
satellite is about 5,000 pounds.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please.
(Viewgraph J-2A [_,'_ :_ 7 _,._[
MR. LEE: This is a continuation of the fault tree you saw initially, where the three major
areas that we believe that could contribute to a cargo or inertial upper stage failure woul:! be:
one, a premature ignition of the propulsion system; two, an explosion or fire d:_e to other rea-
sons in the bay; and three, element separation.
And I would like m address each of those if I could. In the case of premature ignition, there
is three different types of premature ignition we believe we can get.
First let me say that the inertial upper stage is relatively quiescent relative to--during the
ascent phase of flight, meaning we have little or no electronics or avionics on, w:_ have little or
no instrumentation coming back to ground during that phase of flight. And so what we are
having to construct this with with our rationale for acceptance is based on other data, plus other
instrumentation data, flight data, plus recovered hardware.
We have been very fortunate in recovering a sufficient amount of the stage to be able to
prove our
rationale or support our rationale.
2175
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On the premature ignition of the stage, we found three different areas that could postulate
three different types of ignition: one would be from an electrostatic discharge; an inadvertent
ignition command that would ignite the motor; and an auto-ignition. And if I might, I would like
to :alk about each of those briefly to give you our rationMe for why we thin that we didn't
have this case.
I will take the premature _znition first. The orbiter payload bay does in fact have a number
of temperature sensors in the bay, and we believe that if we had ignited the stage that we would
have had a tremendously high temperature rise rate, which would have been detected by those
temperature sensors. As we progressed through the flight, those temperatures remained stable
throughout the entire phase of flight until we lost signal.
The second is, if we aad ignited that stage we would have no doubt had a tremendous shock
within the bay. The orbiter instrumentation indicates no such shock. Plus. the payload, the
tracking and data relay satellite, does in fact have an instrumentation which would allow you to
be able to detect motion on that stage, which is being transmitted back during the ascent
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phase, and we saw nothing on that telemetry.
The main thing I guess would be the inspection of the recovered hardware, which included
the alarming devices, igni_rs, and we found quite a bit of unignited propellant. So that the re-
covered hardware plus that amount of instrumentation leeds us to believe that we did not have
a premature ignition during that phase.
The second .s ths explosion or fire, and we have postulated the only possibility for being
able to get a fire other than a premature _gnition wou d he the reaction control system failure, a
battery failure, an explosion of a battery, say, some ocher cause for the solid rocket motor pro-
pellant to become--to burn, and that may be fi Jm a shock, electrically induced fire, or some---or
radio radiation that caused some activity, some activation which we didn't anticipate.
In each of those cases, we found that on the recovered hardware, that the place where the
areas where this sort of thing would happen there was no fire indication. The same temperature
sensors that I referred to before in the payload bay gave no indication, obviously, of overheating,
and so we believe there was no fire from any other source in the bay.
The third category or third area for sus_ect would be the separation of the elements, and
the
2177
separation of the element8 we are talking about here is the entire payload separating from the
orbiter some way inadvertently, the two stages separating from themselves and the payload sep-
arating from the stage.
Based on the same data, telemeter data we got. back from the orbiter that I mentioned earli-
er, we saw no indicatic,, of any abnormal movement of the stage in the bay. We have electrical
power going from the orbiter into, throughout the inertial upper stage to the l_yload, and we
believe if there had been any separation of any of that we would have lost continuity electrical-
ly.
In addition, in the recovered hardware we see no evidence of any abnormal separation be-
tween those stages.Based on--and this isa brief summary, but based upon those findings--and
we were quite lucky to get as much of the hardware back which proves this point---we believe
that the inertialupper stage and the attached TDRS or the tracking and data relay satellitedid
not contribute to this incident.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Lee.
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Well, let me express our appreciation for these reports, which have been very helpful. I
would like to ask, do you plan to have a written report in
217_
addition to what you presented here today?
MR. LEE: Yes, sir. We will have a separate independent report. We will probably, in the
case of the inertial upper stage and the shuttle main engine, we are probably less than a week
away, and I would have to defer to Mr. Coultas on the orbiter.
MR. COULTAS: The same on the orbiter. We plan to have a report out by the end of next
week, really.
[L_ ughter.]
CH._IRMAN ROGERS: You don't think you could get that down to five days?
[Lau_,hter.]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, thank you very much. We appreciate it
That concludes the meeting for today. Thank you.
(Whereupon, _t 4:00 p.m., the Commi_ion was adjourned.)
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STS Orbiler and GFE Proiecls Office
STS 51-L ORBITER TEAM
CONFIGURATION
• HISTORY
BASIC AIRFRAME WAS ORIGINALLY A STATIC TEST ARTICLE (STA-O_)
TEST PROGRAM COMPLETE IN OCTOBER 1979 TO VALIDATE STRESS ANALYSIS
TEST CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED TO PRESERVE FLIGHT INTEGRITY
LOADS UMITED TO 1.2 x DESIGN
STRAINS PREDICTED PRE-TEST AND WERE NOT EXCEEDED
DETAIL INSPECTION AND TEAR-DOWN COMPLETED POST-TEST
DEUVERED AS A FULL-UP OPERATIONAL VEHICLE IN JULY 1982
NINE FLIGHT MISSIONS
APRIL 1983 - OCTOBER 198S
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS
OMS POD DAMAGE STS 41-8, STS 41_
TILE BOND REPAIR STS 4i-G
• STS 51-L
RECORDS AND DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING THE VEHICLE PROCESSING
AND MISSION WERE RE-REVIEWEO
INCLUDES: DESIGN CONFIGURATION, MOO DEFERRALS, PARTIAL MODS,
WAIVERS/DEVIATIONS, PROBLEM REPORTS, CERTIFICATION,
COMMITr-TO- FLIGHT ANALYSIS
CENTAUR: PARTIAL CENTAUR MODS WERE INSTALLED PRIOR TO STS 61°A
NO ADDITIONAL MODS WERE ADDED FOR STS S1-L
THE AS-FLOWN CONFIGURATION WAS CERTIFIED
NO ANOMALOUS FINDINGS [Ref. :1 7-b10]
1226
tt.
t
J
,. t
;I
STS Orbiter and GFE Proiects OtficeSTS S1-L ORBITER TEAM
PROPULSION & POWER
SUBSYSTEM EVALUATION FINDING.$
OMS ALL MEASUREMENTS ALL NOMINAL
RCS ALL MEASUREMENTS NOMINAL
EXCEPT VALVE COMMANDS, I_ SENSORS SHOW
FLIGHT PHOTOS. EXPLOSION ONSET
VERNIER THRUSTER RSO
TEMP SENSOR
FAILED AT UFT-OFF
(NO MISSION EFFECT)
APU ALL MEASUREMENTS ALL NOMINAL
STS lil-A DATA APU-] EXHIIIITED SEVERAL
DIFFERENCES FROM OTHER
AII_S (NO MISSION EFFECT)
HYD ALL FLUID DYNAMIC MEAS; ALL NOMINAL
SELECTED TEMP MEAS
STS 61-A DATA
FUEL CEI,_'CRYO ALL MEASUREMENTS NOMINAL
I .... Gary Coultas
o.,, 3/5/86
REMARKS
0V-I02 OMSPOOS-
FIRST USE SINCE $T$-9 AND
MAJOR REWORK
PRIMARY ._4RUSTER HEATERS
WERE ON DURING ASCENT
DUE TO COLD WEATHER;
NORMALLY OFF
APU-3 WAS NEW
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STS Orbiter and GFE Projects Office
STS S1-L ORBITER TEAM
PROPULSION & POWER
SUBSYSTEM EVALUATION FIE.DINGS
PYRO ALL MEASUREMENTS NO UNINTENTIONAL
II_I)_OGRAJPH$ OF NASA fiRING COMMANDS
STANDARD DEVICES ALL HARDWARE OK
ORB/ET FORWARD BOLT
ACCEPTANCE DATA
RECOVERED DEBRIS
FUGHT PHOTOS
BATTERIES ALL MEASURMENT_ ALL NOMINAL
FL_;HT PHOTOS
REMARKS
(Ref, 3 7-82]
STS Orbiter and GFE Projects Of_ ce
_ohnsnnSelcicem_ _ te,ll
STS S1-L ORBITER TEAM
AVIONICS
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SUBSYSTEM EVALUATION
GN&C ALL MEASUREMENTS
SRB + ORB SENSORS OFF-UNE SIMULATIONS
SRR ÷ SSME EFFECTORS 1 rUGHT PHOTOS
SOFTWARE
DPS
GPC/MDM
SOFTWARE
CRT/KEYROARD
Did:
ELEC
COMM & TRACK
ALL MEASUREMENTS
ALL MEASUREMENTS
ALL MEASUREMENTS
SELECTED MEASUREMENTS
(ACTIVE EQUIPMENT)
INSTRUMENT ALL MEASUREMENTS
FINDINGS
SYSTEM RESPONSE
AS DESIGNED
PITCH TRANSIENT IN
&24._ $EC PERIOD
YAW ACCELERATION SPIKE
kT 72 SEC
RSRB RATES OPPOSITE
TO LSRII & ORB AT 72 SEC
ALL NOMINAL
ALL NOMINAL
ALL NOMINAL
NOMINAL
DATA DR_'_P-OUTS
_NO MISSION EFFECT)
4 SEC _ 9 $EC MET
I _t_C _ _ SEC MET
ALL NO _liN.,eJ.
REMARKS
INTEREST ITEMS (NO
MISSION EFFECT)
2" HIGHER MAX ROLL
AI"ITrUDE ERROR
94% THROTTLE
(HOT SRB)
SPECIAL HANDLING OF
ANY RECOVERED GPC
SPECIAL HANDLING OF
ANY RECOVERED
RECORDER
[Rer. 3,7-831
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|i| ,__ STS Orbiter and GFE Proje_,cs OfficeSTS 51-L ORBITER TEAMSTRUCTURE
SUBSYSTEM EVALUATION FINDINGS
STRUCT ALL MEASUREMENTS ALL NOMINAL
PRIMARY HAROWARE MODS FOR 51-L LOADS WITHIN
PV & D FLIGHT LOAD.5 ANALYSIS EXPECTED ENVELOPES
THERMAL .5T.5 61-A, .51-F TEMP
PROFIUE.5
.R£MARKS
m
_-..,
v
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[Ref. 3 7-84}
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STS Orbiter and GFE Projects Office
_e Cee¢_ _ TElaS
5TS S1-L ORBITER TEAM
MECHANICAL
SUBSYSTEM
DOORS
Pt.B
VENT
MLG, NLG
RETENTION
P/L
RMS
LO2/LH2 UMR
HATCHES
SIDE
OVERHEAD
EVALUATIUN
ALL MEASUREMENTS
FUGHT PHOTOS
FINDINGS
ALL NOMINAL
ALL UMBIUCALS
MATED UNTIL LOS
"""_'Gary Coultas
REMARKS
[Ref. 3 7-85]
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SPACESHUTTLERAIN ENGINE
GEORGE HOP,SON
MARCH 7, 1986
ORIGINAl. "PAGE IS
OF POOR ffJALn'Y
{Kef. :_17-86 I of 2]
I
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE CHARACTERISTICS
MPL RPL FPL
305K 470K 512K
1950 3OO6 327O
77.5
BENGINE OPERATION
• ',VACUUM THRUST,
POUNDS
"CHAMBER
PRESSURE, PSIA
• AREA RATIO
• VACUUM SPECIFIC
IMPULSE (NOMINAL)
• MIXTURE RATIO
• LiFE 7.5 HOURS, 55 STARTS
"SPECIFICATION DRY
WEIGHT, POUNDS 6958
o
h_
I = 7.5FT =1
[Ref. :) 7-86 '2 of 2]
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SPACESFiUTTLEMAIN ENGINE
TF_HI INVESTIGATIOII APPROACH
o REVIEHE]) ALL PRIOR ENGINE FAILUEES TO VERIFY ENGINE FLIGHT DATA
PROVIDEDEVIDENCEOF OBSERVEDFAILURE
o REVIL:gE])ALL STS 51-L DATA
o PRELAUNCH
o START
o IqAI ISTAGE
o REVIEM_ EACH DATAFRAJ_ (EVERY qo MS)
o REVI_ CHALLENGERENGINES' HISTORY INC.UDIRG HARDWARECHANGES
ANDANOMALIES
o NANUFACTURING
o RE-REVIEWOt: MR'S
o ACC,F_PTANCETESTS
o PRIOR FLIGHTS
INSPECTEDRECOVERFDHARDHARE
[Ref. 3:7-87]
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SPACE SHUTTLE RAIN ENGINE
PRELAUNCHERGINIECOMPARTMENT TEMPERATURES
MEASURED COMPONENT TEMPERATURES WELLWITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS.
NO YNDICATION OF PROPELLANT LEAKAGE.
[Ref. 3,7-88]
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SPACE. SHUTTLE PLAIN ENGINE
.LU__pECTION OF RECOVeR_ lU_DHA_
ALL [NGINES RECOVERED |R CLO-_ PROX|PIITY TO EACH OTHER AND G|I, tBAI.
BEAJUlIGS FAILIED 111 All OVERLOAD RObE
o ENGINES HERE ATTACHED TO THRUST STPUCTURE AND BULKHEAD AT HATER
IMPACT
ALL FRACTURES tf_.RE DUE TO DUCTILE OVERLOAI_S
o ENGINES DID HOT EXPLODE
o DANAC.d[_ DUE TO HATER |IqPACT AND PO_SIBL.Y IMPACT WITH OTHER
STRUCTURE
0 NO TURBINE BLA_ SEPARATION CAUSING IIOUSING DAHAGE
ALL ENGINES HAD i]URH-THROUGH DAIqAC_ |# iK)T GAS REGIONS DUE TO INTERNAL
OVERTEPI_RATURE
o TYPICAL. OF LOX RICII CONDITIONS DUE 10 FL_L AND LOX DEPLETION
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACi=' SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
ACCIDENT--FRIDAY. MARCH 21, 1986
Dean Acheson Auditorium
Department of State
Washington, D.C.
The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m.
PRESENT:
WILLIAM P. ROGERS, Chairman, Presiding
NEIL A. ARMSTRONG, Vice Chairman
DR. SALLY RIDE
DR. ALBERT WHEELON
ROBERT RUMMEL
DR. ARTHUR WALKER
DAVID C. ACHE_e_)N
MAJOR GENERAL DONALD KUTYNA
ROBERT HOTZ
DR. EUGENE COVERT
ALSO PRESENT"
AL KEEL, Commissien Executive Director
2180
1240
s
. o "vg,+_:--.,L. ......................
2182
PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order, please.
Since our last public hearing at the Kennedy Space Center the Con:mission, working in pan
through subcommittees, has made considerable progress in its investigation of the Challenger
incident. The Commission has worked very closely with _.4miral Richard Truly and his assist-
ant, J.R. Thompson, as well as with the NASA investigati'_, panels, and has been given excellent
help and cooperation in all respects.
This session today is for the purpose of updating the information that the Commission has
received and to inform the public as accurately as possible of the progress that has been made to
date.
Now we will call on Mr. J.R Thompson to be our first witness.
(Witness sworn.)
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TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. THOMPSON. JR.. VICE CHAIRMAN. STS.51L DATA AND
DESIGN ANALYSIS TASK FORCE, CAPE CANAVERAL, FLORIDA
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Thompson, will you identify yourself and say a few words about
your present assignment.
MR. THOMPSON: My name is J.R. Thompson. I'm with Princeton University and I'm on
temporary assignment to NASA headquarters, reporting directly to Admiral Truly.
Mr. Chairman, this morning we would like to give you three task force team updates from
the report we gave to the Commission, to the full Commission two weeks ago. The specific topics
we would like to cover w3uld be: An update on our salvage status. I think wc have made a lot of
progress in that area and Colonel Ed O'Connor will give you that briefing.
I think we have now almost completed our photo and time line status, and we would like to
update that for you, and Dan Germany and his team. will be providing the specific information
on that.
We would like to focus most of today's discussion on the accident analysis team results and
an update from the discussion we had several weeks ago.
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Dr. Wayne Littles will lead that discussion and be supported by five additional engineers from
the Marshall Space Flight Center.
In summary, I would like to report I think we have made a lot of progress. I think we've got
a lot of work still in front of us, but I think it is coming together quite well. And I think over
the next one to two weeks we will be seeing a lot of results of the test program that we have
reviewed with your C_mmi_qion.
CHAIRMAN R(X_ERS: Thank you very much, Mr. l_hompson.
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I would call Colonel O'Connor
_Witness sworn.
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TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EDWARD O'CONNOR, CHAIRMAN. SEARCH, RECOVERY
AND RECONSTRUCTION. CAPE CANAVERAL. FLORIDA
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Colonel O'Connor, would you identify yourself and give the Commis-
sion some information about your present assignment.
COLONEL O'CONNOR: I'm Edward O'Connor, Colonel in the United States Air Force, as-
signed to the Eastern Space Missile Center, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. I'm currently as-
signed to the task force as the leader of the search and recovery team that is in the process of
recovering the debris of the shuttle. [Ref. 3;21-1]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You may proceed.
COLONEL O'CONNOR: I would like to give you at this time a quick update on the condi-
tions we are facing at sea. The oceanographic features today are predominantly influenced by
the weather and the springtime seasonal changes.
We expect that the problems we are having currently with recovery operations will dimin-
ish within the next few weeks, permitting us to bring up more components, particularly the
right SRB. We are finding most of the right SRB components, as well as left SRB components,
fairly close to the axis of the Gulf Stream, still in the depths of 220 to 1200 feet of water.
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The next chart, please.
iViewgraph.) Im'f :_ 2 I-z I
The current recovery operations include nine ships, one manned submersible, four sonars,
and 22 divers. In light of the expected improvement of weather conditions and the completion of
some of the analytic work in identifying probable locations of components, we are proceeding to
bring another submersible into the recovery operation.
One of our most successful vessels has been the Sea Link II, which is a manned submersible
supplied by the Harbor Branch Foundation. At this time we will bring in the Sea Link I, which
is their other vessel, similarly equipped, which would speed up many of our recovery operations.
We have released t _,e NR-1, which was a nuclear submarine which was characterizing many
of oar deep water contacts. If conditions require, we could bring this asset back in to complete
the search of certain areas within the next ten days.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) fro, i a z I-:q
This chart indicates some of the changes we have had in our search area. You will recall we
had an initial search area approximately 25 nautical miles by
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10 nautical miles as a box. We then added a small truncated portion going out to the north.
Since that time, using the radar data, optical data, and some information st:pplied by the
FAA area radars, we have included a few additional small boxes for location of specific compo-
nents. We would expect that this wcald probabiy be the completion of our expansion of the
search area for crucial components.
Next chart, please.
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(Viewgraph,)i_,. _.'1II
As of yesterday,oursearchareaencompassedapproximately420squarenauticalmiles.We
havedonea sonarsearchof 400squarenauticalmiles,leavingjust a small portionto becorn-
pleted.Wewouldexpecthat to becompleted within the next week to ten days.
To date, we _ ave made 57t significant sonar contacts. Each of these contacts hes to be fur-
ther identified through video or manned submersible operations. We have investigated 112 con-
tacts. Shuttle components were found at 29 locations. We still need to check 459 different loca-
tions.
Next chart.
IViewgraph.) I_,.t _ .'l _t
Tile recover)" to date has resulted in approximately 20 percen_ of the orbiter being recovered
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and made available for analysis. We have significant portions of the main propulsion system
and, as you are all aware, we are recovering portions of the crew module at this time.
In the area of the inertial upper stage, we now have 65 percent of that particular part of the
payload complement. We have less than one percent of the TDRS. The external tank right now
is about ten p(_rcent complete, and the solid rocket motor--booster recovery, has only brought
about ten percent of the components to shore.
We have seen nothing of the Spartan Halley payload.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) I_,.t :_ _'l "i
: This chart lists the components that we have recovered from the 51-L accident. We have
added a few new components on this list, predominantly in the crew module area. We have come
up with some additional skin panels and some additional portions of the base neat shield.
in the area of the SRB's, we have the frustums, the drogue parachute, the rate and gyro
system tunnels. At the end of this briefing, I will be covering the specific components of the
right SRB that
2189
we have recovered at this time.
In the area of the external tank, we have found few additional portions of the external tank.
That has not been a high priority search item at this area--at this time. But in the future we
will be bringing more of that in. We have located some additional components on the ocean floor
and we'll recover them at a later time.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [ Ref. 3/21-7 ]
I would like to discuss with you now for a few moments the right solid L_',_ster recovery
status. We have formed a recovery team specifically to support the recovery of the right SRB
components and their further analysis. This team is comprised of NASa engineers from both
Kennedy Space Center and Marshall, a contractor team from the contractors involved, Thiokol
and some of their other support contractors.
,,_ We have the design team in place to support all of our activities as quickly as possible when
i we re( ver the components. The identification of the critkzl hardware is being provided by this
team, and they also suggest schemes for recovery and what things are important to them from
an analytic standpoint.
The National Transportation Safety Board
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me-tubers of the team are also investigating the components recovered and are establishing in-
vestigative protocols to ensure the maximum evidence is recovered from any, componen_
Next chart please
(Viewgraph.) r{¢,,J ; -', -[
[n order to maximiTe the effectivity of the search and recovery acti,,'ities, we have used
many data sources. Many of "_he range radars were used. Optical data was used, and a tot of
sonar mapping.
And a quick summary: We have completed the majority of the radar data analysis and data
reduction. The opticai daha has also been reduced in a metric sense to help support the recovery
operations. Sonar mapping i_ approximately 95 percent complete and we are now starting an
SRB breakup analysi_ to bette" understand the breakup mechanism that occurred on the vehicle
after command destruct, to better help locate the components on the ocean floo.r.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Colonel, are you in a position to make any estimates of how long it
will take to complete the work you are doing?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: To recover the total right-hand SRB, assuming that we have some
good weather and that our radar predictions are accurate, two to
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three weeks would let ,asget up many of the significant components that you would be interest-
ed in.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
COLONEL O'CONNGR: I have one chart up there that I would like you to take a quick !ook
at. This chart shows some of the radar and optical data that we have reduced, and it indicate_
what portions of the right SRB we have found to date. [Ref. 3.'21-8]
As you can see, we have the frustum identified, parts of the skirt associated _'ith the frus-
tum, some portions of the center case elements. And at the rear of the vehicle, we have found a
debris field which encempasses the majority of the aft segment and skirt.
It does not include the area of interest in that joint at this time. We are going to continue to
look at that. There is one part there, slightly shaded in in the joint area, I will be discussing in a
moment.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I wasn't clear. In the aft section, the shaded part, have you recov-
ered all of that?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: No. We've located that on the bottom.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You have located it, l see.
COLONFL O'CONNOR: We _ ill start recovery activity in that area early next week.
The next chart, please.
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(Viewgraph.) {R,.r. :_ -,-{4_l
This chart indicates some of the design features we use fcr identifying the components. We
use many of the index devices that NASA uses in the al.i.gnment and tLe stackup and manufac-
ture of the vehicle, hole patterns and dimensions, pain* markings, part. and serial numbers if
they are available. In many cases on the 8RB, these part and serial numbers are not available
on the components that we have.
Seeing they were manufactured as large segments, they would only occur in one or two
places on the case. If the ease breaks into many pieces, that gives us a difficult time associating
a particular piece with a particular SRB.
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tMany of the internal features are also assisting us, such as prope!lant profiles, and scme of
the inhibitor characteristics, such as depth and shape and the r.-nufacturing records for
scratches and blemishes on the case, are also being u_ed to help characterize and help locate
these components.
Next chart, please.
,Viewgraph., _..i !-I I,_
The right solid rocket booster compo_: -rs that we have located are quickly listed here. This
coincides also with the chart on the wa!! anc_ "-dicates those that
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are recovered: the two case cylinders, the ET attach segment, which we are not exactly sure
whi( h S RB is associated with at this time; it has not been recovered, and we will discus_ that a
littl more--and part of the frustum have been located and also recovered.
tViewgraph.I [Ref. 3 21-11]
There is a chart now--and I believe you will have to turn two charts to get to it, and it is a
more detailed breakup or breakdown of the central part of this chart, indicating the type of
radar tracking that led us to look into that area and the concentration of right SRB components
that we are finding.
Now that we have characterize_ this debris field, we are better able to marshal our assets to
speed the recovery of these elements. This is an imtx, rtant step in that we now know the major
area_s that have to be investigated, and we can put ah of our submersibles in that area. as well
as our recovery, ships.
Next chart., please.
iViewgraph.i I_,q :_ -'J a_,,.
This chart, the right SRB aft components_the next chart, please. This chart indicates the
SRB aft--right SRB aft components as fragments, as laid out on a plane form. As you can see,
the aft segment broke into many pieces. They are scattered in a fairly large area of the floor,
and it is
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going to take a fairly lengthy period of time to recover all of these individual pieces.
We will be using the STENA W_rkhorse in that recovery. I have not indicated on this chart,
the upper part of this chart, any location of mnything associated with the clevis or the joint that
is suspected of being the failure point.
If there are no questions associated with any of that material, I would like to proceed with
the discussion of contact or target 292. This has recently received a lot of press attention because
it has been identified as an external tank attach segment.
(Viewgraph. _ [ Ref. 3,' 21-13 ]
The first chart is a sketch of this component as it was on the ocean floor. This component
has now been r_overed.
Okay, would you roll the video now, please.
(A videotape was shown.) [Not published.]
COLONEL O'CONNOR: I have a short video segment here showing the STENA Workherse.
Tbis is the vessel used to recover this component. The componeqt is being taken from the ship at
this time. "Fnis was yesterday afternoon at Cape Canaveral.
That is part of the clevis joint. As you can see, it is badly damaged.
2195
On the screen is O-ring grooves.
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DR.COVERT:ColonelO'Connor,that damage,hasa metallurgisthada chanceto dec.ide
whetherit wasimpactdamageor damagethat existedprior to impactwith thf: water?
COLONELO'CONNOR:Ir, the preliminary--andI needto stress,preliminary--reviewof
that joint, theredoesnot appearto beany erosionor meltingassociatedwith it_That is very.'
preliminary.Soit wouldbeexpectedthat that joint wasprobablydamagedat the timeof'com-
manddestruct,asthecaseexperiencedsometorsion,orat waterimpact.
DR.COVERT:Thankyouverymuch.
MR. ttOTZ: Colonel O'Connor, could you give us any additional information you might have
on the external tank stub attachment points, the condition of them and how much of them is
left?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Yes, I can. I have two photos here i t'fink that might help go
through that process. Let me bring those up, and then I will addres_ your question.
The first photo, p:_ease.
(Slide.) I11,.I. :1 2ill I
This is a still photo_Taph of that same component. This is showing the inhibitor, .'_e of the
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things that we use to characterize whether it be a left c- right SRB.
The next photo, please.
/Slide.) I r,'f. :l zl.l_ l
On this photo you have a better view of the clevisjoint,ifyo:ilook at where the white tag is
attached. That ispart of the ET attach strut assembly. There issome deformation in that area.
There issome insulationjust above itthat has been eroded and removed.
This ishelping us to characterize where on the aftsegment this would be located.
DR. COVERT: Do you want to make a guess as to where itis,please?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: I'm not prepared to guess at that right now, sir.We have got a lot
of contacts out in the area. We think itmay be in that vicinity,but this is a fairlysmall frag-
ment of the case and the dynamics aren't very weil understood now to say itwould fallin this
vicinityor be taken with a larger structure a further distance.
DR. COVERT: I meant, was thin at 300 degrees or 180 degrees?
COLONEL O'CONNOR: Where itison the :ase?
DR. COVERT: Yes, sir.
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COLONEL O'CONNOR: I have a sketch on that, sir. Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) IR,'i. :i 2i tti I
This chart liststhe status of this particular component, seeing itis of such high interest.
The portion was recovered on the 17t5 of March. Itwas brought into port bv STENA Workhorse
yesterday. It was removed from the STENA Workhorse yesterday about noon.
We took itover to our ordnance area on Cape Canaveral. Our engineers were evaluating it
yesterday afternoon and late into the night. The preiiminary evaluation indicates there are no
par" numbers or other positiveidentifyingfeatures.
It isa confirmed aft segment component. It isa confirmed ET attach portion. The external
surface isdarkened and blistered.The ET attach stud hole spacing and deformation isconsistent
with this case segment being from a 90 to 180 degree quadrant on z segment.
Itismost probably a right SRB component. Because of the lack of any identificationnumber
or anyt!:ing that can definitelytie itto the right SRB, we have to qualify itbeing right at this
time. We are conti;ming the evaluation at this time. We brought other engineers in.
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We have been reviewing the other stacked S,RB's at the Cape, looking for other identifying
feature3,
Next chart, please.
!Viewgraph,) [Ref, 3 21-171
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why would you say "'most probably" if you don't know which it is?
COLONEL O CONNOR: Looking at the propellant depth, the inhibitor shape, we have about
20, possibly 25, inferential characteristics would say it is the right SRB. We have nothing that
would point it toward being the left SRB.
But we don't have that crisp nice part number stamped on the side that would let us :eally
track it down and say for sure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
_V;.ewgraph.) Ira., :_ 2J J7 I
COI,ONEL O'CONNOR: This particular view looking down on the orbiter stack indicates a
right SRB with the label pointing to where the black smoke was initially found at the time of
launch, Looking at the different characteristics of this particular segment piece, we would sus-
pect it would be, az indicated on that chart, approximately 180 degrees away from the black
smoke.
That completes my briefing.
2199
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you reD" much.
Any questions?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you, Colonel.
M". Germany.
(Witnesses sworn.)
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TESTIMONY OF: DAN GERMANY, CHAIRMAN. PHOTO AND TELEVISION SUPPORT
TEA_I. CAPE CANAVERAL. AND DEPUTY MANAGER, SPACE STATION PROJECT
OFFICE. JOHNSON FLIGHT SPACE CENTER. HOUSTON. TEXAS: CHARLES STEVEN-
SON. GEORGE McDONOUGH. AND GEORGE ERICKSON
CHAIRM %N ROGERS: Mr. Germany, do you want to proceed?
MR. GERMANY. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess you haven't appeared before us. You might identify yourself
and identify your colleagues.
MR. GERMANY: I would be glad to do that. My name is Dan Germany. My parent organi-
zation is the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. My current assignment is chairman of
the Photographic and TV Support Team, which is a part ze the task force that is : ssisting the
Commission in this investigation.
I have with me today three additional representatives of the team: Charlie Stevenson on my
right, George McDonough on my left, and George Erickson on his left.
These are primaD focal points in each of the center. We have a total integrated effort
among the
1273
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field centers in order to try to focus and understand all of the photographic and TV p ducts
that we have accumulated from this pa_icular incident.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
We know Mr. Stevenson very well. He testified before. Now he is here as an expert. Last
time he said he speculated. Now we want to ask him what his opinion is as an expert witness.
[Laughter.]
MR. GERMANY: Could ! have the first chart,, please.
tViewgraph No. 2.i [Ref. 3 21-18 i
I think it is important to try to give you an over_,iew before we get into the details, Mr.
Chairman. of some of this photographic activity, to help the Commission fully understand the
way we are organized and we are proceeding with the efforts amongst the various teams that we
have as part of the task force.
The TV team, as well as the saivage support team that you just heard from, are in fact
support groups. The four analyms teams are the four blocks that show right below Admiral
Truly's block, as weli as Mr. Thompson's block there. Those are the teams that are responsible
for taking the results of the activities that they ha_e themselves, as well as the activities
2202
from our two support teams, and integrating them together to come up with the engineering
conclusions that will be drawn as a result of the final report for this entire incident.
The activities that _e're going to have for you today are centered around looking at photo-
graphic pioducus and describing to you what we were able to see from those photographic prod-
ucts. The accident analysis team, with Mr. Jones and his people, are the ones that are responsi-
ble for taking that information, combining it with the engineering data base, as well as the
other overall telemetry data from the flight, and coming up with the engineering conclusions
that we will be forthwith as a result of the final report.
Next chart, please.
(Vivwgraph No. 3.) IR,'t _ :l I, U
I have three charts that are ,:oming up, Mr. Chairman, that will give you, help give you an
overview oi the photography in general. I'm not going to brief the details of the charts. We have
included them for reference sake as much as an)thing, so as the Commission goes through its
deliberations and you hear us talldng about various cameras this might help you to pinpoint.
The first chart right there we are looking at is ( e that gives an aerial view of the pad
itself.
2203
There are six positions around the radius of that pad where there are cameras that are lo-
cated. The fifth position, which is the 270 degree point, you are looking across the gantry struc-
ture, so we don't really use cameras there.
But they are in those other positions, and from a total point of view we have somewhere
over 100 cameras, which includes photographic cameras as well as video cameras, not only here
but on the mobile launch platform, the tower itself, and the surrounding areas as you go exter-
nal to the pad and the tracking cameras.
Could I have the next chart, please.
(Viewgraph No. 4.) IR,'t. :_ _t "'-"l
This is a chart that depicts the mobil,: launch platform itself. As you can see, you have a
multitude of cameras th, t are located on what we call the MLP.
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Next chart, please.
Wiewgraph No. 5._ ll_,., :_',_t!
This isa chart that shows the tower itselfand the locationsof the cameras on there.
Next chart,please
_Viewgraph No 6_ I-_,'r : -'_ zz,
Nov, what we're going to do is move into the part of the presentation that deals with the
integrated
2204
time line that has been put together. The photographic team uses the integ_ate,_ time line as a
road map, so _o speak, to step through all of the events that occurred and try to understand the
photography and the video that goes with that.
I'm starting off with this dynamic coordinate system chart for you because I know that it is
easy to get confused in the many coordinate systems that we have for this pa_icular vehicle.
And so at the front of your integrated time line we have put this chart for clarification as much
as anything else, to help you try, to remember which axis is which.
And I will try to walk through this to help you try to visualize it. [f you were sitting in the
cockpit of the orbiter and can visualize yourself sitting there, the plus axis, plus X axis, is in this
direction like so. The minus X axis is behind you.
If you think about the torso of your body, the plus Z axis is down through your feet and the
minus Z axis is like up through your head. And if you can visualize your arms being out like
this, this would be like the Y axis of the vehicle.
So everything that you will see on the time line is rela*._<l back to this particular coordinate
system, to try, to help you keep that straight.
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The next chart, please.
tViewgraph No. 7.) iJt,.I :_ _'_ -':_1
Since the last time that you've seen this, we have changed the graphics of the time line just
a little bit, and let me describe the graphics for you so you will understand it as we go through
it. We tried to separate out the camera events from the other instrumentation.
On the left-hand side of your chart there, you -will see the camera events. You have to read
this chart from the bottom of it to the top. The bottom, you start with T-zero, the ignition com-
mand. In the subsequent charts that follow it, we read from the bottom to the top.
On the right-hand side of the chart, you will _ the other telemetry events that go with the
trajectory itselfi Now, what we will try to do today for you is, first we will walk through this
time line like this, and I will u_ this model to help depict part of it.
And then what we are going to do is show you a video film that we have pu_ together that is
a combination of about 14 different cameras, which includes photographic cameras as well as TV
cameras all the way through this time line.
2206
And we also have it set aside--it goes back and corresponds to the events that we have on
this time line. But because of the way the presentation facilities are here, we could only do one
screen at a time.
So we are going to step through this way first, and then we -will do the video second, and we
will do the- video in a stop-start manner, whichever way you _ant to go _ help you understand
the thing_ that we are trying to depict for you.
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On this pa_icular chart, if you start at the bottom there, at the T-zero command -and let
me reference myself here. This first chart show's the areas of activity that occur at about the
first 3.375 seconds, ar d it all hinges from an imagery anomaly point of view" around the business
that we talk about, the puffs of smoke or the black smoke.
UF to this point, the*e have been different numbers associated with different events, as we
have talked to you, This particular time line today is a current status of those events, trying to
tie everything back and be consistent from this point on.
The confirmed smoke occurs at .67_ seconds, as you see on the Jeff-hand side of the char',.
We've got tv,-o entries there. One says "confirmed smoke above the
2207
field splice." and it moves initially in the plus X direction, and then "confirmed black smoke."
All that's trying to say is that there's bee_ a lot of discussion about the colors of the smoke.
We feel, after a thorough analysis of the film that we have available to us, that that smoke is
really shades of gray. And it starts off, it is kind of like a light shade and it becomes darker as it
goes, before we lose sight of it after a few seconds.
So those particular events there, I have just listed them twice to try to help you understand
the fact that it is not a given constant shade.
Then we ha,,e what we have been describing a_ m_ttiple puffs o( smoke that occur in a time
frame of about .854 seconds up through 2.259 seconds. And in the video film today we wilt show
that to you so you can graphically see what we are talking about.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, that is new information from the presentation made two weeks
ago?
MR. GERMANY: Yes, sir, I believe it is, in terms of the video that you will be seeing.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Can I ask, what was -:he frequency of those puffs of smoke? How
many puffs per second?
MR. GERMANY: Well, we are off trying to
2208
analyze that right now, General. And it appears to have a beat frequency to it. We are not pre-
pared at this point to say exactly what it is. We do have some enhancement work going on that
will help us figure that out better.
GENERAL KUTYN_ Can you give me a ballpark? Two or three puffs per second, 20 puffs
per second?
MR. GERMANY: Well, the numbers that I'm hearing at this particular point are approxi-
mately about three hertz.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Three puffs per second?
MR. GERMANY: Yes. But we're i,_ the process of understanding that and it will be finalized
a little bit later on. I want to emphasize that po!nt for you.
The last positive evidence of smoke above the right aft SRB, ET aft ring occurs at 2.733
seconds. The last positive visual indication is 3.375 seconds. And in there you will see a little
parentheses that says "E-217." That is a camera that perhaps is indicating potential smoke even
further than the 3.375.
I believe, based on the analysis we have done since the last time we have talked to you and
what we will be doing over the next week, probably we _'ill be able to delete that particular
part. I'm not re_dy to take it off the chart now, but ba,_d on the stuff that
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we have donc this week we are having difficulty validating for sure that smoke is occurring alt
tl-e way up to that point.
We do feel very positive about the 2.733. and then the 3 :_75. So we will be updating this as
we go
DR. COVERT: Mr. Germany. on this 2.733. is the inference to draw t,"_at smoke is continual-
ly coming up until--in that interwal, or is the inference that after the puffs the smoke hangs
around at that interval with no material addition?
MR. GERMANY: Well, Dr. Co,,ort, as you will see on the film. the smoke appears to not
replenish itself after a point. As it is replenishing itself, it ten2s to be above that ring. As the
vehicle moves on through that, it tends to go down.
So we're trying to figure out exactly, does that mean it s*_ops or not. and we are just not
prepared to say for sure yet.
DR. COVERT: Well, it must stop sometime.
MR. GERMANY: It mast stop sometime, yes, and we are off to try to understand that.
DR. COVERT: You will report later to us what you have decided?
MR. GERMANY: Yes, sir, we sure will.
DR. WHEELON: Mr. Germany, having reviewed the
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similar photography of prior shuttle launches, can you state that no such smoke occurred on
prior launches?
MR. GERMANY: We have been off trying to do that, and we have reviewed all of the film
that we have from, I believe there is about six different launches for which people have taiked
about having erosion of _.he O-rings. On those flights, we have not been able to find an.: smoke
that is duplicative of the smoke that we have seen on 5!-L.
There are some other films we are looking at, too, but at this pant we have not been able to
find any visual evidence of smoke that is duplicative of what we have seen here oa 51-L.
DR. WHEELON: Thank you very much.
DR. COVERT: When you say that it is duplicative, does that mean there may be other
smoke of other kinds about, or are you just trying to be careful and be precise?
MR. GERMANY: I'm trying to be as precise as we can with the sometimes imprecise analy-
sis that we do.
MR. RUMMEL: Can you account for the puffs versus continuing smoke? Does it relate to,
oh, say the natural frequency of tbe structure or vibratory phenomena or some other situation?
Do you know?
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MR. GERMAlXY: Weli, the imoortance of seeing puffs could be related back to what is hap-
pening with the join,:, and that is why we're putting it on this time line now and trying to un-
derstand that. It could be that the aerodynamics of the situation at that point could be account-
ing for tl_e puffs, and I'm just not ready m say that we know which it is right now.
But we are indicating it and we are doing enhancement work, and as that b_comes clear
then we will report what we find.
MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
MR. GERMANY: Could I have the next ch,_- " please.
DR. WI_EELON: But just to be clear, you .)we said three hertz. Do you mean three puffs
per s_,_ ad?
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MR.GERMANY:Yes.sir.
DR.WHEELON:Thankyou.
_ViewgraphNo._.pth',.1__'l_'l!
MR.GERMANY:Canyouzoomin on that just a little bit. that chart,pleaseBring it upa
little bit closer.Thereyou go.
Now, I've got four charts here to help try to characterize where from a visual imagery point
of view we fee! the location of the smoke is. There are two
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cameras that we use to do this. E-60, which is the one on this particular chart here.
The key to this chart is as much what you don't see as what you do see. The shaded or cross-
hatched area is the area that the camera itself cannot see. The white part or the light part of
the chart is what the camera can see.
Can I have the next chart, please.
iViewgraph No. 9.)[m.a :_21 zn]
Now, this is a little bit closer view, so y_,'_ can get a better feeling for what I'm trying to
describe for you. We can see smoke coming, but we can't see the origin of the smoke from these
cameras. So that tells us that on that segment right there around 270 all the way out to 315,
which is like 45 degrees, moving from the 270 point around--and for a reference point, the zero
segment in this photo is the bottom part of the SRM, which is like--let me get this right here.
Like at this point right here, and it goes around. So we can't see the origin of the smoke
from this view, and so that tells you something. And we will lead you through this and then I
will draw trJe conclusion for you.
Could I have the next chart, please.
!Viewgraph No. 10.! ira.r, :_2J z. I
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Okay, this is a view from E-63, looking from the other side, and it is the same setup with
respect to what the camera can see and what it cani, ot see.
Could I have the next chart, please, which will bring it up a litt!e bit closer for you.
(Viewgraph No. 11.)Im.t. :_ 2] z7 I
Now, you can see what the camera can't see there, and the significance is, with these two
cameras, plus we have a camera that is from the back side, that is not on this chart, looking in
this direction. It can't see the origin of the smoke. Plus, on the back side, I believe it is 217, you
don't see the smoke coming from behind the SRM.
And so that isolates the smoke in our opinion from the 270 point out to around the 315
point, 315 degrees. And we feel it is somewhere perhaos around 300 degrees or some point like
that. And based on other cameras we have seen, we feel it is within plus or minus about a foot
of the joint in question, and that is the most we are able to see from an imagery point of view.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph No. 12.) Im.r. :_ 21-2_]
DR. WHEELON: Mr. Germany, before we leave those shaded diagrams of the shuttle in&-
cating the coverage on the cameras that operated, I have an
2214
impression that a number of cameras in fact failed that morning, possibly because of the cold
weather, and that had they been working properly, '_hat we would have had complete coverage
of the event.
Can you comment on the loss of coverage that morning?
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MR. GERMANY: Yes, I can say a little bit for you. You are ab_lutely right, we did have
cameras that failed to operate properly that particular morning. There were two cameras that
would have provided excellent viewage of the area in question.
It is suspected at this time probably the cold weather was the culprit with respect to those
camera_. I believe we lost somewhere like 11 cameras, and normally we maybe lose two to three
on a mission. And we do believe the cold weather was responmble for that.
DR. WHEELON: Mr. Germany. I brought this up only because the photograrJhic team is op-
erating under a limitation of lost data, ! think that what you have put forward is quite remarka-
ble in view of that ahortage.
MR. GERMANY: In fact, as a matter of fact, you will find in our report when we finish this
up, Mr. Chairman, there will be some lessons learned and some
221.5
reccmmendations we will have with respect to being able to provide be "_r coverage for these
types of activities.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Germany, had you anticipated cold weather might affect the
camera coverage?
MR. GERMANY: Charlie, do you want to answer that? I'm not that familiar with it.
MR. STEVENSON: We think that the cold weather probably contributed to the film break-
age that we had on the two critical cameras We do purge the cameras, but we do not use a
:-::,ring purge, and probably in the future we will start using some type of heating purge. And
there may have also been a humidity problem, and we are looking into the possibility of correct-
ing the humidity problem.
CHAIRMAN ROGEP, S: Mr. Stevenson, my question, though, was had you anticipated that
weather might affect the cameras adversely?
MR. STEVENSON: No, we did not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. GERMANY: Mr. Chairman, we have chart 12 on the screen now, and it is the next one
after chart 7 that shows something heppening from a visual imagery point of view. We have
listed on here three flashes
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downstream of the orbiter right-hand wing. These were put on the chart because some members
of the Commission and others had seer, some white flashes downstream of the orbiter before.
And we are off trying to understand that, and in fact I talked with General Kutyna about it
this morning. We believe that there are probably more than these three that we have listed
here. However, based on the information we have right now, we can't see anything peculiar to
this particular flight as a result of those flashes.
In fact, in the video films you will see in a few moments we will try to graphically depict
what is being talked about. The words that are used on here was words that were picked up
from this particular camera, 202.
Actually, I believe you will see that these flashes, are probably as part of the plume within
the _SME, and we have seen this type of phenomenon, I guess you would ca!! it, before. So prob-
ably _he next time we update this chart we will be removing these from there, because we have
not been able to ascertain at this point that these are peculiar to 51-L.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph No. 13.)IR,'r. :_z; "_q
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Now, chart 12 shows a time where the time line starts to get a little bit more filled up with
activities that are going on. The first part we talked about was the smoke. Now, beginning at
58.7_8 se<'onds is the first time we have evidence of the flame appearing on the right-hand SRB.
As you can see from this chart, we're talking about a period of time here of about six sec-
onds of several things happening. The first evidence of flame, and we have the flickering dynam-
ic plume on the right-hand SRB.
And the reason you see that "TBD" or "'to be determined'for the time there is because that
is an item that you can't really pick up visually with your eyes as you review the film. However,
we have been doing some enhancement work. We have some of that back preliminarily. That, it
appears there might be a flicker, so we're off to understand that.
Now, the significance of that is as to how it relates back to the analysis of the joint and
what's happening to the joint during the Max Q region. In fact, everything you will see us put
on these time lines from the imagery point of view is focused to help the accident team do their
engineering analysis. So things that we know that might be peculiar to the joint we put
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on that to help them proceed with their work, and that is the reason we are show_mg this.
At 59.262 seconds--
DR. WHEELON: Excuse me, Mr. Germany. Is it possible yet to tell how many flickers per
second you're seeing during thi,Q flickering period?
MR. GERMANY: No, sir, Mr. Wheelon. I don't want to give you a number on that, because
really I don't have a number. But once we get that, then we will be providing it.
DR. WHEELON: Do you think you will be able to measure that eventually?
MR. GERMANY: We 1_ I hope so. But don't pin me down too closely, because we are still
trying to analyze that ri_, .: now. and as soon as we get something we will provide it to you.
DR. WHEELON: Thank you.
MR. GERMANY: At 59.262 we have a continuous, well-defined plume on the rignt-hand SRB
in the plus Z, minus Y coordinates. Then at 59.763 is where you see the visual evidence of the
flames from the right-hand SRB in the plus Z direction near the ET attach _r,g. So this is evi-
dence that it is occurring in about the same place that we were talking about before, the same
general location we were talking about before vdth
2219
respect to the smoke.
And then at 60.238 we have first evidence of the plume deflection, and that deflection of the
plume is intermittent. And then at .248. 60.248, the first evidence of the anomalous SRB plume
actually attaching itself to the 2058 ring of the ET, which is this ring in this area right here.
Then at 60.988 is the first evidence of the plume deflection being continuous. At first it was
intermittent and then it became continuous.
MR. ACHESON: What is meant by the term "deflection" in this context?
MR. GERMANY: It tends to be like moving backwards like this with respect to the vehicle,
and we're going to talk abo,lt that some mere when we get into the film.
Then at 64.660 you see the abrupt change in the anomalous plume shape. It is the first indi-
cation of hydrogen, liquid hydrogen, leaking around this or in the vicinity of this E2 2058 ring•
And then at 64.705 is when you see the bright, sustained glow. And all of this will become
more evident to you as we go through the film in a few morcents.
So that is the series of events that occurs
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from the 58.788 up to 64.705. And the significavt thing that is really happening here now is that
the liquid hydrogen is sta_ing to leak
The next chart, please.
!Viet;grapn No. 14.) to,., _ :l :m I
There, are quite a few events that occar on this chart But as you will notice, they all occur
primarily in a two to three second poin_ of time. And as you go through there, you can primarily
see the 72 _econd and 73 second time period.
While it may take us a wkiJc, to describe as we go through this, in fact it is happening very,
very fast. On the right-hand side of the chart with the telemetry information, as you scan
through there you can see that there is quite a bit of movement and things going on with the
vehicle, and we're starting to see the results of that, and that occurs like in the 72 second time
frame.
And then we're sta_ing to see the visual evidence of some of that in the 73 second time
frame, where we pick up at 73.124 the evidence of a circumferential white pattern on the left
side of the ET aft dome.
The LH-2 tank failure, this is the point we feel that the LH-2 tank failed, near this 2058
ring
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frame. The next thing is you will see a hint of vapor at the inter-tank area of the ET. That says
the "inter-tank stag"; it truly should say the "'inter-tank area" of the k-yr.
After that, a sudden cloud appears along the side of the lET between the inter-tank and the
aft dome That is at 73.162. Then there's a flash that occurs at 73.191 from the region between
the orbiter and the LH-2 tank.
And another flash near the SRB forward attach point occurs at 73.213 Then the first indica-
tion of in_ense white flash is at 73.282, and then what we call the greatly increa_-_d intensity of
the white flash at 73.327, which is essentially at the point you have the major st"uctural break-
up of the vehicle.
So on the one hand, it appears that what is happening is that the rigt,c-,_,and SRB, the
attach fitting, either the fitting itself--something has broken loose in this area. The liquid hy-
drogen is leaking at this point, and what's going on is this part of the vehicle is not tied in as
tight as it was, so it's free to move a little bit, and we're going to show you some of that in the
film.
And as that LH-2 tank lower half fails and the hydrogen is dumped out of there, you get a
larger thrust
2222
increase here. At the same time, this thing is moving. You esse_tially end up with a structural
failure of the external tank, which accounts for the total structural breakup.
So the rest of the chart, the rest of the items on the chart, just kind of pick up the remain-
der of the time line there.
Now, what we would like to do if w_ can is roll this video, and it is about a 14-1/2 minute
film, Mr. Chairman. And it will help yJu grr.phically see some of the things we have been de-
scribing here.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine.
MR. STE\'ENS_N: It'll lak_ a _ec,_nd l_ gel lhi_ MufI _\llch¢._i _q_.
(A vide,_lape was shov, n.) [Not published.l
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MR. STEVENSON: The first sequence, we're just going to show you a typical launch se-
quence.
MR. GERMANY: I might say that pax of the filrr footage we have here on the end of this
was supplied by an individual outside the agency that lappened to be taking pictures from the
New Sr:_yrna Beach area. It turn _,_dout to be helpful and so we have incorporated it.
Pause, !
MR. GERMANY: Because these things are happening so fast,we will go back and pick it
through a frame at a time to help you betterunderstand it.
2223
tPause.
This is the New Smyrna coverage right here.
(Pause.)
Okay. Now, it's going to continue to play, and we will go back and go through and we will
isolate the time line ev._nts for you.
Okay, Charlie, why don't you describ_ this.
MR. STEVENSON: What we have highlighted here is the actual smoke as we see from the
camera that is south of the pad and actually looking north, and we will come back and show you
another camera view. This would be E-60, and here's camera E-63 that looks from the northwest
toward the vehicle.
MR. GERMANY: This is the one where you can see the puffs of smoke more clearly because
you've got the white SRB in the background behind you there.
MR. STEVENSON: Now we will show you both of them together.
(Pause.)
And this is just a closeup, another view.
iPaused
We're now moving into the three flashes that we described earlier, and we will actually
show you tbur. You will have to watch closely in the center of the circle.
2224
(Pause.
This is just the next view. There will be three on this view.
(Pause.)
Okay, we'-e now going to the plume development.
(Pause.)
This is a second view of that, and this camera will stop at two stops. The purpose is to view
the plume, the SRB plumes and normal plumes.
(Pause.)
Okay. This is the first evidence of the plume deflection. Again, it's intermittent.
MR. GERMANY: That's at 60.238 seconds on the time line.
(Pause.)
MR. STEVENSON: And now it is constant.
(Pause.)
We're now going into the development of the leak.
(Pause.)
In this first indication of the LH-2 leak.
MR. GERMANY: And that was at 64.660 seconds.
MR. STEVENSON: In this frame you see the glow has moved around to where it's on both
the plus and
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minusZsidesofthe El'.
MR.GERMANY:That'sat 64.705.And this is a pointjust a few millisecondslater that th_
El" LH-2pressuredeviationsbeginto occur.And WayneLittles will becominga little bit later
ontodayandisgoingto pickupandtalk aboutthat for you.
MR,STEVENSON:Okay.Herewehavethedivergenceof the rateswhichDanjust referred
to.
MR.GERMANY:This is a computer-aide_designtool that we'reusingto helpunderstand
whathappenedto the motionsof theSRBat this particulartimepoint.It is itselfnot doingthat
rocking.We'rejust doingthat to giveyouan indicationof themotionthat takesplace,sodon't
getconfusedwith the informationthere.
MR.STEVENSON:We'removingnowinto the LH-2tank failure.
(Pause.)
Thereyouhaveit, andhereare thefirst hintsof vaporfromtheET inter-tankarea.Andwe
will stopthat for you.That'sit.
MR.CF, RMANY: You see, this is extremely hard to see. So we have picked a frame. You
learn to train your eyeballs to look for some of these things, and so we picked some to kind _f
accentuate it for you, because
2226
it's hard to see it right at first.
M_. STEVENSON: Okay. This one is the cloud of smoke that moves along the ET, down
from the inter-tank, and the bright flame that comes between the orbiter. That's it.
Now, this will be the flash between the orbiter and the external tank.
(Pa'._e.)
Now we're moving up to the forward attach between the ET and SRB's.
DR. RIDE: Are those single frames on the camera? Are you stepping ahead single frames?
MR. STEVENSON: Some are single frames, yes.
Okay, here is the white flash at the forward attach point, and the increased intensity.
{Pause.)
Now, this would be a combined view of the steps we just went through, the LH-2 tank fail-
ure, and it moves up to vapor from the inter-tank; then the sudden white cloud along the aft of
the LH-2 tank; and then the sudden flash between the orbiter and the _l _ on the LH-2 tank; the
flash near the upper ET-SBB attach.
And now we move into the SRB sequence, where we are showing the chute deploy. That's it
And here we have the right SRB destruct.
2227
(Pause.)
Followed by the leftSRB destruct.
(Pause.)
And this isjust a summary, again. That's it.
MR. GERMANY: Mr. Chairman, that isthe end of our prepared presentation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. That isvery good. Any questions?
Let'stake a ten minute recess.Thank you very much, Mr. Germany. That was a very good
presentation.
(Recess.)
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS. The Corr, m!ssion will come to order.
Dr. Little_
Dr. Littles, if you wgu!d introduce _our panel, please
Witnesses sworn
'2"2"29
TESTIMONY OF WAYNE LII_FLES. ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR ENGINEERING. MAR-
SHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, HAROLD N. SCOFIELD, CHIEF. CONTROL SYS-
TEMS DIVISION. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, AND ROBERT g. RYAN,
CHIEF. STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS DIVISION SYSTEMS DYNAMICS LABORATORY.
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
DR. LI'_I'LES: Yes. _ir. My name is Wayne Littles, and I am associat_ director for engineer-
ing at Marshall, and on my ieft I have Bob Ryan, who will be discussing the loads and joint
dynamics, and Harold Scofield will be discussing the flight reconstruction and trajectory.
I would like to begin with a brief overview of the fault tree and scenarios, and update where
we have changed since we last presented them to you two weeks ago, and point out the areas we
will be providing information on today to allow closure of some of these areas. If you would go to
Chart W-l, please.
_Viewgraph W-l.I [Ref. 3 21-31]
DR. LI3_I'LES: Okay, looking down in the righthand corner you will note that we have
changed the external tank. When we made our last presentation, we had that as a yellow, which
was a possible contributor. We are going to be recommending today with the
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information that we present to you that we change that to improbable.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Doctor, could I interrupt just a moment to say that we are going to
try if it is possible to conclude this session by 1:00 or 1:30. if it turns out that it runs longer than
that, then we will take a recess and come back after the recess, but if it is possible, we would
like to end at 1:00 or 1:30, and I thought for the convenience of eve_one here I would like to
announce that.
Okay, proceed, Doctor.
DR. LI3_FLES: Okay, go to Chart W-2, please.
(Viewgraph W-2.! IR,., :_z_ :_'I
DR. LITTLES: This is the fault tree which is the expansion of the external tank in SRM.
When we pre_ented two weeks ago we had a number of areas associated with the external tank
in yellow. We were still looking at the possibility of liftoff damage and debris possibly causing
impact to the tank. We will present information to you that concludes that that is highly unlike-
ly. We are also looking at a structural flaw as a possible contributor, and we will present data
on that.
Cored we go then to Chart W-3, please?
(Viewgraph W-3.)[a,,J. :_ zt :_:;i
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DR. LITTLES: This is the chart that provides the detailed scenarios associated with the hot
gas leak, and when we provide the information to close the tank, we will also be providing the
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minformation and recommending that we close item 2 on the scenamo tree, which is the hydrogen
leak impinging on the SRM and causing that failure
We wiil also be providing information and recommending that we close the Item 4C, which
is the leak check port. and we will be providing details of the load item, Item 5. Bob Ryan will
be discussing that in detail We had that in green when we talked to you before. We are going to
provide mo,'e detailed data today. Also. since we spoke to you last, we have added two items to
the scenario tree.
Since we have closed out loads and determined that the loads are within the design limits.
as we discussed before, they could still be a possible contributor to a potentially damaged joint.
We have reflected that by adding the item on the bottom right, liftoff flight loads effect on the
degraded seal, so that is an adde, item. We have also added Item 7 to make this chart more
complete. We have considered the potential of a case rupture.
We have not previded that information yet to
2232
the task force. We will be doing that next week. But based on what we know, we consider that to
be improbable, and we are carrying that as green contingent upon presenting that information
to the task force and getting them to approve that next week.
So, when we close those items out, what is remaining then are the items associated with the
joint itself. Those items deal with potential damage to the joint during mating which is Item 3,
that is, damage to the O-rings and/or the tang/clevis. The items associated with s_condary O-
ring defect in the joint or a delayed actuation of the O-ring, and Item 6, which is putty holding
the pressure off the joint combined with low temperature.
So, we are left with items that--those items which either individually or potentially in com-
binati6n, defects, will and/or possibly a low temperature, and possibly a combination of those
things being the thing that initiated the milure in those joints, and we will go through at the
end. the testing that we have under way to try to define w[_ __h one of those items or which
combinations might have caused the :allure. Could we go to Chin 5, please?
_Viewgraph W-5.) [Ref. 3 2]-34]
DR. LITTLES: I will now t'e getting to the
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information which we have accumulated in summary fashion, and recommend to you based on
these data that we close the tank. The investigation approach--we reviewed all of the flight data
for 51L for the tank, and the only anomaly that we saw in the tank itself, and this was men-
tioned by Dan Germany when we went over the time line, was that there was a change in the
ullage pressure rise rate at 66 seconds, and that got progressively worse with time. Other than
that, all of the flight data was perfectly nominal.
We have reviewed all o¢ the Challenger external tank histo; y, all of the build paper. We
have reviewed all of the x-rays. That has been done by four different people on all the x-rays,
and we have found no irregularity in all of that paper review which would indicate that any-
thing on the tank was a contributor to the anomaly.
We have evaluated all of the potential anomalies, the hypothetical anomalies that are on
the anomaly tree, and I will now addre_ each one of those items in :_ummary fashion and pro-
vide the rationale to you as to why we think they shoald all be closed out. Could we go now to
Chart W-2, plpase?
(Viewgraph W2.) [Ref. 3 21-32]
DR. LITTLES: Okay, this is just recalling
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that "+ee again to point out the things that we want to cover again. It is going to be the liftoff
damage and debris. The potential of a structural flat', premature year shape larger detonation
or structural overload. Could we go not- to Chart 6?
:Viewgraph W-6., i1¢,.i _ -'l ;-,
DR. LITTLES: Okay. this item on the fault tree deals with the potential failure of the exter-
nal tank due to a structural flaw. We have reviewed, as I have said, all of the build paper x-rays,
and we fnund no inappropriate dispositions.
\''\\ _,_,t''lJcl _llllt ill Tti;ll t_'\l_",',. ,,lit' \ Iit\ _xlal_+ i:,l+l ;t_ 1_1 il_,tlt',l _t_'_t+t T Ii _,X,I- li,,*lll I,*i_t
T, l_ti,- ,,I :l_ !lltjl i,,11_: It xx_t- ,t _x_'t,,t lJ:_ll xx:i- t_+_atq,,t ,,t _h_' !ttlZltt- _. i|\l', _,rl tit(' ]1!5"_ IlII;_
frame. Now, that is not in the area where we had the anomaly. It is on the minus Z axis of the
vehicle. We have analyzed that flaw, and the analysis indicates that it should not have contrib-
uted to the failure. As a matter of fact, the critical flaw in that area would be something like 5.2
inches, and you would have to have a flaw of something like .65 inches before it would break
through and have a leak.
The growth rate of a flaw in that area with the stresses that are imposed on that weld is
very. very
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CHAIRMAN" ROGERS: Dr. Little,s, in questioning some of the Martin Marietta people who
had the responsibility _or this, apparently they found out that an employee failed to discover
this imperfection that you have described, and they apparently have interviewed him, and so
forth. Is this a problem that you find recurring that there are mistakes on the part of the con-
tractors that maybe are getting more regular? In other words, there is more sloppy work being
done by your contractors in some ef these things?
DR. LITTLES: Well, I don't know that I have all the information to answer that questmn
completely. I am not aware of any progressive degradation in quality. It does happen from time
to time. There are human mistakes that do come about, but I am not aware of any degradation
in quality.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I think that is one of the things the Comm._ssion will want to
focus on in its
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report whether we need to beef up the supervision of the contractors in some of these things. I
thinl_ _t is fortunate in this case that you found the portion that we are talking about, and obvi-
ously it didn't contribute to the accident.
DR. LITTLES: Yes, that was fortunate, but as I indicated, it was not in the right orientation
at all. It was on the minus Z axis, which puts it around pretty far from where we see the plume.
It was fortunate that we found it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, the imperfection did show up on the x-ray. It just
wasn't reported by the employee?
DR. LITTLES: Well, it did show" up on the x-ray. Now, my understanding is that something
like a half a dozen people had re-reviewed that x-ray, and I was told that only about half of
them actually saw it. So it wasn't something that jumped out at you. It wasn't too obvious. So it
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wasn't something that he failed to report, but something he just failed to detect, just a human
error.
Nov,', if I could have Chart 7, please.
tViewgraph W-7.! iR,-I _ -im i
DR LITTLES: Okay, this item deals with the structural overload. As I indicated, Bob Ryan
will
22,37
discuss the loads in more detail, but what we have found is that the liftoff and flight loads on
the tank were well within the design limits. There was nothing greater than 80 percent of the
maximum, and of course there was the safety factor on top of this. The ullage pressure was
maintained well wit-in limits. There was no cursion on pressure The trajectory was nominal up
to the _gint o! Lhe incident. There was no excessive heating that could have caused an overload
of the structure, and we have also done analysis that indicates that if we had lost some TPS in
the area of interest during this time frame, that the heating would have been low enough that
we still wouldn't have degraded the structure to the point of having the failure. So, we conclud-
ed that it is improbable that a structural overload from flight loads or excessive ullage pressure
or excessive heating initiated the failure.
Chart 8, please.
_Viewgraph W-8.) [Ref. 3 21-37]
DR. LITTLES: Okay. This is an item I discussed when we last were together, but just for
completeness I have included it again, and it deals with the premature detonation of the linear
shape charge. The bottom line, of course, is, we did find these !inear shape charges with the
recovered hardware, and they were
223_
intact,so they were not involved in the incident.
Chart W-14, please
(Slide W-14.) Ira', :l 21 :l_ I
DR. LITTLES: Okay, this item deals with damage to the tank from deblis which could have
caused a leak. The ice team when they went out, and they went out more than once that night,
but when they went out at T minus 20 minutes, they saw no evidence of a leak.
Could we see Chart W-14 please, Okay. This is a photograph that was taken during the
night that contains the area of interest, and whvt I wanted to point out to you was that they
have a very good view of that area. The right hand SRB is on the left of the picture there, and
the area of interest is, of course, around toward the tank, so they had a very good view of that. If
you could give me Chart 14A, please.
(Slide W-14A.)[m,r :l 21-a:t I
DR. LITI'LES: Fourteen-A is just a little closer view of that area, so you see, they had a very
good view in that area, and if there had been a leak there, I think they would have seen it.
There was no evidence from the cameras on the pad of any debris. H you could give me now
Chart 10, please.
(Viewgraph W-10.) II_,.r. :l 21-4o I
DR. LITTLES: You have seen these camera locations described by Dan Germany earlier.
What this
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sketchis isa compositeof a numberof the cameras.He mentioned E-63. You see that one down,
at the bottom right. And E-60, to the left. and several cameras that are shooting across from 90
to 270. You see those cameras give you a pretty good view of this area.
After liftoff at about one and a half seconds there is also a ca,_era which is E-:_I. which is in
the top right, which gives you a view of another po'.tion of that a:ea, and s_ you see there is
really only a small portion that you can't see between liftoff and the :econd and a half, and in
reviewing those films we see no evidence of any debris in that area.
One of the possible contributors to debris, one thing that we were concerned about earlier
was that there had been a modification made to the covers for the hold-down pests and there are
springs in there, and those springs, several of them were missing. There has been a good bit of
work done on that, and it has been concluded that those could not have been a c¢,ntributor to
debris. An analysis done by KSC indicates that the springs could not physically get o_lt of that
cover prior to greater than eight-tenths of a second. Hence, since we saw the puff of smoke at .68
seconds, that is not consistent, and so we conclude that that was not a debris source.
You will also note in looking at the sketch on
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the screen. Chart W-10, that the area of concern, the righthand SRB, is well away from the f'Lxed
support structure on the stand, which is where the ice was. That was of some concern that night.
And so if a piece of ice were going to cause debris, it would have to come off of that stand, and it
would be a very rough trajectory to get it around to the point of interest, and it is improbable
that that could have happened, but there has been some analysis and tests done associated with
ice, and what those analyses and tests indicate is that for a reasonable size piece of ice, that you
would not get penetration of the tank
There has been some recent testing done with ice particles as large as a quarter of an inch
in diameter and four inches long fired out of a gun at a velocity of 300 feet per second, and the)"
did not damage the tank. Of course, it goes through the thermal protec_.tion that is on the tank,
but it actually shattered when it hit the metal underneath, and there are a number of other
tests like that, but a particle of ice falling off the fixed support structure couldn't attain any-
thing like 300-foot-per-second velocity, and so we conclude that ice is not a probable source of
debris relative to penetrating the tank and causing a leak.
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There have been some other tests done which are of some interest relative to both the ice
team seeing the leak and a jet impinging on the solid rocket motor. There have been tests per-
formed at Denver, and I am going to show a videotape in a moment showing these tests. These
tests indicate that very small quantities of hydrogen escaping from the tank would be visible. As
a matter of fact, tests have been done down to something like 3/1,000ths of a pound per second,
and you can still see the hydrogen coming into the atmosphere, so if the team, if it had been
leaking when the team had gone out, they probably would have seen it.
_nere have also be _. tests done at Marshall where we have impinged a burning jet of hy-
drogen, again, fairly small quantities of flow onto the materials which are present on the solid
rocket motor in the area of interest. There is a significant quantity if you go back to Chart 14-A,
please.
(Slide 14-A.) [Ref. 3 21-39]
DR. LITI_LES: There is a significant quantity of instafoam which is on the ET/SRB attach
rings. It is about four inches deep. There is also some cork on the ring that closes out the pins on
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the joint, andof coursethereis paint in thearea.andif youimpingesmallquantitiesof burning
hydrogenonthosematerials
2242
you see significant quantities of smoke and flame, and _hat I am doing is trying to relate this to
the fairly small quantity of smoke that we saw with the initial puff at 6_ seconds Could we see
that videotape now. please?
_A videotape was showr.. [Not pub]ished.]
DR. LITTLES: There is sound with this, Are we going to get it? Okay. it is narrated, but we
are not going to get the sound. Okay, the test conditions are on the screen. The first test, what
you see is on the left. You see there is a small hole. This is something like .003 pounds per
second. There are three series of tests on here at varying flow rate_, but .003 for the equivalent
conditions we had at KSC was the lowest case that was fur That wasn't the limit of visibility. It
was just the lowest one they ran. Again, here is another view. You can still see it coming out.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So your conclusion is, the ice team would have .,_een that leak if
there had been one?
DR. LI_rLES: Yes, sir, I am confident they would. They had o very good view, as we showed
in the earlier photographs. They could see the area very. well, and you can see that you see that
leak very well.
2243
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is that water condensation you see?
DR. LITTLES: Yes, it is cold hydrogen with the moisture content of the air making it visi-
ble.
4Pause._
DR. LITTLES: Okay, the next series of tests are those that I mentioned, and this is 21
pounds per second of hydrogen being ignited, and you see the test fixture there. It will be
coming from your left to the right. What's on the right are simulated portions of the material on
the solid rocket motor. And the burning jet will be impinging on the material on the right, and
you can see the smoke and flame characteristics.
There are four of these tes_. The narration tells what they were, and I didn't bring that
with me, because I thought we would be hearing the sound, but the first one here was, as I
recall, just the jet impinging on paint, and you don't see a gTeat deal that comes from that. You
can see some smoke, but not a large quantity.
The next one that we will see will be one of the two that is of primary interest because it
will be the burning jet, I believe, impinging on the instafoam, and the instafoam again i,_ on the
ET attach ring, in
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that area, and you can see large quantities of smoke and flame, and this had a simulated quanti-
ty of _nstafoam, and it burned for quite a long period of time, and again, it is a very low flow of
hydrogen.
This again was just some smaller quantities of material, paint primarily. I believe this one
also had the cork and t.he hypolon paint. And the last one you will see will be as composite
panel which has the instafoam, the cork, and other materials that are in that same area.
(Pause.)
DR. LI'ffI'LLS: You can see that there are fairly copious quantities of smoke and flame with
that simulated material, and this, of course, is quali_tive to some extent. But it would seem to
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indicatethat youwouldseepotentiallyn )re smoke than we saw from that initi£ puff. Okay.
could we go to Chart W-i,% please?
V:ewgraph W-I!_' [Ref. 3 21-401
DR WALKEP Could you just repeat what the s,ze of the orifices _ere in the first set of
tests. _
DR. LITTLES fhat orifice was ._)_:_quare inches. I believe, _nd the flow rate was 0l pounds
per second. Are you referring to the bu:.zing test"
DR WALKER: No I was referriug to the first set of tests.
224:)
DR. LITTLES: The first set of tests. I don't have those written down in front of me. Dr
Walker, but I will get those for you. I remember the flow rate was .003, but I don't remember
what the di, meter was. I will get that for you.
Chart W-10, please--I am sorry, W-11. i am out of sequence.
iViewgraph W-11._ [l',.t __'1 IIl
DR, LITTLES: So even though we don't feel that it was likely that we had a leak from the
tank, we have also done some analysis to try to determine what the effect of the leak would be
on the joint. What we have done is, we have used the maximum amount of leakage which would
not be detected by the instrumentation. That turns out to be something like four pounds per
second of hydrogen, and we have mixed that stochiametrically, and really it would be almost
impossible to get a stochiametric mixtu-e. So that is a conservative assumption. We have mixed
that stochiametrically and burned it and impinged it directly cn the membrane and the joint.
Now. what happens when you do that. of course, is that it doesn't stay in one to!ace for the
whole period from zero up to the time of the incident, because the velocity of the vehicle, the
aerodynamics around the
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vehicle are going to be causing that plume to sweep back away from the point When we did
that analysis, we came up with a maximum temperature on the membrane of about 650 degrees.
and on the O-ring of 360 degrees Fahrenheit.
Now. we have done tests that indicated that after you get the O-ring sealed and have pres-
sure behind it, that you can maintain that. It will maintain a seal up to a temperature of 1.000
degrees.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Dr. Litt!es, when you did those tests, what kind of air flow did you
assume on the vehicle? Did you just assume a Mach 2 air flow, or did you actually look at all of
the eddies and currents that were going around those tanks at the time?
DR. LITTLES: We used the vehicle aerodynamics. This question has been raised. As a
matter of fact. I was going to mention later that this is one area where Thiokol has requested
some additional information, and, as a matter of fact, we have Thiokol and the people from
Rockwell who were responsible for the flow fields, and our own people, meeting t,xlay to review
this analysis, anc particularly to review the flow fields that we are using.
Now, there were some assumptions made in the flow field that we used. We used the free
stream flow
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field. In the area where we have this leak, of course, between the tank and the SRB, at some
point in flight after you start getting a lot of shocks in that area, the assumption we made would
not be completely valid. So that there is an assumption there, but there are also assumptions
associated, as I mentioned, with the fact that we have assumed that it is stochiametric, which is
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|a worst case. We haven't accounted with the large leakage that we have used here for any cooi-
ing effect There would be a cooling core in tne center of this jet So there are some questions
about the assumptions we made there, and those are being worked today, and I think _,'e v*ill be
able to resolve that, as I said. because there are a lot of con_ervat,.ve :brags _n here even with
that simplified assumption that we have made.
There is another point, too. that I think I should make Well. two polnts One is that, you
see, we have a reasonably large margin betv*'een the temperature we are predicting and ",'hat v*'e
think or what the test da, - says the O-rings could withstand.
And the other thing, i _aess, ;.s that we don't feel. based upon the other data. and '_ think
there is quite an accumulat :- of data nov,', _hat the tank was involved. What we are doing here
is assuming the worst
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case leak to try to see what that would do to the motor, but we have no basis for believing that
such a leak existed. So, we are trying to resolve that point.
DR. WHEELON: Dr. Littles, I find your conclusion both reassuring and just a little surpris-
ing. Let me read the conclusion. Tests indicate that the O-ring wilt maintain the seal at 1,000
degrees Fahrenheit. Th: re_on I find that a little surprising is that in prior sessions we have
heard a good deal of descrit,.mn of confusion and differences about what the low temperature
end validity of that seal would be, whether it v*_ uld function at 30 degrees or only at 53, and yet
you seem quite sure that at the upper end of 1,000 degrees you know that the seal wi}t pe_3rm
satisfactorily at the high end.
Can you describe the _ts that give you that confidence and explain to us why ,re don't
have similar confidence at low end?
DR. LI2_rLES: Yes, these tests are tests that have been conducted since the incident. Of
course, the spec on the O-ring is 500 degrees.
DR. WHEELON: We have heard a lot about the specs. Let's talk about the test.
DR. LITTLES: It was specifically oriented to this type of analysis and the possibility of
having
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somet}Ang impinging on that joint, so there were special tests that were conducted, and what
they did was, they had a test rig which had a fairly small O-ring in position, .eated it with pres-
sure at the rig:::t pressure, 900 psi, and then ti_ey just heated that up and monitored it with a
thermocoulJie, the temperature in the O-ring area, and heated it up to the point where they got
the O-ring to break loose structurally. And there were, I believe, three or four of those tests, and
the temperature at which you had the structural failure was something above 1,000 degrees, and
so that is the basis of that statement.
_HAIRMA_, RC_oERS: The last time you were herp the Commission raised the ouestion of
whether there should be outside independent people involved in these tests, and I will now ask
General Kutyna to make a comment about that. I understand that we have, the Commission has
work__ out an arrangement to provide for that.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Chairman, those people are in place n .... "'e took them out to
Thiokol on Wednesday. They are there through today, and they will be down at Marshall next
week, and so they will be involved in this particular test and this analysis to make sure that it
checks out.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How many people are there?
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GENERAL KUTYNA: There are six people, sir: repre, entative_- :rom the Rocket Propulsion
Lab. from the National Transportation Safety Board. from the Air Force's Space Division. and
from indastr_ support to the MX Missile Office.
DR WHEELON Mr. Chairman, may I continue my question v,'ith Dr. Little_ just a little
fur:her" If it is so easy to determine the high temperature behavi_,r of the seal. why isn't it
equally simg.le to determine the low temperature end? Can you explain zhat for me and perhaps
other people on the Commission?
DR. LITTLES' I don't believe it is complicatee to determine the low temperature perform-
ance of the sea!, and we are doing that in more detail a:, a part of this investigation. The thing
that is a little more complicuted relative to the failure szenario we are pursuing is not the per-
formance of the seal itself at low temperature, but the peribrmance of the seal in combination
with the dynamics associated with the joint. That makes the testing of that total effect a little
more complicated, or at least the building of a test rig to do that a little more complicated.
As I will report to you in the test section, we do have our dynamic test rig functioning prop-
erly
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nov,,. We are getting good data out of it. I believe v,'ithin the next fe_" days, week to ten days, we
will have the information required to resolve that particular failure scenario.
DR. WHEELON: Okay. given tha_ this test is easy to perform either at high temperature or
Iov, temperature--I accept your judgment there--is it true that we had done these simple tests
prior to the launch of 51L. either at high temperature or low temperature, or are these new
tests that are being done for the first time?
DR. LITTLES: These particular tests I am referring to are tests and test fixtures which have
been designed and fabricated and are being used specifically to evaluate the scenarios or hypoth-
eses for failure. ]'h,-y are oll associated with the failure investigation.
DR. WHEELON: So the?" were not done prior to the launch?
DR. LITTLES: These particular test fixtures were not used prior to launch, no, sir.
DR. WHEELON: Were any tests of this nature done prior to launch?
DR. LITTLES: To mv knowledge there were no subsca!e tes's which incorporated dynamics
There were some subscale tests looking at the O-ring capability of
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the seal under the ignition pressure transient. Those tests had been conducted down to some-
thing 30 degrees or a little below, I believe--I know it was 30 d_grees; it might have been a little
lower--as a par:: of an evaluation of the joint that had gone on, but there had been, to my
knowledge, no subscale tent,, _hat included joint dynamics.
DR. WHEELON: Had there been any full-scale tests?
DR. LITTLES: Yes, of course, because the motor firings themselves have joint dynamics, yes,
and those have been conducted down to a temperature of 40 degrees on one of the--it was either
the development motor or qualification motor, I can't remember which, but that motor was at 40
degreee on the joint, calculated 40 degrees. The environment was 36. And there was an analysis
done which indicated that the joint was 40.
MR. RUMMEL: However, those flail-scale tests were not really representative of the flight
article as I uncle -and it, because additional putty v;as inserted at the field joints prior to those
tests. Is that cor_ c?
DR. LITTLES: There were some modifications made to the putty. The concern was, as I un-
derstand it,
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that they wantedto makesurethat theydidn't havegapsin the putty,a t therewerein some
localized ar,-as It has been reported :,_ _,s e,v Thlokoi that there were some areas :n there where
they had to go in and do some adjustment to t_'e putty. It wasn't over all joints. And _t waen't
over the total area. we are told. on any joint Jut there were some areas where they made a.-i-
2ustments to _t That is cc, rrect.
MR RUMMEL: Those same kind of additions of putty, just to be clear, have not as a matter
of practice or really at no tirae wa_ that same thing done tc flight articles. Is that true'.'
DR. LITTLES: No, sir. not to my knowledge
MR RUMMEL: Thank you.
DR. LITTLES: Could I have Chart W-17, please?
IViewgraph W-17.i Im.t _ _'t I_'[
DR. LITTLES: So, we conclude, based on upon what we have just discussed, that it is im-
probable that damage to the tank initiated a leak or, based on the anaJysis, that a leak within
the detectable limits of the tank instrumentation would have served to initmte the SRM failure.
Chart W-:_., please.
iViewgraph W-3.! [Ref. 3 21-331
DR. LITTLES: Having concluded, then. that
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there was no leak in ,he tank, we did get a failure of the tank. of course. We have indicated that
at 6T seconds we saw a decrease in the ullage rise rate, and what I would like to address now is
what caused that and also. while we are on this chart, with what we have just presented here.
we recommend to close Block 2 vn this chart.
Could we go no_ to Chart _/-1_. please9
!ViewgraphW-lt.i [,:,_ _-'_ l_i
DR. LITTLES: As you have seen from the film and time line earlier this morning, there was
a hot gas leak from the motor which .,_as evident from that film at about the 58 to 59 second
time frame We have used the data, the chamber pressure data that we have from flight, and we
have established a leakage from the size h,5_e that the change in chamber pressure would indi-
cate.
We have looked at the heating that woald result from that type of plume coming out, and
impinged that type heating rate on the ex_rnal tank, and we have concluded that within the
time frame between 5S to 59 seconds, when we larst see the hot gas leak coming out of the
motor, and the time at 66 seconds, when we see the change in ullage pressure in the tank, that
there is more than sufficient heat during that period of time to
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burn a hole through the tank. As a matter of fact, with the heating rates that we could get,
•ajh;_l,- _- • 1
....... vuzu range up to 880 BTU per hour foot pec square second, you could burn a hole in the
tank in a couple of seconds, and _o we conclude then that it is probable that the leak from the
SRM initiated the tank failure rather than vice versa.
This concludes the section on the tank, and we recommend, based upon what we have here.
that the tank be colored green on the color code indicatinl_ that it is improbable that the tank
initiated the failure. As I montioned, this information has been presented to the task force.
Martin Marietta agnees with this, and Marshall also agrees with the recommendation that we
close it. There is some, as we mentioned a minute ago, some residual work that we are doing
with Thiokol. They are reviewing some of our analysis. We are going to provide some additional
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oat_ to them. so there is jsome residual work going on there But on balance we concluded that
the tank i:_ not involved in the failure at this [_oint in time
Could we _c _ W-20. please'?
Viewgraph W-k0 [Ref. :3 2!-44]
DR LITTI.ES: Relattv_ to the leak check port. Chart W-20 _s a subuer failure tree that _ as
used to evaiuate the leak jet p_.rt, as wa_ discussed this
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morning with the time hne in the film Dan German) showed )ou where the cameras were rela-
tive to the liftoff I am not going to go through a_l of the details that we went through in this
investigation because the bottom line is that in reviewing all of the film looking at all of the
cameras we have. there is nothing visible from that lc<:ation.
Could we go to W-21. please?
Xr,
DR. LITTLES: W-21 is the picture I h_ ' ap earlier, which shows the locations of the camera,
and what you can see from that is that l_okmg at cameras E-63 and E-80, you have a very clear
view of that leak check port, and in reviewing all of the film, we have never been able to see
anything that comes directly from that port.
DR. COVERT: Dr. Lirt!ee. it might be helpful if you would indicate if that leak check port is
on the top or the bottom of the righthand booster. The picture yov have does not indicate where
the leak check _ort is.
DR. LITTLES: If you go to Chart W-23. Flease. I believe that shows it.
(Viewgraph W-23.) [R,._ __'l _7 i
DR. LITTLE& I am sorry, it was W-22.
(Viewgraph W-22.i lt¢,.f I :: l_,[
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DR. LITTLES: On *he left part of that figure there you see the arrow pointing to the loca-
tior, of the leak check p_rt on the righthand booster, and what this is is an artist's concept of the
view that you would have from camera E-63, and where you might _ee the p _ff of smoke ema-
nating if _t came out of the leak check port, and in looking at all of the film. we don't ewr see
an area, a clear area on the motor itself between the leak check point and the tank. There is
always _l:;oke over there, up against the tank. So we conclude that it doesn't come from the leak
check po_, but it comes from somewhere around out of view, coming around the corner there.
Could we see Chart W-23, please?
tViewgraph W-23. ) [ Ref. 3 21-47 ]
DR. LITTLES: This is just the conclusion relative to that that the smoke is plainly visible at
.678 seconds. The source itself is no_ visible, _nd, as Dan indicated this morning, all of the film
ir_dicated that it probably originates between 270 and 310 degrees, and we conclude from this
that it is improbable that the smoke origin was from the leak check port, and we recommend
closing out that Jailure scenario.
Okay, that concludes the leak check pert. We would like now to move into ".he section on
trajectory
2258
and flight dynamics reconstruction, and Harold Scofield will cover that for us.
DR. SCOFIELD: Mr. Chairman, Dr. Ride, gentlemen, I joined ABMA in 1956, and have been
with Marshall Space Flight Center since its inception, and since that time my speciahty has
become the analysis of flight dynamics. I am currently the chief of the Control Systems Division,
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which applies the analysis of flight dynami_ to the synthesis of auto pilots and Ix) ring control
systems.
If I could have Chart S-2, please.
{Viewgraph S-2.) {Ref. 3 21-481
DR. SCOFIELD: This pitch is about reconstructions. Now, reconstructior_ is a computer sim-
ulation, and in that computer simulation we attempt to include all of the environmental effects
that we can in order to recreate what happened, in this ease on 51L, of course.
So, our task will be to construct math models of the environment, and we hope to get out of
these reconstructions three things, truth checks against failure scenarios. That is, if we can
detect the effect of some attribute of a failure scenario, and if we can simulate it and can under-
stand it, then that leads to increased confidence that that failure scenario happened
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or that itdidn't.
Secondly, the data that is produced from these reconstructions is needed for loads analysis
to determine the dynamic loads on the vehicle,again to be reconstruc*ed for the 51L flight,and
Bob Ryan t your right willcover that part of the pitch later.
And lastly,of course,the reconstructions enable us to tellwhether the vehicle systems oper-
ated properly, particularlythe guidance and control system in this case.Now', the chart that is
on the screen graphically shows you how these analyses fittogether.
On the left,the propulsion reconstruction feeds into the trajectory.First,I will talk about
propulsion reconstruction.Secondly, I will talk about the winds aloftand the atmospheric recon-
struction.That isin the upper leftcorner of the chart. That also feeds into trajectory.And then
on th_ right _art of the chart isa block called plumes and aero. And what that isisa modeling
of the failureplumes, the hot gas leak from the SRM using photo data, and the calculation of
re,Ased aerodynmnics due to that plume. Those aerodynamics have an effectparticularly on tne
control system. They do have some effecton the trajectoryalso.You will find that those effects
are
2260
nloA_urLad.
Fourth. we generate a coordinated time line,which we need for the trajectory reconstruc-
tion,and with allthat data we are able to compare our mathematical simulation on the comput-
er with observed data and feed that into a control system simulation which ge _.ratesthe dy-
namics or a more detailed explanation and understanding of the dynamics from which we can
estimate the loads.
Chart S-4,please.
(Viewgraph SM.) [Ref. 3/2149]
DR. SCOFIELD: The main propulsion system performance was reconstructed. That is the
Space Shuttle main engine system that I referred to. We determined the propellant loads at
main engine start command and the thrust and flow rates during flight.We reconstructed the
SRM performance, and that included the internal pressures, the flow rates, and the thrust
during flightnow. On the screen you ha_,ea plot of SRM right chamber pressure, internal pres-
sure, versus time. The heavy line is the measured data from 51L for that right SRM. The dot-
dash line that italmost covers isthe mean of our flightexperience in the first24 flights,adjust-
ed to 51L conditions.We do that by running testson each hatch
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of propellant. Each batch ot propellant is a little different, you see, and we make small motors
as well as the big ones that we use from each batch propellant, and fire them to a,_er*_ain the
differences in performance.
The temperature also has an appreciable ef_bct on tb,_ parameter, and that is not the pa-
rameter of the temperature of the atmosphere, but, rather, the temperature of the propellant
inside the rocket. It vari_ nowhere near as ,nuch as the outside temperature, but nevertheless
it is important. Those two main parameters were used to shift what those first 24 flights would
have done had they been flown on the day that 51L was launched, and had they been construct-
ed from the same batch of propellant.
DR. WALKER: Are thoee test firings done at Marshall or at Thiokol?
DR. SCOFIELD: At Thiokol, sir. Now, we hsve two attributes of this curve that need to be
discus_,_cl. Tne first on the left is marked right SRM performance higher than pre< cted. That is
not a large deviation. That is about 14 standard deviations above the mean, and you would
expect variations on the order of one standard deviation in examining this data. Now, further-
more, there are some mechanisms which are not in this reconstruction which tend to make us
believe that
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that pressure would be a little high, for that motor, my-way.
Nevertheless, it is not important in our opinion. The attribute on the lower right, marked
SRM leak begins, of course, is ,ery anomalous. You _ that it crosses, "it" being the heavy line,
crosses the dotted line, which are marked "expected limits", and we would estimate the [-oba-
bility of that behavior at being less than three parts in 1,000 if we only had to worry about
randGm things, and so we conclude that that is not random. We would have concluded that
anyway. Even if we had not had a failure on this mission, we would have been very much con-
cerned about this phenomenon. Of course, we know from photo coverage that the SRl_ leak does
begin at about that time that we see the divergence of the internal pressure.
Now, we use--our propulsion people use tkis divergence from the expected to construct the
size of the leak that must have been evident in this right SRM. Now, of course, that leak had a
zero area at the start_ but it was estimated that it grows to about 45 square inches at 72 seconds.
With that data, we can construct a "hrust profile from that leak, and we can use it in subse-
quent reconstru_ions.
Chart 8-5, please
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(Viewgraph S-5.)IH,.f.:_zl -_ol
DR. SCOFIELD: All right.At this point, with no other reconstructions accomplished, we
were able to go to work on liRoffdynamizs. We simulated liftoffdynamics with a three-dimen-
sional translation and rotational program that included the flexibilityof the shuttle and the ini-
tialconditions for this liftoff--thatis,the ;onditionswith which the vehicle leftthe pad--were
chosen to match the flightrecords telemetered from the flightand the firstone or two seconds,
and we obtained a match for that telemetered data using the values that are listedthere which
were within the nominal range of expected variations.
That is,the space shuttlemain en_ne thrust risewas within the expected variations in that
parameter, and likewise the SRM ignition timing differencesand the ground winds which were
measured that day, of course. This gives us confidence that we understand this part of flight,
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and it enables us to conclude that the control sys_m, for example, worked properly daring the
liflmff pha_, of flight.
We also compared the SRM gimballing activity for 51L with STS 6. SPS-6 was also the Chal-
lenger, and it carried the TDRS satellite also, so it had essentially the same payload, and those
plots are very
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similar up until the point when the vehicle clears the launch supports, the haunches, as we call
them, the supports the SRBs sit upon.
Afher that, t_, _ diverge some, and we attribute that to ground winds. That is a minor thing.
We also evalua_ the liftoff films to make sure no collision occurred with the ground structure,
and we were able to determine, of course, that there was no collision with the ground structure.
Now Chart S-7, please. Im'1 :_2,5il
(Viewgraph S-7.1 I_,.r :_z, _2I
DR. SCOFIELD: Next, we needed to reconstruct the environmental model for 51L.
DR. WHEELON: Let me make a point, before we leave that matter for the last time. During
this initial part of the liftoff sequence the vehicle has vibrational modes. It twangs like a reed.
At what frequency does it twang, in its resonant mode, as it lifts off?.
DR. SCOFIELD: The first main mode is essentially three hertz.
DR. WHEELON: Three cycles per second.
DR. SCOFIELD: That's rdght, and it was contained in the sir _ulation, and indeed that has to
match in order to obtain the match that I claimed we do. We were able to see that twang from
the photo coverage. You can actua_!y see the vehicle bend or ratl'er you can see the
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vehicle move, and you must include the bending of 'he vehicle in your simulation to account for
how it moves, and so that was included.
DR. WHEELON: So the vehicle in its principal mode is twanging three times a second. Do
you make any correlation betwee _ that and the fact that the smoke was apparently puffing
three times per second?
DR. SCOFIELD: Well, that has been discussed earlier today. I can only say that I have seen
that data, and " is nn!y a very rough correlation.
DR. WHEELON: It is better that no correlation.
DR. SC( WIELD: No, sir, it is not no correlation. That is too many negatives. The puffs of
smoke do appear to be very, very approximately at a three-puff-per-second rate. However, we
cannot account for that. We are still working on it. We feel that it could be a coincidence, but of
course we are not going to ignore that as evidence, and we are going to pursue that until we are
sure.
DR. V_HEELON: It could indeed be a coincidence, but it is worth noting in passing.
DR. SCOFIELD: It certainly is.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It is at least not inc°nsistent.
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DR. SCOMELD: It is not inconsistent with the mechanism that opens that gap according to
the vibration of the vehicle, and I think Bob Ryan will talk more about that later, as a matter of
fact.
DR. WHEELON: Thank you.
DR. SCOFIELD: Surely. Now, next we reconstructed the atmospheric environment, and that
is mainly winds aloft and pressure and temperatures aloft for this type of analysis. We need that
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data in order to predict where the vehicle goes and what sorts of air pressure are exerted on it.
The ground w_,nds were also reconstructed, and the ground _mperatures, and the main fault
histories also, and that was mainly to supply it to other teams. Our team was in charge of pro-
ducing these reconstructions for our own use and for others' use.
Now, the plume of the SRM leak was modeled from photo coverage, and you see the chart
which cor, tains some line drawings on the right as seen by Camera E-207 at 60.6 seconds. Now,
you can actually see the plume from that camera at that time of flight. The aerodynamicists
estimated the size of that plume, and they estimated how much choke flow they get in the chan-
nel between the SRB and the tank, and they estimated the differences that would be evident in
the plume
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downstream of chat leak.
And they produced what they called aerodynamic increments or really new aerodynamic
data that would account for the forces and moments on the vehicle due to this p,, ._omenon.
Now, on the left part of that same chart, if you could go to the left side, please---thank you--we
have an aft view. Unfortunately, we don't have a camera that shows this. It would be re_!!y
great if we did. We have modeled the plume from the SRM leak along a 45-degree line to the
vertical. Some people think that is known fairly well, say, within ten degrees. ¢_*hers don't.
They think that we cannot reduce that photo data that accurately, and so we are doing a
sensitivity analysis at this time, assuming a 30-degree error in the location of that plume, and
we are gcing to see if we can tell any difference in the flight dynamic reconstruction the t would
aid in pinning down where the SRB leaked.
Now, that is the kind of thing that we are after. And of course the leak was a fan-shaped
phenomenon. It wasn't a round hole. And so we expect that this could have a small effect. If it
does, we won't be able to help pin down where that leak came from. But, on the other hand, if it
does make enough
2268
difference, we shall.
The maximum aero force due to the aerodynamics, the revised aerodynamics of the plume,
are about 130,000 pounds, and I think by anybody's rule book that is a lot, and you will see in a
few moments it does move *.he whicle. We provided all of this data from the atmospheric recon-
structions and frcm the propulsion reconstructions to JSC, and to all others, contractors includ-
ed, that needed the data.
Chart S-9, please.
(Viewgraph S-9.) [ Ref. 3/21-53 ]
DR. SCOFIELD: Now, next we determined a coordinated time line, and a trajectory using
the winds aloft, the propulsion, and the SRM leak with aerodynamic increments. We have al-
ready obtained excellent time line agreement with the JSC time line activities, and we have ob-
tained excellent agreement with both Marshall Center photo activity and the JSC/KSC photo
activities. And we are talking about ten milliseconds here. We know these t_mes very well. We
may have some difference of opinion on the interpretation of the filrP_, but we know when the
phenomena occurred, and we know what i8 on the film.
The reconstructed trajectory was succemfully compared w;_t_ a JSC product called the best
estimated
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trajectory. Now, the best estimated trajectory is constructed from radar data, and it is a very
accurate thing Those radars are quite precise, and the other data is used there, too, to deter-
mine true record of whe-e the vehicle went, altitude versus time, for example.
Now, our simulation is not constructed from that data. Our simulation is constructed _trict-
ly from the environmental models. And so we compare these two. Now, before you here we have
a chart of what we call the dynamic pressure versus time. The dynamic pressure is air pressure.
It is the same force you feel on your face when you ride a bike, and it is a very important
parameter in predicting air loads, and so we tried to very carefully reconstruct this parameter.
The solid line is the simulation and the dot-dash--no, I am backwards. The solid line is the best
estimated trajectory from the radars, and the dot-dash is reconstructed, and you can see that
they are virtually identical.
This transient at the top is due to winds aloft, and that is not abnormal. You see excursions
in this parameter when the vehicle encounters winds. Chart S-10, please.
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(Viewgraph S-10)ik,.I _ 2t _1]
DR. SCOFIELD: Next, we attempted a reconstruction of the flight dynamics between 50 and
72 seconds. We were interested particularly in these times of flight for obvious reasons. That is
where the SRM leaked, and we have quite interesting dynamics in that region of flight. The
match was a successful match, and the data acts as a check on the SRM leak model. The data
was used or isbeing used in loads analysis.
Now, I might remark that Rockwell also isdoing the same sort of activity,and we provide a
check against each other. Rock_ell isa systems contractor for JSC as well as building the orbit-
er, and they are doing these same studies, and so they have made a reconstruction similar to
thisone, and we have compared notes,oh, every two or three days here.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What do you hope to conclude by these reconstructions?
DR. SCOFIELD: Well, we hope to provide data that shows that the loads were within limit
loads after you do the loads analysis.We hope to conclude that the SRM leak was in the position
that I showed, and we hope to conclude that the guidance control system of 51L operated proper-
ly.We have not documented _llof those things,Mr. Chairman. Some of them we are quite sure
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of,but we haven't studied the test.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When do you think you will complete that?
DR. SCOFIELD: The firstweek of next month.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Thank you.
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DR. SCOFIELD: All of the paramet_rs of vehicle motion were within predicted envelopes,
every one of them. Now, the predicted envelopes were generated early in the program. I don't
mean a predicted envelope for 51-L here. I am speaking of the dispersions analysis that one goes
through to provide data to thermal analysts and to provide data to loads analysts and that sort
of thing,and those are large variations.You take very conservative assumptions about what you
know regarding the environment in the vehicle,and those variations are, oh, 30 percent above
what we saw in this flight.
Now, all of the parameters that were t_lemetered and reconstructed from 51-L were within
flightexperience up to 65 seconds. At 65 seconds we did begin to pick up some effectsof the
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Lfailure phenomena that drove us outside of our tube of accumulated flight experience. The peak
gimbal angles, SRM gimbal angles, were within flight experience, but the total travel of those
SRM gimbals was outAde our flight experience.
Now, what I mean by that is if you take _ach increment of angle, each telemetered number,
take the _bsolute val ,_ and add them all up, it gives you a measure of how far that rocket had
to gimbal _. it angle
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during the flight, and that parameter for this flight was 132 degrees. The largest previous w_s
125.
:_et's have Chart S-11, and we will begin to show why that was.
(Viewgraph S-11) [mq'r :_ Zl _]
DR. SCOFIELD: This is a plot of pitch attitude error versus time. Pitch is the up and down
motion in the plane of flight, and th_ attitude error is the angle between where the vehicle is
and where the guidance system wants it to point, the command angle. And once again you have
51-L measured data, dot dash, and the simulation in the solid lines.
Now, note the region between 40 seconds and 60 seconds. We have quite a transient re-
sponse there. All of those variations are due to winds aloft, and we can reconstruct as we did
from 50 seconds-on a simulation of this. We think that is very close to that. That is a very good
reconstruction. We have not only this angle within 1 degree or so, but the slopes of the angle
matches up very well with the telemetered data.
At 66 seconds or so we have a response to a planned roll maneuver that comes out of the
guidance system. That is normal, but the long feature in that transient response leading to the
lower right corner is
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the response to the SRM leak. If the SRM had not been leaking, as hypothesized in all of these
reconstructions, that curve would have turned back up and gone towards zero before 70 seconds.
So we know ve_T well--it's a dramatic difference. We know very well that the SRM was
leaking at that time. We know fairly well where it was. We have a fairly good measure of what
the plume was. We have a pretty good measure of what the flow was. It all adds up. That is the
bottom line.
Okay, Chart S-12, please.
(Viewgraph S-12) [X,.f. :_ :_t-:_.j
DR. SCOFIELD: This plot is actuator extension on the leR SRB versus time. Actuator exten-
sion is in inches, but actuator extension in inches is approximately the same as gimbal angle in
degrees. The point I want to make from this chart is the response to wind gusts between, oh, 35
seconds and 60 seconds. There is a lot of activity there, and even though this parameter was
within our flight experience, once again, the dynamic activity was not within our flight experi-
ence. This has been referred to by one of the guys on our team as a busy wind. It is a lot of
motion.
Now, if we are incorrect about how much that joint opens up due to the loads, then this
data would
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become very important. We don't think that this type behavior would open a gap in a healthy
SRM seal.Itiscertainly not designed that way.
MR. ACHESON: How close to the limitsof your flightexperience were the winds that were
experienced in this frame oftime?
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FDR.SCGFIELD:Theywereveryciose,sir, up around _!,-, naething seconds. That peak up at
62 seconds is barely within our flight tube. The one at 4I seconds is well within our flight tube.
We usually get more activity down in mid-flight, 40 to 60 seconds, than we do at 60 to 70 sec-
onds. That is a healthy maneuver for that time of flight.
Now, I might remark that if we had a degraded structure at that time, these data could
even be more important. We don't know the answer to that question. We don't really have a
good way of determining the effect of this type of behavior on a degraded SRM structure.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But, Mr. S¢ofield, what you are saying is we saw the flame appear at
about 58 seconds, and if I can use an analogy, this chart shows the Shuttle going on a fairly
bumpy road prior to that time with loads on that SRB. If you had a weakened joint that had
sealed itseif on lift-off, this could be
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the factor that opened that joint up again, is that right?
DR. SCOFIELD: We are very much interested in that theory. We are working on it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can you give us a little more certain answer on that?
DR. SCOMELD: Not at this time, no, sir. What we are waiting on is the next presentation,
and the next pr,_-,,entation will show you some pretty sporty analysis that needs to be done to try
to evaluate the degraded structures, or even a normal structure, for that matter.
If I could have Chart S-13, please.
(Viewgraph S-13) IX,., - _ 21 57 I
DR. SCOFIELD: This is a summary of findings. The propulsion performance was within the
predicted limits until 69 seconds. At that time the right SRM broke outside our limit band. The
SRM hole opened at approximately 60 seconds and grew to 45 square inches by 72 seconds. The
m_asured winds aloft, propulsion reconstruction and aero increments based upon observed SRM
plume give us a trajectory reconstruction that matched the best estimated trajectory, and a dy-
narnic simulation that matched the flight data very well. We conclude that the control system
worked properly until 72 seconds. It did
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not after 72 seconds. When _,, got into structural breakup at 72 seconds, it was a bit much to
ask of that system. It wasn't aesigned for that, of course. The parameters were within flight
limits from the preflight simulation and were within the flight experience through 65 seconds.
However, the SRM gimbal angle duty cycle, as we call it, was large due to winds aloft.
Now, that concludes my prepared presentation.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: In determining the flight derivativ,.s for the region of
interest here with the plume, the CM-alpha/CM-beta, did you do those, determine those new
values analytically, or did you use tunnel models?
DR. SCOFIELD: We did those analytically. Rockwell also did, and we compared notes, and
we have a wind tunnel program planned. However, that probably will be several weeks off yet.
Those things, as you undoubtedly know, take a little time to do. We have to make a model which
includes--we have to make a wind tunnel model which includes some sort of representation of
that plume, of course.
,'ICE CH._IRMAN ARMSTRONG: But with the analytical ones you can do a bit more sensi-
tivity analysis with the geometry, is that correct?
DR. SCOFIELD: Of course, and that is going on today.
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DR.LITTLES:Mr. Chairmanthe nextsectionwill bepresentedby BybRyan,andthereare
twosubjects.Oneis the datathat we have used to cenclude that the loads were well within the
design limit, and the second section is the work that we are doing relative to the joint dynamics
and applying the specific 51-L bads to that joint.
MR. RYAN: Mr. Chairman, Commission members, I have been in aerospace engineering for
30 years. I started out with ABMA in January 1956, and went with NASA at the organmation of
the Marshall Space Flight t_nter, and been Chief of the Structural Dynamics Division since
1974.
What I would like to do today is give you a status report because I don't have a full report
of all of the structural ar.alysis, it is not complete, of the 51-L mission, including the aft field
joint in particular, since _t is of primary interest. And so I will split my presentatior into those
two parts. The first part I want to discusf is the overall load.
So if I could have C_nart R-1.
(Viewgraph R-l) [Ref. 3/21-58]
MR. RYAN: The objectives of this analysis that we are doing is to determine the loads expe-
rienced by 51-L for all flight events, compare those loads to
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the expected design loads and determine if excessive or unusual loads occu_ed. And then, third-
ly, we want to extract from those loads forcing functions for special dynamic analysis. In par-
ticular, we want to run response analyses of the SRM, solid rocket motor field joints to see how
the gap would open for the different events.
Could I have Chart R-2, please?
(Viewgraph R-2)Im.r. :_ _l _:q
MR. RYAN: Those events that we will be reconstructing the flight loads for are on the pad,
the liftoff, the in-flight--the in-flight covers all of the dynamic regions that have been discussed
by Dr. Scofield as the major events of the gust, the roll maneuver and so forth. To do this, a
dynamic model of the 51-L vehicle, its payload, the MLP pad for the lift-off phase, etc., has been
generated, and the vehicle then is flown "n a simulation through all of these different flight
events and different environments that have been created that Dr. Scofield talked about. Also,
we made use of telemetry data and certain measured data that were available on the pad for our
work.
This work is a joint effort that is carried out by Marshall Space Flight Center, Johnson
Space Flight Center and Rockwell International at Downey.
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The next chart, which is R-3--
(Viewgraph R-3) [R,.f. :_ ",I-,o I
MR. RYAN:--I have chosen to illustrate the dynamic situation that really occurs during the
liftoff phase of the maneuver. This is the most dynamic situation that we have. It is where you
saw the puff of smoke. It is where you see all of the structure wringing out. A lot of things are
going on at that time, and I would like to take just a minute to step through those bamc events
for you so that you might get a feel for what takes place.
I have chosen only two parameters to plot out of many parameters that we could plot versus
time. The time base I am using here is when we give the commands to start the flow in the
Shuttle main engines, all the way through to approximately four seconds after liR-off. Now, the
two parameters I have chosen to plot for you are at the aft field joint of the right solid booster,
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tsince that one is of concern to everybody. As I say, ve could plot all kinds of parameters at any
other location on it.
• Now if you look at the left hand side during the first two seconds, there is really nothing
going on in terms of loads and so forth. The vehicle is sitting on the pad. The wei_ nt of the
vehicle you see there
4
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indicated by the axial load, that trace, and that is a compressive load in the aft field joint which
is like the weight of it sitting on i_.
The other parameter I have chosen to plot is the bending moment in the Y direction, that is,
in the pitch direction, whicn would be the bending moment that would bend the vehicle this
direction if you looked at the model there.
Now, at approximately 2 seconds after we start all the _rocess, the SSMEs start coming up
in thrust, and as they come up in thrust, you can see a slight decrease in the axial load. In fact,
the thrust of the SSMEs are lifting the vehicle up, particularly the orbiter, reducing some of the
weight that is in the SRM joint, and the vehicle is bending over, and it is bending over away
from the orbiter. Of course, the orbiter and everything is bending with it, and you can see that
in the films. In fact, that deOection is quite dramatic, and if you look down at about ,_.1/4 sec-
onds, you see the peak of that bending moment. At that time the SRB, the solid rocket booster
motor, has bent approximately 24, 25 inches, and the tank is bent like 32 inches.
Now, we give the signal to light the sohd rocket booster motor and to release the hold-down
bolts
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that hold the vehicle on the pad su_.h that we have a minimum amount of energy stored in the
vehicle, and that occurs there, as you can see, a little past six seconds on the chart is that mini-
mum moment part. You see literally the vehicle is being bent over, is being pushed, which roils
the SRBs, and we are storing a tremendous amount of energy in that structure. Yogi are winding
it up like a rubber band, so to speak. And then when the SRB thrust comes up and we get a
thrust-to-weight of greater than one, the vehicle lifts off the pad, and it releases from the pad,
and all of that energy is released into a dynamic motion.
Now, you can see that occurring from about 6.25, 6.35 seconds on in the MY, and you see
that frequency that everybody has been talking about wringing out That is actually bending
moment wring-out in the structure at the aft field joint.
Now, later I will talk about how that corresponds to an effective gap opening, hut the struc-
ture is wringing out in some very complex structurally dynamic modes at this time, this being
mainly a 2.7 to 3 hertz mode, but there are two or three modes in this region that the vehicle is
wringing out. So those are the basic events that are going on.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Ryan, could I ask a
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question?
If we had plotted the axial load curve earlier in time, you weald have it for, not for the
whole assembly but for each solid rocket booster itse.lf, would it _Ae possible to see the dynm_fic
effect on the joint and the pins as the load transfers from being down to being up?
MR. RYAN: Yes, sir, that occurs, as you see that, _round 6--
DR. COVERT: No, I am talking not about the whole asser,.bly coming off of the booster, but,
rather, as I pressurize the rocket case..
MR. RYAN: Yes, sir, it w_uld do _he same thing. It goes in tension just due to pressure.
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DR. COVERT: Are you going to talk about that today?
MR. RYAN: Yes. s;x, I will talk about that later i. the second part.
DR. COVERT: Okay,
MR. RYAN: So _hose are the dynamic events that go on that affect the joint and affect the
!. loads.
Now, to evaluate that we did three things. We had the film ccverage that you have seen
some of many times, I am sure, and we observed those films, and compared it with several
Pights. In particular, we
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compared 51-L wi_h STS-6, whic._ was a comparable flight, and the deflections on the SRB or. 51-
L was 24 inches, and on STS-6 it was 28 inches. These are within the envelopes of what we have
been seeing and indicates that everything was okay, that it was a nominal flight at liftoff. The
i frequency of that oscillation that occurs is about a quarter of a hertz for both vehicles, in fact,
for all of our vehicles, which indicates that the pad effects and so forth were the same. That's
the important conclusion there. IX,._.._ _J "_1
We have two other modes that go on there. When the Shuttle main engines come up, due to
the fact that the nozzle is not full and the thrust wallowing around in the nozzle, those loads
appear to be nominal. One is a 25 hertz load and the other is a 30 hertz load. Dr. Scofield talked
about the clearance, and that was nominal.
Now, R-5, please.
tViewgraph R-5)[m.i :_ zl ,-,]
- MR. RYAN: Now, we also evaluated the loads during the twa,_g motion we had. On each
hold-down post of the SRBs, we had strain gauges, and we have those on the flights to tell us
how muck, loads go into those SRB hold-down bolts or the posts. Those are designed by that
twang motion that I showed yo_ earlier when that MY
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moment peaks. We evaluated those, and you can see on the chart that I have here, if you look
down at the base of that chart where the arrow points to the base of the solid rocket booster
motor, you can see that the design bending moment was 347 million inch pounds. We actually
experienced by measured data on this flight 291 million incr_ pounds, which is about typical of
what we see. If I transfer that same measured data up t9 the aft field joint of the right solid
rocket booster motor, the design limit load there would have been 248 x 106 million inch pounds.
We experienced 208 by transferring that measured data to that point. And so, in addition, we
could observe some of the posts. We couldn't observe them all. But we could also observe from
the fihn, we could observe from the strain gauge standpoint each one of those four hold-down
posts on each SRB released nearly simultaneously, which tells us that there was not undue
energy being transferred and undue motio:_ being transferred into the vehicle at lift-off.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: How did you determine that near-simultaneous? [m,i. :_z_ ,:_]
MR. RYAN: By the timing, sir when the strain gauges show that the load has been released
on that hold-down bolt and they were within a couple of milliseconds of each other, which says
that there was very little abnormal enerff_, or
:'=_" 2286
•t unsymmet_cal energy or unexpected energy in that part of the liftoff.
Could I go to Chart R-7, please?
(Viewgr.aph R-7)[_,.t, :_ zl-,lj
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!MR. RYAN: The third way that we have evaluated the loads by the different parties that I
mentioned earlier is a reconstruction of the liftoff loads used in the dynamic model I wa_.t to
use this chart. R-7, to show you where I am going to talk about some loads later If you notice
the Ps that are at the back end of the graph, you have the struts. We called the ]_ads for e,_:h
strut a P-l, P-2, P-3 and so forth, and if you will notice there that P-1 through P-7 are the ET i.o
orbiter struts and are indicative of the loads that the orbiter relative to the ET are experiencing
during the liftoff. And then if you notice the P-8 through P-13 are the loads, the struts that
attach the two solid rocket booster motors to the external tank and are indicative of tbe loads
experienced there.
Now, on _nart R-8--
GENERAL KUTYNA: Before you go off that chart, is P-11 about where we think we saw
the flame?
MR. RYAN: It is very close, y_, sir.
(Viewgraph R-8)Ir_'f. :_ zl '_-_l
2287
MR. RYAN: All right. On Chart R-8, on tne first seven flights of the Shuttle, development
flights, we had measured data on some of the struts at the strain gauges, and we measured that
data, and I am comparing the mean of that data and the standard deviation of that data with
the predicted recoqstructed loads for 51-L, and then on the far right column I have the design
loads, the limit loads.
Now, these do not have the safety factors in them. All loads are multiplied by a factor to put
margin in them above this. So that is not in this limit load. And so you bave got the safety
factor above that. So you can see that the 51-L reconstructed loads of the struts are well within
the design loads, and are comparable W, the loads that we l_ave experienced in the first seven
flights.
GENERAL KUTYN _ : Mr. Ryan, you know what I _-:n going to ask you, but if you look at P-
11, that strut I _ast aske_ about, if you look at STS-! through 7, we have got a number of about
70, and on 51-L it is 141.
Would you explain why that is not a concern?
MR. RYAN: Yes, sir, I wou!d be glad to.
On STS-1 through STS-5 and on STS-7, we flew a heavy external tank. That tank had a
marginal condition in the bulkhead region, and because of that we put the
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margin back into it by preloading the struts. In other words, we put the struts in compression so
that when yeu loaded the tank with its cryogenic propellant and it shrunk, then it would make
up that d':_erence and take that load out.
GENERAL KUTYNA: As you look at that load, however, this is in the area of that joint
where possibly it failed.
Would there have been any structural deformations as a result of that load that might have
been a factor?
MR. RYAN: It should not have, sir, with a 306 versus a 141 SR design and then the 1.4
times that. SO that would be a big margin, really.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Thank you.
DR. RIDE: If you compared the 141 with others that we have seen on P-11 using the lighter
weight tank on Flights STS-8 and subsequent, is that in the general ball park of experience?
MR. RYAN: Yes, it is. We have not had measured data, though, Dr. Ride, on these other
flights, and so we have to do it just strictly by analysis.
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2Okay, let me go to Cha_ R-9. please.
(Viewgraph R-9! iR,'t I zl ""i
MR. RYAN: Taking the same loads and the same
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reconstruction of the liftoff motion to the SRB or the solid rocket motor field joints, I have put
on that chart the design loads in terms of an equivalent load, just to keep it fairly simple. All of
the joints are designed to the same load. The forward joint determines that design load, and that
is the --17.2 x l0 s pounds.
Now, as you come down the stack, because of bonding and because of pressure drops and
hoop strains and so forth, that load drops for the aft field joint in M-L--these are the recon-
structed values--the forward field joint would have been --15 x 10 s. If you drop down to the aft,
field joint, the one with the leak, you see a--4.1 x 10 s. So you could conclude, and some people
have concluded, without damage to that joint, then, another joint should have leaked first be-
cause, it should have had a higher load and a slightly higher opening. There is not a large differ-
ence, but there is a difference between the loads in those joints, and the forward joint does have
the highest load.
All joints are designed alike. They are equal and interchangeable.
Now, Chart R-10, please.
(Viewgraph R-10)[m,t. :_ "l _7}
MR. RYAN: Dr. Seofield talked about the reconstruction of the trajectory and the loads
during
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the in-fligat regions, the roll maneuver through the maximum dyn_:aic pressure region. That
reconstruction has not been completed, and we do not have all of :ne loads for thBt reconstruc-
tion. However, to get a feel for what those loads were and what we were dealing with there
relative to what was seen, we took a simulation that was made at a couple of times, the L minus
three and a half hour wind and the L minus zero wind, plus estimations of the loads that oc-
curred due to the gimbal angle excursions that he showed you, and predicted what--and we
think they are very conservative loads--predicted what we will get out this coming week out of
the total loads reconstruction. And you can see compared to the design loads that in the struts
the loads are a good bit lower than the design limit loads.
I have put one load indicator there for the tank. You can see the loads going into the tank
there where the struts go into the tank are substantially lower than the d_ig_ loads. And you
can see that even in the SRM right field joint, that that load is _ubstantially lower than the
expected design load.
So on Chart R-11 then we conclude that the 51-L systems loads, the overall loads of the vehi-
cle were lower than the design limit loads and were essentially within our flight experience.
However, the [Ref, 3 21-6_]
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effects of those load_ on a degraded solid rocket booster aft field joint is in the process of being
And _he next presentation that I am going into, if there are no questions on this, I will talk
about where we are at in that analysis.
DR. COVERT: I have a question or two, Mr. Ryan. As I understand what you have been
talking about, you are dealing with static strength of the structure and static loads of the struc-
ture, is that correct?
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MR. RYAN: I am _ving you the equivalent static design loads, yes, sir. derived from dyn_'_m-
ic and static loads.
DR. COVERT: Is metal fatigue a critical factor in any of the structural design of this sohd
rocket booster case?
MR. RYAN: Well. I don't have the total answer on that. Dr. Coven. We will be glad to give
you a review of that when you come to the task team. It is designed for 20 reuses. It is basically
a pressure vessel, and that is the essential design consideration.
DR. COVERT: If a crack of suitable length existed, is it possible that a case failure could
have existed while the case was, to use General Kutyna's words, driving over that bumpy road?
DR. LITFLES: We have added, Dr. Covert, one
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item that I mentioned earlier on the fault tree associated with case rupture, and we intend to
present the data on that next week to the task force. But relative to your specific question, I
believe the program is set up such that if we had a flaw which would have been driven to a leak-
through type situation with the loads we had on this flight, since they are within design limits,
then we should have screened that out in the proof test that we run on the case.. But we are
accumulating all of those data, and we will specifically address your qu_tion relative to the fa-
tio_ue in closing out that action item.
DR. COVERT: I just want to mentiGn m passing that, if I recall, in October of 1983, a crack
of sufficient size did slip through the inspection, and it was fortunately caught by the proof test-
ing, so that I guess my point is that it is a little premature, I think, to paint this thing toc green.
DR. LITTLES: Well, we are certainly accumulating that data, and we will pursue that.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. RYAN: Are there any other questions on the first part?
DR. WHEELON: Perhaps just to clear my own mind, if i may, to sum up what I think I
heard you say,
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the forces and the bending moments, or the torsion on the SRB was about vormal. There was
nothing unusual in that save the temperature, which is outside your expertise, but there is more
work to be done to translate these forces and moments into the tang-clevis area, is that right?
MR. RYAN: Yes, sir, that is what I am talking about next.
DR. WHEELON: Th_nk you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You mab, proceed.
MR. RYAN: Could I go to Chart R-13, please?
(Viewgraph R-13! [Ref. 3/21-69]
MR. RYAN: The objective ef this analysis that we are conducting both at M_rshall and at
Thiokol is tc reconstruct the 51-L SRM field joint response, in other words, the gap openings
that some of the questions that are being raised here, for all of the events using the mated data,
the natural environments, the induced environments, and the reconstructed 51-L loads.
If you will look at Chart R-14--
(Viewgraph R-14)IR"I :_ 2, ;"1
MR. RYAN:--we feel th_ + we have to start with the mating of the SRM _gments. Where
you actually start with the first segment, mate the second one to it, take all the dimensions and
so forth there, and the
131:;
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loads, etc., that they would e×p_rience and move Lhrough the stacking, the transportation, the
on-pad, and then the other conditions that I have talked m the previous section, which was the
lift -,ff dynamics, the roll maneuver, and the maximum dynamic pressure or the in-flight regime
which really covers all of" the areas that Dr. S¢ofield talked about fr, m approximately 35 seconds
on.
Chart 15 then--
!Viewgraph R-15)lm4 __,1 711
MR. RYAN:--is the approach that we are taking to do that analysis. We are developing
finite element static and dynamic models of the joint, the !ield joint, and the structure arouna it,
carrying enough of the structure out t 3rough the segments to adequately describe what happens
there. We are conducting tests at Thiokol now on joint rotation, and we are tuning these models
such that they match or duplicate the teats that are being run at Thiokol on joint rotation.
We are adding to these models, then, the SRM segr:'lents, the propellant effects, and the
structure, like the ET attach ring _d so forth. Then we _re characterizing the initial joint con-
dition. In other words, every joint that is mated is slightly different
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because of the ovality and so forth between the tang and clevis, and we are in the process of
characterizing those conditions. And then they will be us_ in conjunction with this model and
with this dynamic analysis to say then what was the joint opening on each of the joints, in par-
ticular, the aft field joint of" the right ._olid rocket booster.
Then we will determine then the static and dynamic r_ponse of the gap at the primary and
secondary seal.
Now, Chart R-16 is a chart that kind of summarizes _br you some of the different types of
models that we have.
(Viewgraph R-16)t _,'t :_z, ._'!
MR. RYAN: If you look at the top right hand corner you see the finite eJer..ent model of the
clevis and tang. You see just under it the deformed model. In other words, if I load that w_th
internal pressure or if I load it with a line load or a punch toad, you see that that clevis deflects
in particular, and it deflects away from the tang, creating a gap between the seals and the joint.
Now, down below that is the aft attach ring. That is our model of the aft attach ring that
the struts are attached m, and it is attached to the overall SRM
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segment. Now, the picture on the left hand side of the chart shows all of that put together with
a one-diameter length of our model of the segment fore and aft of that aft field joint.
Okay, now, taking that model and taking all of the forces that were recreated or recon-
structed in the liftoff loads ar_alysis that I talked in the first session and Dr. Scofield talked in
the liftoff sequence, took all of those and got out of that tracted out of that the forcing func-
tions, including the internal pressure _ of the SRM, an,, all of the loads that would go into
that section of the solid, the inertial loads, the point loads going from the struts, etc., we recon-
structed that and drove that model. And on Chart 17--
(Viewgra_h R-17)I m'l :_ 21 7:_I
MR. RY_N:--I show you a maximum and minimum response during the short period of
time when the SRM pressure is coming up, and all that dynamic load that I showed you earlier
is going on.
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Now,the maineffectthat youseehereis theeffectof the pre,_urebul_,ngandstretching
the SR_. andyou_ that gapopeningthat is givenin mnsthere Youseethat gapopening.
andyouseeit occurringvery.fastdueto that pre,:_ure.Asthat
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pressurebuildsup in the solid,thethrust comesup, it opens,andit opensveryfast,andyoucan
seetherethat it is overonly about600milliseconds.Thenyouseein addition,andit is not as
cleanasit lookedon that MY a whileago,but youseein additionthethree-hertzoscillationin
that gapopening,althoughit is a verysmallopening,plusor minusa mil anda half or so.you
doseethat openingtaking place,openingandclosingof that gap.It is not really openingand
closing.It is opening.It isjust adeltaopeningandclosingrelativeto theopenposition.
GENERALKUTYNA:Now,Mr. Ryan,this isa pretty importantchart.Whatit saysis that
gapopensasmuchas.025to .030assoonas 'oulight cff -hat SRB.
MR. RYAN: As soon as I reach maximum pressure, yes.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And what you are telling me is if we had a metal-to-metal contact in
the area of that seal, we could open that gap as much as .025 to .030, and the seal would have to
follow that opening very quickly, within a half a second, to remain in contact with the other
piece of metal.
MR. RYAN: Yes, sir.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And the second thing you are
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telling me is that 3-hertz opening or vibration of that gap, possibly, or at le_t does not dispute
the data that says the smoke was puffing a_ about three cycles per second.
MR. RYAN: That's right, it doesn't dispute it. It doesn't fit it necessarily, but doesn't dis-
pute it. That's a very small opening and closing, but it does happen.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Ryan, one other minor point here. My memo_' is not very good. so please
refresh it. This 25-mil change corresponds to wl-,__t change in the percent of squeezing on the O-
ring between the static condition and in the as-deflect_l?
DR. LITFLES: I believe about a .040 is a squeeze of somewhere arovnd 12 percent, I believe.
I think that is correct. So ,_ e are reducing it by whatever fraction that is
DR. COVERT: And the 25 would take it down around 7 percent?
DR. LITTLES: Yes.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
DR. WHEELON: C_uld I just editorialize on this data for a moment and perhaps say the
obvious a second time?
We have this rapid expansion of .025 probably
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in this clevis "ang area, and we are counting on the seal to follow it, which is to say, expand and
take up that ¢_ Werenee, and it is true that cold seals expand more slowly or have more difficulty
in doing that aaaptin_ than warm seals do.
MR. RYAN: There _re two things that cause a seal to seal, tho_gh. One of them is the fact
that the aerodynamic p_essure around that gap is more on the inside than it is on the outside,
which drives the seal out also. So you are not depending just on resiliency to get the seal out
into the gap to seal. So you have to put the two effects together, sir.
The next chart, let me go to R-19.
(Viewgraph R-i9) [Ref. 3i21-74]
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MR RYAN:R-19is just a static analysiswherewecanput a little moredetail in than we
can in a dynamic analysis, but we can't show the dynamics, of the same pressure rise buildup
rate. and it shows essentially the same thing that I showed, previo_ 'v, but without the dynam-
ics.
Nov,, we are continuing this analysis. We have not run it for the Max Q region, the roll
maneuver and th _se kind of things that you saw. and that is in process. When we get the recon-
struction of the loads, we will be doing the same thing. We are also
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continually trying to refine this model and to try to predict more accurately last how these gaps
and seals behave.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Ryan, I think this is part of the answer to the question that I asked ye_
earlier about the rise time in the longitude. This looks--I realize the motions are small, but
looks like a fairly rapid change in position.
Is there an impact load as this thing seats at the other side of that motion?
Now, remember, these pins awe--you can sort of put them in with your thumbs, so there is a
certain amount of slack in the system, and I am sure you have been on a Pullman in the middle
of the night when they have stopped and started suddenly.
MR. RYAN: Yes, sir, this is a nonlinear problem, obviously, and you are talking about a
verb" difficult analysis. The results I presented to you today was a linear analysis that didn't
take into account those contacts. That is vet2," complex and very time consuming for us to step
through iteratively to do that. We are looking at that. In the particular data I showed you there
they did not contact. But there are conditions where they will contact, and that does give you a
bouncing and a twanging motion, and as I say. we
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are looking, and we know we can do some of that type of analysis. But it is ve_" complex.
DR. COVERT: Is there any evidence when you examine the holes in either the clevis or the
tang where these big pins go through that there is permanent set of the order of maybe .003 to
.005, that sort of thing? Do tho hoi_ stop being round and become sort of elongated?
MR. RYAN: I can't answer that, sir. Maybe Dr. Littles can. I haven't been involved in that
side of it_
DR. LITTLES: I can't answer that specifically. I am not aware of that, but I would have to
check on that.
DR. COVERT: Would you get that for me?
DR. LITTLES: Yes, I would.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. RYAN: That concludes my discussion, Mr. Chairmen.
DR. LITrLES: Mr. Chairman, we need to change speakers at this point.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I assume that all the tests you are conducting are for the purpose of
assisting the Commission and NASA, too, in deciding the cause of the accident. Are you also
going to use that material, or are you thinking about it in connection with redesigning
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the seal?
MR. RYAN: Yes, sir.
DR. LITTLES: We will certainly u_ anything that come out of those tests or the analysis
which indicates any problem with that joint, in the redesign, certainly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But it is primarily to determine _he cause of the accident?
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DR.LITTLES:At this point in time, yes,sir, thesetestsandanalysesare to determinethe
causeof theaccident.
CHAIRMANROGFRS:Aren't testsbeingrun to think aboutredesigningthejoint?
DR.LITTLES:Weatecertainlylookingat tbingsthat wouldbenecessaryto changeir that
joint to resolvethe kind of thingsthat mayhavegonewrong,and w, are lookingat that. yes,
Sill
MR. RYAN: There are analyses being conducted now, parametrically, to determine some of
that at Marshal and Thiokol, too.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you have separate teams doing that?
DR. LI'I_LES: Yes, sir. It is different people. It is not the people who are involved in the
investigation, although they are aware of what we are
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doing and we are keeping them up to speed, but it is a different group of people.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
DR. WHEELON: Mr. Chairman, I was going to hold this question until later, but I sense we
are about ready to lose the right people from the witness stand, so perhaps I could flash back.
Could I invite your attention, Dr. Littles, to W-10? This was the top view of the Shuttle and
the orbit _r, and it shows the camera obscuration I thir k in a very skillful way it localizes the
rotation around the SRB, the position of the probable leak that caused the black smoke at take-
off, and incidentally precludes the possibility ti a, it was the check port doing the leaking.
(Viewgraph W-10) [Ref. 3:21-40]
DR. WHEELON: Now, this addresses two of the three dimensions, namely, where around
the azimuth is the leak likely to take place by camera elimination. Have you thought about the
vertical, the other dimension, where along the length of the SRB was the smoke coming from?
How consistent is that with the up and down location of the field joint? And incidentally, if
there were a leak in the clevis-tang combination, it seems to me the smoke would be shooting
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up relative to the stack. And that is in fact what it does. So you are trying to put together the
other dimension of the three dimensions of this leak, potential leak location puzzle?
DR. LI'I_FLES: Yes, sir, we have tried to do that, and as you know, the smoke, when you first
see it in the film, is not at the location of the leak check port. It is some distance up. And it is
apparently coming from the hidden location, and what we have tried to do, we have done an
t_nalysis looking at a jet that would emanate from an opening of the dimensions we have in the
tang clevis, and using as parameters the pressures that you have in there, and all of those varia-
bles, to try to establish at what point in time we might have had to have that leak coming from
the joint area to see the smoke at the vertical locations at a given time. And the bottom line of
all of that analysis is there are so many variables in it that, depending upon what assumptions
you make within the bounds of those that are reasonable, that you can get that time to be any-
where within, where it might first come out, within 5,,'}nfilliseconds of when you first see it or as
far back as 400 or 450 milliseconds. And so that shows you something about what kind of--actu-
ally, you can predict the vertical location as well, because those would be
2305
substantially tied together.
There are just so many variables involved in that problem that you just can't tie it down
very well. But we have tried to do that.
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1DR. WHEELON: But simplifying all of those variables in that ve_" complicated problem,
simplifying it just a bit. isn't it likely tha* if the leak were occurring in the shaded area, that is
to say, the obscured area, and if the flow was going vertically_ because that after all is the way
the opening ;n the tang-clevis combination is, that you would first see on any one of these cam-
eras the puff of smoke above the opening? It would have shot out of sight vertically and then
come into view only as it expanded and expanded out'?
Would you agree that that is still consistent with the idea the smoke was coming from the
O-ring?
DR. LITTLES: Very much so, yes, sir. We feel it does come ,"-om the joint, yes, sir.
DR. WHEELON: What was the significance of your remark_ about the timing, the delay?
DR. LITTLES: What we were trying to establish was when in the timeframe of the ignition
sequence that the leak occurred. It would be of interest to know wnether it is close to the maxi-
mum pressure time or
2306
whether it is back down during the early phases of the ignition transient, and that relates to one
of the scenarios we are working, which is Scenario 5, which deals with putty holding the pres-
sure off the O-rings, the joint rotating, and then a lack of resiliency and the gas blowing through
the putty and by the O-rings, So chat is the area of interest there in Scenario 6.
DR WHEELON: But before, again, you get away, isn:t it clear that these optical observa-
tions of the black smoke near liftoff and the flas:,-es later on come from about the same angular
azimuthal are_, on the t_nk and the same vertica] or linear dimension, and doesn't the web of
evidence seem to be closing in on the location of whatever has happened, or do you wan_ to
reserve on that?
DR. LITTLES: I think the location of what is happening, we are narrowing it down veD"
well.
DR. WHEELON: That's my sense, you've really got it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I thine there is no objection, we will take a recess for lunch and
-esume after lunch.
Why don't we say 1:45, and Dr. Littles will not get away.
IWhereupon, at 1:00 oclock p.m.. the
2307
Commission recessed, to reconvene at 1:45 o'clock p.m. this same dayA
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INVESTIGATION APPROACH
0 REVIEWED ALL STS SI-L DATA
0 REVIEkED CHALLENGER EXTERNAL TANK HISTORY
- ALL BUILD PAPER
- ALL X-RAYS
0 EVALUATED POTENTIAL ANOROLIES ON FAULT TREE
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|FAULT TREE EVALUATION
STRUCTURAl. FLAg
FAILURE BECHANISM
0 FAILURE Of EXTERNAL TANK DUE TO STRUCTURAL FLAg OF CRITICAL SIZE
_S._ENT
0 BUILD PAPER AND X-RAYS RE-REVIEMED--NO INAPPROPRIATE DISPOSITIONS FOUND
0 X-RAY RE-REVIEg DID IDENTIFY A Ooq" INTERNAL FLAW IN A MELD LOCATED ON THE
-Z AXIS IN A 2058 RING FRAME ME[O
o ANALYSIS SHOMS FLAg DOES NOT DEGRADE STRUCTURE BELOW REQUIRED SAFETY
FACTORS
o RECOVERED HARDNARE INCLUDES THIS FLAg, NO EVIDENCE OF FLAW PROPAGATION
0 NO INDICATION OF LEAKAGE DURING PRE-PRESS AND ASCENT PHASES UNTIL AFTER 6G
SECONDS
0 IBPROBABLE THAT STRUCTURAL FLAg INITIATED THE FAILU_ OF THE EXTERNAL TANK
w-6 [Ref. :3'21-35]
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FAULT TREE EVALUATION
STRUCTURALOVERLOAD
FAILUREMECHANISM
0 STRUCTURALOVERLOADINITIATES FAILURE
FINDING
0
LIFTOFF AND FLIGHT LOADS MERE WITHIN DESIGN LIMITS (80 PERCENT MAXIMUM)
ULLAGE PRESSURE gAS MAINTAINED WITHIN LIMITS
STS 51% FLIGHT DATA INDICATES NOMINAL TRAJECTORY PRIOR TO OBSERVED ANOMALY
- NO EXCESSIVE HEATING TO DEGRADE SIRLICTURAL CAPABILITY
ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM LOSS (TPS) gOULD NOT
HAVE RESULTED IN OVERHEATING
IMPROBABLE THAT STRUCTURAL OVERLOAD FROM FLIGHT LOADS, EXCESSIVE ULLAGE
PRESSURE OR EXCESSIVE HEATING INITIATED THE FAILURE
w-7 [Ref. :; 21-36]
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sFAULT TREE EVALUATIOt4
PEF../4ATUEELINEAR SHAPEDCHARGE(LSC) DETONATIOM
FAILURE MECHANISM
0 PRE.HATUREDETONATIOnOF LSC INITIATES TANK FAILURE
0 NOT CONSISTENTWITH INITIAL "S/'iOKE" LT 0.68 SEC. OR OTHEREVENTSFROM
0
E]llP_U_
0
FILM AND FLIGHT DATA
PORTIONSOF LO2 ANDLH2 TANKLSC WERERECOVERED[gTACT
PRF_RATUREDETONATIONOF LSC NOT INVOLVEDIN FAILURE
• I II
FAULT TREE _ [T_J___N
DAMAGE TO EXTERNAL TANK AT LIFTOFF
FAiLUREMECHAN lSM
0 DAMAGE TO TANK CAUSES H2 LE_K
ASSESSM___IT
0
[Ref. ;121-;|7 ! of 2]
J
ICE TEAM SAW NO EVIDENCE OF IEAK AT FINAL VISIT TO PAD PRIOR TO LAUNCH
(T-20 MINUTES)
POTENTIAL FOR DEBRIS DAMAGE
- NO EVIDENCE OF DEBRIS DAMAGE FROM FILM
- SPRINGS MISSING FROM HOLDDOWN POST COVERS
o KSC ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT _PRINGS COULD NOT BE REI.EASEDPRIOR
TO 0.8 SECOND DUE TO PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS
o NO_ CONSISTENT WITH "SMOKE" AT 0.68 SECOND
{Ref. ;] 21-:]7 2 of 21
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D
D
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DAiqAGE TO EXTERNAL _ANK AT LIFTOFF (CONI__D_
- AREA OF CONCERN IS OPPOSITE FSS WHERE ICE WAS PRESENT
- ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT ENERGY ASSO£1ATED WITH ICE IMPINGEMENT ON
TAME NO[ 91FFICIENT TO CAUSE STRUCTURAL DARA_oE
- TESTS INDICATE THAT LEAK OF 0.00_7 LBR/SEC. WOULD BE DETECTABLE
- TEST IRPINGIRG BURNING H2 JET ON IWSTAFOA/q INgICATE SIGNIFICANT
OUAITITIES OF FLARE AND SMOKE
0 EVALUATION OF BURNING H2 JET IRPIN_ING ON SRR RERBRANE OR JOINT
ENVIRONRENT GENERATED ASSUMING STOICHERETR!C MIXTURE OF H2 AND AIR
RAXIRUR SRM TERPERATURES WITH JET IRPINGEREN,
o GSO°F MERBRANE
o 360aF O-RING
TESTS INOICATE THAT O-RING WILL RAINTA[N SEAL AT 1000°F
W-11
iRef. :_121-41]
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%-.
_,._I_)_/_._,L TANK AT LIFTOFI: (£ONi"D)_
0 I_ EVII_N(t THAT DHqAC_ TO EXTERNAL TANK INITIATED A LEAK 09 THAT A
LEAK kIITHIN THE [._ETECTAIg.E LIIqlTS OF TANK INStRU_NTATION WO4JLD
INITIATE THE OBSERVED SRM FAILURE
I III
OVERHEATII_G EXTERNAL TANK FR(ffq SRM HOT GAS LEAK
W--17
FAILURE MECHAII]S/q
0 HOT GAS LEAK FROM SRM IFIPINGES _q EXTERNAL TANK AND INITIATES TA_ FA|I,URE
SRR i_CT GAS LEAK EVIDENT FROM FLIGHT FILM AT 5,8.7 SECONDS
/UI_YSIS HAS ESTABLISHED THAT RESULTING HEATING RATES kqOULDBURN TH_OLi,_I
TANK BETI_r.EN T|I_ OF VISIBLE _.EAI( AND INI)ICATION OF TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE
DECREASED RISE RATE (_.7 e,_CONJ)_)
PRO_ABLE THAT SRM HOT GAS LEAK INITIATED TANK FAILURE
[Ref. 3 21-42]
F W-18 [Ref. 3/21-43]
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LE/M( CHECK POeT
(SR01(E AT LIFTOFF)
• U_CH 21, !986
H-127
W. LITTLES
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P_ .,_,NG ANO J ]
SMOKc - FROM PORT ]PLUG LOOSE AND
SMOKE FROM PORT
ALLOWING SECONDARY
O--RING BURNTHROUGH : :
(_1 "-"
JOINT LEAK
• NOTHIh,.; VISIBLE FROM PORT LOCATION
• NOT CONSISTENT WITH OBSERVED SMOKE
• DOESN'T ALLOW SMOKE IN OBS[ RVED
LOCATION UNTIL > 1,33 SEC
@ SHOULD GET ,._&OK E FROM TWO
LOCATIONS
@ NOTHING VISIBLE FROM PORT LOCATION
• C¢_NSISTENT WITH OBSERVED UPWARD
VELC._-ITY OF S&IK)KE
• CONSIS rENT WITH VOLUME OF SMOKE
CLOUD
CODE E] IMPROBABLE
EI PROBABLE
W-20 [Ref. 3'21-44 2 of ?]
_H-212 EARERA LOCM iUN
E65
E52
D67
VIEW
C)IR
sL
5Oo
VIEW FROM ABOVE
ORBITER
_ _ _. ,.. \\\\\\\\\\\\ \\ ATTACH RiNG
AN_) ,_IE LO_
_,_,_,T_
/ \// t / /,
PROUABLE
LEAK
OFtlGtPI _6,,,i '
\
\
\
"\ F S S
>\
f(
W-21 [Ref :_l21 45]
I.I-lO2
rl o
f
EAHERA E-63
m ".,.- --
SMOKE PLilME
EMANATE
FROM THIS
LOCATION iF
LEAK CHECK
PORT WAS
LEAKING
/
/ \
W-22
[Ref. :1 21-46]
1335
e . •
.%
pROBABLE LOCATION OF SMOKE
SROKE eLAINLY VISIBLE AT MET = ,678 SEC.
SROKE SOORCE NOT VISIBLE
0 FILM EVALUATION INDICATES THAT SMOKE PROBABLY GRIGINATES _TWEEN 2700 AND 3100
PROBABLE T_7 SMOKE ORIGINATED AT SR_ AFT FIELD JOiKT
W-23 [Ref. 3/21-47]
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TRAJECTORY AIID FLIGItT DYNAMICS RECONSTRUCTION
RMCH 21, 1986
HAROLD SCOFIELD
s-o
[Ref. 3/21-4_ 1 of 3]
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PROPULSION SYSTEM PERFO_MNK, E
i
0 MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM PERFORMNICE WAS RECONSTRUCTED
o PRO#ELLANT LOADS AT l'lAli4 ENGINE START C(N'U_AAD
o THRUSTS _D FLOW RATE DURING FLIGHT
0 SRM PERFI)R#qN_.E WAS RECONSTRUCTE_
0 iNTERNAl. PRESSURES, FLOW RATES, AND THRUST DURING FLIC._ii
0 SRM LF_ WAS MODELED
o HOIE SIIE C:IOSEN TO MATCH PRESSURE DRC_° iN RIGHT SRM
o IHRUSI Of _ ESTIMAIED
0 ALL DAIA SUPPLIED TO JSC AND OTHER MSF,' T_
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M
RIGHT SRM INTERNAl_
PRESSURE
_51-L RIGHT SRM MEASURED
DATA
-----MEAN OF FLIGHT EXPERIENCE
ADJUS1 ED TO EI-L CONDITIONS
...... EXPECTED LIMITS
"_ -, \ L..._I;._
0 . | le 24 32 40 411
TIME IN SECONDS
54 64 72
5,-3
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TRAJECTO(_YAND FLIGHT DYNAMICS RECONSTRUCTION
0 PROPULSION SYSTEMSPERFORMAN(-
0 LIFTOfF DYNAMICS
0 ATMOSPHERLC ENV[RONI'_HT/UiD/LERODYNA/'_LU
IRA.J_CiORYAND FLIGHT PROFILE
0 FL. dIT DYNAML_,$
|
-o
0 ,S_Y
FLIGHT n[COHSTRUCTIOW
..-.
I,-,,,,I l __ j
I J I _., I
l SPEClnL STnOCTBilnL I _ I mt i
i I STaUCTUn_
| _._ a RESPOIISE
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LIFTOfF DYNA/4ICS
0 LiFTOI:F DYIIJ4RIC,S _...RE SIMULATED
o THREED[MENS[ON/_LTRANStATIONAND_OTAT[ON WITH FLEXIBLE BODY
] NCO_PORATED
o INITIAL CONDITIONSFROMLIFTOFF CHOSENTO MATC.HFLIGHT RECORDS
0 MAT-'-IWAS OBTAINED tiSigG VALUES WITHIN NOMINAL RANGE
o EXPECTED VARIATIONS IN SSME THRUST RISE
o EXPECTED VARIATIONS IN SRH IGNITION TIMING
o GRO(JNDWINDS
0 SRH GIRBALLING ACTIVITY FOR SI-L WAS COMPARED WITH STS-B
o STS-G USED CHALLENGERCARRYING SAI'_ PAYLOAD
o PtOTS ARE SIMILAR
0 LIFTOfF FILMS WERE EVALUATED
o NO COLLISION WITH GROUND STRUCTURE OCCURRED
0
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ATMOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENT AND AERODYNAMICS
AT/_)SPHERICENVIRONMENTWASRECONSTRUCTED
O WINDS, TEMFff_RATURES,AND PRESSUREALOFT
o GROUNDWINDS
O GROUNDT_RATURES AND RAINFALL HISTORIES
PLUMEOF SRI4_ WASI'W}DELEDFROMPHOTOCOVE._&GE
o L_ LOCATIONIS SHOWNIN ACCOI_°ANY[NGVISUAL /4ATERIAL
AERODYIIAgIC ilICREMENTSDUETO PLUMEWEREESTIRATED
o P,JLXIRURAERO FORCE ABOUT 130,OtW}POUNDS AS OPPOSED TO ONLY ABOUT 30,000
POUNDSDUETO THRUSTOf LEAK
DATAPROVIDEDTO JSC AND MSFC TEAMS
[Ref 3 21-50]
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H--2)_, _R_ LEAK NODEL
SRM LEAK MODEL
F
AFT vIEW
S_RM LEAK MODEL
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VIEW BY CAMERA E 2,'07
AT 60.6 SECONDS
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00
TRAJECTORYANDFLIGHT PROFILE RECONSTRUCTION
TIMELINE AND TRAJECTORYWEREDETERMINEDUSING RECONSTRUCTED
0 WINDS ALOFT
o PROPULSiON
o SRM LEAK WITH AERODYNAMIC INCREMENTS
EXCELLENT TIMELIEE AGREE/IENTHAS BEEN OBTAINED WITH:
o MSFC PHOTO ACTIVITY
o JSC PHOTO AND TIMF_I_INEACTIV'TIES
RECONSTRUCTED TRAJECTORY WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPARED WITH JSC BEST ESTIHATED
TRAJECTORY
o BEST E_TIRATF_/)TRAJECTORY IS ,_ASEDON RADAR AND OTHER INSTRUMENTATION
o RECONSTRUCTED TRAJECTORY COMES FROM SIMULATION OF THE VEHICLE IN ITS
ENV! RONMENT
, v I I I I
FLIGHT DYNAMICS RECONSTRUCTION
FLIGHT DYNMICS WERERECONSTRUCTED
0 EMPHASIS BETWEEN50 AND 72 SECONDS
o MATCHWASSUCCESSFUL
o DATA ACTS AS A CHECK ON SRM LEAK MODEL
DATA WAS MEEBED IN LOADS ANALYSES
o ALL PARAI,ETERS ARE WITHIN PREDICTED ENVELOPES
o ALL PARAMETERS AidEWITHIN FLIGHT EXPERIENCE UP TO 65 SECONDS
PEAK SRM GIMEAL ANGLES WERE WITHIN FLIGHT EXPE&IENCE BUT TOTAL ANGULAR
TRAVELWAS gOT
o TOTAL GIMBN. TRAVEL (DUTY CYCLE) WAS 132 DEGREES
o FOUR PREVIOUS FLIGHTS HAD DUTY CYCLES BETWEEN 120 AND 125 DEGREES
[Ref. 3 21-53 2 of 2]
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_-121 51-t. LEFT SRB ACTUATOREXTENSION
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_Y OF FINDINGS
PROPULSION PERFORPAJICE WAS WITHIN PREDICTED LIMITS UNTIL &9 SECONDS
o
0
o
RIGHT SRfl PRESS4JRE19[GdkNANOt_ALY AT _0 SECONDS
NINllqUM PREVIOUSLY Oi_IER'Q[D PRESSURE MAS EXCEEDED AT 59 SECONDS
SAM HOLE OPENE.D AT 64) SECONDS AND 5REH TO q5 S_UARE INCHES
MEASURED _INDS ALOFT, PROPULSION RECO,'_STRUCTION AND AERO INCREMENTS BASEb OR
OBSERVED SRR LEAK PLUME EPaP_._J_t:
TRAJECTORY RECONSTRUCTION PATCHING BEST ESTIMATED TRAJECTORY
DYNAMICS SIMULATION PATCHING FLIGHT DATA
CONTROL SYSTF_J4i,K)RKF_DPROPERLY UNTIL 72 SECONDS
PARAJ_TERS MERE WITHIN LIMITS FROM PREFLIGHT SIRULAT|ON
PARAMETERS MERE MITH|N FLIGHT EXPERIENCE _EFORE GS SECONDS
SRH Glle_AL ANGLE DUTY CYCLE gAS LARGE DUE TO MINDS ALOFT
s-13
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OOJECTIV£S
0 DETERIIIIEELOk_ F..X,_RIEilCEb BY S1-L FOR ALL FLIEHT EVENIS
COf_/U_E TOEXPECTEDAND DESIGJILOADSAND DETERI41NEIF EXCESSIVE0t,1 UNUSUAL.
LOADSEXISTED
0 DETERMINEFOeu_G FUECTiOflS FORS,PECIA_ DYIIAJqIc ANALYSIS
R-1
[Rpf. ";I "21-58 "2 of 2,]
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FLIGHT EVEETS
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LIFTOFF TRANSIENT (SRB IGNITION THRU 10 SECONDS)
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LIF[OFF FIL_ EVFLUATIO_
0 51-L WAS CO_qP/LREDWITH 41-D
0 SRB TIP DEFLECTION24" (SI-L): 28" (=ll-D)
FREOgEIICYWAS APPROXIIIATELY0.25 HZ FOR BOTH VEHICLES
o 25 HZ MODE AT APPROXI_TELY GO0 PSIA - THRUST WALLOWS AROUND IN NOZZLE
o _ HZ MODE AT APPROXIMATELY 1200 PSIA - NOZZIF FILLS P,ACH CONE
(VISIBLE)
0 LIFTOfF CI.F_.ARAJI£ENE__ARNO_qlNAJ..
R-4
[Ref. 321-61]
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SPACE SHUTTLE L]FTOFF
i!
AFT flllP JOINT
LIlt'IT lOiO: Z48XIOI6 IN LU5
51-L 20BXlO/6 IM LB5
II
S1-L MEASURED DATA
R-5
[l{ef.:) _1-62]
..lJ_LI_DOWII_T
0 POST DESIGNED BY S_ BlJlLDUP
0 POST HAD STRAIN GAUGES ON EACH
0 DATA VALID UNTIL SRI_RELEASE
0 BASE _T: DESIGN VALUE 3(17.000,000IN-LBS. 51-L RIGHT SRB 291,000,000
IN-L_S.
0 NO INDIVIDOAL PO51 LOAD EXCEEDEDLIMIT LOAD
0 ROMENTAT SRBAFT FIELD JOINT (lq91)
o DESIGN 2qO,O00,O00 IN-LBS.
0 51-L 208,000,000 IN-LBS. (RI RE£ONSI"RUETiON_
0 SRB RELEASE AT EACH POST WAS ESSENTIALLY SIMULTANEOUS
GIRBAL ANGLES S&ALL. INDIC,a.TINGNEAR NORMAL LIFTOFF DYNAMICSi ° R-6 [Ref. 3 21-63]
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SHUTTLE STRUT i_ _T IF ICAT IOl_l
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H-203 LIFIOFF 14T_.ASURED SIRUT LOADS VERSUS 51-L CALCULATED
STRUCTURAL
ELEMENT
STS,--1 _ 7 51-L
MEAN (KIPS) SIGMA (KIPS) (KIPS)
P1
P2
P3
P4
I)5
1=6
P7
P8
ixj
P10
Pll
P12
P13
, ET/ORB
, ET/SRB
-51 2.6 -48
--46 3.1 -60
163 7.8 92
163 7.4 111
-541 11.5 -471
-530 13.0 -532
8.2 2.0 13
-77 13 -139
138 10 138
-116 20 -108
-61 27 -141
125 10 140
-118 27 -94
LIMIT
LOAD
(KIPS)
-131
-131
484
481
---834
-834
177
-306
393
-306
-306
393
-306
[Ref. 3 21-65]
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(X
t MID ft[LP JOINT ]
LIMIT LOAD:- 17.2X1016 tOS!
SI-L -145X _'ll6LB$ I
AfT FIfLD JOINT i
LIMIT LOAD:-17.ZXIOI6 LOS I
51-L: -141X1016 LOS ]
[Ref. 3 21-66]
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STRUCTURAL ELEM
P3
P4
1=5 AFT ET/ORB
P7
1>8
P9
p ,
SRB/ET
Pll
P12
P13
ET BARREL
3-40
SRB FIELD JOINT 1491
EQUIV. LOAD
MAX "Q" RESULTS
LIMIT LOAD VALUE
484, _334
481, --481
168, -834
i68,-834
177, -173
10,000.000 LOAD IND.
- 17.200.000 LBS
51-L (ESTIMATEDI
210
225
-415
--416
20, -20
113
190
-160
92
95
z 60
6.000,000
- 10,800.000 LBS
R-tO
iRef. 3/21-671
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0 STS 51-L _.OA_DSWERE LOWER THAN DESI_I LIMIT LOADS
EFFECTS OF STS 51-L LOADS ON DEGRADED RIGHT SOLID ROC._ET 800$TER AFT FIELD JOINT
BEi_ ASSESSED
R-11
[Ref, 3'21-68]
1356
S1-L SRR FIELD JOINT _ALYSIS
/_,RCH 21, !986
R. RYAN
R-12
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AF'rERNOON SESSION
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Will the Commission come to order, please?
DR. LIT'I'LES: Mr. Chairman, we will now go into the final three topics. The first one will
be a short review of an O-ring analysis model. This model has been in existence for some long
period of time. We are using it in this investigation, and Garry Lyles will tell the Commission
wb'_t the pedigree _)f that model is and how it has been verified, and then Rick Bachtel will go
into the work that has been going on relative to the joint thermal flow analysis. Primary empha-
sis of this analysis is trying to establish whether we could have had a continuous link from the
time we first saw the puff of smoke until 58 or 59 seconds.
!Witnesses sworn.
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TESTIMONY OF GARRY M. LYLES, PROPULSION ANALYSIS BRANCH, STtCUCTCRES
AND PROPULSION LABORATORY. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, AND
FREDERICK D. BACHTEL, THERMAL ENGINEERING BRANCH, STRUCTURES AND
PROPULSION LABORATORY, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
MR. LYLES: My name is Garry Lyles. I have been an employee of Marshall Space Flight
Center for ten years in the area of propulsio_ systems analysis, propulsion ar.alysis, dealing in
the area of internal flow dynamics, and as Yh-. Littles stated, I will present the analytical model-
ing that has been done to predict O-ring erosion and the model's application as a tool to evaluate
possible 51L O-ring failure mechanisms.
Could I have Chart L-i, please?
CViewgraph L-I._ IR_l :_21-7_1
MR. LYLES: As an introduction to the O-ring erosion scenario and the two types of O-ring
erosion that we have modeled and can cause erosion of the O-rings, what I would like to do is
talk from the picture, and I would like to zoom in, if I could, on the area of the putty and the O-
rings just a little bit. The hot gas enters the cavity between the putty and the primary O-ring
through a path in the putty, this path that we have been calling a blow hole.
2310
The blow holes range in sLze. The:y are nominally one-inch width and flow between the insu-
lation to the primary O-ring, and this causes impingement of a hot gas jet on the O-ring, and
fi_is impingement erosion continues until the cavity in front of the primary O-ring equals motor
pressure, and this occurs during the pressurization transient of the SRB or the solid rocket
motor. [Ref. 3'21-76]
1364
-.'T
_°_
°-
That is the impingement eroeion, and that scenario assumes that the primar. O-ring seals
The other type of e. osion that we have modele_ is the erosion which could '_cur f the primary
O-ring does not _al, and in fact we ge_ leakage by the primary O-ring. In this ca_e, we predict
what ._e cah blow-by erosion of the prima_ ° O-ring The hot gas then continues on into the
cavity between the primary aod secondary O-rings, pressurizing that cavity until the two cav-
ities equalize, and we also predict impinging erosion on the .seconda_" O-ring
Could I have Chart L-4. please'?
IViewgraph L-4/ IR,.t __'l 77!
MR. LYLES: Chart I,-4 is a description of the analysis and the modeling that we have done
m this analysis. The first part of the analysis is a cavity pressurization model which we have
modeled as a simple
2311
lumped-parameter cavity pressurization model in which we solved the conservation of ma_ and
energy equations by numerical integration.
The model includes the solid r_cket motor pressurization transient which is a function of
time, of course. It models the change in volume of the seal cavities as the seal rotates or the
tang and interleg of the clevis move apart. It also models the heat transfer from the gas to the
metal parts and predicts a cavity pressure and temperature which predicts ho_ long a gas jet
can flow into the cavity, and how long it can impinge on the primary O-ring.
We also have an impingnng heat transfer model or an erosion model of the O-ring based on
impinging heat transfer coefficients in which, again, the hot cast jet pressurizes the O-ring
cavity, impinges on the primary O-ring, and we erode the O-ring by stagnation point heat trans-
fer.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If I may ask you a question, is this sort of a general study of the O-
rings, or is this trying to simulate what happened in the accident, or what?
MR. LYLES. This analysis originated about a year ago, and it originated because we were
getting some erosion of the O-rings, and we wanted to study that and
2312
determine if we could the cause and try to--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, this has been a study that has been going on for a
year?
MR. LYLES: Yes, sir, and it started about a year ago, and it was presented ia, I think, July
of last summer.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And why was itstarted?
MR. LYLES: It was started because flightdata on disassembly indicau_l that we were get-
ting some erosion on the primary O-ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which flightcaused you the most concern or gave riseto the study?
MR. LYLES: Well, itwas--I think itwas just the general fact that we were getting erosion.
Iam not sure it_as a specificflight.We did--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, what prompted it? There must have been something that
prompted it.
MR. LYLES: Well, I think at the time the model was first created, we were getting erosion,
we started getting erosion in the field joint, and we had seen some erosion in the nozzle joint,
and those data poims indicated to us that an analysis needed to be performed to determine the
cause of this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How large a group worked on this?
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MR LYLES: This was originated Ly Dr Salita at Mortor, Thlokol, and he developed the
model. We then, after the model was presented to us, we brought the model in-house and atldit -
eel the model, and have exercised the model, and have made some modifications ourselves to it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who worked on that project?
MR. LYLES: Well, Dr. Salita at Morton Thiokol worked on it. Out of my group I have
worked on it. And a couple of engineers in my group have run the model.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did it have a namE: Did you have a name for the group that worked
on it?
MR. LYLES: Yes, sir. The engineers in my group were Sam Lowry and we've got another
young engineer, John Hurt, who worked on the model, and we are the ones.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were any of you involved in the telecon the night before the 51L
launch?
MR. LYLES: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGEI_q: Were any of you asked to give information about the work you had
been doing for that gru,:p on the telecon?
MR. LYLES: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS Do you have a report of the work that you have beam doing on that
joint, anything in writing that your group has produced?
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MR. LYLES: Dr. Salita hes published two reports on the work that has been done.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When were those reports made _
MR. LYLES: I think Part 1 of the report was issued in July of last summer. The second
report, I believe it was the following month.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did they point out in those reports--are you familiar with the re-
ports?
MR. LYLES: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did they point out that thvre was mncern about the O-rings and
what had happened previously?
MR. LYLES: The reports were mo6tly a techmcal writeup on the modeling work itself. Part
2 showed a parametric analysis, and compared that analysis to the flight data. It also gave _me
analysis looking at what the _imit cases could be on O-ring erosion, and it indicated that you
could predict the type of erosion that we saw in flight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were those reports given wide circulation, or werp they closely held?
MR. LYLES: I am sorry, I can't answer that. I got a copy. And there are several copies
around my office. I assume it got wide circulation.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was it fairly well known as far as you kncw at Marshall that these
studies were being conducted?
MR. LYLES: Yes, sir, I think that analysis had been presented a couple of times.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And I assume the same thing was true, obviously, in Thiokol too?
MR. LYLES: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, go M_ead. Thank you.
MR. LYLES: Could I have Chart L-5, please?
(Viewgraph L-5.) I_,,_ :_'l-TN
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MR. LYLES:
CHAIRMAN
MR. LYLES:
CHAIRMAN
you were doing?
MR. LYLES:
MR LYLES: The other type ot erosion that we have modeled we call blow-by erosion, and in
this m_x:lel we treat th- .jet as a hot jet created bv an assumed initial blow.by area beneath the
primary O-ring. _'hich allows gas to irr, pinge on the secondary O-ring We erode the primary O-
ring by simple pipe flow heat trans(er relations. We then spread the jet and erode the secondar'_
O-ring by impingement heat transfer as we have shown m the primary O-ring.
The model has several parameters that affect the magn}tude of erosion that you would pre-
dict. Those parameters are the width ¢f the jet o_' the area of the blow-hole that you get, which
_nquences the rate at which you pressurize the cavity and which, of course,
2316
drives the time at which you are eroding the O-ring.
DR. WALKER: I have a question. How did you determine the size blow-holes to use?
MR. LYLES: We based our estimates of blow-hole size on the disassembly of the spent motor
cases from flight, as when they take the joints apart, if there is evidence of a blow-hole through
the putty, they measure the blow-hole and over that range of measured data we assumed that
we get nominal blow-holes of that size.
Now, we did in our parametric study look at a wide range of blow-hole sizes, and we did
show that when you calculate, when we do a worst case analysis, that we do bound the flight
data, that is, we predict erosion greater than the available data we have from the flight motors.
DR. WALKER: I would just like to pursue the question of the analysis of the blow-holes
observed for a moment. Who carries out that analysis, and is that analysis made for every, single
case which is disassembled?
MR. LYLES: Well, it is more of an inspection than an analysts, and yes, sir, I believe the
putty is inspected every time the joints are disassembled.. We have data on all of the flight joints
except, I think, one that was los at sea.
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DR. WALKER: Could the Commission get copies of that, of those records?
MR LYLES: Y_s, sir.
CHAIRMAN I_,__3ERS: Mr Lyles. were you consulted at all prior to 51L by anybody about
O-rings and the study you were doing'?
MR. LYLES: Yes, sir, we made a presentation on the modeling work and our calculations on
erosion before 51L.
CItA!RMAN ROGERS: When was that?
It was last summer, in the August time frame.
ROGERS: But not after that. I mean, the summer of i985?
No, sir.
ROGERS: Was there any discussion with you after the accident about the work
Well, when it became apparent that it was a possible joint failure, we immedi-
ately turned and started exercising the erosion model again, and looking at tbe parametric, that
we have run, we haven't come up with any different conclusions than we had at the time, that is
that the parametric analysis that we have run bounded the data from am, impinging erosion
23i8
standpoint.
There is one thing that I shouId say, and that is, these are two ce,mpleteiy--not completely
different problems, but they are different problems, the impingement erosion and blow-by er.o-
sion. The model does not predict when you would leak past the primary O-ring. We have to
! 367
assume in the model that you could leak past the primary. O-_ng, and then we can calculate an
erosion rate to the O-ring, but the model is not sophi_t_ca_ed enough to tellus when the O-ring
would leak. That is a major aasumptlon in tbe m.-_lel,and we have to assun_e the size of the
hole,and so on and so forth.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I am not quite clear.Did you finishyour work on the model before
the accident?
MR. LYLES: No, sir.The work on the model isongoing, and we have been t.tyingto improve
itallalong.
CHAIRMAN ROGEKS: Did you reach any conclusion before the accident from your mode]
work?
MR. LYLES: The conclusion that was reached by running the analysis was in the range of
the blow-holes that we had seen, and even for blow-holes smaller than that and for worst ca_
analysis, that we would not show enough erosion tc burn completely through the O-ring,
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and it would leak by impinging erosion.
We d_d show that if in fact the primary O-ring leaks, that erosion would, of course, continue
until you filled the secondary cavity, and you could get large amounts of erosior of the primary
seal, and then all you have got left is the secondary seal. On one flight, we din have erosion of
the secondary. _al. as you probably know, on the nozzle joint, and we mat.':_ed that data very.
well, and again, by worst case analysis we showed that you would not get e rough erosion on the
secondary, nozzle joint to burn through, and the worst case analysis was ir_ fact a wo=_t on worst
anal)-sis.
It is assumed that all of the gas that passed by the primary seal d_i impinge on the second-
ary seal, and in fact it doesn't. It has to go around a 90-degree bend, and it spreads in three
dimensions, and we had to take that into account to match the flight data that we had.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you familiar with the criticality 1 decision that was made in, I
guess, December of 1982, which said that the secondary O-ring could not be counted on if there
was a failure of the primary seal?
MR. LYLES: No, air, I was not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You weren't familiar with
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that?
MR. LYLES: No.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And your work came to the apposite conclusion, I assume you felt
that maybe the secondary O-ring would hold?
MR. LYLES: For the nozzle joint, and we did come to the conclusion that the secondary O-
ring would seal on the nozzle joint because it does not go through the same rotation and prob-
lems that the secondary seal has on the field joint.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You weren't talking about the field joint then?
MR. LYLES: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Go ahead.
MR. LYLES: Okay, the model was then validated. The erosion model was validated by
subscale hot fire data. If I could have Chart L-8, please.
(Viewgraph L-8.)[a,.t :__: 7_,I
MR. LYLES: Chart L-8 shows the calibration of the model or the predicted model results
versus the results from the subscale test data, and in this test the blow-hole was simulated by a
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rectangularorificeupstreamof a VitonO-ring Thefieldjoint wassimulatedin thesetes_,and
it. thedata,showedthat anal_ticallywecouldmatch the erosion, and we did vary
2321
the w tth of tL_ upstream orifice to simulate the va_'ing widths of the putw blow-hole, and we
varied the cavity volume to calibrate the pressurization model that we have in the analysis, and
we are showing a plus or minus 12 percent variation on the measured data, and the picture is
there. It just shows--it just represents the type of erosion that we are seeing on tho subscale test
versus the one case of the flight erosion, and it shows the same type of erosion that we saw in
flight.
MR. COVERT: Mr. Lyles, talking about validation of the model, if I understand the model,
there is an undefined heat transfer coefficient that allows for the cooling of thi, gas stream, and
there is also an un4efined heat transfer coefficient at the stagnation point. Did you do other
tests to validate the model before you did the comparison with the subscale data? Or does this
data represent the best fit of the results from your model based on the selection of those two
coefficients?
MR. LYLES: This does represent the best fit of that subsca!e data based on varying the heat
transfer coefficients to the metal, and I think they had to vary the discharge orifice, discharge
coefficient some.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Lyles, were you asked or did
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someone else as a result of your analysis try to determine whether this analysis suggested there
was a serious safety problem?
MR. LYLES: I think this analysis showed that we did have a proolem in the joint with ero-
sion. I don't think this mod_.l showed that we had--that we were getting real close to a flight
failure. As I said, the worst on worst case that--by analysis that we put on this model did bound
the flight data, and we predicted much larger erosion than we had seen. And when we used that
worst on worst case, we still did not show that we would burn through an O-ring unless the O-
ring did not seat and we got blow-by erosion.
And m the case whore the O-rings don't seat, if both O-rings don't seat the model becomes
moot, really.
DR. WALKER: Did you consider the possibility that the secondary O-ring would become un-
seated as a result of the rotation?
MR. LYLES: I was really--at the time we were doing this analysis, really not up to speed on
the dynamics of the joint rotation on the field joint.
DR. LITTLES: I think we are getting a little beyond Garry Lyles' involvement in this. He
was just an analyst who was doing this analytical work but he was
23z3
not involved in the safety issue or the criticality issue or those kinds of things. So it is a little bit
beyond what he does, I think. He is not really involved in those things.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I would like to ask with respect to this chart, because I
think it may have confused some. We talk about prediction versus measured, and I understand
that measured has to do with the after the fact measurement of erosion on recovered seals from
previous flights. Is that correct?
MR. LYLES: That is correct. 1369
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: But the prediction has to dc with what )'our model would
say the erosion would be gnven certm_ _. conditions appropriate to _hose _ights Is that correct or
not9
:/IR LYLES: Well. we can't specifically analyze a flight, We don't have any idea. We can't
predict what the blow-hole would look like on a specific flight. All we can really do is take the
data that is available to us and try to calibrate the model with that data we have, and it is
really not good eno_,gh to make a specific prediction on a flight, because we don't know yet how
to handle the putty blow through.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you Let me ask it a different way then. it is a
comparison of the
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actual erosion as measured post-flight with the prediction that your model would hypothesize,
given the conditions as close as you might be able to guess them appropriate to that particular
seal. Is that correct?
MR. LYLES: That is right.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And it does nothing--the prediction has nothing to do
with predicting into the future?
MR. LYLES: No, sir.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And one should not assume from this prediction that you
could predict what the erosion on 51L migh_ have been or what the prediction on :he next flight
would be.
MR. LYLES: No. We did--all we did was a parametric analysis, and with _tae seeming ran-
domnes,s of the blow-hole and the putty, there is no way that we could predict a future flight
erosion.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you.
MR. LYLES: If I could have chart L-10, please.
(Viewgraph L-10.)!u,,I. :_ 21 _l
MR. LYLES: This chart just says tha, we do have _- reasonable analytical tool to predict
erosion within the bounds of the prediction _Ye are still improving the model, and we are using
it to evaluate the
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O-ring failure mechanisms due to erosion for 51-L failure. Included in that we are improving the
analysis relative to O-ring heating as we blow by the O-ring. We will try to correlate that with
the mass and mass flow that has been analyzed for the black puff of smoke.
If there are no more questions, that concludes my presentation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
MR. BACHTEL: My name is Rick Bachtel, and I have been with the Marshall Space Flight
Center for the past 21 years, and I have been working in the area of heat _ransfer thermody-
namics and thermal analysis, and since the 51L incident ] have .ly_en assigned to the SRM fail-
ure analysis team in the area of SRM thermal analysis.
What I am going to talk to you *oday about is some of the werk that we have been doing
about concerning the flow through the clevis that would be initiated at the leak. We are dealing
with a subset of the scenario that says that the leak occurs at liftoff as a result_or the puff of
smoke indicates that there is a leak at liftoff, that the smoke is either obscur,_,_i or disappear,
however the leak continues until 58 second_, when it become_ obvious in the form of the plume
that we see.
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The purpo of the analysis we did was to go off and see if that kind of scenario is feasible
and to underst_na the events that happened between the puff of smoke and 58 seconds, and of
course the alternate to the scenario that I am going to discuss is that the leak stops and then
starts again in 58 :_econds.
The objective of the anatysis was twofold. One of them was to determine the thermal re-
sponse ef the joint during that continuous !oak, and the other one then was to go back and look
at what kind of parameters either flow or dimensional _r whatever would be required to sustain
a 58-second or 60-_,,econd leak consistent with the observation3.
iViewgraph B-I.I [Ref. 3 21-81}
MR. BACHTEL: When we are assessing the thermal analysis there are three events we were
looking at. One of them is when the exit temperature or the exit gas temperature, the gas
coming, emanating from the joint, when that temperature exceeds 3,000 degrees, it was fek that
at 3,000 degrees_ that it would be clearly luminous, that it would appear as the plume which we
saw.
Another one is, when the outer sin-face comes to a tempexature of 2,150 Fahrenh__.'t, again,
that was a visibility factor. It was felt that at that temperaturc
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it should be white hot and may represent what we saw. It is also indicative of a possible failure
of the case, of course, and then the third event which we are looking for is any kind of failure of
the clevis or the joint that would alloy" a blowing hole, which is pretty much obvious what we
saw at tha_ time.
Some of the parameters which we were assessing to estimate whether or not we could have
a 60-second leak was the leak flow rate. We tried to determi-Je what leak fh w rate or how small
a leak flow rate we would have to have before we could ge_ out to 60 seconds without a catastro-
phe, what kind of putty blow-hole size, the blow-hales that Mr. Lyles was talking about, how
small they would have to be to be consistent with a _:0-second leak, and then what kind of clear-
ance between the tang and the clevis that would iim_t zhe flow that would be consistent v,uth a
60-second leak.
Nov,-, if you would put up Chart B-3, please.
(Viewgraph B-3.) [Ref. 3 21-82]
MR. BACHTEL: We had two different models we were using. One of them was a two-di "_en-
sional model, which is pretty much like what you see on the table here as far as this cutaway, It
is one circumferential slice af the clevis and tang. It is between the pins. There is no pin in that
particular model, and that model is
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basically a parametric tool. It has fairly good detail thermally of what is going on in here. It is
not as complicai_t as a three-dimension model such that we could turn around the model as
rapidly and run some parametrics. It is pretty much appropriate for doing analysks up until
when it is we get a failure of the joint.
Now, once we get a failure of the joint, we have to go to a three-dimensional model if we
want to assess how th, failure progresses in the other dimension. Both of the models, of course.
include the heat transfer and thermodynamics that go on inside the joint, the heat transfer out-
side the joint due to the aerodynamics of flight, which tends to keep the joint cool, the melting of
the steel, the recession of the steel, the opening of the gaps, and thus the increase of the flow
rate, the ablation and the increase in size of the putty blow-hole with time, the recession of the
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O-rings which then allows more flow. And when we do this analysis we do it in two different
ways,
One of them ts, we run a fairly simplified flow analysis which allows us to do parame_rics,
and then another method is. we depend upon a separate flow analysis which is a rigorous ap-
proach to the flow, a three-dimensional approach which takes into account the
2329
spreading as you come through the clevis, the interaction of the pins, et cetera.
We take the output from that analysis and feed it into _he thermal analysis we are doing,
and then finally we are trying to couple those two together, and that is in work cm'rently, and
we should be able to report on that in another couple of weeks. If you would go to Chart B-4.
(Viewgraph B-4.} Im'J. _; 21-_:_1
MR. BACHTEL. This is a detail of the two-dimensional model. The grid work you see on the
chart represents the elements that the clevis and the tang are broken into. Within those ele-
ments, there are subelements or nodes which allow those olements to become sma!ler as the
metal shrinks, rather, I am sorry, as the metal meita As the metal melts, then the gap between
the clevis and the tang _omes greater and the flow rate becomes greater, and you fairly rapid-
ly cascade the flow rate and tl z melting process until you go catastrophic, and of course the
purpose of the anaiysis was to find out how small these various gaps either in the NBR, either
in the insulation and in the putty coming mt_" he O-ring area here, hov, small ti_e O-ring c!evis
clearance had to be or the other clearar_ce,- to get a 60-second leak.
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Now, if we go to Chart ]3-5.
_Viewgraph B-5.) [_f :_ 21-_,}
MR. BACHTEL: These ave the results of some of our analysis. The box at the _p is where
we ran some constant flow parametrics to find out what kind of flow rate it would take to get
the 60-second leak, and I have got the chart up now. As you can see, it is a fai '?y small flow rate.
It is on the order of .004 to .005 pounds per second. Now, this would be continuous flow rate
during that 60 seconds to keep from having either a case failure or an exit gas greater than
3,000 or what have you at 60 seconds.
Now, that .004 pounds per second relates to about 700 cubic inches per second if it was a
volumetric flow expanded to the atmospheric pressure. The next thing we did then was look to
see how small the blow-holes would have to be to keep the flow rate that low and thus last 60
seconds. The 0-2, which is the smallest one I have on the chart, of course, shows a failure at
about 49 seconds. The 0-1 gets us out to 70 seconds. As Mr. Lyles reported, the blow-hole sizes
were normally on the order of half an inch, so the minimum or the maximum blow-hole size
that I can tolerate to be able to have the joint last for 60 seconds with a continuous leak is
almost an order of
2331
magnitude below what we normally see.
The third box shows the ]zindofanalysis we did for the tang to clevisclearance. Of course, if
this closesup enough, itlimitsthe flow,which then allo_s us to get up _o 60 seconds again. The
kind of clearance we had to squeeze this down to in order to keeo the joint alive for 60 seconds
was on the order of .002 inches.
Mr. Ryan ahowed you earlierthis morning where we normally open up to .025 inches,which
isalmost ten times greater than that. So in almost a}l _ses our analysis shows that ifthe puff
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of smoke indicates a leak that was to continue, that we should have destroyed the joint within
about 10 to 20 seconds.
So, if we go to the next chart, B-_
(Viewgraph 13-6.1 {_,-s __ _5!
MR. BACHTEL: I will carry this just a little bi: further. We }-.ave also done some three-
dimensional analysis. One of the things that the three 'imensional analysis does is, it picks up
conduction circumferentially around which tends to sr ad the heat out and makes ¢he joint last
a little bit longer, and there is a demonstration of ' hat here. When we ran the two-dimensional
model on a specific ca._e, we took the joint out at about 24 seconds. The same case on a
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three-dimensional model got us out to 35 seconds, so that g_ves us a little bit of time.
The box at the bottom _hows our best estimate of the flow case. Now, _his is a rigorous flow
case, which is the best estimate of what the blow-hale size would have been, what the O-ring
erosion would have been based on some of Garry's work, how the flow would have spread once it
comes through the clevis. As the flow goes through the hole in the O-ring, it tends to spread out,
which then dissipates, which could possibly let the joint last longer, and again, we are showing
on the order of 16 to 20 seconds in this case when the joint should have failed.
So, if you go to Chart B-7.
!Viewgraph B-7.i fm.f _ _,1 _,,I
MR. BACHTEL: In sammary, then, our analysis which we have done to date tends to indi-
cate that the scenario that the leak continued, from the puff of smoke all the way out to 50 sec-
onds is probably not the proper scenario. There is still some work that has to be done in this
area. For example, one of the things tha: may limit the flow and which als¢, could give us the
other scenario, and that is a stop flow, would be the deposition of aluminum oxide in these gaps,
so we are going to start looking at that or we have started
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looking at that. We are not prepared to report on ityet. That kind of analysis,as I said,would
support both this analysis or this scenario of a continuous leak, an intermittent leak. It may
start and stop on the way up, or even a stop at,say, six seconds, and then reissueat 58 seconds.
The analysis does show, however, that ifwe were to reestablishthe leak at about 5i)to 60 sec-
onds within ten seconds we would expect to go catastrophic, and that concludes what I had to
say.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. And that test on the aluminum oxide will be completed
in a couple ofweeks?
MR. BACHTEL: We ,gre starting to do some analysis. It is a very difficult analysis to do
because it involves empirical data. It involves a lot of statistics. It is not an exact analysis. It will
only show a probability, and it is going to be based primarily on some test data which we are
now acquiring, and we expect to have within a couple of weeks some type of a report on that
analysis. Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very. much. 1373
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jF._._ION SCENARIO
GAS IMPIN_NT EROSION
- GAS JET PENETEAIES VACUUM PUTTY AND IMPINGES ON PRIMARY SEAL
- SEAL EROSION COIITINLIESUNTIL PRESSURE IN CAVITY BETWEEN SEAt ANP PUTTY
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BLOW-BY EROSION
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O-RING BLOWBY MODEL
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THERIIUId.ANALYSIS OF SRM FIELD JOINT LEAK
0
DETERRIE THERIed_I-RESPOILSEOf THE FIELD JOINT TO A CONTINUO_JSLEA_
EXI1 6&S _ERATURE (3000°F)
0 EXTERIOR METAL TEgPERATURE (2150°F)
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TWO--DdffJSIOnAL DETAILED THERP,AL MODEL
CIRCUMFERENTIAL SLICE BETWEEN THE PINS
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SUMMARY
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DR LITTLES I will nob conclude.._.'r Chairman. with a summary of the testing which we
bare under way to try to nar-ow Jown _,orr,, of the remaining
2334
sce:,ar_os Ill c'ouia go to Chart "_,-25, piea_e
Viewgraph W-25., [Ref. 3 21-87]
TESTING TO c.^J HA,_
S/._I4ARIOS
w. LITTLES
I'b_RCH21, 198G
[Ref. :3 XI-87 1 ,,t'2]
m
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DR.LITTLEStFhetestingthat wehaveunder_'a)relatesto theseremaimng1ternson this
scenario.Items3. 4A. B. and D, and Item r; In addltic_nto that. _ '- e of the subscalemotor
t_stingthat wearedoingrelatesto the analysisthat Mr Bacht_vastdiscussedrelativeto the
,:onunuousflow or stop-leakflowanal,.-,lsI wil! summarizeso :e of _hosetest resultsfor you
Thereis other_ork that is still gsingon there And then I a .! get rote a _.:hedale cha.,-t and
discuss the specific tests related to these scenarxo:; and _her" we will finish those or when we
hope to.
Could I have Cha,-t W-27, plea_ _
_Viewgraph V_-27 , i_,.! _ _'l ,,,
DR. LIT*[LES This chart depicts one of the two sdbscale mot rs t at we are using, and this
particular one has a full-scale cross-section of the tang and clevis. It ÷ roughly 11 inches in di-
arr, ecer, but you can see if you look at the joint area that it is identi_ .1 to the design of the case
standard size joint design.
It has capability of--or we have the capability of inducing defects with this motor cf the O-
ring or defects on the ceiling surfaces, scratches,
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and we a!so have the capabihty to induce def_ts in the putty, and we can run the motor over a
range of temperatures to evaluate the temperature effect on any kind of defect or parameter
that we put in there, and one of the kev things we are going to be doing with this motor and the
other one is looking at putty performance at various temperatures. The motor simulates the
pressure in the actual SRM. We can get up to 1,000 psi.
It operates from 10 to 75 seconds, depending upon hew we configure the propellant in there
If we could go to Chart W-28. please
_Viewgraph W-28., _,.i __,_ _,,:
DR. LI'I'rLES: I just selected a fe_" of the tests here. an initial test to show you what kind of
vxriatL-'n _'e are getting, and these tests are where we have had simulated defects in the motor
to see what kind of results we get relative to the continuous flow or stop-leak type flnw evalua-
tion.
The first one there is one where we had 6-inch cutouts in the O-ring. very large defects
there. We also put a half-inch wide fault i_ the putty, and we had a .(_t0 inch e×trusion gap and
burned for 20 seconds. We had a complete burnthrough on thor one of the tang neer the primary
O-ring at 6 _econds, and so it failed very quickly. The second test was
2336
identical to the first, except here we had only eighth-inch flaws in the O-rings, had an eighth-
inch section cut out, and in parentheses there you see that we think we had about one-sixteenth
of an inch after we had it actually put together and squeezed, but in this case it burned for 20
seconds without visible leakage, and when they di:-assembled it, they found soot between the O-
rings, and the gap in the primary O-ring whizh filled with a combustion residue, so the differ-
once between those tests was the magnitude of the defect, but there was a considerable differ-
ence m the result.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: How do you account for that? Would you guess the O-
ring grew back together?
DR. LITtLESt Well, if somebody had told me before we had the test that we could have
gotten this result, i guess I frankly wouldn't have believed it. Whet they saw was that in the gap
of the O-ring, they said it was filled with a combustion residue. To me it seems unlikely that you
could get that with a hot gas flow through there. But indeed it did occur It seems an unlikely
result, but we found some other similar :esults. I will mention another (_ne in a second _hat is
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no,_ on this cha,_ On Test 3. again, it was the same as ! except both O-rings '*'ere ground d_n
from their normal diameter
23:_7
of 2_'_ I(>wn to .290 for abc, u_ _:_, of an inch. and m this one, the burnthrough, it burned
through the tan " in about 12 seconds.
Now. since then. as a matter of fact, a couple of days ago. and I don't have the detailed
results yet, but we ran a test similar to three, and the only difference was that we put some
:nstrumentation in this one to get more thermal data. Other than that, as I understand it, the
conditions were Identical, but this one ran for the full 20 seconds.
it had aluminum oxide deposited in the area of the initial--of the cutback O-ring, of the
defect, and it stopped the flow there and moved it around, so there is a considerable amount of
variation that you can get with these motors, and ! think they are not very predictable relative
to what a defect will do relative to progressing the damage, which makes the analysis that Mr.
Bachtel talkecl to you about extremely difficult, if not impossible.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMST[_,ONG: Let me ask yoa to look at this again to make sure ! un-
derstand it properly. I am comp, ring test 2 and test 3 And these were essentially identical tests.
In test 2 you just completeiy rem :,,'ed a section of the O-ring that was 1/8 inch across.
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DR. I,H_FLES: That is correct
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG And in No. _, you bad a complete O-ring but you .just
made it a little narrower, for :_!6ths of an inch?
DR. LIT'rLES: That is right.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: So one would think on the smface that test 2 would be
much more severe than test 3
DR. LITTLES: I would think so.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And yet in test 2, the more severe vast. you didn't get
any damage. In test 3 you had a complete collapse.
DR. LITTLES: That is correct.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: So one would draw the coiJclusion that it is difficult to be
able to predict the characteristics of these burnthroughs past an O-ring
DR. LFI_LES: That is correct. That is the conclusion I draw.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess one of the thing_ that ,occurs to me in these tests, and maybe
you can explain it, weren't tests like these run before the accident? I mean, kdmwmg that the O-
ring_ were such a--or seemed to be such a serious problem, weren't tests of thiE t,ind run before
the accident?
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DR. LITTLES: Well, these are failure tests that are lxfing conducted here t_ try to duplicate
or to try to un ]erstand the condition that we might have had if we ha A a puff of amoke and then
a continuous leak.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I guess my question really is broader than that. Were some-
what similar tests run to determine what would t_appen to O-rings under certain condiuons?
DR. LH'YLES: No, sir, no te_te were run that ! ai-n aware of like this. We always knew, i
think everyone would agree, that one cannot tolerate the kind of conditions we are setting up
here with an O-ring I don't think there is anyone who would have predicted that you could
sustain that kind of defect and have a successful burn of the-- -
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS. That _s real}y not quite my question My quest,on is, in _he begqn-
ning. say. of l_.-,, when concern was expressed about the O-rings. werent tests run then either
by Thiok_,', or bv Marshall to decide some of _'_ese ccmcerns, to answer some of the c_ue,_.*io,_, that
were raised at the time _
DR LITTLES: The analysis and the supposing tests that Mr. Lyles discussed were ongom¢
at that time. As a matter of fact. they' had been started a number of months earlier Those anai-
yses and the
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supporting tests that confirmed that analysis were used to evaluate the degree of erosion that
one might expect in a worst-worst case ,an the primary, and so those kinds of tests and analysis
were conducted relative to the phenomenon that we had observed which was impingement ero-
sion of O-rings.
CHAIRMAN pr_p,z_c n^
...... ,_._ L,,, you or does Thiokol to your knowledge have any histoD" that has
been prepared about O-rings and their failure? The reason I ask that :s aecause in 1982 it was
known that the O-rings were a problem, and the criticality was changed l_'nm criticality I R to
criticality 1.
I would have thought there would have been a lot of te,_ts to determine reliability of the O-
rings during that three-year period, and ! would have thought that there would be a history of
the O-rings and how much you could rely on them. and so forth To your knowledge, are there
any such re_o_rts or any histcry of the O-rings that has been prepared"
DR. LITTLES Well, there was a history of the O-rings relative to the erosion that had been
seen in flight. Those results were available on every occasion when we had erosion in flight.
whether it was on a field joint or on a nozzle joint, it was looked at, that specific case was looked
at. Those resuits were
2_4 !
discussed, and the fligh? readiness reviews for the subsequent fligh_ and were reported all the
way up through channels, and that histoD" was maintained on a continuing basis.
So. yes. sir, that history was available
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. the Commission would want to get all of that infer;nation
before we make our report. As i remember some of the original testimony, though, by some of
the people who made the decision to launch was that they were not familiar with the problem
with the O-rings at aii.
DR. LI3"I'LES: We!l, I don't recall that testimony, but I do know based on personal experi-
ence that those anomalies that have been experienced in flight have been reviewed in flight
readiness reviews.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So it is your opinion that that concern was generally known both at
1Varshall and ThJ_'kol among people at the top of the agency?
DR. LI'V['LES: Yes, si,-. 1 can't imagine that it was not known because it has been, I know,
overed in flight readiness reviews. We always discuss any anomaly that we have. We evaluat,e
_t relative tan its potential consequences on the subseqaent flight, and we discussed it in flight
readiness reviews. And so ! am not familiar with the testimony you refer to, but ! pe_rsonal!y
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couldn't imagine anyone not being aware of a flight anomaly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, of course, the astronauts s_v they were not aware of it. You
bare seen thin testimony, I guess.
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DR.LITTLES:Yes,sir I haveseenthat I amnet personallyfamiliar with their participa-
tion in flight -eadinessrevkws.If someonehadaskedme,! wouldhnvesaidi thoughtthat they
wereprobablyrepresented,but I don'tknowthat, but I doknow_- _ tact that thcy havebeen
dtscussedit: the '_e_e!2 flight readiness-eviewswhere! wouldha_eexpected at least a crew
repreaentat_vo to t'_ave been present. So I Know they have been discus,sod
CtJAIRMAN ROGERS: So I assmne then when you heard statements by th _ astronauts that
they did noc know" about the problem in the flights where they were revolved, that surprisal
yOL1.
DR. Lil_I'LES: Well. li_ e say, I am not familiar with their direct paFticlpation in flight
readiness reviews, and so I don't know what their normal communication chmmeis are with
those who do participate.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let me ask the question more directly. Were you surprised or
are you
2343
surprk_t now when you learn that a commander of one of the space shuttles was not totd after
the fact what had happened in connection with the O-rings on his particular flight? Did that
surprise you, or does it surprise you today?
DR. LITTLES: It would surprise me. As a matter of fact, I couldn't believe t_,at that incident
had not been covered in the subsequent flight readiness review. Now, again, and I would b_ sur-
prised if anyone who had been involved in that flight didn't somehow find out about it, but
agaim I dont know where the communication channels are. i know it was covered in the flight
readiness review, but what that commander's opportunity for getting that information might be,
I am not familiar wlth
CHAIRMAN ROGERS Okay. We will come to that lau " on in the investigation. Thank you.
MR, LYLES: Mr Chairman, can I make a statement fc the record? I would like to clari_"
something tl_ _t i said before.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Surely
MR. LYLES: I told you that 1 was not aware of the criticality 1 issue. That is a true state-
ment. However. I think all of us knew that if the secondary O-ring leaked, that it was a bad
situation.
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CHAIRMAN ROGEYcS: Excuse me?
MR. LYLES: If the secondary O-ring leaked, that was a bad situation.
CtlAIRMAN ROGERS: The criticality 1 that I am talking about said that if the primary O-
ring fails, you can't rely on the secondary O-ring.
MR. LYLES: I :,as not aware of that criticality. I was aware that the effort that was going
on, that Thiokol was going through a redesign effort on the field joint, and we were looking at
different O-rings and things like that, but as far as the specific_o of all that, we were working the
erosion problem.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I see. Thank you.
DR. LI'VI'LES: Could we have Chart W-30, please?
(Viewgraph W-30.) [m'l. :_ _l .o I
DR. LITTLE",: This chart depicts the second subscale motor that we are using. This is a five-
inch motor. It is a little smaller than the other one. It can burn between three and 24 secc.(ts.
We can get up to 800 psi pressure in this one, and run for 24 seconds. Again, we can vary the
temperature ,-,ver a wide range, and again, we can simulate degraded O-rings and sealing sur-
faces and putty. Would you focu_ in on the bottom
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right, please? You will see that this one does not simulate the actual joint, so it is not quite as
g_:l in that respect as the other motor, oat you can ge_ a lot of good. qualitative data with this
motor. Could we see Chart W-3i, please '_
_Viewgraph W-:31.: i_,., _ -)_ ',1
DR LIT'rLES: I will summarize aga,.n just a fe_ of the tests that have been run with this
motor, and you will see the same kind of trends as with the othe _ motor, a lot of variabiiitv Test
3 had an eighth-inch section of O-ring missing, no putty in t _.is one. It had a 0.03 gap and
burned for 3 seconds. And it had smoke at ignition witc., flame at 1.2 seconds, and the O-ring was
mostly consumed, and hea_2" metal damage on that one.
The next test, test L was the same as 3. except there was a 0.004 gap rather than a 0.03, and
it burned for 24 seconds. This one we had continuous smoke hut no fire, no O-ring damage at the
cut, O-ring erosion and heat effect away from the cut, but no ,netal damage. So the primary
variable there was just the gap, and there was a considerable difference in performance.
Could I see W-32, please?
!Viewgraph W-32.)i_,.I ._ -'_ ,,_
73,16
DR. LI2WLES: Test 6, ",_hich is "h,_ first one on this sheet, we had a half-inch vent in the
putty at this time with a scratch on h:e sealing surface. The O-ring wasn't damaged, but just a
scratch an the sealing surface. It burned for 24 secc_,,-ts with a 0.019 gap at 70 degrees. It had a
small plume immediately on this one, at the defect, and it shut off and then reappeared 90 de-
grees away from that original defect, and there was considerable damage on this one. It had
molten metal and very heavy damage.
Test 7. again, was the same as 6 except here we had the putty intact. There was no vept or
defect in the putty, and we cooled this one down to 30 degree,o, and it had two scratches on the
surface. Now this one, nothing happened at all for ten seconds, and then we got some flow for
five seconds, and then it stopped. The significant item out of this test, at least to me, is tha_ the
putty appeared to hold that pressure off of the O-ring for ten seconds, and that is very signifi-
cant, of course, because you need to get the pressure on the O-ring during the ignition transient.
particularly with the joint rotation situation that we talked about.
DR. COVERT: Dr. Littles, I think that these are vet?,." interesting results, and I wonder if
_, # .......... x to repeat these several ":
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in other -,ords, take the configuration exactly the same, for example, as Test 7, and then just
retire it, _nd then build a new fixture, and retire it.
DR. LYffYLES: Yes, sir, we are going to do that. You see so much variability with the same
general type test. I think you have to run several of the same type to see what really can occur,
and we are going to do that. That will probably be a little later, though, because one of the key
things we are going to be using these motors for in the next few days is to support failure eval-
uations for the remaining scenarios. We are going to concentrate on that, and then we will do
some more tests relative to the leak stop leak type thing.
DR. COVERT: I would like to pursue this just a little bit further. I wasn't particularly inter-
ested in, although I think it is important, the leak stop leak, but in all of these tests the level of
variability is such that it suggests to me that if you are going to base any serious conch,,sions on
it, you might want to have some repeat points.
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DR I.ITTLES: I agree I certainly do And even more specifically I g_uess, even more impor-
tantly " _r those there we are verifying scenarios, we will have co run a number of tests on those
b: those areas where we _nd resuit_ that are im_ant to us and might
support conciusmns one way or the other. I agree with you. We have to run a number of tests
That wi!l be very important.
DR. 'd,ALKER: Can we just return to a point that I think you made? At 30 degrees evidently
the putty becomes quite stiff and can withstand considerable pressure Is that the point you
were making?
DR. LiTTLES: Well, that is a point I was making. I was going to continue with that, though.
We are running some additional tests at higher temperatures in these motors. I had hoped to
have a higher temperature test or two by this time, but I haven't gotten it yet. But one of the
things that we have found from the putty tests we are doing, we are doing tests with putty over
a range of humidities and temperatures and defects and all these kinds of things.
And we haven't completed that by a substantial amount, but one of the things we are learn-
ing out of that is that the putty is temperature-sensitive. It will hold pressure at lower tempera-
tures for lcnger periods of time, but even at ambient conditions, ?0 degrees, the putty still will
hold pressure off for long periods of time relative to the hail:second of the ignition transient. So.
yes, it is temperature sensitive, but even at ambient temperature it will hold
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pressure for long permds of time relative to the tm'.e of interest that we are looking at.
No_, those tests, there is still some work that has to be done in that, bec, ase those initial
tests were conducted in a fixture which did not incorporate the dynamics of the joint. In other
words, the joint was held fixed, and actually you get some motion of the insuiation around the
putty, and we have a test fixture which has just started into test, and we will be getting a let of
results out of that, we hope. in the next week to 10 days which incorporate that feature.
DR. WALKER: Now, it was my understanding from discussions at Morton Thiokol that the
way in which the joint was to operate was for the putty to transmit the pressure pulse to the O-
ring in order to seat it. and these results would suggest then that that theo_" of the operation of
the joint may have been faulty.
DR. LITTLES: That is absolutely correct. That is correct. And that is the hypothesis of sce-
nario 6, that that concept of the joint operatmn which people had believed was correct is not in
fact correct.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Dr. Littles, this one interests me. You are interested in the putty, but
I am interested in the leak-stop-leak. You had a leak and
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then it sealed itself, and this is one of the few that it has done that on. How did it seal itself?.
What was the mechanism? What was the structure of the m_terial in there?
DR. LI'FFLES: I am not exactly sure how that sealed. I asked the other day somebody to go
check on that. I am not sure whether it sealed because of some internal mechanism or whether
the putty itself sealed. And we have run some tests, some lab tests in configurations that don't
simulate this joint, and we are going to have to do some more, where we have seen the putty
have a blow-hoie breakthrough, and then seal ivself. So, i'_ could be that the putty sealed itself
here, or it could be something internally.
GENERAL KUTYNA: This is, of course, very similar to the actual shuttle launch, in that
we had a leak and possibly it sealed itself. I had heard at Marshall that in some of these cases
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the matertaithat seaie0'_, ieak ,_askind _r
. ._ o. a glass) substance r_her than sontethlug very
tough, and ;r ;, were _!assv and britt!p It mizht be someth:ng t _'-_ .... _.... . ... _ , .... .... break of'f later :."
_i_ht--break open later _" a;_,, after ',au had !oad_ :.:r.posed or" it
DR LITTLES That is correct
GENERAL KUTYNA: Do you have an of that experience to report.'
--OO_.
DR LITTLES: No, we don't have anything that simulates that.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Are you aware of that glass) substance, though?
DR. LITTLES: Yes. I would not be at all surprised that that could happen either with the
iosds that we were putting on it at that point in flight or. you know, we were. of course, be_.n-
ning to increase in motor pressure. At about that time the pressure was going back up. which
imposes a little additional opening on that joint, and so there were thing_ going on which, with a
damaged seal, and possibly having some deposition like you referred to could have caused it to
open up.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Thank you
DR. LITTLES: Cha_ W-33, please.
_Viewgraph W-33.; im.f ' :_ ',;i
DR. LITTLESt This is just a summary of observations, and I think we have touched on most
of them as I have gone through. There is more work. as I said. to be done in this area. but my
conclusion, I guess, at this point in time, it: is obvious, is that it is a highly variable phenomenon
which I don't believe is amenable, frankly, to a very detailed analysis There are _u_t too many
variables to try to do it, and I think it is posmble based upon what we have seen that you
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could have had a leak that stopped and started some time later, i think at this point in time it is
highly unlikely based up( _ the analysis thin Rick Bachtel reported that you had a continuous
leak at one location for that long. I think that is highly unlikely.
Chart W-34, please.
_Viewgraph W-34._ [m.i ; _,] ,,_:
DR. LITTLESt Okay, we have a number of tests that are going on relative to the other ele-
ments of the joint scenario. The first item on the chart there is testing that we are doing rela-
_; ..... .1.. .... kt,- ._,-,¢,-_¢;_1 ..... I-.l. 'ha" we ha"e ,_,oo,,oe,,A _,,-e,,_e wp _,_,,_ a "oo'
fixture at Marshall which is a partial joint tang/clevis. It is a segment ,:)out two and a half feet
wide, and we have it in a fLxture, and we are using that to simulate various off-tolerance situa-
tions in the mating to look at Potential damage of the tang and clevis or the O-ring, and depend-
ing upon the results of that, and we may go further and do some full-scale short attack tests on
that
Item 2 deals with sce_,,:io 4-A.
MR. ACHESON: May I ask a question about 1? I see that 61G is to be destacked in April.
DR. LITTLES" Oh, yes. I failed to point that out.
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MR. ACHESON: Is there any reason to believe that 61.G experienced particular assembly
problems, out of roundness or difficulty in stacking?
DR. LITTLES: 61G, as you might recall from our last discussion. 51L had a negative dimen-
sion which puts the tang back over the O-ring section of the clevis of .393, I believe it was. 61G is
not a direct analog of that, It had _ negative dimension, I believe, of .274, but there are some
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reportsthat therewa_somedifficuitv in makingthat mate.andwethink tt wouldbevery _n-
format!re to take.t apart and seewhat the condition_s.but it is net _ direct analog of 51L
MR ACHE_N: Thank vou
DR LKVI'LES: So then. back to hem 2 the sea! test relative t_, a defective _eai, ant th:s
,'elates primarily to the cioseout photo that wc have discussed We are still doing some work on
t_at to try to determ:ne whether what we see there ,_s :ndeed a defect. We have a test fixture
that we put together to do that with, and to take some photographs and see if we can simulate
that, depending upon the results of that. we might go t_ our d) _.amic test fixture which I will
disct_ss in a minute, or maybe even to some hotfired test_ to close that out.
Item 3 is testing related to ice in the
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.)int We have a visual fixture that has been built to look at what might happen when you get
_ce up near the second O-ring or ice and grease above it in _ column to potentially unseat that
O-ring. We are doing tests on that. Depending upon what cones out of that, we will probably do
some tests in some of the other fixtures possibly in the joint motor, the motor that has the joint
simulated very well. test !04. and probably even in the dynamic test fixture.
C_)uld we see Chart W-35. please?
,Viewgraph W-35.' [Ref. 3 21-95]
DR. LITYLES: The first item on this chart is the relative to scenario 4D. This is the scenario
which deals _nth the situation that was discussed on the Monday night before the flight, where
you have coid s_tuation, you have O-rings which have degraded resiliency, and you have the joint
rotauon. We hove this test fixture in tests now. We have gotten the first series of tests back. We
ran the first series of tests with the minimum squeeze that we had on the 5iL conditions, and
we ran it with a gap opening of 0.020. In other words, we had it get at the minimum squeeze.
and then what we do with this test fixture is that we open that gap at a rate which simulates
the gap openin,_ on the actual motor tang, clevis during flight.
2355
and of course it is simultaneously--you have the pressure that you see during the ignition tran-
slant imposed on it. Those first series of tests, there were seven run at a range of temperatures.
There were two run at 75 degrees, one at 40, two at 25 degrees, one at ten degrees, and one at
minus ter,, and in all cases the seal performed properly except at minus ten degree_. _nd in that
case it did not, but down through ten degrees it did perform properly.
Now, we are nov," going into another series of tests with that fixture where we are going to
impose the maximum squeeze condition. In other woros, in looking at the way this joint is as-
sembled and the tolerances, it looks as though you can have a situation where you have, rather
than--you can have a situation where you have almost metal to metal contact, and to us :hat
seems to be a worse situation relative to the respon_ of the joint than the minimum squeeze,
and so we are going into that test series now, We will set that up with the maximum squeeze
and then run through the full joint rotation and we expect to have those tests probably some
time next week, so that is a very interesting set of tests to us.
DR. KEEL: Dr. Littles, could I just ask a question there for clarification? You say you are
2356
simulating the gap opening due to rotation, but you aren't simulating, as I understand it, the
gap opening due to this going back from out of round to round, if you will, based upon this load
analysis you have done.
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DR LIT'TLE5That ,'orrect ]t do,-sr_ , do tr.:_t. 0ecause .t on!v moves :n one d:rection. _n,
doesn r nave that in ::. bh a_a.n, i th:nK :_e worst cond:tion :s _omz to be ',_ere ",o_ have the
maxm'um squeeze, and It: that ca_-e :t :s _o_r. tc be _otn_z in one direc" on a,_yway The effect oc
tn_ roundm_ s;tuat..op, v, nere you nave the max:mu_ _uueeze _s much less t-at. it f_ where you
have the mln_mum _,queeze Iivou ha_e the ram-mum squeeze, what you act'uai.!v _et dur:ng the
roundin_ process is th_._ _hen t_at takes place :n the ne,ghborhood of 50 to :.-'_(ipsi, you act_iallv
_et more squeeze put en that O-ring. and :t cont:nues to open up. but you are right That feature
is net there.
The next item .s item 5. which are the putty tests i have mentioned these already We have
that second f.xture read)" now. It is m tests. We are conducting a range of parameters there.
temperature and relative humidity. And again, we expect to complete that by the end of the
month and have the data evaluated by the end of the first week in April.
Item 6 is also--
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DR WALKER One questmn on Item 5 Are there putt) tests both at Marshall and at Thio-
kol? Or just one place or the other?
DR LITTLES Well. the primary tests are being conducted at Thiokot That is where we
have tnis more high fidelity feature We had conduzted some tests at Marshall on very simph-
fled lab rigs. We have done some work there, but the predominant work is being done at Thio-
kol hem ,_ _s another very important series of tests for us. We have a test fixture for this which
we can use to s_mutate the dynamic situation that I discussed under Item 4D.
But it can also be used to simulate the s_tuat;or, that you get w:nere the putty hoL s the
pressure off of the O-ring. The gap or the jo_.nt opens, the gap opens, and then you get a pressure
through tr_e putt)', and you hit the O-rings while you already have a gap underneath them. and
that is the s_tuat_on that we walt be simulating with this test fixture, and that test fixture ,.s now
avadable, and we should be testing it next week. so in the next week to ten days we hope to get
a sigmficant amount of' data relative to these prime scenarios, and that concludes my presenta-
tion. Mr. Chmrman
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Mr. Chairman, I
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think The_',e reports of test results are a substantial contribution to the Commission's investiga-
tion. And I would iike to ask Dr. Littles a couple of questions by way of summar,_, I [mnk the
time line we hay,: seen is a substantial improvement in accuracy and understandaoihy, and my
understanding of the information you have presented today is that there have in the past been a
lot of reports, both in the popular press and the trade press and so on of :mtential external tank
leaks, and being contributory to the event, and I understand that your analysis to date indicates
that in fact although you have still some people that are reviewing the conclusions that you
have drawn, that at this point in time you have no evidence to indicate that leakage to the ex-
ternal tank was contributory first or even existent. Would that be a fair conclusion?
DR. LITTLES: That is a good summary of that, yes.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Secondly, there have been a "_ariety of speculations re-
garding potential loads, both unusual loads either at liftoff or at the combination of Max Q and
wind sheer events and a detailed look at tL,:- load profiles up to this time indicates that tho.qe
are in fact in the normal range.
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Iqo_ever, :f ther_ _ere ear_:,er aiternate faAures, :t is possible that _eads ceu!i have cor :r'.b:.'ted
t,_ the suOsequent DreaKup, that norma! _oacis _ouid have contrlbuted to the subsequen: !:reak-
Li p"
DR LITTLES: Yes. I rE,,-,: ,hat is a pcss:blii.y
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG. And thirdiy, you find no evidence to indicate that the
leak check port had any applicabilitv to the failure?
DR. LITTLGS: No. we don't think it did. I think the evidence indicates that it did not ema-
nate at that point.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And now I am going out on a limb a little bit with the
last presentations. We had earlier, some had earlier thought that the prediction of O-ring ero-
sion was perhaps impossible or an unp "edictable kind of event, and I think Mr. Lyles' presenta-
tion indicates that in fact tl re is a certain predictability to 0-ring erosion, given the proper
initial conditions and characteristics of the flow But at the same time the tests that .you have
done in your latter presentations ipdicate that in fact if there are abnormalities present of one
sort or another, then the way in which a joint might fail are quite variable and even unpredict-
able
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DR LITTLES i think that is true I think that the work that was done, the analysis that
was done to develop the O-ring erosion model and the test data did a good job of bounding that
problem, but when you get the s_tuation, the situatmns that we are simulating in these tests
where you have defects that allow blow-by and don't gnve the joint or the O-ring an opc_rtunity
to _al. I think it is a highly variable situation in that case. and very dffficuh to predict.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you. That is ail t have. Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just one other. I assume that the conclusion you r ,ched last time is
still valid, and that is the joint still seems to be the area of most saspicion, the one you are most
concerned about. Is that correct?
DR. LITTLES: That is correct. I believe we have eliminated ali of the other possibilities
except these items we have just discussed here relative to the tests, and those all deal with the
joint.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you vory much. ! _h!nk there has been real r,_'ogress since me
last session. Thank you. There may be some other questions. If not, thank you very much for a
very good presentation.
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(Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned..*
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PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order, please. Today the Commission
will hear presentations by representatives of NASA's Johnson Space Center. We are interested
in operational aspects of the Space Shuttle System with particular emphasis on the methods by
which technical and safety concerns are considered.
It might be well to refer again now to the mandate given to this Commission by the Presi-
dent. It is: one, to review the circumstances surrounding the accident, to establish the probable
cause or causes of the accident; and two, to develop recommendations for corrective or other
action based upon the Commission's findings and determinations.
The matters we will discuss today may not directly relate to the cause or causes of the Chal-
lenger accident: however, they do relate to the second part of the Commission's mandate, to
make recommendations on how to make future flights safer.
it is in that connection that the Commission is giving careful attention to concerns ex-
pressed by astronauts because the Space Shuttle Program will only succeed in the future if the
competent and highly qualified men and women who fly the Shuttle have
] 405
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confidencein thesystem.
One other point before we get started. The agenda for today includes a presentation by the
Office of Flight Crew Operations. Dr Ride, who works in that office, feels that it would be more
appropriate for her not to take part in the questioning of witnesses from that office, ano of
cour'_e the Commission agrees.
Now we will proceed. Dr. Keel, with the witnesses
DR. KEEL: Mr. Abbey, Mr. Young, Mr. Weitz, Mr. Crippen, and Mr. Hartsfield, please(Witnesses sworn.
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ITESTIMONY OF GEORGE ABBEY. DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS. JOHN
yO_rNG, CHIEF, ASTRONAUT OFFICE, P. J. WEITZ, DEPUTY CHIEF, ASTRONAUT
OFFICE, ROBERT CRIPPEN. ASTRONAUT. HENRY HARTSFIELD. ASTRONAUT
CHAYRMAN ROGERS: Gentlemen, we would appreciate it if y_u would identify yourselves
and give a little background about each of you with partic,Jlar reference to the astronaut pro-
gram and any flights that you have take part in.
MR. ABBEY: I'm George Abbey, the lJirector of
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Flight Crew Operations. I'm a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. I served in the _ir Force as
a pilot for 13 years and received a master's degree in electrical engineering and subsequently
was assigned to various management and technical positions since that time. I was assigned to
NASA in 1964; assistant to the Manager of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, Assistant to
the Director of the Johnson Space Center, Dr. Gilruth and Dr. Kraft, and then Director of Flight
Operations and more recently Director of Flight Crew Operations.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you, Mr. Abbey.
Mr. Young, would you want to move the microphone over a little bit in front o_"you? Thank
you.
MR. YOUNG: I'w John Young, Chief of the Astronaut Office. I've been working in the Navy
from 1952. I went to G_orgia Tech, bachelor of aeronautical engineering. I've been working for
N'ASA since 1962 and been working on the Space Shuttle since December of 1972, and been
Chief of the Astronaut Office since about 1975.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which flights did you take part in?
MR. YOUNG: Gemini III, Gemini X, Apollo X,
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Apollo XVI and STS-1 and 9.
MR. WEITZ: I'm Paul Weitz. I was a Naval aviator when selected as an astronaut in 1966. I
have been in Houston since then. I'm Deputy Chief of the Astronaut Office. I flew on the first
Skylab flight in 1973 and on STS-6, the first flight of Challenger in 1983.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You're Deputy to Mr, Abbey?
MR. WEITZ: No, sir, to Mr. Young.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To Mr. Young I understand. So it's Mr. Abbey is head of the office
and is not an astronaut, yourself and Mr. Young, and then you are Mr. Young's Deputy, is that
right?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Crippen.
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MR CP.IPPEN: My name is Bob Crippen I'm a Captain :r. the United States Navv I re-
ceived a bachelor of aerospace engineering from the University of Texas I've been assigned at
the Johnson Space Center since 19_9 as an astronaat
I ser_'ed in support roles on the Skvlab program, the Apollo-Soyuz program, worked on the
development of the Space Shuttle, apd set'red as pilot on STS-1, and have been commander of
three subsequent Shuttle flights and missions STS-7, 4!-C and 41-G, and
2:367
have spent a period of time serving as Deputy to Mr, Abbey as the Flight Crew Operations Di-
rector. I'm currently assigned as the commander of the first flight from Vandenberg.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You flew with Dr. Ride I assume?
MR. CRIPPEN: I flew with Dr. Ride on two flights, STS-7 and mission 41-G.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. Mr. Hartsfield.
MR. HARTSFIELD: l'm Hank Hartsfield. I have a bachelor in physics from Auburn, a mas-
ters of engineering science from the University of Tennessee.
My background is in the Air Force. a fighter pilot. I joined NASA in 1_70 as an astronaut. I
worked in support of Apollo XVl and all the Skylab flights, in CAPCOM's support crew I was a
pilot on STS-4 and a commander of flights 41-D and 61-A.
I also participated in the developmental pha,_e of the Shuttle.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
I understand. Mr. Abbey, now you have a statement that you will make and begin with?
MR. ABBEY: I thought I might clear up a little confusion relative to the organ:zations. I
was going to tell you a little bit about--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't you move the mike over if you're going to do the talking
for a while.
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MR. ABBEY: If I could have that first chart, please.
,Viewgraph !l¢,,f I _l!
MR. ABBEY: I've tried to she w on this chart where we fit as far as the organization is con-
corned. We are the Flight Crew Op_ rations Directorate. the one outlined in the dark lines, and I
am the Director of that organization.
We have two major activities within the Directorate. the Astronaut Office and then we also
have the Aircraft Operations Division.
"1"}1{' .\_ll_}ilal_il ()lli_ ," }l,i-, !_l ,_'-!_,,rl;l_,!- t {lllq'!tli\ ;l-*l_[)_.l_ ;lt,,[}_ \_.1!11 *ll[,lllql][}2_ I_'}-,_liJ!, _,
;lll_ tallt l}l;ll [('_|l("-l}l(' ,_l[_}l_'l alll_'! V_' ];ll]_] ...... ';lll_Jl]l_ ,qt Ilia, \_(.-1 ( ,,;i-I [,] _'l]ltiql\ ;lll_i
,ll'_!l}l_t {11_' ! I_{ll_,ll\
We also have T-38s and we also have "he three Shu:tle training aircraft that are pretty key
in training the crews to be able to land th : orbiter.
We also operate a zero GKC-135 and a super guppy which hau!s large cargo that go into the
Shuttle around the country.
We k ,ve astronauts involved, I think, in a
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variety of activities, and we will try to cover that a little later, but I thought I might just touch
on the fact that we have astronauts participating in nearly every phase of the program.
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We have astronauts assigned at KSC doing the test and checkout work in support of the
veh _ '!e at I-LSC We have other astronauts that are assigned to the Shuttle Avionics Integration
Lab ,_'atory. where they are doing the engineering and software verification tests.
In Houston we have astronauts doing design ard development work. doing engineering slm-
,.,lations We also have astronaut,= assigned to the flight control team when we fly the flights and
as we prepare to fly the flights as CAPCOMs and in other roles supporting the mission.
So we are involved, and the Directorate is in_olved, I think, throughout all phases of the
program.
Could I get the next chart, please?
!Viewgraph._ {_,.t i Iz
MR. ABBEY: This shows the Directorate. and again we have the Astronaut Office which is
headed by Captain Young. His Deputy is Paul Welt.z, on John's right.
Then we have the Aircraft Operations Division. That is headed by Joe Algranti, who is
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probably one of the more senior aviators in NASA, and we have an astronaut serving ms his
Deputy on a rotating basis, Don Wilhams. We have rotated a number of astronauts in that posi-
tion.
I think it has been very good for the organization because that Aircraft Operations Division
is primarily involved in supporting the astronauts, and ! think it has given a better understand-
ing to both the Astronaut Office and to the Aircraft Operations Division of the objectives and
problems at both orgamzations.
So that is something that we started sometime ago. and I think it allows us to use some of
the experience and talent that we Eave within the Astronaut Office.
We also have a Vehicle integration Test Office, and that is primarily providing engineering
support to the astronauts at KSC as we support, test and check out operations there. They are
also involved in preparing _o do the work at Vandenberg in support of Captain Crippen and his
crew.
We also have a Payload S tmcia]ist Liaison Office. That is headed by Don Bourque. and this
_'roup is responsible for bringing in _he payload specialists that fly with us, training those indi-
v.ciuals, and integrating them into our activities and integrating
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them into the flight crews. That office has been a part. of our organization probably only about
six months.
As far as how we operate and how we work, John is going to talk a little bit about what
astronauts do other than when they fly and maybe give you a better understanding of what we
do and where we have people assigned.
Paul Weitz is going to talk about our participation in all the various activities across the
program; the boards, the panels, many groups that we get involved in.
Then Bob Crippen is going to talk about our involvement in the Flight Readiness Reviews
and how we pa_icipate in the L-minus Reviews and then how we participate in the launch deci-
sion. They will cover that in some detail.
As far as how issues and problems get identified, we have people, as I say, involved across
the program. They bring these issues and we status them. John and Paul status them in pilots'
meetings at least once a week where we have--the astronauts have opportunities to raise issues.
Of course, during the course of a week daily they will come forward with problems. Usually
if they can be resolved, John or P,J. will resolve those
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problems If I need to get into it. they will bring them forward to me. l will attempt to resolve
them and. if necessary, if I can't I will go forward to the individual I work for, who is head of
Space Operations. or I will go to the Program Manager. or I will go to the Center Direc' Jr. cr in
certain instano,s I will go to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight
We have. of course I think, a lot of inputs that coine in We are successful, I th.;nk, on get-
ting a number of those inputs accepted. Sometimes they get fully accepted Sometimes they get
partially accepted, and of course I think sometimes they don't get accepted Usually those are
due to programmatic considerations.
Usually if they are not accepted, they are usually due to some programmatic considerations
where they weigh the inputs that we give them and for other reasons decide that they would do
otherwise, so we will talk a little more about the specifics I think a little later.
CHA1RMAN ROGERS: Mr. Abbey, I'm having a little trouble with seeing the chart. Mr.
Young is Director of Flight Crew Operations?
MR. ABBEY: No. I am up in the top of the chart, and then John is in the head of the Astro-
naut Office.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So they've got their own chart. John is head of the
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Astronaut Offi, ce?
MR. ABBEY: Yes. sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who do you report to?
MR. ABBEY: I report to Cliff Charlesworth, who is the Director of Space Opera:_ons. We are
one of three elements that make up this Space Operations Directorate. There are two other or-
ganizations that are part of that org,_m_*ion, and we are only one part of it. We report through
Mr. Charlesworth to the Center Director.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are all of the astronau',s in the Astronaut Office under Mr. Young?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, they all are assigned to that &rice. We do have individuals, as I say,
working in other jobs as collateral duties, so they still have to keep up with all their astronaut
duties and all their training but we use them in other positions.
As I say, within Aircraft Operations we have the Deputy of that divismn is Don Williams,
one of the astronauts, and he has flown once and is scheduled to fly again as a commander.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So Mr. Crippen and Mr. Hartsfield are both involved in the Astro-
naut Office and they have other assignments, too?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, they are both actively
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involved. Mr. Crippen is my Deputy, and then I also have other individuals that are involved as
technical assistants, and we rotate astronauts through that position. So astronauts are involved,
I think, in every phase of the Directorate's operation.
I think that has been very beneficial to us because they have a direct involvement in the
management, and we can make use of their experience. I think that has been very good for us.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, I think I understand now. Mr. Crippen, then, is your _eputy?
MR. ABBEY: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Weitz is Mr. Young's Deputy?
MR. ABBEY: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Hartsfield works in the Astronaut Office?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, sir, he ,works for Mr. Weitz and Mr. Young.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Andhehasotherassignmentsaswe!i?
MR ABBEY:Yes,hedoes
CHAIR?JANROGERS: I think Im clear nov,
•Laughter ,
MR ABBEY: John is going to touch on that, talk about the
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different assignments and where they get involved and how' Henry, as well as the other astro-
nauts, ge', ssigned to other duties,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine.
MR. ABBEY: So I will turn it over tc John.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Young.
MR. YOUNG: Give me the first chart, please.
tViewgraph.) Im'' _ _ :_I
CHAIRMAN RGGERS: I think maybe one of the reasons I'm. having a little trouble is my
name tag blocks out--there.
MR. YOUNG: You can see this is a pretty straightforward requirenient for astronauts, but
we are providing those flight crews for NASA space vehicles and when we do that they get an
awful lot of time in flight planning meetings and simulators and test and checkout and training.
The commander will get at)out 1,000 hours probably, the pilot 500-plus, a mission specialist 500
to 700 depending upon what kind of assignments they have and training.
When the commander is assigned to a mission, no matter what it says in any book any-
where, the commander i:= responsible for getting that mission organized and getting it going and
getting his craw" trained and getting everybody ready to fly. When he is in thet
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machine he is responsible for that part of the thing too, from the time it lifts off to the time it
lands. All the things that he can do he will be responsible for.
When you talk abo_t participating in design and development, what you're really talking
about is hours, and hours and days of meetings and reviews and engineering simulations. You
talk about operating techniques and procedures, you're talking about more days and more m_et-
ings, desktop reviews, engineering simulations, reviews of malfunction procedures, and so on and
SO on.
The test and checkout, more time on your back and simulators and places like that, a lot of
places around the country. So the first four bullets really specify the kind of people tAat we
rP.aily need in the Astronaut Office. We need pilots, engineers and scientists, the best people
that we can get ,who are interested in taking care of those first four bullets, and I mean they
have to be interested.
'rhe qualities that we look for besides being pilots, engineers and scientists are desire, dedi-
cation, determination, drive and the ability to work with others. It is particularly important in
',light crew teamwork because it is critical to the success of every
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mission. You take a flight crew with five people in it, Those five people may know the vehicle
thoroughly, and when they learn to work together as a team they can do things that people
couldn't even imagine, that they wouldn't even imagine.
But most of the work that is done in the Astronaut Office, strangely enough, is desk work.
Eighty to ninety percent of the time it is behind a desk somewbere, and that is just the way it is.
It is study;ng and figuring out how they're going to do the right job, and that is the kind of
l-Ill
peoplewewantandthat we'relookin_for. If they'reinterestedin that kind of work.wecanuse
you
The next chart, please.
:Viewgraph J_,,._ _ : _.
MR v)UNG' This chart was made before we had the 5I-L accident, and at that t:me you
can see that we were primarily involved with flight crews asslgned to missions Im not _oing to
go into the second bullet because we have a lot of mission developmer_t work going on Wece
always iook,,ng at ne_ things to do. but I would like to talk a little bit about the third bullet,
mission support.
You just heard we have people that are in the mission control center They work clays and
mghts in
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integrated simulations. They work 24 hours a day around the dock ",,'hen we have missions
going on at Kennedy, and we have a full team of people down there, the cape crusaders who
support, test and check out the vehicle and payloads 24 hours a day for as long as it takes to get
them checked out.
The software in the Space Shuttle is a very interesting thing. There are about 110 pages you
can call up on a cathode ray tube that you have to know the information that is on there so you
can react to it.
There is also a thing called program notes. '34. at last count of program notes plus another
20 or so depending on what sofia-are drop you have. that crews have to know how to operate in
real time so that they don't do something, talking to the software, that might mess up their
system operations.
You have people supporting Johnson Space Center Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory.
When tbis chart was made. they were working two shifts a day. five days a week. but they work
around the clock when necessary. Our flight data file is aver:, interesting compilation of proce-
dures and techniques established over the years for normal nlissions that weigh 85 to 95 pounds.
That is a lot of tK ,Ks. For a space lab mission or somcLhing like a space lab mission, it could
weigh as much as 108 poun(,s.
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Ascent and entry is a separate bullet that people work on. and the reasen that is so is be-
cause there are about 175 separate crew procedures invoived in doing assents and entries, and
people have to know those and practice them a lot. We're right now working on aim simulation
in the vertical motion simulator to do some things to learn more about landing and rollout, and
I will talk some more about that 2ater.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph Ira.,. I :_ _i
MR. YOUNG: This is what we are doing right now. We have cut way back on flight crews.
We are still working with the last four assigned.
I won't talk very much about thi_ chart except to show you t_a_ the next to last line. the 51-
L accident investigation and recovery--and that number is not right. It changes daily. I think
yesterday it was 63 people, and when more people get back from spring break there w;ll be more
people on that chart.
Ninety-five percent of this work t:'mt the Astronaut Of'qce i_ doing is desk wo,k, and the
part that is not, I'm sure. is not very pleasant because it mainly involves sifting through crash-
type wreckage.
Let me show you the next chart, please.
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MR YOUNG This is what we did las_ >'ear It :scaiied the 1_,5 Astronaut Ac:ivi:> Last
:'ear ,*as an incredib!:, good year for the space program We flew nine Space Shuttle missions,
which was four more _han we fie*" in 19_4. and we almost flew ten but we had two hold kills
and one remanifest.
People say, well. that's bad luck. We!l, I tell you when you have a hold kill in this vehicle
the bast place to have it is before liftoff. There is no doubt about it, We had to do a remanifest.
and if you're not ready to fly that is exactly what you ought to do, so 1 think those were good
luck.
But in terms of training with respect to crew requirements and almost everybody else's re-
quirement, that was equivalent to about 11 flights, Since we have people all over the agency
working in almost every area--
DR. FEYNMAN: Excuse me. sir. What's a hold kill and what's a remanifest?
MR. YOUNG: That's a good question. A hold kill is when you're down there at the launch
pad and you get right up to engine sta_ t, and the engnne doesn't start or it starts and then shuts
down because it ha3 a prob','em
A remanifes_t is when you roll back and decide to go with another payload, so you put a new
payload in. Im sorry.
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DR. FEY> MAN: Thank you.
MR. YO_ NG: There is. in terms of requirements there is an awful lot of people who make
this program work, as you all kno_" b} now, in engineering, in training, in mission operations
and vehicle turnaround and payload test and checkout and so forth and so forth.
With my people all over the area. I can tell you that we were working about as hard as this
system can work from where I could see last year. We really did some amazing things. Becau_
we had such good flight crew training we were able to do some of these exercises, some of which
require enormous amounts of crew coordina¢ion that you would never even try.
The extravehicular activity bullets down there, for example. The first one was a try to re-
start a communications satellite, the LEASAT that had gone bad, a_H the next extravehicular
was a teamwork repair of that same satellite, and then the third was ._ space construction dem-
onstration, all of which reqmred all five people on each mission to work tog_'ther,
It was a very good year also from the standpoint ef flying. We Pew 58 seats with 54 astro-
nauts, and we got 14 new crew people experienced in space flight, so by the end of 1985 we had a
really good effort going. Right now we have 57 of 91 astronauts who
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hive Space Shuttle flight experience, and so right at this moment we have a lot of professional
flight crews with a lot of experience.
They are ready to deliver and do all the things that we need to do in space with people, but
expect until we recover from this accident it will be a while before they get to try out those
skills again.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Excuse me May I ask. did at the end of i't85 you feel or your office
%el that you had had too much to do in 19857
MR. YOUNG: I think unless--it was hard for me to see how we could do a lot more with our
people unless we do something different, and there are ongoing plans to improve Yhat situation,
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CHAIRMAN R_ERS In other _ords. you thought the act.vit_ .n 19_,', -,.as ab,-ur all ",.vu
.... _,4 hand'_e, but that th._ pressure in " ','=, was not toc _-roat i5 +'_'_" J.J:rect"
MR. YOUNG: f thought i965 was a really outstandin_ )'ear for the space program
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that if you had had to do more that )ear. _t ,night have been too
much?
MR YOUNG: I think we would have been pushing it. yes. sir
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. RUMMEL: What do you mean bv new crew peoFle? Are these people who have not
flown before?
MR. YOUNG" Yes. sir. The) are pc- r'!e who got space flight experience in i955.
MR RUMMEL: Would that include pec_[e like payload specialists0
o" " _ ba_,_MR. YOUNG: No. sir these are just people that work in the ,fic_ on a regular .
MR RUMMEL: In other words, the 54 would be a total number, 54 astronauts?
MR. YOUNG: In the office, yes. s_r
NIX. RUMMEL: In the otfice.
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir
MR. RUMMEL: I see. All right Thank you
• + _- . O+ +MR HOTZ: John. :n view of your statement that -9,,.> _as about as hard as you c+u_d push
the system with nine fligh, ts, how do you view the I;5 launch schedule for this )ear as far as the
load on }our system °
MR YOUNG: It is really hard for me to assess it from where I sit. but I think that it uould
have been
pretty tough.
MR HOTZ: Thanks.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, _,:o ahead. John,
MR. YOUNG: Well, that's about the size of what I had to say in my pr,2pared statement,
MR. ABBEY: Paul Weitz was going to go r_ext.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We want to ask ycu some questions later on, but we'll come back to
you. Mr. Young. Fine.
MR. WE!TZ: If I could have my first chart, please?
!Viewgraph.t ll¢,'_ _ _ tl
MF[. WEITZ: Mr. Chairman, what I'd like to do is. without goin_ into detail on this again is
te kind of round out a little bit what: John touched on, wos to point out to you. to try tc give you
some feel, you and the other members of the Commission. for the :nw>lvement of the Astronaut
Office in the day-to-day activiti(s at the various levels of the program as they occur
The Program Requirements Control Board. to take the first bullet for example, is a board
that is wh_t we call level two. which is chaired by Mr. Aldrich. to whom you've already spoken
and will later today. The purpose of _hat board is to approve most changes to the Shuttle
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transportation system both as they pertain to _he fleet generically or any changes that may be
made to a sl_ec_fic unique vehicle for anv particula_ purpose
Another very important level is the Configuration Control Board, which is at level three.
which is obviously the next level down below Mr Aldrich. They have signif :ant but limited au-
thoritv to authorize changes of the same type that the PRC'S wou!d do. Their primary purpose
in life is. as the:Jr name implies, is to maintain a record of the coy.figuration of the vehicles so we
really know what we're flying, and that is a lot more significant tt'.an it perhaps sounds.
Another, if we go clown to the fourth bullet, the Orbiter ._ vionics Software Control Board is
essentially the same type of activity and control of the software. Remember tb, at, as you have
probably been briefed, that this vehicle flies to;ally by wire.
_verything in it is controlled by the computers, and the software control and design is ver-'.
very important in every aspect of managing this vehicle, both on orbit and during the active
assent and entry flight phases. So this is essentially the software equivalent of the PRCB, as we
have referred to the Program Requiremel,:_ Control Board.
Another significant one is the next to the
'_* bullet, the Mission Integration Control Board. which primarily its primary purpose is to
_. _re that the Shuttle transportation system will in fact support the missions that are assigned
to it.
They are the folks, for example, who decide that--and these folks work for Mr. Aldrich, and
they will decide to remanifest, for example, if the situation warrants, to use John's prevmus ex-
ample.
Could I have the next page. p}ease?
MR. WEITZ: We have many other functions, as you ca., see here For example, the Flight
Operatie ts Review is a periodic assessment of our progress toward the planned flight rate. This
looks at it from an overall programmatic point of view to see that we are doing the things we
can in the right manner to get to where it is we're trying to go as far as our manifest and our
flight schedule,
CHAIIxMAN ROGERS: Which one is t aat?
MR. WEITZ: That's the first one, sir, on the second page, the Flight Operations Review.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just to make it a little more easy at least for me to understand, in
_he event of a problem with the joint that caused the trouble in 51-L, when information devel-
oped about that which one of
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these groups w_uld that information normally go to?
Would it be--in other words if you have trouble on a flight with blow-by and it was clear
from that flight that there was erosion and blow-by and it ly ne a problem, how would that
information be conveyed to these panels, and who would convey __?
MR. WEITZ: I'm not, I think, well versed or Qualified enough to answer that question. I
would prefer, if you don't mind, that you address that to Mr. Aldrich when he is on later be-
cause that is with . his organization.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In ot_er wo:ds, you wouldn't know how that would get--I'm trying
to find out how that information gets to the astronaut community, and I gather in this case it
didn't.
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MR WEITZ Yes. sir
CHAIRMAN ROGERS And the information about the joint that failed and we think prob-
ably cau_d the accident was not known to anv of you gentlemen, as I understand it
MR WEITZ That is true. which means, therefore, that if it surface_ at one of these activi-
ties as represented on these pages is either we were not made aware of it while we were there or
we did not realize the sigt-ificance ot the item.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. _' gather from s') far in our investigation that it wasn't present-
eel to you from an
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organizational standpoint None of these groups knew about it, or at least you didn't know about
it. That is correct, isn't it? None of you knew about the problems that you had been having with
this joint?
MR. WEITZ" Yes, sir, that is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess one of the tL. :gs we have been trying to find out is how that
happened. How' did it happen that the astronauts who are so _itally concerned with safety as-
pects didn't know about this problem?
MR. WEITZ: That is part of what _e're tryihg to reconstruct, also.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess my question i_ -*+here would you normally have expected that
information to go organizationally? Which one of the_e groups would normally, or should have
rather than normally, should have received that information?
MR ABBEY: I think, if I might answer that, if it was a flight anomaly it usually would
come u-," at the Flight Readiness Review, which Mr. Crippen is going to taik about in a minute.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, thank you.
MR. WEITZ: Well, but as a design change I would expect it to shcw up, if it s recognized as
a problem, and something potentially requiring a design
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change, it would prebably show up at the first bullet on the first page.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let's be specific because obviously i'm having a little problem
with so many suborganizations. I understand it is necessary, and you do a wonderful job, but for
us to decide where it should h_ve--where that information should have gone. In this c&_e begin-
ning in August of 1985 concery, had been expressed to a lot of people about this joint and about
this seal and about the O-ring and about putty and so forth, and at that point there were tests
being made to possibly redesign that joint.
Now, what I have trouble understanding is why none of you gentlemen knew about that.
That was a redesign question at that time. They were considering the redesign of it at the begin-
ning of 1985, and they were considering the redesign of that joint even at the time the accident
happened, and yet none of the astronauts were given that information.
I'm asking the question to see if we can find out what happened in the system that caused
that failure, that you didn't know anything about it. Well, we will get to Mr. Crippen later. Go
ahead.
MR. WEITZ: ::e do not have an answer to that, Mr. Rogers.
:?390
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I wasn't pressing you. I'm just trying to find out why it might
happen, because one of the things we're goin¢ to have to consider in our report is what can we
do to recommend corrective action so that it doesn't happen again so that everyone, particularly
the astronauts, are aware of these problems when they arise.
1416
Now,we realizethat you're not goingto beawareof everysingieproblem,but certainly
critical oneshke this that hadgottento the point wherea redesignis _derconsideration,it is
difficult for usto understandwhyyoudidn't knowaboutit
I can_e whyMr. Youngandothers were upset about it, Mr. Hartsfietd, t know, I noticed
the same thing.
MR. WEITZ: We feel the system is in place but it broke down in some way. an't I think part
of the message that comes across here. perhaps, is we do not have enough people in the Astro-
naut Office to he intimately involved in all of these details along the way. I think from John's
presentation, and you can see from some of these activities, these do not represent all of the
activities of these various boards and panels that go on at 'be Johnson Space Center, either, and
that we must in
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fact have a system that does identify and correct these deficiencies.
MR. HOTZ: Mr Weitz, do you think the joint problem is the kind of prc_lem that should
h, :e surfaced in Flight Readiness Reviews or configuration control beards or wherever, that it
ought to have come t( your attention?
MR. WEITZ: I do_,'t see. how we could say otherwise, Mr Hotz I have to say I believe that.
since it turned out to be apparently a fatal flaw.
MR. HOTZ: Well, we're interested in your opinions. That is wl-:v we're asking these ques-
tions.
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir. The answer is yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thal_k you. Go ahead.
MR. WEITZ: As we move down this page, this mainly is a representation of how we get out
of the design and engineering type of activities and into the mission and flight specific planning
activities.
All of these groups are related one to the other. They tie together in various ways, and we
either directly or indirectly have tried to maintain awareness and cogniz2.ne _ of what is dis-
cussed and what will be discussed ano what Las been decided at these various boards. As I say.
we can't always go but we are within the Space Operations Directorate.
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One of the other divisions was the Mission Operations Division. Those are where the flight
directors are resident, and the flight and controllers, and they are our principal representatives
at many of these boards and panels.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I'm _orry. Could you say th._t again, Paul.
MR. WEITZ: Yes. The folks in MOD, the Missions Operations Directorate.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Are representatives of whom?
MR. WEITZ: We often depend upon them to represent us, either directly or indirectly, at
these different boards and panels when we can't make it. We lean heavily upon those folks, the
flight directors and the flight controllers, to keep us up to speed and apprised of what is going
on because those are the operational system experts.
If you have no further q-_nons, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Chairman, I think I'll leave this view-
graph and turn it over to Bob Crippen, who will discuss a little bit _bout our involvement in the
mission specific activities.
MR. CRIPPEN: Yes, as George Abbey, John Young and Paul Welt:. have indicated, the As-
tronaut Office is intimately involved with ell phases of the program.
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Obvio,lslyonethat you'vebroughtout showsa breakdownsomewhere,but it i not becausewe
don'tthink we're involved.
What my remarks are go_ _ to be directed toward, what it tnkc_ in the _nal week _r so
prior to launch, the major milestones that we go through ip deciding tt:at we are ready to fly
There are many things that lead up to a mission, many meetings, many miles: rues. and I'm only
going to address those that occur in the final weeks.
If we could go to :t-art C-2. please?
MR. CRIPPEN: The first one is the Flight Reaainess Review, which was lluded to earlier.
The Flight Readiness Review occurs approximately one to two weeks prior to fi_ght. It is a Level
I, meaning the Associate Administrator for Space Flight is the gentleman that is the main
leader of that particular meeting.
One of the prime things that we do in t Flight Readiness Review is review the anomalies
that have occurred on previous missions and decide how we have resolved those or why we think
it is acceptable to go fly with those.
Specifically in mentioning the joint problem,
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I was the pattie pant representing the Flight Crew Operation- As I indicated on the second
bullet there, we normally are represented by the Di ¢-tor of Flight Crew Operations. George
Abbey or myself: the Deputy, as his representative; al, d t senior member of the Flight Crew or
Astronaut Office. Normally it is the one that w refer to as our Deputy for integrated Ops.
On Mission 51-E, which was the mission that we flew right after 5l-C where we did have a
blow-by problem, that was presented, and it was presented that we had had a blow-by and that
there was sooting In truth, from my perception it wasn't considered that much of a big deal,
and _t wasn't like we had a major catastrophe awaiting in front of us. ! guess the emphas_s was
not such that one would think that it was the major problem that it was.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who presented that anomaly?
MR. CRIPPEN: That was presented by the Marshall Space Flight Center. In going through
their stuff on the solid rocket boosters. It was presented as an anomaly and, if my meraory
serves me right, we had had a putty change on the joint just prior to that, and it was alluded
that perhaps the putty modification may have had something to do wi'zh that but that it really
wasn't that big of a deal.
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That was the only specific flight that I can remember, although I think in some other Flight
Readiness Reviews that perhaps was discussed.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Crippen. looking at a document that related to that Flight Read-
iness Review, I notice that the resolution said acceptable risk because of limited ,_xposure and
redundancy on the seal.
Mr. CRIPPEN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Lid you at that time realize that the Criticality One list had indicat-
ed that there was no redundancy?
MR. CRIPPEN: I did not, and I was not aware of the waiver that had changed the joint from
a 1-R to a 1, and I was not aware of the rotation problem. If I had been aware of that in associa-
tion with the sitting I would have taken the problem much more seriously.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR CRIPPEN So at the Flight Readiness Review we do go through all of the anomalies
from the previous flights, and if it is--usual!v what we are addressin_ is the flight just prior,
and since we are also rotating vehicles now, orbiters, we also go back to the !ast lqiKht of the
orbiter that we are just getting ready to fly
In addition, we get essentially' a go irom all of the levels of the program that we are ready
to go in
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the missio_ and sometimes it's normal that we do receive action items out of these meetings
that are to i, closed prior to the actual flight.
Could we go to chart C-8?
!ViewgraphC-3.} It¢,,I _ _ 1,7
MR. CRIPPEN: Fhe next major milestone is address(a at the Launch Minus One Day
Rev,ew, which is jast that. One day prior to _he flight we will hold another Level I meeting, and
it is primarily" a final tagup looking at the actions as have been closed from the Flight Readiness
Re_ iew.
It looks at specifics like what is the weather prediction for tomorrow and any other anoma-
lies that might have occurred in that period of a week In general, i_ is aqme or less of a final
tagup, and again every element of the program gives a final go.
We are represented again at that meeting normally" by Mr Abbey and Captain Young. Now.
that is the minimum representation. We quite often have other people that will attend or be on
a telecon hookup. For example, the Deputy of Fhght Crew Operations normally monitors that
from Houston,
Could we go to chart C-4, please?
,Viewgraph C-4. i ,a,_ _.: J l
MR. CRIPPEN: When we get into the final
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launch count there are numerous people involved, obviously. The most obvious, of course, is the
flight crew. The flight crew, like e', erybody else in the program, can only work on the basis of
the knowledge that they have. They normally are kept fairly up to date regarding all details
with regard to problems that are directly mission related or vehicle related.
In truth in the final count the commande: and the pilot are the only two people in the As-
tronaut Office that actually end up giving a final go. In the final count, the launch director will
ask if the commander is go and if the pilot is go, and in truth I have. nor do I think any of the
other gentlemen who have flown, have ever thought that if we said we were no go I'm sure we
wouldn't have lifted off.
We, of course, would have to have had a reason for doing that. For example, Dick Scobee on
51-L when they had the hatch problem wanted to make sure that the hatch was go and didn't
want to take that responsibility on the crew and wanted somebody to come in and check it, and
requested and received that kind of an inspection.
The Director of Flight Crew Operations, George Abbey, is located at the launch site. the
place right off the launch control center called the Operations Support Room. and he is inti-
mately aware of what is
239_,
going on in the final count
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We have a weather pilot up flying one of our Shuttle training airplanes, and that is normal-
lv John Young doing the final check of the weather in case we might be involved in a return to
launch site abort
In addition to that we also have a wea:her coordinator, who is an astronaut located at the
landing field itself talking to both all of the Cape weather people and to Houston and to whoever
is flying the weather airplane, normally John.
The Deputy Dirt :tor of Flight Crew Operations will normally be back at the Johnson Space
Center in Houston, available in the flight control area if there are any questions that come up
that he should be making an input to.
In addition, we have a senior astronaut assigned in a support room. That is referred to as
spacecraft analysis with the acronym of SPAN just off this flight control room, and that person
is intimately aware of what is going on in the finM count and can make inputs.
Of course, we also have the CAPCOM. who is assigned to the flight contro! room who is an
astronaut that does do all of the communications with the vehicle.
So we definitely are intimately aware of what
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is going on in the final count and have numerous means of making inputs to that.
MR. RUMMEL: I note on the first chart 2 and chart 3 that the Astronaut Office is repre-
sented by a Director of Flight Crew Operation and so on. Is that a mandatory participation?
MR. CRIPPEN: It is a mandatory participation that he is either there or his representative.
MRI RUMMEL: Well, now I note the absence of the mention of the specific flight crews that
are involved in the mission being considered. Do I read that correctly?
MR CRIPPEN: You read that correctly, and that is by intent. It is mainly that the crew is
so involved in the training and the daily preparation of getting ready to go fly that it would be
impossible to pull them directly into these meetings. It is always, they are always given a sum-
mary. quite often given the detailed pitches of e',erything that has gone on in the particular
meetings n"olved
It is also true that we have a health stabilization program that starts at a week prior to
fligt-" _,nere we don't have them normally getting in large groups just to make sure they don't
come down with a col _ or something.
2400
MR. RUMMEL: But of course there is TV and telecon and that sort of thing that might take
the place of that. But what I'm getting at you've already touched upon, is in cxercising the final
judgment, which I now understand the commander has from what you said, as to whether to go
or no go. Since he did not participate directly in the Flight Readiness Review or the Launch
Minus One Review, he is relying on passed-on information, I take it, to the extent that he may
receive it rather than direct participation?
I wonder if that doesn't raise the question of the degree of knowledge that he nay have in
his possession as to any potential problems or questionable areas that he may be confronted
,;th on the flight?
MR. CRIPPEN: Sir, I can understand your concern; however, you must realize that putting
the n =_ion together to go fly is a very complicated thing that involves lots of people, and there
is no wa: _hat the flight crew themselves can personally participate in ever_xhing that it takes
to get reacL, -o go fly.
They are totally reliant on being supplied information, and we have set up chains of com-
mand and funnels for doing that. I think that there has no_ been anything that has occurred in
one of these reviews that was considered in any way significant that the flight
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cre_ .-. haven't heard
MR RUMMEL: I think I understand the inherent comple×ity and the difficulty of the com-
mander be_ing apprised of each and every item that might be brought into consideration with
respect to the flight.
What I was addressing, though, were the
ever, that have existed or that may exist, but
that he at least is aware )f those things with
actual problems that have developed.
I would have thought that that category
p)tential hazards, those conditions, O-rings, what-
which review should shed light and make clear, so
which he may be confronted with a3 contrast,_d to
would not be limitless, that it might be contained
and it might be an important item for him to consider in deciding whether or not to go or no go.
MR. CRIPPEN: In general the system is set up such that those items are brought to his
attention, and they are numerous that we go through and talk about and get the flight crew's
inputs as to what we sheuld be doing about them, in the case of the O-rings again.
That isn't just true of the Astronaut Office. I might admit there are several layers of NASA
management that were also apparently not aware of the O-ring problem.
DR. RUMMEL: But it is indirect information?
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MR. CRIPPEN: It is indirect information, yes, sir.
DR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
MR. ABBEY: If I might, there is a system set up where we do have the systems people at
KSC that do the test and checkout work. We have the flight control :cam go o,,er each of the
systems in a telecon, realizing that the crew is in quarantine. That is done at L-I. and we go
through each of the systems and any problems are discussed over that telecon directly with the
KSC test and checkout personnel as well as the flight control team in Houston.
MR. RUMMEL: Well, are those problems that have manifested themselves in the normal
course of checkout or ar. these potential problems that maybe existed on prior flights or which
analysis indicates could occur ?
MR. YOUNG: They really fall into both categories. They are any concerns that any of the
systems people are knowledgeable of m Houston and the flight control team or any of the
system problems that they are knowledgeable of at KSC.
In addition to that we do have, as we said, the astronauts involved in the test and checkout
operation, and they do the switch list and they support all of the activities before the crew
comes out to the
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vehicle. They are very knowledgeable of any problems that the team is aware of, and they brief
the crew on any anomalies or any problems during that last day and right on until when the
crew goes out to the vehicle.
MR. HOTZ: Bob, could you explain a little bit more about this authority of the mission com-
mander on launch, the go or no go call? Is this a formal documented authority, or is this just
developed over usage and tradition?
MR. CRIPPEN: It is a part of the formal OMI or the Operational Maintenance Instruction
that the Cape uses to count down the launch, and so it is a formal NASA document and he is
one of the--he and the pilot are the two people that have a formal go.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
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MR.RUMMEL:Howlongprior to launchis that go nogodecisiongivenby the command--
er?
MR.CRIPPENSomebodycanprobablyhelpmeout. it is aboutthe pineminutepoint, the
0-,c)minus9 minute.
MR.RUMMEL:Prior to theau amatedIll'toil"prc.cedure?
MR.CRIPPEN:Yes,sir.
DR.COVERT:CaptainCrippen,you'vebeenanoperaLionalpilot and a piiot in development
squadron and a test pilot as well as a pilot and commander of the
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Space Shuttle
Would you sort of help me to understand some of the similarities and differences between
these different kinds of operations, particularly in terms of the complexity and th=_ decision
points and the pilot's input into the activities, or is this such a broad thing that you would be
here the rest of tla_, ,"lay talking about it?
MR, CRIPPEN: I'm afraid we would be here the rest of the day talking about it.
DR, COVERT: Could you summarize it briefly, then?
MR. CRIPPEN: Flying a spacecraft, of course, is a lot more complex than taking off in an
airplane. Even if you take a test flight, for example, that will have a test team behind it and
usually a test conductor or a test engineer on the gro. _d and the pilot. You are not working
with as many people. You are working with--even though it can be complex, it is a simple piece
of machinery. I don't think there's a vehicle anywhere in the world that is probably as complex
as the total Space Transportation System when you put it together.
Consequently, the biggest difference is you have to, as I was saying for Mr. Rummel. you
have to be reliant more on people supporting you, and you have to
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have confidence in the system. You have to have trust in the system, otherwise you never would
go fly it.
We are normally cognizant of thing_ that we consider significant problems, and we are inti-
mately involved _ith working those. Again, if--just like a pilot would have the opportunity
when he went out and ran the engines up, if something didn't look right to him or didn't fee!
right to him you could say no go, and the commander has an opportunity to do that. however, be
is only as goozl as the data base that he's working with.
DR. COVERT: It is essentially the complexity of the data base here that puts the increased
challenge and the increased reliance on the whole team to make this _- successful decision?
MR. CRIPPEN: In truth, with most of the modern clay aircr :t we are flying, as they become
more and more complex the pilot in the cockpit is faced wi:h a similar situation. He really is.
DR. COVERT: Fine. Thank you very much.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: How much total flght crew personnel are assigned to
each flight ia addition to those that are actually going to gc in?
MR, CRIPPEN: I think I might defer to Paul on that one.
MR. WEITZ: We don't have the support teams
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anymore, Neil, so directly assigned to follow a flight is just the flight crew itself.
MR. CRIPPEN: But we do have the CAPCGMs that are directly associated coming up on a
mission; however, they rotate from flight to flight, but we do not have in a role like we used to
have of a backup crew plus an astronaut support crew. We do not have that anymore.
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MR.ABBEY:Wedohaveat leastfouror fiveastronautsona full-time basissupport:ngthe
final countandsupportingthe crewdownat theCape.
VICE CHAIRMANARMSTRONG:Other than thoseindividualsassignedto the specific
flight, who wouldbe mostknowledgeableaboutthe specificflight considerationsystems,pay-
loadsandsoon for a givenlaunch?
MR CRIPPEN:That wouldbetheCAPCOMs.
VICECHAIRMANARMSTRONG:Isheassignedthat positiona substantialperiodaheadof
timesothat hedevelopsthat bodyof knowledgealongwith thecrew?
MR. CRIPPEN:Normallywhatwehavebeendoingis supplyingCAPCOMsin for a period
of at leastsix monthsto a year,and we rotatethembut weusethe sameCAPCOMsoveron
eachflight. Themoreoftenyouareflying flightsthe lesstimetheyhavein betweenthemto get
familiar w_ththe payloadsthat areassociatedon
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a particular mission.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It appears as though you are dependent, to some extent,
on a conduit of information from in terms of the review processes that Paul was talking about of
information from whoever, Mr. Abbey or his representatives, that are in the review process get-
ting to the commander.
So that is a conduit, but a conduit also acts as a filter and cuts down the amount of informa-
tion that comes through to the most important points. I think the question that concerns the
Commissioners is how do you a_sure that the filter doesn't filter out too much m,_crmation or
provides the proper amount?
MR CRIPPEN: We do depend upon the filter, but we are ftying crews of normally five
people fr_m the Astronaut Office. My personal experience has been probably the most knowl-
edgeable people on the center with :he payloads -were in the crew, and I'm not sure that isn't oi
the vehicle If you want to take it from an overall standpoint. It is mainly because, as John
indicated, sti!i our job is not sitting in simulators. It is sitting down and going over paper, and
we are normally assigning crews like mission specialists to a flight a year ahead of time. The;_
work in great detail with that
2408
payload and with the payload support officers that we have there in our flight control room.
Those people know that payload as well as anybody, and so I don't think that they are
really dependent from a payload standpoint on that much of a filter, if you will, to get data.
From the orbiter side or the vehicle side, I think that our flight crews probably understand
it as good as any person that possibly could when you have to look at the overall system. They
rely veL _. heavy, as we always have, on our systems division people who monitor each system
specifically, but everyone will--is not bashful about picking up a phone and saying hey, come
talk to me about this, and sit down and go over any details of any problems.
We normally have the anomaly list from a flight to go through as soon as that flight is over,
and you start looking at it yourself as well as having observed what's going on in the flight.
So I don't want to leave the picture that the flight crew is off here training and they don't
know anything about what is going on down in the bowels of the ship because that is not correct.
Going to these formal reviews, we have to depend on other people to handle it for us.
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MR. YOUNG: .- the countdown demonstration tests, the people down at the Cape go
through a complete nsting of what's happened with that particular vehicle, what has gone
1423
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wrong with it. and then when they get down there for the flight the Cape people go through
another listing of what has happened with that vehicle Each vehicle is very different.
We a!so get a complete listing _f what has happened on the vehicle from the systems people
in the Missions Operation Directorate that savs what has been changed out. what are the new
problems, what are the old problems, what are the unresolved problems.
This is about a five-page memo of specific things that have happened to that vehicle that
people are interested in, and since they're going to be watching the machinery while it flies they
are the best. They know that, and they also participate in that L-1 briefing so they know what
happened to the vehicle before it launches.
It is about as good a job as you can do on this kind of thing. You really want to tell astro-
nauts what's going on about problems that they can do something about. When you go to a
Flight Readiness Rev%w and you hear what people have said, there may be some very interest-
ing things in there, but if the
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astronaut really can't do something about it or be aware of it or take some kind of action and
it's not a serious problem that anybody has brought up, the Flight Readiness Review lasts all
day long, and those people are terribly busy, you probably wouldn't tell them about it. I don't
fecal! anything coming up in the Flight Readiness Review on the solid rocket motor seals.
MR. RUMMEL: Why wouldn't what he could do something about include discussion, de-
mands, requiremepts, whatever, for design improvements in cases where such appears to be the
case?
MR. YOUNG: I think that's exactly what would happen, and I think if anybody in the gang
had known about this business and understood it we might have said something, but really it
should have been taken care of by the process long before it ever got to a Flight Readiness
Review, I believe.
MR. RUMMEL: Absolutely, but in cases where it does not that would be a legitimate con-
cern, would it not, or might not it be on the part of the astronauts?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. and they would talk about it.
MR. ABBEY: Nell, I think we dor.'t just rely upon John or I or Crip going to the Flight
Readiness
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Review. We also have a very formal meeting with the flight directors and the CAPCOMs, and
the flight directors have been at the Flight Readiness Review, so you're getting really two inputs
coming into the flight crew.
We schedule that meeting at L-, probably L-4 after the Flight Readiness Reviev_, so they're
getting an input not only from John and I but they're also getting an input from the flight direc-
tors and as well as the CAPCOMs, so they're getting kind of a redundant input there.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: George, I understand that, and I think I understand that
we have a system of very complex information flow and a system that you've devised with
checks and balances to make sure that information flow properly gets to the right people.
Nevertheless, we have to face the fact that somehow it hasn't. Can you be at all specific
about whether you think c:,aanges are appropriate? If so, do you have any idea as to what you
could recommend?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, I think we have some thoughts along that line, and we are going to cover
them a little later.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Okay, thank you.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To be a little inure specific there was some Mission Management
Team meetir_
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on the 27th of January, the day before the launch. Was there an astronaut at that meeting or a
representative, and who was it?
MR. ABBEY: We weT-e tied into that meeting by telecon, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: According to the testimony, as I recall the testimony Mr. Aldrich
said at that time that there were weather concerns expressed.
MR. ABBEY: We were in on the meeting on the 26th. We were not involved even on the
telecon on the 27th.
CHAIRMAN ROGE1;;,q: We:l, to go back to it, the meeting was held at 2:00 p.m. after the
launch was scrubbed that day, and it was 2:00 p.m. on January 27th.
At that time Mr. Aldrich said that there was a concern about the weather the next day, and
he advised everyone at that meeting that if they had any problems with weather or any con-
cerns about the weather to let him know.
As the testimony disclosed, he was not advised about the O-ring, the joint problem and the
weather as it related to that joint, and my question ;;,as, was any astronaut present at that
meeting?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir', I think I was, along with, as Bob said k_fore, the Spacecraft Analysis
Room representative.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Then a: the 9:00 meeting the morning of the launch, were you there,
too, Mr. Weitz?
MR. WEITZ' "_es, si_.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you remember that Mr. Aldrich advised the people at those
meetings if there were any concerns about the weather that he should know about it and that
he should be told about them?
MR WEITZ: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And he wasn't, apparently °
MR. WEITZ: Well, the meeting on the--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm speaking about the weather as it relates to the joint, the O-rings.
MR. WEITZ: We were not aware, no, sir. We were not aware of any concern at all with the
O-rings, let along the effect of weather on the O-rings.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So he was not, nor were you, advised of all of the problems that ex-
isted in the minds of the people in Thiokol and the people at Marshall about the weather? Nei-
ther you nor Mr. Aldrich were advised about that?
MR. WEITZ: Not that I remember at those meetings, no, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROSERS: Thank you.
MR. CRIPPEN: Okaj_, if I could go on to chart C-5, please?
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MR. CRIPPEN: As you brought up, the Mission Management Team meetings are a mecha-
nism that the Level II program manager uses to make decisions throughout a mission, and he
can use that Mission Management Team meeting prior to the mission, as was done in this par-
ticular case.
rap-
Norma!iy as I address them here. :hey _re daily meetings that occur during a mission that
give the program office an opportunit2, "_o make any major decisions that need to be made. We
are well represented there, as I indicated, again as a minimum by Mr. Abbey, Captain Young.
and again our SPAN represenb _ive wii! also be there.
Chart C,6. please?
,Viewgraph C-6.i lt_,._ I : L_i
MR, CRIPPEN: For entry essentially it is an inverted process from what we do for launch.
Of course, the flight crew is there, and any time that they elect that they might want to wave
off the entry they certainly have the authority to be able to do that.
Again, we have a Shuttle training airplane checking the _eather at the landing site and in
general if the landing site is intended to be the Kennedy Spaceorafl Center we also have one as
a backup at
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Edwards in case that should become the prime site. We also have our weather coordinator, an
astronaut on the ground at the landing site itself passing that information back and forth.
MR. RUMMEL: Now, would these things you mentioned apply to alternate sites, for exam-
pie, overseas sites?
MR. CRIPPEN: The only overseas site that we normally staff would be our trans-Atlantic
abort site, and that is not normally done with an astronaut but it is done by a member of the
Flight Crew Operations Directorate who is very familiar with the capabilities of the Shuttle.
They do check the weather at that particular site, yes, sir, but that is the only one that we
check.
DR. CO_ ERT: Do they check that by standing there or by getting in an airplane and flying
around and seeing how it looks from the ai:'?
MR. CRIPPEN: Normally getting in an airplane and flying and checking it out, yes, sir.
We also, back in Houston, will be staffed with normally the Deputy Direr-tot of Flight Cr_w
Operations, again in a standby mode in case he is needed, cur SPAN representative and again
the CAPCOMs, of which there is a prime and a backup, that are all aware of that.
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Those actually conclude my formal remarks. If there are no other questions, I will pass it on
to Hank Hartsfield.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, could we just ask one question here to follow up on Nell's to
make sure that we do cover this?
Are your recommendations, Mr. Abbey, downstream going to apply also to improvements
that you may see in the astronaut participation in the Flight Readiness Review or the Mission
Management Team meetings, or is that just going to be in terms of resolving issues?
MR. ABBEY: No, they're not going to address that aspect of it.
DR. KEEL: Well, can we ask now, then, are there any recommendations you have now, any
of you, with respect to improving astronaut participation in Flight Readiness Reviews or the
launch decision process?
MR. CRIPPEN: Mr. Keel, from my standpoint I don't know of anything that I would recom-
mend that we would change in that particular area.
I think that the basic system is good, but again it is only as good as the _ata base that you
have feeding it, and I don't know how we could change that at this particular time as far as the
actual participation that we have from the Astronaut Office.
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DR WHEELON: I have a question for those of you that were there the day before that fate-
fui day Did you detect an unusual urgency to proceed with the iaunching? Was it out of tht •
pattern o( prior launches that you had experienced?
MR. YOUNG: I think there's an urgency to proceed with every launch once you get a vehi-
cle loaded and on the launch pad, I don't see anything wrong with that, but it is there. I think in
the future the higher the launch rate the more that urgency exists, and I'm not sure that that's
something we have @ whole lot of control over, but I think we ought to watch it very carefully.
DR. WHEELON: I accept that answer, of course, but the question, granting that each
launch has an urgency, was there an unusual urgency surrounding this launch. °
MR. WEITZ: I did not perceive any different sense of urgency w'iti, this one as with an),
other. I agree with John. I think that that sense to get it off, there is a general feeling once you
start into the count that a lot of work has gone to get yeu out there on launch morning, and we
would like to within reason do those things necessary to get the launch off.
But I think that that has, you know--if
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vou're asking for perceived differences. I did not perceive any.
MR. ACHESON: I have a question for Captain Crippen. I would be interested in your reflec-
tions on a suggestion that some of us have heard made informally, that perhaps new problems
that don't have preplanned responses ought not to be decided or disposed of after, let us say, the
L-I or at some stage fairly near the launch, but should simply be the occasion for a scrub and
then a more deliberate consideration.
Would you regard that as an unmanageable approach to the problem, or would you think it
had merit, or would you have some modifications on that idea of your own?
MR. CRIPPEN: There comes a point in time in any count where if you have an unusual
problem develop that the answer is to go ahead and scrub. I think that if b 1, if you're tatking
about L-1 days. would be unreasonable myself.
There are numerous things that can happen, arld quite often _hey are not what you antici-
pated but we have a crew of people, both at the Kermedy Space Center. the Marshall Space
Flight Center, and the Johnson Space Center., as well as all the supporting contractors that are
very knowledgeable on the vehicle.
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In general, if they have time to work a problem and run it through the checks and balances
that we have within our program level management and everybody is satisfied w!th it, then I
think we ought to be able to lift off.
I personally think that the way we handle that today is reasonable.
MR. ACHESON: Thank you.
MR. HARTSFIELD: Let me make a comment on that. I think I can give you an example on
flight 41-D, because this is something that came up, I think, in the thing you're talking about,
something of a general nature that doesn't really apply specifically to something uncovered
during the launch.
We had had a problem with so_,e of the jet driver boxes, and we began to look at our elec-
tronics, and in the process of !ooking a _ all our electronic boxee we found a possible single point
failure in the master events controller box that would ca'ase a timing problem such that if it
occurred we would not get rid of the solid rockets.
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Thepossibilityof thissinglepoint failureoccurringwasvery.very low There ",'.as a way to
temporarily fix the problem by patching t_e software to open up the period in which it would
give the PC :.ess
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than 50 and let the thing ope-ate.
Well. this problem onl) .._urfaced the day before we were _upposed to launch, and George
and John brought the problem to me as the commander and the crew. and we discussed all the
aspects of this. We could, as it was presented to me, we could a_cept the risk and go fly. We had
flown 11 flights already with this problem and didn't know it; or we could delay a day a:,cl fix
the software and veri_ the patch. We had the patch ready to go but it had not been verified in
our avionics lab.
Our input as the crew and the commander was let's wait a day and do it right and fix the
software. They took that back to the program, and as far as I know--well, we did delay. That is
what happene6 and so that is, in my mind, the way the system worl_ and it is supposed to work.
But again, the information has to surface. In the case of the solid rocket n '_tor. somewhere
along the line the information didn't get to us.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I suggest we take a ten-minute recess.
_A brief recess was taken.
MR. JOHNSON: Let's continue, please. Mr. Weitz. do you want to make a correction.
please?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir, there were many meetings
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involved with the efforts to launch 51-L. and as best I can recollect I went to more than one
meeting on the 26th and 27th but apparently the particular one under question, the 2:00 p.m
Mission Management Team meeting on that date I was not p:esent at.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is fine. It wa_ only impor'_nt because, in my mind, because
Mr. Aldrich had pointed ot, t to every'_xty at that meeting if ti_ere were any weather concerns,
not just about the launch pad 5ut any weather ccncerns, that he would like to be notified him-
self the next day.
Mr. Hartsfield, would you proceed?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Yes. sir. If I could have the first chart, please?
tViewgraph.t [_,.i i :_ I i I
MR. HARTSFIELD: What I would like to talk about here is how I think we Jught to address
some of the issues. You know, we know that there are certain issues that some of us have been
concerned about, and we've had a lot of discus,_iens, as you might imagine, at our office as to
how we should handle these.
What I would like to present to you now are my views on the subject, and I might say that
it is my opinion that the general thrust of what I am going to tell you is shared by almost every-
one in the office as
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to how do we get from here to flying again.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could l say. too. before you g'et started again, the_e are the very
things that the Commission is most interested in.
As I said in my opening statement, one of the things ti_at we were asked to c'o was to make
recommendations to the President on safety factors that should be considered and make recom-
mendations along the lines of how can we make flight safer in the future.
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Sowhat -ou areaboutto doandwhatwewill bea_kin_ " others on the panel about are the
safety factors that should be addressed bv ;he Commission. and so we appreciate this presenta-
t io.<,
MR t{ARTSFiELD: Well. this is _oing to be very generai in nature, and were goin< to talk
about aome issues _nen [ ge_ through here. but what I am propesin@ _s how I _ae,,s, that I
would like to see things proc:ed Asisa.,d, ] think that it is shared in the office
If l could go to the nex: chart .>
,Viewgraph, I<,.!_ : _-,
MR HARTSFIELD: All of us kno_ that we have just suffered a great tragedy, ard I think It
has gnven me a lot of time to reflect, and I think it is time for introspection in a!l areas of our
business, star_ing
2423
right at the Astronaut Office and going cn up throug.l-: all of the facets of this program, to see
what we should do.
Nov,. most of the things that I'm going to mention here are already being done, and we have
astronauts, as you saw a while ago. participating in all of these things. In mv mnd when we go
through ail these things and when you read intc these recommendations, safety is the watch-
word That is the thing that is, of course, foremost in all of our minds because, really, if you are
_afe that equates to a successful mission, and after all that is who* we're trying to do.
If I could have the next chart?
_Viewgraph., !m._ i ; I-i
MR. HARTSFIELD: The first thing that I think we ought t,, do and we ar,_ doing is revali-
dating the design. Now. that is getting rather basic but I think we need to go back and look at
what we set out to build, what our design requirements are and whether they were consistent or
not.
For example, it doesn't make much sense to build a wing that is good for %ur G's and _ tail
to fal'. off at two G's, so we need to make sure that we've got a good basic design, that we did lay
out out" requirements
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properly, and then look at what we built. Does it meet the design? Hcw did we test that?
For example, if we had a spec tha: said a certain device was supposed to operate between
two temperatur_ limits, did we test it? If we didn't test it to those limits, how did we certify the
design? Did we do it ihrough analysis? Is it acceptable? Yf there are waivers, do we now stil l` say
that those were good waivers and then the en:t result, th,m, is there are constraints that have to
get into our operational dedgn? We want to review those .rod make sure that--
MR. HOTZ: Excuse me just a minute. Could you ,,iarify as to whether th, .e are conceptual
things that you are recommending or these are processes that are actually going on now?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Well, this one is going on. I'm giving you my personal opinion that I
think is
program
MR.
that you
MR.
MR.
shared in the office of how we get well. and we are going tc look at all facets of the
which I think Admiral Truly has started us doing.
HOTZ: So what you're telling us here is basically an ongoing process and not something
plan to do at some future date?
HARTSFIELD: No. it is already started.
HOTZ: Thank you.
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MR HARTSFIELDWewan' to review the high crlticalit_ 1terns This ',s aireadv :_- re,lew
In addition, we are <oTiciting concer:-s !rom all e]err..,nts of our organization We have had ea_h
organization, for example., at .JS('. the enzineers :n each _pec_a!:ty present up the hne their _.,r_-
cerns. What shstems do I nave concerns about? Those are being cate<orized and consolidated
We are also reviewing th_s famous critical _tems iist We are going through t} ose and seein_
whether that list is properly validated We're looking at each item indivi:iually We may add ro
that list. We may not. When we get all through _*ith this we're going to try to identify and
prioritize our concerns and fixes
One category, of course, is what have we got to fix before we fly" We know of one item
already we want to fix before we fly again, ard that's the seals. We've got to do that but, a_e
there others? As an example, maybe the 17-inch disconnect flapper valve?
But all of these things have to be prioritized, and we have to use some good engineering
judgment on which ones we need to fix. Some of them we may decide th: : the risk is acceptable
as is; that that shouldn't be a concern for us.
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GENERAL KUTYNA: You got off the design and safety chart quickei" than I thought you
would. Let me ask a question m that respect.
In the design stage, the Shuttle had several crew escape and survivabihty features that were
contemplated but tbr one reason or another weren't put on the vehicle th: we have todav In
vmw of our experience, what crew s,:rwivabi!itv and escape provisions wou,d you like to see on
today's Shuttle?
MR. HARTSFIEID Well, I personally would like to see some sort of a low altitude escape
system. This all fits together in a package: you know, some ability to bail out of the vehicle, We
have abort modes that we call contingency aborts, in which we lose two engines, and the end
result ot that is ditching.
I perso,3a!ly don't think the vehicle would sur, _ve a ditching When you talk about smack-
ing the water at 200 knots with an airplane that is basically an airliner type design. Fm con-
vinced it's going to break up. If you've got a 60.000 pound pay!oad behind you. it's probably
going to come in tb.e cockptt with you
So I personally would like to see something along thin line, Whether we can develop such a
thing reasonably or not I'm not sure. i_ut there are options I would like to see us !" k at and
review this once again.
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GENERAL KUTYNA: John, you've had some thoughts on this. Do you agree?
MR. YOUNG: I have been at this for a very long time. Back in the early 1970s. and this
wasn't an idle situation, we went all over the country and we talked to people about solid rocket
motors, and we talked to people about engSnes, and we talked to people about great numbers of
things. They told us there was no way to do all these things and make them 190 porce:at reliable.
So at that time we did try to--we had ejection seats in for the vertical flight te, t phase. We
got them put in for that flight phase, and then they came back out. Since then o,_ numerous
occasions we have talked to people about doing things like putting in bailout systems such as the
tractor rocket .%'stea, or just plain bailout, and they have always seemed to be more than people
could put up with
But I really believe that manned space flight, manned space vehicles, if we don't do it for
this one, for surely the next vehicle that we develop there should be an escaee system.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But are there things you would like to see in th; _e?
MR. YOUNG: I would but it i_ not going to be_
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a cheaptypt, qmck fix, I don': think, todo _t _t,f_veyou aid reaso,:abiechanc_,+c>r escape
GENERAL KUTYNA: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: This is one of the thin_,'s that ti:o Commission might want to---'*ell,
but maybe this isn't the righz question to ask you but certainly it is one of the thin<s that )
think the Commission should consider If we have views on it, we should make recommenda-
,ions.
One of the things we would like to see from you are your recommendations about whether
money should be appropriated for that pc rpose or not, and how soon could it be done.
Captain Young, do you want to address that?
MR. YOUNG: Sir, I think it would be touch and go to put an)" escape _ystem in there before
you fly Again, depending upon how long it takes to get back up. which I really don't have a
good feel for but it would be a tougt- proposition.
I guess if you put the right people on it with the right money and the right effort, you ought
to be able to do it pretty darn quickly, but I'm not sure that we have that kin, of capability at
NASA.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about in building a fourth orbiter ° Should that be one of the
things we
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consider?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. I believe that would I:-, a good idea tbr other reasons probably, too,
yes. sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do any other of you have views on that '_ We will be asked as a Com-
rl-1_;slon.
MR. YOUNG: I'll tell you. theres a wide chsparity of ideas on that in the Astronaut Office
MR. CRIPPEN: Mr Chairman, I guess, as John knows, he and I have worked this particular
problem long and hard on the Shuttle. and it's more than mcney. It is a tough problem to solve
technically with i.he vehicle that we have.
If you were going back from square zero and you went tc some kind of concept like the F-
111 cabin escape system, you might--and build it from the ground up, you might be able to do
something like that. Yau might be able to come up with some kind of a sjstem that woulJ satis-
fy the requirement that Hank brought up of giving you capability to bail out in one of these
contingency abort kind of things.
But again, I've said this before publicly and I'll say it again, I don't think I know of an
escape system that would have saved the crew from the particular in :dent that we just went
through. I don't think it is possible to build such a system.
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MR. HOTZ: Are there other incidents in which a t,'pe of escape system could have saved the
crew?
MR. CRIPPEN: The one that Hank alluded to is a very real possibility. We have a large
portion of the assent phase where if you lose multiple engines, multiple of your main engines,
the only option is a ditch which puts it in the water, m,d it is questionable whether that is a
survivable situation.
It would be possible or potentially possible that you might have time to get all the crew
bailed out. That would be a tough problem itself considering you would probably have them
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s,_re_d out acro._s the, ,wean _'_m_ln_ ou_ ut pretty hl_h v_,h_ci_le:_, but _t is pr_b_bl) m_we survl_.-
_bie than ditchin_ :he veh}cI,'
But th_.,t i, _b_ut th_ rv.air" situathm I ihir_k _, w.uld bc t,i!k;n_ ,_b,.)ut
MR H()TZ Ho_ _t&Jut your return to launch site abort mede _shere I km_ there- are _f,m_,
concerns about whether th,_ is reatI) a feasible m_de _r noT, and _ouidn't some kind o! an
escape _y_tem like that tune[ion in the time that you might have when you were tryin£" to make
a return to, an abort and return to the launch site _
MR CRIPPEN: That type of system v, ou]d work in any kind of a landing situation if you
ran into a problem where you weren't, from an energy standpoint.
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couIdn't make the field or something of that nature.
But with regard to the RTLS, whether return to launch site abort mode, I guess contrary to
what you just voiced I thinl_ that everything that we have seen says yes, that is a doable kind of
a mode
DR FEYNMAN: I would suggest another possibility that has never happened that [ hope
would never happen It is possible that the crew, because of some gas in the cockpit or some-
thing or heart attacks or whatnot, is unable to make the reentry completeIy, and so would it be
possible to make a backup computer-driven reentry that could back up the crew if the crew is
unable to operate and therefore save both the mission and as many o t" the crew as are still alive?
MR CRIPPEN: Today, m the way the vehicle is designed and the computer software put
together, we do not have any kind of capability to have it all done automatically or executed
from ground
That was one of the considerations in designing the _huttle, because there was an element
of the pro_'rarn that thought we ought to fly it completely unmanned the first time In fact, ]
think Captain Young and myself were probably two of the opponents for doing that because we
thought that putting the man aboard probably gave it more of a chance for success.
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I personally don't think the scenario you just raised is a reasonable one where you could
have the whole crew totally incapacitated and such that the)' were f_oing to end up surviving
But technically, yes, that is a feasible kind of thing to do but it is not in the current system.
DR. FEYNMAN: I think m fact it is fairly simple to do, although there are some things that
are not built i'_ that make it impossible right now" that are very easy to fix up. such as the auto-
matic lowering of the landing gear which can't be done now.
GENERAI. KUTYNA: Can it be done by the ground?
MR. CRIPPEN: No, it cannot.
DR. FEYNMAN: That seems odd because it is such a simple thing to put in, and although
the contingency is unlikely it is only thought of as a backup idea. I wondered what you thought
of that.
MR. CRIPPEN: Any time you put in a system like that that can be automatically activated
or automatically done by some other, you have built in another failure mode in it, and putting
the landing gear down at the wrong time on this vehicle you can cost the vehicle. Consequently,
it was a very conscious decision of ours.
Like I think it was pointed out earlier, most
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of the things are done hv the c_mputer The, _e_.r lo_erin_ i_ _trictl_ _ n_arlual _,lectrical _)per-
atlm that bypasses the c_mputer to[ally, and it wa_ made a,_ simple and as stril_htii_rw_ird as
we could to preclude any additi_mal failure modes
MR HOTZ John, I believe you raised th__ questi(m in role _f" _'m_r pr_wi_us discu_si_m_ ab_2'
the possibility of putting a thrust terminatin_ device _nt_ the' _;lid re':,-.et booster,
Would that have had any eff,,ct if you had such a device, that is short of total destruct and
I'm not talking about marine safety packages, but would that have had any effect on the 51-L
incident'?
MR. YOUNG: No. sir, I don't think it would have been abl,: to do anything for them. The
manoed orbiting laboratory program had thrust termination based on chamber pressures in t_
two solid rocket motors being different, and they would thrus terminate and get off, and tt -,
had a Gemini escape module I'm not sure that thrust termination would have helped this situa-
tion.
MR. HOTZ: What was your point in recommending it '_
MR. YOUNG: I recommended thrust termination back in the early days in order to avoid
the range
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safety system problems that you have when you separate--when you activate the range safety
package either on purpose or inadvertently
I think the range safety package, if we have t(_ carry one, should be one that doesn't tear up
the whole piece of machinery, including the crew I think with humans on a vehicle that the
range safety package, if you have to have one. should be man-rated That is just mv opinion.
MR HOTZ: Is this one. the one you carry now, man-rated" tt is pretty destructive, isnt it _
MR. YOUNG: The solid rocket motors ride down the side and wilt blow up the externa!
tank, and people are looking at that to see if we really should fly one at all on the system, I
.guess, through the range safe_y, through the range safety panels
But I will tell you, we fought this long and hard to e',en have a range safety package on the
vehicle in the early 1970s, and we were never successful to get it removed In fact, we had sort of
an unwritten agreement that when we took the ejection seats out the range safety package
would come off, and it just never did.
MR. HOTZ: How do you feel about it nov,":' Do vou still feel that it should corn., off'
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MR. YOUNG: I was sure if the vehicle is reliable enough to go where you want it to go. I
think the range safely package should come off. On the other hand, they've just got some data
that says it is not as reliable as it should be.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To come back to building another orbiter--because this is one of the
things that Congress is obciously going to consider, and when we make our report it is one of the
things we are going to be questioned about by Congress--is it feasible to provide for an abort
system in the fourth orbiter, if you build a new one?
MR. WEITZ: You mean an escape system? A modular escape system _
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes.
MR. WEITZ: I think probably not.
MR. YOUNG: I think you can put a low altitude tractor rocket system in there without too
much trouble.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS You could put a what ir_ there"
MR Y()['N(; A tractor or a rocket escape system in the new (_rbiter wltht_ut a lot ot difi]-
culty
VIL'ECHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG "_%u're talkin_',,b_ut a Yar_kt,_,:_r_ _>_a s,,s'_ern'
MR YOUN(; Yes, a Yankee,_v_tem that take_
cockpit and lets people jump out that _ _,"
ROGERS: Would that be a unanimous v, v of you gentlemen, or is there divi-
out the top of the
CHAIRMAN
sion on that '_
MR. WEITZ: No. sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: One of the reasons we're having these hearings is iet's talk about
the differences. In a free system that is what we do. bet's talk about them.
MR. WEITZ: Well, I think what we're down to is basically we have three alternatives, and
these have been looked at at various times over the last several years and will be looked at
again. In fact. we're starting to look at them again now.
You have an escape module. You have some sort of probably rocket-assisted personnel ex-
traction where you use. as Neit said. the Yankee system, or you have some sort of bailout
system. With the orbiter as it presently exists, it is really--you cannot modify the existing orbit-
er to accommodate an escape module, and so therefore we have considered these other two meth-
ods.
John Jikes the rocket extraction system because it does cover a wider flight regime and
allows you to get out perhaps with the vehicle only under partial control as opposed to complete
control; however,
24:17
any system that--when you add more parts hke rockets it gets more complex.
Another system is a bailout system which we have looked at in which you have to modi_-
the side hatch or the top hatch, depending upon what you wanted to go out, so that it could be
pyrotechnically blown off the vehicle to give you the route out, and you then hook up to your
parachute system and bail out the side. What that says is you obviously have to be subsonic in
stable flight.
So there are tradeoffs and it is not simple and straightforward in my mind, an)_'ay, as to
'vhich way you really want to go of those two. That is why we have asked and have reinstituted
a t_adeoft study to be done on those two.
MR. CRIPPEN: I guess I'm very much for first building a fourth orbiter. I think that is the
right thing to do. I think it is also important that we keep the configuration of the vehicles es-
sentially the same. It is a real problem, and we've seen this previously.
Any time we get multiple configurations between vehizlea we have got a training systems
problem that is phenomenal, and somehow it doesn't make m_,ch sense to me that we would end
up with one vehicle that
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had an escape system on it and three that didn't.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You all agree you couldn't modify the three existing orbiters to pro-
vide that?
MR. CttIPPEN: The only kind of a system that I'm aware of that I think is even somehow
feasible would be maybe some kind of a bailout system that could be used subsonic, and we've
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I()oked 4t that :\t this point Jn t:me we haven't seen tit that l_ wa,_ worth the c,,nlplexit> _(, _{)
through it
[ mean, we c_,_ reevaluatu that {_in, _lnd I'm sure, as P_ul ,__ay.,,,we will do :_hat
('tt.-\IRMAN R()GI£RS I understand Dr IRides _ubcommittee 1_ co,qslderin_ tb.i.-, matter and
_s goin< t_) have, some turther discussion.- next ,*eek about it. so her pane_ can discuss it further
but it _.- _oing to be '_me of the things we're going to be questioned about by ('op.gress
We have alread_ had questions about what we rec_)mmend, and w, are in the position o!'
saying we havent come to anv conclusions about it, but that is why th*s discussion is helpful
Thank you
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It was mentmned a moment ago that you did not feel the
orbiter had a good chance of a _uccessful ditching. _ least some felt that way. It is my" under-
standing that some tests had been
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conducted in the past. but thev may not be directly applicable to the orbiter and other tests were
never conducted
Would it seem reasonable from your collective points of view to beef up the understanding
of whether or not an orbiter is ditchabte because, as I understand it, you don't really know yet"
MR YOUNG: _:: MV a. There's a lot of that.
MR. CRIPPEN: I think that would be a very reasonable thing to do, because it is the sort of
an unknown that we have in the program right now
MR WEITZ: I don't agree with that.
MR. YOUNG: I don't think it's an unknown There's just no evidence that hitting the water
that fast with the kind of ultimate crash loads that the orbiter has in systems associated *¢ith
the orbiter--we've got a 20-G cockpit, but the stuff in the payload bay is a lot less than that, and
the stuff in the nose is a lot less than that.
MR. WEITZ: When I said that [ didn't a_ree with Crip. what I meant was m' ,_'_eling is so
strong that the orbiter will not sur_'ive a d;tching, and that includes land, water or 5"13 unpre-
pared surface, that such a study would fran,.ly be a waste of money.
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I think if we put the crew in a position where they're going to be asked to do a contingency"
abort, then they need some means to get out of the vehicle before it contacts earth, the surface
of the earth.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Do you mean the first test w'ould be a real one?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Could I ask a question of one of you, please?
What is your experience in terms of the maximum dynamic pressure you would like to bail
out into considering the high adrenaline flow and all of those other contingencies of that kind?
MR. WEITZ: The mechanics of separating from the orbiter in a bailout, which means no
assistance at all, requires you to be--if you go out the overhead hatch you would probably hit
either the OMS pods or the vertical tail. If you go out the side hatch at air speeds in excess of
much over about 220, 229, 240 knots, you would hit the wing.
DR. COVERT: The window is pretty narrow, then, in terms of the available--
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir, because you're now trying to bring the orbiter down to a regime
where you are at relatively high angles of attack.
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VICECHAIRMANARMSTRONG:Was'hat part!y due to thv fact that there i,_ no spoiler at
_he hatc_l '
MR WEITZ _es
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Could that envelope, do you think, perhaps be improved
somewhat if _,_ere were?
MR WEI .Z: Intuitively I *'eel that _t could, Neil. but we just don't know.
DR. COVERT: Still, there's a basic _e2 that a person is reluctant to enter into at some point
MR. WEITZ: Yes. sir.
DR. COVERT: So would you envision then that they- would bail out wearing a helmet or
some other sort of--
MR. WEITZ: Well, they wou!d wear the basic flight--yes, we would !ike to minimize the
number, the amount of additional equipment that is necessary in order to do the bailout, and so
I v,ould envision doing it with the flight equipment that we presently have fbr launch.
DR. COVERT: But bareheaded and barefaced?
MR. WEITZ: No, sir, we launch with helmets on.
DR. COVERT: Okay, fine. Thank you.
DR WHEELON: This question goes in a different direction, if I may.
Earlier John Young spoke about the problems of mounting the flights in !9_5 and the poten-
tial
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difficulty of going even higher than that in the future. This question builds on that and goes in a
different direction
Prior to January we had four orbiters. We nov," have three Our former plan was to begin
operating this summer both from Vandenberg and Kennedy. That presumed that we would have
four orbiters, four Shuttles. We nov," have three.
Can each of _ou give a view on whether it is feasible to operate nov," from both launch pads,
both Vandenberg and Kennedy. with only three orbiters and what strains that would put on the
astronaut crews?
MR. CRIPPEN: I reav think that that is primarily a programmatic question more than it
is an Astronaut Office question, the last question you had, I don't think from our standpoint it is
going to put any additional strains on us. Now, as to whether you can shuffle the vehicles
around enough to do that, that is a different question and somebody else would have to address
that.
I think that you can certainly operate still from both sides, especially ff we're landing at
Edwards. You have just got which way your Shuttle carrier craft goes when it leaves to take it
back to the launch site.
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But with three you can't fly as much as you can with four. I think that's the basic answer.
DR. FEYNMAN: I think it is an astronaut-related question because it has to do with a kind
of launch pressure. Whenever you have _. decision whether to fly or not. there are other consid-
erations: how important it is to fly in order to keep up the number of flights, and if yo: have too
large a number of flights you are going to have a big pressure on the astronauts.
Would y_ u then consider that in order to reduce this pressure it would be worth considering
the possibility of having unmanned missions for tbose satellites and those operations which
don't require men and thus take some of the load off the Shuttle?
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MR CRIPPEN: I _'uess goin_ back to vour original question regarding pressures, pressures
are a normal part of the aystem and I think they are a normal part of most systems
I think that the ,merican public would want us to try to keep what we think was a reason-
able launch schedule, that was still a safe schedule, and I personally believe that. contrary to
the evidence of 51-L. that we thought we were doing that
I don't think that our management nor our office really thought that we were trying to
press into
2444
an unsafe situation, and I don't think that anybody wou!d have made a conscious decision to go
fly if they even thought that there was a possibility, if they personally thoudht that there was a
possibility of thst seal coming loose.
I guess I'm a big proponent of manned space flight, naturally. I think we have clone a _uper
job in the past of showing that we can deliver satellites to orbit with the Shuttle. That doesn't
mean that there is no place for expendable :_oosters. I think that the proper answer is really
what we have now, and that is a marriage between the two and that program management
needs to decide what the balance should be.
I personally am biased to go over toward having tbur orbiters and a reasonable launch rate
with those four orbiters and supplementing it as required with expendable boosters if vou need
it.
DR. FEYNMAN: That is r,ot what I meant. I agree. I think there will be enough manned
things to take care of the Shuttle but we should be sending up tb.ings on--the question is wheth-
er we should be sending up things on a manned Shuttle when we could have done it without
them because of the new pressures, that is th_ new total number of things that we want to de.
MR. CRIPPEN: Again, I guess I think using man
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to deliver satellites to orbit is a viable capability that we can and have used m; "_ for and should
in the future, personally.
MR. WEITZ: I think the key to the whole thing is manifesting or scheduling, whatever you
want to call it. your resources in a manner that you feel confident you can support.
It is m_ personal opinion that in the past that we have basically, for different reasons.
_.?und up requlring what appears to be !10 to 120 percent of your resources. That serious defi-
ciency in the p ogram. I feel. is a serious lack of spare parts but what this requires is frequent
cannibalization of other orbiters at KSC in order to properly outfit the one that is going up.
All this does is really add work to the flow" at the Cape. It increases the exposure of both
orbiters, the one you're taking the equipment off and the one you're putting it on, to intrusion
by people. Every time you get people inside and around the orbiter you stand a chance of inad-
•,'ertent damage of whatever type., whether you leave a tool behind or whether you, without
knowing it, step on a wire bundle or a tube or something along those lines.
I think, and it is pointed out in Admiral
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Truly's me o. that what we need to do is look at it from the bottom up. We really ought to
decide if we have a four, three, whatever the number is, airplane, air force, we've got to decide
what it is we can do and those types of things _hat it makes sense t( _tilize this :esource for.
If it turns out that man can ao many wonderful things in orbit, ana I think we havc demon-
strated that, but we've really got to 1o_ at what it is we're using a very valuable national re-
source for.
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MR HOTZ Could we move along to some of the other Eight safety cot ,_rns on the current
orbiter fleet, such as the microwave ]an_ting system and your crosswina [,,oblems and your
brake nroblems?
Could we just [ao!] the delegation and get a cross-section of your vie_s on those problems °
MR. WEITZ Henry, we haven't heard from you in a while.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr tq'art_field, would you rather go ahead with :,'our presentation.
then we can come back t,, some of these questions?
MR, HARTSFIELD: Well, we've sort of talked about what is here. I might go through this
rather quickly, and I would like to becau,_,e there are a couple of points I would likc to make.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. why don't you go ahead and continue.
MR. WEITZ: I think we're going to touch on Mr. Hotz's subject later.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It might be well to take them one at a time. too, as we go along.
MR. HARTSFIELD: This is just the approach one takes.
The next thing we've already talked about here, alluded to, is taking a look at our mainte-
nance, our turnaround. We're doing that: we're looking at the requirements--
iViewgraph.) !_,._ I _ i_!
MR. HARTSFIELD:--and checking what the requirements say about the high criticality
items that we discussed previously, and then we would see if we could trace these requirements
to the turnaround procedures themselves, the test and checkout.
I personally think that there is already some mechanism in place, but I think we ought to
assure that in all of our checkout procedures that when we are checking some Criticality One
item that that is esp,cially flagged in the procedure itself so that the workers involved know
that, hey, this thing needs close scrutiny.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You're reviewing that _hole
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question of Criticality One and what wmvers mean and so forth. I assume?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Yes, sir. The system is doing that, and we have, for example, people
from our office sitting with groups, for example, going through our maintenance instructions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, I meant the system. You are involved in that? The astronauts
are involved in that review?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Good.
MR. HARTSFIELD: 1 think we need to take a look at our waiver mechanism _s well. be-
cause many times checks are called out and then for one reason or another we want to waive
that for this particular flight. It was due to be inspected, but let's put it off and just make sure
that we have our process going right on the waivers and that the right people are being ap-
proached.
(Viewgraph.) [J_," '-_ i'_i
MR. HARTSFIELD: Now, that is the maintenance side of the house. In the next chart I get
into what I think we ought to be doing to the OPS side. and it is the same sort of thing, and
we're in the process right now, for example, of iooking at all our flight rules.
We have a set of rules that you may have been
2449
told about that are general in nature of how we operate the orbiter and what we would do in
light of certain failures or contingencies, and we try to think all of this out ahead of time so that
1438
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Vif the case presents itself during a flight, that the flight team has a course J, action that they
are going to follow
We don't always, I might point out don't always follow this course of action but the flight
r_.ies are a departu.e point At ]east all tn_ :inkine has been done in advance under mere care-
fully controlled situations and not in the exc;:_ ,'n_ of the moment.
These flight rules, of course, are going to be :: easured against, again, what we think the
crit;cai items are in the critical systems.
I have the training hat en in the office now. so I am in the process of re-evaluating o,:r
traini':g that aspect of the thing to see what I think about the crow workloads and the prepara-
tion f r !i_ght. There is some evidence, for example, that the demanc_ ,m the crew, the training
process, gets very heavy. We!l. it is not evidence. It is there.
About two-thirds of the crews that have flown so far have made statements regarding that
they felt there was a time compression in the training in the few" weeks before flight, and I
think that is something that
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we are re-evaluating and saying we are looking at w-hat we can do to offload this work period st)
that the crew doesn't go flying tired.
There is going to be a little tailup at the end, naturally, because tLat is when you get your
final flight software and you're trying to hone your skil!s to the highest level, and so you're
going to intensi_" your efforts closer to flight. But some of us have some concerns that maybe
this load is getting a little bit on the high side and we ought to look at turning that back down.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What is the age limit of an astronaut, or is there one?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Ask John
Laughter. I
MR. YOUNG: No. there is no age limit. As tong as you're physically qualified you can sti!l
fly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which astronaut was the oldest when he flew'?
MR. YOUNG: Dr, Karl Henize.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do most astronauts--and you may not be able to answer this. but do
most astronau_ think of their career as astronauts, or would some of them like to move into
management?
MR. HARTSFIELD: I think from my standpoint
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flying spacecraft is a very ir:teresting job, and I think a lot of people would.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I notice there aren't many astronauts in management, and I've been
impressed with one astronaut that has recently gone into management, and that is Admiral
Truiy.
I wonder if more opportunities should be given to astronauts to move into management?
(Laughter.)
MR, ABBEY: I know I get a lot of complaints about using them the way we do now, but I
think I would certainly agree with that. I think we have had astronauts, and I was going to
touch on that a little later in a number of management positions, and I think they could provide
and could contribute a lot within the program office.
Frank Borman, for example, after tke Apollo accident in 1967, took over the redesign effort
and ran that until it came about before we went to fly again, and I think we could '_'_11 do that
again with an astronaut; put him on accomphshing all of this effort within the prog_.:m office.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Does the managenlent make that possible_ Do the}" encourage that
development from the astronauts to management?
MR. ABBEY: Within the i_st month I think we
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have felt or I have felt that we are getting a lot of encouragement to do that
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you
DR. WHEELON: A followup question to the previous comment. You indicated that at the
present rate you are pretty busy. perhaps too busy I think you implied.
Can you identify the number of flights that you think it is safe and prud,mt to get off with
three orbiters per year?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Well. I can't do that and I think it is only by going through this proc-
ess. I have a chart that addresses the flight rate here later, The flight rate has to be determined,
as P.J. said I think, f_om the bottom uF, and I think that is the way Admiral Tru'_y is going to
approach it.
We need to determine how often we can fly the orbiter from the standpoint cf resources,
and then we will look at how we suptmrt it. I know that we can from the crew's standpoint
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How is the decision made as to which astronaut should fly on a par-
ticular launch?
MR. HARTSFIELD: A lot of us wish we knew that.
Laughter.
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MR. YOUNG: It is primarily a rotation basis, and depending upon what missions are up and
what people are coming due for training. It is really nothing magic about it. It is sort of straight-
forward Once a person flies they are put back in line and they are supposed to get to fly again.
and there may be some reason why they don't _uz it is very rare.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So it is just an erdi nary rotation system?
MR. YOUNG: Pretty much,
MR. ABBEY: There might be some special mission requirement on a particular flight due to
an EVA or due to a rendezvous or __ome special aspect of the flight.
MR. YOUNG: Dcpartment of Defense missions are all military.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Put who makes the decision? You, Mr. Abbey or Captain Young. or
a committee or what?
MR. ABBEY: I think as far as determining who flies on any particular mission, I rely very
heavily on the input i get from Paul Weitz and John Young, and really that is kind of a mutual
thing that we come up with, depending upon what we have to do on that flight nd, as John
says, what the rotation is and who's available.
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I think John has--
MR. YOUNG: Sometimes people come in and ask if they can fly a mission, and we try to
honor that if we car do it. Nobody believes that. but it's true
( I_ughter, )
MR. ABBEY: Probably John has the biggest inpzat as far as that goes.
MR. RUMMEL: I have a question relating to workload that lies in a somewhat different
area, but first I have to ask this.
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As i understand it from what has been said and inferred today, the astronauts are indeed
given the opportunity to inject the !essor, s of experience and their opinions in new development
programs, either redevelopment of the Shuttle or new thin_s comin_ onstream Is that correct '_
MR. WEIT7 Yrs. sir
MR. RUMMr_L: Okay. weli. my question then has to do with workload and avaiiable man-
power concerning new programs that might affect the efficiency or the conduct of the Shuttle
program.
One that comes to mind would be the space station, for example, which is a major project
That is coming onstream, and are you able to cope with the kind of workloads that that has
imposed or will impose
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concerning manpower and the injection of the experience which at least I tkink is most impor-
tant that it be done?
MR. ABBEY: Prior to the accident we had approximately one individual in the office work-
ing on space station, and then we would dra_ _n other individuals as they became available.
So with the workload that we had prior to the flight, we were not able to put a lot of people
into the space station definition.
MR. RUMMEL: Well, does that suggest that this is a budgetary problem of some kind or
not?
MR. ABBEY: I think itwas just a manpower problem 9n getting experienced people that
could be available to contribute to space station.Most of those people were tied up getting ready
for flightsor going back into preparations for our mission, so we just didn't have I think suffi-
cientcrewmen to make available at that time.
MR. RUMMEL: Do you contemplate that that sort of--I hate to use the word but--deficien-
cy willcontinue?
MR. ABBEY: No. I would hope that we would be able to free up some experienced crewmen
and get them involved in that effort.
.MR. RUMMEL: May I ask in thisgeneral regard.
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too, and take the space station again as an example, in coming te the policy decision to move in
that direction, which is probably superb, if various alternatives were also considered, that i_ the
general direction in which the future space effort would go? Are you folks involved in those
processes, too?
I suppose if you are at least so,._e degree of manpower loading would be required. Can you
comment on that?
MR. YOUNG: Kathy Sullivan is on the National Space Commission, and she has been talk-
ing our inputs into that thing probably a lot of the time.
MR. RUMMEL: Do you a,_,yore own manpower planning in terms of the numbers of people'?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: You do. T} ank you.
MR. YOUNG: As best we ca_:. It is a very dynamic situation most of the time.
MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
MR. HARTSFIELD: One area 1 t} nk that we can improve on. and I've got it under the
bullet of mission planning mi!estones, is we need a little bit more. I ti_ink, stability in our mani-
fest, We need to freeze th_ basic manifest very early so that the products that have to be gener-
ated to _:Jpport a mission can be delivered on
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time
_Now b_ products I mean the tra;ectory data tha_ has _o be buit. for example, for a _:gh:
and the mass properties of the vehicle that go into the soft_are _ad that is used to dy that
,flight Theres a iong lead time ,,m that to build that. and if we take se:nethm_ off the _]ight or
put something on it after that process has been started, then that i_ just hke a square wave in
the system and they almost have to go back to square one and start over again.
We have had cases where the actuai flight software _as delivered within a week of the
flight, and m severai occasions two weeks of the flight, which some of us feel is just too doggone
close to the flight to see the final software. We are looking at that now. and I think that we need
to be a iittle tougher in defining the flights.
One other aspect of that is late add-ons to a flight, Now, in some respects it is very easy to
say. well, gee whiz. Ive got a place to put this little thing and I want to put it on the flight, and
it is no big deal. We've got the weight margin. We've got the stowage.
But on the other hand. late additions to a flight, even though the}" s,:_ ", innocuous eneugh,
they
• )4r "
stil! have to go throu_ : the safety reviews that we conduct to make sure that there are no mate-
rials prob!ems, and it _s safe to i!y the item.
But in my mind it d_-tracts from what we ought to be concentraung on close to flight. When
we're getting within a couple of months of flight v,'e ought to be thinking about the flight we're
going to execute and not worry about, well. we've put this on, now we've got to change the pro-
cedures, or we've got to put a place in the time line to do it.
What i'm getting at is we'd like to see more stability in the last cout:le of months toward
the flight, and I think we can do a better job the,'e. We certainly are evaluating that now.
(Viewgrapht ll_,,i _ :¢ .u, i
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I ha_e a question on the section training crew and train-
ing. What is the status of the load on your simulators, mission simulators and so on, let's say
over the past year before the accident?
,Ln_iv,ft. HARTSFIELD: You mean ho_ n:_ny _ou_' _ me _e get_ilJtg on them?
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: No, in terms of is it fully loaded or overloaded'?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Yes, all of the above.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It is heavily loaded. You're simulator limited?
MR. HARTSFIELD: We are pretty much so, and in fact that is one when we get through
with this Mnd of overview we were going to address a number of subjects and that is one of
them that ! would like to talk about.
MR. HOTZ: Could you elaborate just a little bit on the software deliveries on time? Are you
experiencing problems with that nov,'?
MR. HARTSFIELD: We have had those problems, yes. sir. For example, on mv last flight.
61-A. we got the flight software about two and a half weeks, as I recall, before we flew the fine;
software.
Now we had had previo_s loact_ but because of launch date changes and trajectory there
wasn't too much trajectory, when you change tin? launch dates, you change the time period with
the general weather
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•Dart":a.- T!-_-r"-;,._ a lot _,.,"_i........¢ that ao into:bu{!di,_.,the fliKht _¢oftwareWa.hadto redo;',. In
'act. we had three software versions built tbr that _ight Normally we only build two
_,_,e had to build a third one. and that forced me. because I wanted to see the software, to get
mvoived in the actual checkout of tb.e trainin_ load in the simulator, which meant taking the
crew a--d g_ing o',er ,,a_e at night, when they normally do these things and going through it.
We have. starting with the, n_xt load dolivery, we have started, because of this. and I'm put-
ting on my training hat here, we've instituted a process to allow the crew to took at the software
earlier. One of th, things we worry about is shelf life on the software, is what we call it.
In other words, we would like to fly this final software and use it enough so that if there is
some little bug that has crept into the software or some bad I-load, that we catch it before we
fly. We feel that the more eyes that are looking at the software, the better off we are.
The next chart gets to the thing that I think really is the key in the accident, and that is
communications. Apparently we had some sort of
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breakdown that the word about the seals certainly didn't get to the right places. It didn't get to
JSC in any sor_ of a fashion that I'm aware of even to our Level !I people, and that is something
we have got to correct We have got to get the communications
I think basically, as Bob has said, weve got a good system but it's only as good as the data
that gets into it
CHAIRMAN BOGERS: _,_,ell, we have some reservation about the iast comment or whether
the system is good. I thin],: the system is probably good as described here this morning, but the
system according :o the people at Marshall. they cemplied wuth the svstem They say we had no
obligation under the system to do anything that we didn't do. It was a Level III question• As
thev say, we worked it and therefore we didn't ha,e any responsibility under t le system to do
anything else.
if" _hat !s the system, that's wrong. That is not a good system.
MR. HARTSFiELD: I couldn't agree with you more. Personally, I think that is wrong.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So to that extent if that is the system, it's not a good system•
MR. HARTSFIELD: Let me clarify. When I said
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the system I me_,_t the system as we're working it at our Ops side is good. but this part of the
channel appm'ently has broken, or it certainly was broken for this problem. 1 think we have to
correct that, and we are going to correct it. I don't think we can afford to let something like that
continue.
CH, IRMAN ROGERS: It seems here, speaking again for myself but I think most people on
the Commission agree with me, that if that is the system that there is no obligation when a
critical matter is involved and the contractor or the engineers and the contractor have serious
questions about it. There is ne-vnder the system there is no responsibility to convey that infor-
mation to Level II or Level I. That is a flaw of the systom.
It may be that that is not the svstem Maybe the svstem is that they should have conveyed
it. If that is the case, I think that is a failure of those invoh, ed to comply with the system• Either
one is wrong, and it seems to " e we have to be sure that we c(.rrcct both
MR,• HARTSFIELD: Well, that's true• The system obviously depends upon people• I mean.
the people are the weak link.
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UiiAIRMAN ROGERS But ,-e,_nJ back. they -av n-) They say--the people i, Mar_._i _av
no, _,**e
compi_ed with the sv.,tem We did exactiy what the svstem told us to do Wecons_de, red this, and
we had a Telefax. and we didnt ha_e an)" obli_ation te tell Level 1[ or Le_'el i
Ifthey are corre(t at that. that is a flaw of the system it seems to us We must see that or;
matters of critical importance of teat type. the system would require that that information be
provided to Level II and Level I, and all of the astronauts should be aware of it.
Now. moybe t. _t isn't the system. I tnink that probably Mr. Aldrich and others will feel
that that was not the system The system requireci them to tel! Level II and Level I about this
problem
Mr Aldrich did s-v in that meeting that I referred to at 2:00 on the day before the launch,
it there is any" consideratior,_ about weather that we should know about let me know. So he
apparently relied upon tha: instruction that anything to do with weather concerns, including
the joint or anything else, _[.euld be conveyed to him. and it wasn't conveyed to him.
Anyway. I think the Commission has received a lot of information about the lack o[ commu
nication, and I think we are in a position to make sin,he recomme'_.dations that will be construc-
tive
MR HARTSFIELD: Well. good. because the
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. t'rn glad because there again that is or:e of the things we are
thinking about recommending is some kind of independent safety panel We would be c'erv
happy to get your views on that because we think it is very important and were not quite sure
how that should be set up. but I think all of us believe that there should be an independent
safety review or panel of some type. so we lock forward to that.
MR HARTSFIELD: All right. You mentioned flight rate. and I think my next chart address-
es that.
&-iewgraph.) I_,._ _ ; 21 t
MR. HARTSFIELD: I think we've already discussed the bottom-up approach, so there is no
need of belaboring it. but the flight rate has to be established on what our capabilities are. With
this
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review we're doing on our test and checkout procedures, we're going to come up with what it
takes to turn the orbiter around, and then we play that against what resources we have.
ltow many people do we have working at KSC. and what do we have at the Cape'? Do we
have to share those people and move them ba-k? I don't know how that is set up. but it boils
down to resourc,_s and what we have to do.
Certainly initially, as Admiral Truly has said. we are going to establish a flight rate based
upon those kind of inputs, and then as we start flying we may be able to increase the flip'ht iate.
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emd_cer'zi;nly hop,e we ,,vouL. _ut that has _ot to bt' ba_ed utxm. u_cain. ;_hut our c_lpabilit_ is
_Ahat i rt,aii_ rneml i.- .t.. vv¢ gvt mort. miormutlon on the systems, rm_vbe ior t.×ample we re
ct ckln_-[ the system at_ter every flight and _e n_.ver see anythina wrvn_ w_th it, and rll__ivb_
throc_h a'reement we can say maybe we'lt check this on ever_ other fliKht, that's just an exam-
ple or _p mi_,ht find somethln_ we're checki- _ every firth flight is showunK some problems, and
we ought te increa._',e the check rate
So this is a Five and take. but we truly can expand the flight rate c,r increase it based upon
our experience
21(46
Well, now, _'e'll _et to the chart you're all looking for, the summary.
,5,'iewg-raph iml I : ":i
MR. HARTSFIELD: I think we're on the right track. I really do. i "hink we are doing the
right thinf4s The on!', _hin_ i'm concerned about is that we don't stop an_ we carry them right
_.,n to frmtion and we look at what we need to do before we fly.
Despite what has happened, I still feel that we've _ot some of the best people in the world
working at NASA. I kno_ that they're some of the finest people I've ever worked with They're
dedicated people, and the)" take a lot of pride in their work. They were just as much hurt by this
accident a_ we were, and they want to get us on the road again, and I thin_ they are. I've got
faith in them
There is one thing that I would like to leave here. and that is in that last "but" down there.
We've got to be very careful I'm concerned that the cure may • worse than the illness I don't
think we ought to run off doing some half-hearted--or let me put _t this way--hasty fixes, think-
ing we've got to go do this and let's throw it on the bird because that'._ goin_ to fix this problem.
Sometimes we find that when you do those kind of thini4s what we just put on there is more of a
"4(;T
problem than the system we had.
So we need to fix those things that we have to fix that we've identified through this review
process, like the seals. It may be that, as 1 said earlier, that some things we might want to live
with by very careful quality cont.'ol while we research the fix, and we need to fix it but let's
don't be very hasty about it. We need to very thoroughly and rationally evaluate all of these
things.
So that, to me, is a concern and I don't know whether that is shared by other folks. I think
it is.
,Viewgraph.t [_,_ _ :_ -':_l
MR. HARTSFIELD: My final thoughts are that I think we have got to accept--this has been
discussed before, too--that the STS is certainly not an operational system in the traditional
sense, and it can't be. Certainly for those of us that fly it, it will never be routine and there will
always be risks associated with flying in space. We will fix all these problems and go fly again,
but it is still going to be a risky business, and I think everybody should remember that.
The bottom line is, though, that this daggone vehicle is probably the most magnificent and
fantastic machine I've ever seen, and it is something that we all ought
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to be proud of. It has capabilities that are totally unmatched an}_'here in the world. There's
nobody that has a machine like this, and it we use it properly I think it can do a great deal %r
this country.
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I think that is the v,_t, W+,'v_. _}t t_,_'xplmt the thln_s that it d_}e., ;_.lI ;tad v_rr_ ,m
I)H FEYNM:X.X ] _,,ukt ltke" t.., r'aakv -.,m_t' c,m/nl-nt- M_,mt tt.;_t ] u_r,',, _llh '_ l. t!_;,', it
Is the' nmst Ianta_tw rnauh_ne and .;_ t;_rih, f,dt *m__ ha.'. th*' possibilLt; ,,I b_r_*'trin_..,_m_'ti_lr_ It',
t!x" pr;_cvs,-,, and that is ,,vha' v;_u kept talkln_ about, acceptin_ rl_k-
h _s. therek_re, lmport;_nt t_ under_tand that alth,m_h it _ I'm, most _mdarfui ',_nd i;_ntas
tl,: machine as ,,ou mentioned it. hut I'm just tryin_ t_ _,m[;h _si/_, it f_r ,,_u, and that _t it, ,_
risk', machine and has t]aws It ha:, dift]cultie,, It i_, not complete It is n_' perfect It is not
operational exactly,
I'm tryind to filure out '.,,here the difficulty is in th_,_ s,,'stem that made it _o wro_ :, and I
think ,,ou mav be addressing: it later when you're talkin_ about the safety panel, hut let me
sul4gest somethin_ and see if we a_ree with what yo,_r que,_tions are.
The problem _s con_munication, and the communication will be fixed _I you have the safety
panel, if there is a member of the astronauts on the
2169
safety panel, because then you will be fully aware of all the thin_s that are unsafe
So the communication problem in the safety panel, as lonfz as _ has astronaut representa-
tion on it. will automatically f]K each other with regard to an understandin_ of what the real
risks are.
Because the idea that you accept risks, the consideratxm ;,f this thii1R is alwa,..., durimz
flight It is a fli_:ht review, and so _ou decide what risks to accept I read all of these reviews.
and the; agomze whether they can g.'.; even though they had some hlt_w by in the seal or the',"
had a cracked blade _n the pump _f one of the engine_, whether the,, can ._o the next time or
this timm and they decide yes Then it (lies and nothin; happens
Then ,.t _ssug_ested. theret'_,-, that that risk is no longer so high Fo_ the next flight we can
lower our standards a littie bit because we _ot away with _t last time If you watch the criteria
of how much blow-by you're _oing to accept or how man_ cracks or how lon_ the tbin_ _oes
between cracks, you will find that the t_me is always decreasing and an argument is always
given that the last ume it worked
It is a k_nd of Russian roulette. You got away with it. and it was a risk You _o_ away with
it.
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but it shouldn't be done over and over again like that When I look at the reviews. I find the
perpetual movement heading for trouble.
So I would like to know if by a safety review board you mean th_s, that there should be after
each--there should be during a flight review a permanent place, the safety board or whatever
you want to call it, which rides herd on that ddficulty and tries to get rid of it as quickly as
possible and actively for the next qight.
I think that is what is missing in the system that you say is so good. I think we haven't got
a direct action, positive activity, someo_ _ whose responsibility is to work as hard as possible to
keep everybody awake to the last tning that had to be accepted.
Would you aaree with something like that? Is that what you meant by your safety beard?
MR HARTSFIELD: Yes. I think you've said that very well. That would certainly be my con-
cept of the way the system would work. The safety panel, he has no axe to grind. His only inter-
est is the safety of the vehicle and mission success, and they go hand-in-hand
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. thank you very much. I must say that is an excellent presenta-
tio_._..
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..\ [_*F[<R N(K)N SESSION
, l::dl) pm
('tt/_IRMAN R(XiERS ()r_ the record Mr Abbey
MR. ABBEY': We were kind ot at the paInt where _e wanted to address some _.pecific c,_n-
corns so, if we may, ,h)hn was going to bring up at ,_ ast two and then we would go (_'t)ni there
('ttAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine
MR YOUNG: We have been talking about some concerns ,'e have had in the Astronaut
Office for many years, and one of them is the prudence of !anding the vehicle at Edwards or
Northrup strip complexes The reason _s because el the things that you learn about both the
vehicle and the system when you start using it I will try to explain that I'm a F19rida boy
myself Ialways thought that the program _houid land the orbiter at Kennedy
Over the past five or six years what has happened is we have come to some very different
conclusions ba.,_d on learnina" about the environment that exists _n that world and learning
about the limitations of the orbiter that we have in that environment
One significant difference in Florida is the difficulty of accurate!,, furecasting tht, occurrence
(_t thunderstorms, fbgs or crosswinds for an end-of-mission
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landing. You have t_,, do that about an hour and a half prior to landing the vehicle, and that is a
very difficult and complex job because of the dynamic environment that Kenned> area presents.
The orbiter requires much better weather than you might imagine _o be able to make rea-
sonable approaches and landings. We're looking for ceitmgs with a m_crowave landing system in
excess of _,000 feet so that the crewmen can make the proper c(,-;'ections m case those things
are not working ,just properly
Then we're looking at croKswinds not very high, because right nov witk the vehicle we have.
we have a system that is single string to its nosewheel steering. There are .,merous failure_
that can cause you to be no string to its nosewheel steering.
We have a brake system on the orbiter that has--that is ,cry heavily loaded and is sort of
energy limited. It is very difficult to use precisely right now. In fact. we're finding out we don't
really have a good technique for applying the brakes, and on one landing we were told that we
put the brakes on too long at too high an air speed and kept them on too long. Then the next
landing, that was perfect as far as we were concerned. We were told we put the brakes on too
short and kept them on, and put them on too hard
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Well, that is a very strange thing. We don't believe that astronauts or pilots should be able
to break the brakes, and that is sort of what has been happening to us. When you land at Ken-
nedy, with the tires that we have because of the runway, the vehicle is heavily loaded during
rotation. As it pitches over the elevens come up and the main tires _re heavily loaded. If either
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_)m'_)tth_, tires ha_l<'akeddo_n {m _,{}uwhich ',m_d{m't km_, right rm_,becausev,e don't
km,_ _m,'e _" _¢et the vehi,.'le up _r', the stack whether the tires have leaked _r n_t
It either ,_Im of th_s_, main landing k{ear tir_'s bare leaked down _m you, the information is
that the ne×t tire will fail When that happen., if v,m don't have no..ewhe,,l ,.teerin_, with the
-,lf]]t_ll_t[l(_rLs that _e have rut] and any amour_t (,}1[ crosswlnd at Kennedv _n excess of ten knots,
the data shows that you have tr_';,ble keepin}¢ the vel_lcle _m the rup.wav These are from simula-
t_ms, not from ot'p,'thirdd that is new
_ we think we've learned, at least as far as we've _'one so far, how the vehicle operates We
'are pushin_ t_ make our nosewheel steerim4 more than sin_te strln_ so that many failures can't
_:_ke the nosewheel system down
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We found out also that handling qualities of the nosewheel steering are very sensitive to
what kind of tire model we use We're running the simulation right now at Ames, as I told you,
and we found that this vehicle that we have nov,, witn the new tire model which is based on
Langley test data does not handle nearly as well as the system that we used last time v, ith the
old tire model
So now we're having to tune the general purpose computer handling qualities to a new tire
mode',, and I'm not sure that when we land on the real runway for the real first time that we
won't be looking at a totally different tire model.
At Ke,nedy the runway surface is very rough in a high crosswind, which it is difficult to
predict what kind of crosswind you're going to have when you start out. You may want to limit
vo,_r end-of-mission crosswind to ten knots, but _,hen you arrive there an hour and a half later
it could be ,omething different than that
!n a hit4h crosswind it tends to scrape the cords off the tires, and that is very hard on tires
The runway ts surrounded by a moat, and dependina upon how much ram you've had the water
could be pretty close to the runway. It doesn't meet Air Force runway
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standards If you have certain failures, it's going to be very difficult to make the runway.
One failure that we talked about the other day that might hurt you on the end of mission is
an early geardown situation. That requires two failures to get it but if that happens to you while
you're up around la0 it is equivalent to having hatfspeed brakes all the way down, and unless
you have visual contact with the runway and when the lg0 degree position is 23,000 or 24,000
feet--excuse me, 28,000 feet, it might be difficult to get there. We think that _ould be very bad.
On the lake bed complex like Edwards, with 20 miles--that is 20 miles long and 7 miles
wide, you don't have that problem; or at White Sands, where we have two intersecting runways
that are the equivalent of being 29,000 [eet long and 900 feet wide.
We just think it would be more prudent and safer for the program to take this vehicle and
land it at the runway complexes for end of mission. What I mean, I think it would avoid some of
the risks associated and make sure that we get the vehicle back every time.
Now, we know we spend a lot of program resources on building up the Kennedy system and
making
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it possible for ,as to land there and that we do have to land there and the times that we have
return-to-ianding-site abort because there's jusv nowhe e else. but if we ever have a landing acci-
dent-and that was really the first accident that I thought we would ever have going into Ken-nedy. We spent a lot of money on that place and we did a lot to it, but if we ever run off the
runwaytit Kennedythe repairbili is _oin_to beprobablyenou_zhto build fiveor six morerun-
waysthereat Kennedy
N_wethink thelakebedcomplex,thedry lakebedcomple×eswouldbemuchbetter {'orthe
overallg(_ of the spaceprod'ramThat lskind ofwhat ,aerecommend
MR RL'MMEL:Hasconsideratienbeengivento anysort of landingbarriersat theendof
the runwa.v: large, very strong nylon nets or whatever to take care of or help take care of over-
ru l-.ib '_
MR YOI.rN(;: Well, there again, sir, yoa would be looking at some vehicle damage. We are
l_u)kmg at barriers and barricades but what kind you want to have and how big you make it and
how da you avoid getting any damage to the vehicle is certainly a consideration.
People are looking at barriers. I think that they would be more applicable to trans-Atlantic
abort sites where your runway lengths are limited and you are
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heavyweight.
MR. RUMMEL: Yes, that is why I asked, because as you indicat_ there may be no alterna-
tive except to land at Kennedy.
MR. YOUNG: Well. that is certainly something that peop!e are looking at. The difficulty
with the barricade or barrier is to design one that this geometrically shaped machine will go
through and not hurt everything so bad and slow every'thing down at the _ame time. It is really
a tough engineering problem.
MR. RUMMEL: Yes, it is.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about the weather considerations? What is the effect of rain
on the orbiter2 If you landed at Kennedy and a sudden squall came up that was not predicted,
what would the effect of rain be on the orbiter?
MR. YOUNG: Well, Mr. Rogers, I'm sure glad you asked.
tLaughter)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I didn't realize you had this, John.
MR. YOUNG: Here's a visual aid. That is the effect of 10 to 15 seconds of light tc moderate
rain on the real orbiter tile, and I think the repair bill for doing that to the whole orbiter, if it
didn't hurt the
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lift-to-drag ratio very bad, would be--I mean the turnaround time would be unbelievable. That is
why if you can't predict when a thunderstorm is going to arrive at the Cape, it is better to avoid
that problem.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about the safety factors though, aside from the damage to the
orbiter? Is it safe to land the orbiter at Kennedy if it's raining?
MR. YOUNG: Well, you have a wet runway but the runway is highly grooved, so it m_ght be
safe. I wou!d be more worried about the other part of the environment. If you ever came
through a rain like that--I mean, you're not going to save yourself any turnaround time because
you're talking about many days of serial time to repair the damage. That would be what you
would be concerned about. I would be concerned about getting that damage all over the vehicle
and picking up maybe 100 or 125 or 130 drag counts and then having a wind situation where it
wouldn't be able to make the runway.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is what I was asking about.
MR. YOUNG: The engineering people say i_ w ,ald only be half that is the most drag counts
they could ever get, but I don't know if they've ever seen
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anydarnamelike that I me,in.I dont kn(_ it ,he__ere reailv-
('HAIRM_,NR(_;I']RSflow ¢_)od;_r_, th* _,ather predicticm_ in Fl,_ricict in t_,rm> ¢_t qu_ck
_quall< like tb _t thiit might cause, that kind ¢)f"dan'.aKe"
MR YOt'N(; ()he day we took Mr Wah Williams out to _lve him _, flight in the STA. and
there was one little thunderstorm sittina 1;{ miles ;_f'f the end of the runv,av Thirty minutes
later there was a squall line acr:)ss both ends of tht, runv,;_', B_q'ore we went out _e checked
with the weathar and the) said there wasn't _oind to be any
That is not unusual, and it wouldn't hurt a reaular airplane. You wouldn't care at all. You
would just go right ahead and fly but you worry about that with a real orbiter because of the
problems associated with those kind of events
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What choice do you have once the decision is made to land at Ken-
ned', and vou have an hour and a half to go? I mean, is there anything you can do during that
hour and a half" period if the weather changes?
MR. YOUNG: Once you have b,'_en given the go f_r deorbit if you lose communications or if
you don't have communications right up to the time you deorbit, which is a little over an hour,
ma)'be an hour and a
21"1
minute prior to deorblt--we waved off (_, .p ,,me time three minutes prior to deorbit on STS-. or
41-C. and the) reported to us the weather was ¢oin_ to be clear at the time of landing
At the time of landing, there was ] i.5_(i foot rain showe: _ over the end of the runway, so
It'S a difficult problem, and I think we were about three minutes away from having Crip !and [n
.-,ome pretty interesting rain showers
CHAIRMAN ROGEI_S: Once deorbit _x'curs is there any option left "_
MR "fOUNG: No. sir It is not !ike an airplane whzre a"v time you ¢o somewhere in weath-
er you always have an alternate You are committed to land on one end of the runway or the
:_ther end of the runway You can swap runways maybe from about Mach 6 which is _2 minutes
prior to deorbit is when they would like to do it--i'm sorry, 12 minutes prior to landing, brt that
:s about the extent of your capability in terms of goin_ to an alternate.
MR HOTZ: John, do you have any crossrange alternates?
MR. YOUNG: No, sir. We have talked about that. but the problem you get into there is
that's even more harmful to the program. Suppose you did have a
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crossrange alternate and you ended up in Orlando, for example. It's perfectly safe, but then
you're looking at a long time to get your machine back to Kennedy. What do you do, close the
Beeline and tow it?
(Laughter.)
MR. YOUNG: That would really be a tremendous problem to do that. You would probably
have to chop up some overpasses and stuff.
MR. HOTZ: But it would be a safety alternative?
MR. YOUNG: It could be, but I'm not sure Would i'. be worth that risk? i mean. would it be
worth it to the program to slow it down that much? I don t think so. I mean. I think you would
be better off flying it into Edwards and bringi _ it back in four days or so. and that way y'ou
wouldn't have to worry about that safety alterrate
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What conclusions do you draw from ,,_hat you've said. that you
should not land at Kennedy except in an emerl;ency?
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MR "fOl.'N(; I think for a return-to-landing_ite abort its the place to land because it's the
only one there is. but the rest oft e time I think it would be in the best interest of the _pace
Shuttle pro_rnm ,_o land at one of these ;ake bed complexes
24",:_
because of all of" the reasons that Ire _iven there, and I left out some others
F_r example, there are nine--there are 14 different procedures :nat crews have t.o use
during breaking and rolling out. and there are seven other sa_ety-crltical procedures they must
use during breaking and rollout These are different from what yoc, _:_e
I mean. we have to train the pdots to do that using simulators, and the only one that is
really a valid simulation of that kind of thing Is the Ames Research Center simulator. It's a good
simulator, but you just can't go one time to a simulator and do all the rest of your training
somewhere else ancl say that you know how tc do it because you revert to your old habits.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do any of you other gentlemen have any other views on this sub-
ject?
Mr. Hartsfield?
MR HARTSFIELD: I tend to agree with John. I for one began very much as you did, think-
ing that as soon as we get things squared away we ought to land at the Cape I have since
changed my mind, based primarily on the fact that we have got a lot ef probl,., s with the
brakes and the nosewhe_i steering. The problem that I have with the Cape. if those • ere fixed,
if we had a good, redundant nosewheel steering system and brakes that we could depend on.
that were more natural to operate--and incidentally, iet me point out that we are pushing the
state o _ the art on these brakes, and so it is not an easy solution, but then, the weather factor is
certainly something to consider. I know that of all my years of flying at Edwards. that the
weather is very predictable there, and it is genera'_ly good. When it is good. ;t ,s going to be good,
and you've got a complex of runways to choose from, and we can make a last minute change of
runways, for example, if the wind shifts on us. and put the bird more into the wind to a,'oid the
cross wind problems.
The thing that bothers me about the Cape is the weather. Even the first flight v_e took in
there.
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STS-11, I believe it was. if you look at that. it is a little frightening. You see patches of ground
fog all over the place, and they're pulling streamers off the wingtips as he makes his final flar_
to land, and that _.asn't predicted. 3o we were just that close to him coming back to a socked in
airport and I don't think we want to risk that kind of thing.
MF CRIPPEN: I don't think you would get any pilot in the astronaut office to disagree with
the basic premise that you are much safer landing at Edwards. There are some things you could
do. as was indicated, to make Kennedy better, but you're never going to overcome the weather
unpredictability.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you all agree with Admiral Tru!y's plan that certainly for the
next few flights you plan to land at Edwards?
MR. CRIPPEN: Yes. sir.
MR. ABBEY: I think the question John rmse_ on the stability of the weather is a fairly key
point because you want to go into an environment where the weather pattern is going to be
stable and predictable for a long period of time. and at E _,'ards a':d in New Mexico you have
both those situations.
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We have tried to _et lnt_ Kennedy a number of :Jm__.s.and we h_. e proven tha: _e cou]dn't
predict the
_eather. and it _las chan_ed on us very rapidly Crippen was _aved off _w!ce. and in December
we had three wave-off_.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Weitz. do you agree _
MR, WEITZ: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you nave anything to add to what has been said?
MR. YOUNG: No. sir.
DR. V HEELON: Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment on this? If we were to accept th_s
very reasonable consensus and implement it so that we land only at Edwards except in the case
of emergency, then our attention turns naturally to the way that we get from Edwards back to
Florida for relaunch. That way is a single 747 that has been specially modified to carry the orbit-
er. That 747 becomes a single point of failure in the Shuttle program, and I submit that we
ought to think hard about the possibility of buying a second one.
Do you have any comment on that, gentlemen?
MR. ABBEY: We have been. I think, talking, about doirg that. and I am very hopeful that
at is going to be one thing that we get into the budget.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If there are no other questmns, do you want to proceed, Capta:n
Young?
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MR. YOUNG: Another issue that many people have raised is why don't we do auto land.
md _hey are talking about auto land both to improve our ability to handle low ceilings and visi-
b. "y. an_ as you _oe what hu:,c_ens when you talk about doing auto land at the tow ceilings and
vim, ";ty. you are probably going to be in the rain. if you are not goirg to be in the rain. you are
going be in very low ceilings _hich are about zero-zero practically, and I suggest that you
probab_: don't want to land the orbiter in those kind or conditions, for many, many reasons.
We propose, it t'as been proposed to do automatic approaches to low altitude and low alti-
tude operations in cloads or in a ceiling or reduced visibiiJty does introduce more risk into the
human controlled approach, and it is not just the machine itself: it is the interaction of the
human beings with that machine. Our current mission rule has ".000 foot altitude, and that
gives us five miles of visibility to the precision approach indicators where if a fellow is doing a
hea_'eight landing into Dakar. he has got about 28 seconds to preflare altituce, which is
where you have to be set up right, and less than 18 seconds to 400{) feet, and with the automatic
speed brake system that we have. it is mandatory for a Dakar landing _ ith a short runway
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to be set up in a stable dive by 4000 feet to do a successful preflare and landing, and it is par-
ticularly true when that vehicle is hea_wweight and the runway is short and narrow like it is at
Dakar, or if it is like it is with a rough suriace as Kennedy. and it has a cross wind or tail wind.
We need ground sensors operating full time to do auto lands, and we feel that with only three
orbiters left _;ght now, that lower weatl_er minimums is about the oppos:te of what the Space
Shuttle program ought to want to do for a long time.
We also sort of have a requirement because people up in space tend to get rusty, and people
who haven't flown the orbiter tend to get rusty, to have them fly the control stick so that zhey
get some stick time .lust before landing, and normally that is about three minutes of attitude
control st,ok time all the way around the heading alignment circle to landing. And therefore, we
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believethat automaticapproacheswouldnotbethe way,o fly theorbitersucces,_fullywher,the
pilot hasgot to do the landing Crew monitoring for auto-land the wa" the Navv does automatic
!andings, thev require two independent auto land monitoring systems before tbev can do auto-
lands At the present, with the Shuttle auto-land system, we have no independent monitoring
s_stem, and no one really knows how to
implement one independent monitoring sy_[em for successful low altitude crew takeovers. Even
if successful crew takeover cou!d be done, which it really can't, crew interaction wi_h auto-land
in the {;huttle, crews really can't successfully interact with the auto land system at low altitude
because we have these great big etevons on the back, and we ha;e a little bitty attitude control
stick, and it can move those big elevons an awful long way awful fast. And when that happens,
exciting things happen.
We actually train our pilots not to use tt',o attitude control stick very much. They set up a
trajectory, and the closer they get to the ground, if they are set up r!ght, the less they move that
control stick. And the orbiter exhibits what we call reverse altitude responses, and I will tell you
what that raeans. And when it does that, a natural reflex takeover pilot action would be the
exact wrong thing to do. For example, if you've got a sudden nosedown pitchover when you are
doing auto land. the reflex action to take over would be to pull back on the stick, to pull the
nose up, and it would be--what it would do, it would raise those elevons, drop lift on the wing,
and drive the wheels right into the ground at a high sink rate. And then the onlv way that
people do operate
2-. 90
on an auto-land touchdown machine safely is with a g _-around capability provided bv throttles
That is how you get yourself out of all kinds of jams with airliners, and needless to say. the
hundreds of approaches to to.achdown that airliners must make to get FAA certi:_ed to auto-
land, we will never be ,able to do in an orbiter.
And the auto land system is dependent on many sensors, and it is always one failure away
from not working at all because it isn't even in the backup flight system. An inavertent backup
flight system engagement would be catastrophic if you had to do an auto land.
For all those reasons and for many others, we don't vieu auto lands as a practical solution
to any problem in the Space Shuttle program, and I guess _e have stated that to the program
folks. And ! guess the overall basis for tha_ is that it is just not--it is not something, that is
going to do the program any good.
And I wish it was because I am not against auto lands, but I am sure against not being able
to do it right.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you, Captain Young.
I assume that part of your job over the years
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has been to learn about concerns of astronauts and to express them to the system, and to ex-
press your own concerns.
One cf the questions I think the Commission has and wants to address to you. do you feel
that those concerns have been properly and appropriately handled by the system?
MR. YOUNG: Sometimes yes and sometimes no. You know. the NASA way of doing things
is an interactive, argumentative way of doing things; everybody presents a pretty solid image to
the public and everything, but when you get in a meeting with engineers, you are h, a knock
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down, drag out discussion about how you want to do things, and that is the way we o,_erate, and
I don't see any_hing wrong with that, but i hate to lose But we sure dont win them al!
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. I think we all understand that. I thin]c the thing that would
concern us is if you fel" "hat the concerns that you expressed and the concerns you expressed on
behalf of the astronaut ct, '_munity were not considered by the system.
MR YOUNG: Sometim_,s they' are and sometimes they" are not, and I think that is pretty
understandable
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. I guess maybe I didn't
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ask the right question.
I don't mean do they always agree with you, but did ",ou have a feeling that consideration
was given to the questions that you raised about safety?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. I don't know how much, though. I mean, I am not able to judge what
weight they would put on those kind of things.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, without going back over the past history of problems that were
presented ta the system and how they were handled, do you now think that there are matters ir_
addition to the ones that you have talked about today that are important safety considerations
that are not being given the proper attention?
MR. YOUNG: I think as a result of this review that Henry talked about. I think they will
Le. yes. sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yoi_ are satisfied, then. that the concerns that Ju have expressed in
the past and the ones that y,.,u may have in your mind today are being p:'operly considered
under Admiral Truly and in view" of the study that is now being undertaken?
MR YOUNG: Yes. sir. and I think that is going to be an ongoing process for a long. long
time. And I am going to keep an eye on it. yes. sir.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you have any recommendation_ to make in the structural organi-
zation as it exists? Now, as I understand it. the astronauts' concerns are normally expressed to
you, although sometimes they are handled directly by pa_icular astronauts, most of them are
expressed to you and Mr. W'eitz, and then as I understand it, you would pass those on to Mr.
Abbey and Mr. Crippen in that office, and they would consider them and dc whatever w_,s ap-
propriate, including pass them on?
MR. YOUNG: That's how the system works, and we work a lot of off line things in other
low levels, we do.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you have any recommendation for changes in the structure?
MR. YOUNG: I have one that we will talk about later, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you want to wait until later, or do you want to do it now?
MR. YOUNG: No, sir. I would rather wait until Mr. Abbey sets me up for it.
.![,:lll_h_'r t
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Any way you want is fine with us.
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MR. WEITZ: I would like to address a couple of concerns we have, and as a demonstration of
the fact that John and I did not rehearse and compare notes, he has kind of spiked my guns a
little bit on the first one. We do have some concerns over the considerations that have been
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Igiven to the possibility of executing a TAL. a transatlantic abort iandmg, which by our approach
to the rules under which we decide whether the conditions are acceptable for a TAL are some-
what modified and flavored by consideration of the probability of occurrence. By that i mean
that--and of course, we have gotten new data recently which I think only se_'es to underscore
our concerns. One is that we have in the past launched flights that required a v, aiver over the
maximum allowable TAL weight at Daka:'. and i am referring primarily to Dakar, because the
bulk of our missions do go out at L_,-1 2 degree inclination launch, and *heretbre Dakar is the
prime "IAL site.
As John alluded
the capability of the
Dakar in light of or
same, the visibility
to, we have serious reservations about the nosewheel steering system and
brakes to stop this vehicle, and we also accept lower weather minimum at
in the regime of vis:bility requirements. The ceiling requirements are the
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requirements there are five miles rather than eight, or six rather than eight, but it is on the
order of something less. What we do not want to do is run an airplane, an orbiter, off the end.
We only have one suitable runway at Dakar since the wind is primarily from the northeast
quadrant there, and the prevai!i_._g wind runway. Dakar often has visibility problems caused by
the winds that blow across the n.-,rthwestern Ahucan deserts and pick up dust and sand and
keep it in the area, and I lose track of our numbers, but 1 know that we did delay for several
days on one mission because of poor visibility at Dakar.
So basically we do have a concern with the apt;roach to how we systematically approach the
requirements for the condition:- at Dakar when it is a primary TAL site.
Another concern that we have is night landings. We have demonstrated more than once.
twice now, that we do in fact have the capability to safely ]and the orbiter at night. However. a
night landing _s not quite the same as a day landing, principail_ because it is at night, which I
will get into a little bit, but in those cases where the conduct of the mission absolutely requires
it, then we will accept the responsibility to go and either launch at night or land
2496
at night or do both, if requirer It is just that sometimes there have been instances in the pa-:
when the hard, firm, absolute ,. _ .:rements of the mission did not in fact mandate the condi-
tions which resulted in a night la_" , or a night landing. It was more to maximize, either to
increase by some percentage the scien:_!.c return on a missior, or to have a wider launch, window
to take advantage of on launch morning.
The reasons wc don't like _night landings are, as I said, because, it is at night. In fact. your
landing the orbiter is like landing any other airplane in which you primarily use your outside
scene as the cues on which to get dc, wn once you get in close to the ground Once you get past
the preflare point and get within that last couple of hundred feet of the ground, at night those
cues just aren't there. You must rely on the guidance and navigation system which is resident
within the orbiter, and you basically use electronic displays in order tc get you down. You don't
perceive--if yc, u have a cross wind, for example, it is much more difficult to perceive drift across
the runway at night than it is in the morning.
We have a principal example cf that by the fact that a very highly experienced pilot of ours
landed at night vn a wet runway at Ellington, experienced
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hydroplaning which he did not recogr, ize the fact tha* he was drifting off the runway and wound
ur) leaving the runway and nearly destroying the airplane. Fortunately he was not injured, b,lt
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hadthat occurredm the daytime,hewouldhavereco¢mzedthedr:ft, the condition,muchearli-
er, andbeenableto dosomethingaboutit
Soit basically:snotsuppressionbut :he lackof eutside env:ronment _: t'a] cues wh:ch _ou
experience in the night landings t'_at we would like to avoid then to the maximum extent possi-
ble.
Another consideration along those lines is that just as the pilot is deprived of his ablhtv to
discern what is going on around him, so are the folks involved in weather observing and fore-
czsting. In fact, we had one mission that would have been a night TAL at Dakar. and even after
the fact--was that Dakar or Morone _ Any_'a2, -, I think it was Dakar where there was some dis-
pute as to whether the ceiling was on the order of 3.000 or 4,000 feet or whether it was up
around £_.000 or 9,000 feet. And so the weathermen are making the obser_'ations, and therefore,
that is going to influence the validity of their forecast and also obviously influence the launch
director's decision whether to go or not.
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Another thing we cannot overlook is that training to do a night landing requires a signifi-
cant amount of crew time. Our nearest training site using the Shuttle Training ._drplane is _.t
the White Sands Space Harbor in E1 Paso which, if you go out there to fly at night, you basicaliy
have shot nearly a whole day and a half. By the time vou get out you observe crew rest require-
ments from a pilot freshness standpoint, and it is very hard on the crew when they are trying to
get out to come up to the level of proficiency that we feel ls required for a planned night land-
ing.
We do train every crew to be capable of performing a mght landing, but :f we know that
folks are in fact going to be reqmred to perform one, then it does require--we do expose those
folks, require that they do get mcre training.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. Mr. Waltz,
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTROI%G: I understand that Casablanca is a p_xeutial alternate
TAL. and is there significant performance penalty in terms of the inclination to successfully uti-
lize that?
MR. WEITZ: Well. it's on order. We would have to go up to about 31.3i_a degrees, and what
number are we using now, 60{i! pounds a degree or a 1000 pounds a degree? So you are talking on
the order of
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2.000 to 3,090 pounds performance penalty. But in those cases where we have that performance,
we would like to consider shaping to go do it, which requires more resources. Another reason we
have locked in on a standard 28 1/2 degree inclination is there are a lot of things in trajectory
planning and analysis we don't have to do over and over when you start picking difference
launch azimuths.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How many night landings have there been?
MR. WEITZ: Two.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who was the commander?
MR. WEITZ: Admiral Truly made the first one, and he complained bitterly. He stayed up all
night and went to bed during the day. but no one else did.
t Laughter.)
MR. WEITZ: And the second one was Hoot Gioson landed at ;,dwards about an hour before
sunrise, I think,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
Any other questions'?
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GENERALK/_'TYNA:John,iet measkyou.if yougo:nto Dakar on a TAL with some o:" the
hea;-vxveiKht pa_:oads that we have p_nnee,. ' ,_ the brakes _ _u hav_ now. can you _t..p
MR f()UNG it depends _pon _i_a', brak '_ energy mar, m and what kind ofa head ;vmd __:
tail wind you've got. i think the latest Ames Sire sho_'ed that. It ,*as really touch and go You
have to put the brake_' ,_r. with 5.t)i_!_ feet to _o in a no-wind _fituation when you are doing !67_
knv.s, and I think that _ould be really, you kpow. you are putting those brakes on so darned
fast that you use the energT up just like nothing fiat. and if th_v don't hold ap. if they don't give
you _he full brake amount, which is 5:, million foot pounds, if the)" fail at 40 million f, t pounds,
like :t4 million foot p,_unds per brake, as we have had happen, or maybe at 34 million foot
pounds, like happened on Hoot Gibson's flight, which we still don t understand the reasen for
that failure. I know you would be in real trouble on stopping.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And what's at the end of the runway?
MR YOUNG: Well, there's a block house and a cliff.
' p.,i I.a:l _ntcr. )
MR. hO','Z: ,John. what kind of an engineering effort is ongoing en the brake problem, and
is it a matter of technolo_ or money to fix it?
MR. YOUNG: It is a matter, I believe, of
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money, yes.
M !:', HOTZ: Thank you
- ,r gMR. 'fOr.. G: But I can't tell you where that stands right no_ That is one of the issues
that we are carrying on right now with the program office.
MR. HOTZ. But is there any kind of an engineering program under way °
MR. YOUNG They are looking at carbon brakes. I saw the spec on them the other day. and
som_ ,)f those were rated at up to 100 million foot pounds per brake, an I've seen others with .ib
m:',lion foot pounds per brake. And there are four brakes, two on each nre.
MR. CRIPPEN: John, if I could interrupt probabiy Mr. Aldrich can give yo, moro 3ata m,
this. but there _s an ongoing program for improving the brakes, and there has been for some
time.
MR. YOUNG: But it takes a long time to build a set of new brakes.
MR. HOTZ: But is it a question of technologT? Do ycu have to go into another order of brake
technology?
MR. YOUNG: These are carbon k_,_.^,
MR. HOTZ: __,re they the same kind they use on the Concord"
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MR. CRIPPEN: They do have carbon brakes on the Concord and several other aircraft. It is
not so much developing new technology, but we have discovered that the making of aircraft
brakes is more of an art than it is a science, and especially on airplanes, you have the opportuni-
ty to take them oul and do ground runs and make adjustments for them. and we really don't
have that kind of a facility available to us. Consequently, we are also developing a new lab at
Wright Pat to help us do some of those kinds of tests so that we can improve the brakes.
MR. HOTZ: Thack you.
MR. HARTSFIELD: I would '_ke to talk about a couple of items that we are concerned about
that relate--they are training items, really, but they are things starting to concern as. and what
PJ and John have been talking about lead right into it. One is handling qualities. The orbiter is
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a really nice f'.'Vir_ m.achine up and away. but _hen _ou _et it dov n close to the runwt:v _nere
it becemes important to have good handlin_ quai:t_e_-, it has aome very strange characterist_c's
Nell w',il understand th:.-. I knc._, but the pilot n, !t_cated at ,._r si:_htl) air of the apparent center
,.,f rotation, whwh _s k:nu _,," a bad place hJr t,nv e,.lot t., be It ,_s lust the, nature ot the a_rplane
because of
the large percentage of the wing area that is in the elevons themselves, and the end resuh is
what Jonn talks about, when the mlot makes an input, he doesn't get an)" nhysicat _eedback that
he has dore something, and so you have to learn to fly the orbiter pretty much open loop. You
make small inputs and then wait and see what happens, and that is not _ natural pilot instinct
So we spend a lot of time training _he pilots in the training airplane.
Further aggravating this problem of sensing what is happening is the eye heighth You are
about 33 feet, your eyeballs are. above the grouncl when you touch down. and that is in the same
ballpark as. say, like a 74. or something, and of course they have perceFtion problems, too. and I
have talked to those guys on how they land ,'hose things, and they pretty much set up a steaav
rate of descent and just fly them on.
Our problem is aggravated by the fact that we are decelerating rather rapidly and losing
over 5 knots a second We are just a glider, and so we have to set it up and get it on the ground.
As John says. we learn not to make inputs close to the grounci because anything you do is
wrong
For example, the sink rate. if vou sense the sink rate is a little bit toe high. the instinct is
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to put in a little backstick. As soon as you do that. you move the elevons. One degree of elevon
at 2_0 knots is worth 6.,n,! pounds of lift. so you move them 3 or 4 degrees, and you've really
dumped a lot of lift. and the thing really drops in on you.
So it takes a lot of time to learn this technique
Now. the STA. our training airplane, the modified Oulfstream II. is the essential link in this
training, and that is where we really learn to fly the orbiter and learn to land it. and we cant
do this in a simulator We need the real flight environment, and vou need this training airplane
to learn how to land.
Now, all the pilots who have flown the orbiter come back and sing the praise of the training
airplane. I know it has been my case and everybody that has ever flown it, that you come back
after six or seven days in space and the first time you do this. I guess almost every time you are
a little apprehensive that. you know. gee. I haven't flown in a long while. I've been up there for
six or se_en days and my reflexes maybe aren't what they should be. You take over the ma-
chine, and you feel it out, but as soon as you start around the _ading alignment circle, all of a
sudden it clicks and you say I've been here before, and the reason you have is that training
airplane.
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Well, what I'm leading up to is we are beginning to get in a lifetime problem with those
airplanes, and that is starting to worry us. Let me give you an ez.ample. A F.,'.et that starts into
the flow, by the time he becomes a commander and lands the orbitc_ mr the first time, he will
have made in the vicinity of 900 approaches with that training auplane, and we find this. that
this is about right. In fact. some pilots will tell you the: would like to have a little more, but
that is about what we are getting.
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For 12 tlight_ a year. to _upDort that sort of program. I am just _iv_ra_ you :_ r,_uffh nurub,,r.
we need about 14_!_ hours oftrainink, time a year in the trainin_',u_pt',tnes :\t ,_ptimuru. we z_n
_et about 73_ 'ours on each airplane, ',rod you f[_ur_ _, we find that we _'t r_m_rh[y :_ 7_ per_'_,nt
efi_ctiveness factor In other words, a lot ,,fl'th, _ f'lvin_ time <m ar, airplane is n,_ d_,dl,'ut_'d t,Jtal
tv to training You are moving the airplan( back and fo:th to EIlinknon o,, to the hL'tor, for
inspections, you t:now, there _s overhead S_J thre_, -iirplane- can _lve )_m, it ',_,u c_mld _et 7hl_ _
,,'ear. which we had last year. you could get .-,7.; h,)urs, so roughly three _rplar_e_ _ll _upp_rt i:_
flights a )'ear, which is what we were approachin_ when we had the accident
Two of those airplanes now have over 5,000 hours on them, and the predicted fatigue life _f"
some of the components, like basic wing structure and things l_ke _hat. wert_ under that number.
4,800 So we have reached a point where we are having to be very careful on our inspection
programs and we are reaching the point where we can expect to start having failures in major
structure or cracks. The airplane is failsafe, let me point that out. Ym/re not _oin_ to have a
catastrophic failure, but when you do detect the crack or _hatever indicat_-n of a fai!ure vou
see, of a fatigue life problem, you've got to fix it. and if it is a major structure, yo': are going to
be down for a while
one of the concerns we have had in the office is we see ourse!;'es reachin¢ a point where
we may not be able to support the crew training, and we have in the mill right now a push to
get a fourth STA to carry us through Our tMrd STA doesn't have that much t_me on .,t, but we
need another airplane. Otherwise, I am afraid that we won't be able to support the fi_ght rate
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is that fatigue life at that level because you are highly
loading the airplane during practice approaches?
MR HARTSFIELD: Yes, sir.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: So it wouldn't be comparable with _he n_,rmal L,-II"
MR. HARTSFIELD: No. Every approach we cycle the [_ :r We!I. you know. we've probably
got more gear cycles in those airplanes than any G-II that's flying
MR. ABBEY: It's about a factor of four.
MR. I-I_,RTSFIELD: The other training item that is causing us a little concern now that I
wa_t to mention and I told y_u earlier I would is the SMS--our shuttle mission simalator.
What we have is two training simulators. One of them is a fixed based--in other words, it
doesn't move. A full cockpit mock-up; the other one is a moving base and I think you've been to
Houston and looked at that and those have an aft station in that part of the cockpit that doesn't
move attached to it.
Those two bases are essential t_, our training, and it's a very complex machine. And it has a
heck of a lot of fidelity that all of the crews brag about.
At the _ime of the accident we were _;etting a hundred and 48 hours a week on the shuttle
mission
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simulators: that i: total for the two bases. ,_ut of a possible, of course. 24 hours a day. _even days
a week out of a possible 336 hours. We were planning to ramp up to about 160 hours a week
Our best estimate is that the two bases at best could only suaport about a ixe hvurs a week.
There is an awful lot of time that can't go directly into training for reconfigurations for new
training loads and just the maintenance on the simulator itself.
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Nc)_ v,e complicate tha: :_ titt_, ' bit. and th_t's (_h_d_,_cencv I_:- ;_ had ',_rd. but :_- _rL,'_'
h:_'_e hud_e_-lim, _em_ t(_ _lar! up_r;_din_ _i,_,-,_, facilitie_ .-\_ an examp!e, thP
computers that are being u_ed in the mi_sion -qmulator are no longer hein_ made And the
vendor _a,,_ he `*on't make parts tbr them in three more years
So we kn;,w `*'e are aoin_ to have to remachine the simulator_ And we have already _ot
that _oin_. But ir_ add_thm to this, we have problems with the simulators, known deficiencies.
We have a pretty lousy visual system; we know that and we're tryin_ to _,et something, on line i"o
improve it.
We ha_e _ large number of the models in the simulator that _re not what they ought to be
As an example, the main engine model--in other words, the interact_o_ bet`*_en the crew :rod
the simulation of th_ shuttle main engines is so bad that in some cases we _et negative train_n_L
and i'{ is one of our h_gh priority items to fix
And we have now finally turned on some efforts to ;et ..,ome of these problems fixed The
word `*e had `*as _hat with the t]ights rate as it `*a.-,, and the limitation of the simulator and the
_rowin_ list of t)roblem_, _ff which there is somethina ctose to O,_ ot them, and a lot of :hese are
liltie nits, but they've documented over 6_t_* discrepancies agmnst the s_mulator and _t _ot us
worried about maintaininz, our trainin_
And `*hat v,e really needed, I think, is another
at least one more SMS base m order to support a flight rate of a doTen or mare and do it com-
fortably
Some o, her things that we needed and we are stepping out on this now Zs a guidance and
nawgation trainer Right now if we want to teach a pilot, a commender flight 'echniques or
teach him how to do the nav. we have to tie up the whole base to de that. and we shouldn't do
that, We should have a part-task trainer A_d we've been trying to get one of those for a long
time. It looks like right no,*" that we may very well be able to do that, We have got the thing
roiling
And the only reason I bring this up is to show you that we have concerns and we still do;
but there is still a lot of work to do to make the training side of the house with our airplanes
and our mission simulators match up to the flight schedule.
.MR. WEITZ: If I might add, Henry, the inadequacies in the SMS affect the level of the
training of the fl:.ght control teams also in that they' get significant _n-:ounts of training while
they're running integrated simulations with the flight crew in the simulator
MR ABBEY: I think those covered at least all of the major specific con,:,, rns we were going
to talk about. I don't know whether ther_ were any other
2-I ]
questions or not that you might want to ask us.
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MR A('t|E:'4()N I have :_ quest>n ,m Intern_i] :i_em'v-,ah_t_, p'ar+,wukl,-I_ the _l_ th_,,<de_v
f'IAIIH_U)H Is ()rk_IIll/l:,d Ill tile' Lt_('_l,.'_
I _v()uld by tnterested In the r_'actlons _)t _m', ui vou dent -': q to the queMlon whether the
_r)terrlal sMet% (UllCtl()[l [_ ."4t't LIt) 111 it _t _, [hilt _,()t.l thlr]k HI&- - the* (9_..)_l[llkl[]l cuntrlbhtlun I()
l]i_ht _,atet_. And it n_)t, wh,, n()t. _tnd _t_ wh_H _ l> ).()u 'a()uJd ilke t() '<e(," It chan<_(.d
MR .ABBEY %V_,II. )h'a) wa-; r<_llv th(" noxt t<_pl,: t.h_t ,a_. _.r_. _oin).' t(_ touch on, _:_d 'a.
;'nn _et into that nc)_a.
MR :\('HES()N Verv_ ,<)d
MR ABBEY Both .],)hn and I ,v_'re v(.,rv much involved in t:_e tvtivities after the Apolh)
_'11"(' i"1 lm;7
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you move your m_crophone a little closer.
MR ABBE'_" Both John and I w.re w,rv much involved in the acuiv_ties following, the
Apollo fire in 19);7 and at that point there was considerable strengthening of the reliability and
quality assurance and the safety organization `*ithin NASA We established a safety office
within the office of space flight We also had an independent reliability and quality
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assurance ,.nn safety orgat_tzation at eac)_ oi the centers reporting to the directors.
And Dr Gilruth and George Lowe. who ,*'as the Apollo spacecraft program manager, ,*'ere
very insistent upon having that be an independent function that didn't get into the programmat-
ic considerations.
We had. at that point in tlme. a lot of flight anomalies from Apollo 7 to Apollo I1 We had a
period probably of about six weeks m between flights where we had to res>Ive all the flight
anomalies
George Lowe, I think me're than any individ,,a! I've ever met, put a lot of era?basis on iden-
tifying ali of those anomalies, right up to the top level up through NASA headquarter,_, and .hey
`*ere reported and acted upon and satisfactorily resolved
Even with that six-week time period, in betweon seven and eleven. I think that only hap-
pened because of a lot of painstaking attention to detail and I think dedication to get the joo
done wei! by all levels within the Apollo program.
l think that same attitude exists within the shuttle program I think we were successful on
the flights before 51-L, to a large degree, by that same kind of attitude
But I think as we tend to attempt to fly more
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frequently, I think we probably need to look at a better check and balance of the system and
John and I have talked quite a bit and we talked to other people about looking at establishing a
more independent safety organization and activity within NASA and within the center.
We have, I think, a good system within our aviation program. We have an aviation safety
officer that worries about our aircraft operations. John has an aviation safety otficer within the
astronaut office. They always aren't the most popular individuals because, I think, they don't
always tell us what we would like to hear.
For example, we have got eight of our airplanes grounded nov,'. But I think that _s the kind
of at'Stude and the kind of feeling you have to have in that kind of a program, and I think it is
important to have.
And John, I think, could probably better express than I some thoughts in that regard.
MR. YOUNG: This is really the key to the reason that I'm glad to be here today because I
have this feeling that the very biggest problem that must be solved before the space shuttle flies
again is that one of communications. And that is communications with
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res[_cr t_, the _,arl,, ich,nt_ticat_on and pr_,ic_.r apprecl,:ltwn of prodram-wide saf_-qv _.sues
T}-uJt .N.\_.\ _r_t_,rnul '._orkln_ pal:_'r (m space _hutth' pro_zr;._.m t'll_ht safet,,, iw _me _hnt I
_r,,t_, th:it _'a._ rt, h,:_._ed [ha',, f,_r the re,'ord I didnt rea)tv release--Lovered se_era} concerns
lh_tl ,ir_, _Ld'vtv i_su,-s Lind e:tch ol th<_st, c,,nc_.rns is being (lentil with right now and chanKe con-
tr_H b_nrds nnd _)th,_.r rvviews
And prh_r to the. accident, man_ ol thv._e safvlv _ssues 'were be_n_ w)rked and they were in
the system But they were not bein_ w()rked and l was told mainly because vve didn't have the
rhonev b.) deal with them
Now that is a worrisome condition to me, and it needs to be corrected and it ought to be
worrisome to everybody else. But b) ,tse'(', it is kind of a communications problem because l
didn't know some of" those were in the s'._st_m.
The space shuttle, after 24 mission , is exactly what we should expect from the first of its
kind. It has certain risk associated with its normal operation, if you can call what it does
normal. And it is a vehicle that we're all workin_ very hard to make operational And I think
once you Ket it on orbit and start dom_ what people are supposed to do in space, it
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really is what you can call an operational system.
And I wonder, though, sometimes why if the space shuttle is inherently risky: why we
should accept additional avoidable risks in order to meet launch schedules and we do that some-
time. or to reduce operating costs, and that has been proposed. Or to fly unsafe payloads. And I
think ._;ometlmes that happens.
The problem is that we've _'ot right now and I think everybody in the astronaut office appre-
ciates it: we just can't afford to have another accident. We cannot.
But I maintain if _e are very, very careful, we can still have an outstanding space shuttle
program just like _'e did in 19_.5. and that doesn't mean that the program has to accept avoid-
able risks
And one of the problems we have is to get a communications link and properly define tho_e
risks.
Furthermore, we need a fool-proof way to surface to the top and correct safety issue _, early
so that we can prevent another accident.
There is a great bunch of engineering people at NASA, and I guarantee beyond anl, reasona
ble doubt that all the working troops right this minute know exactly what all the space shuttle
issues are right this minute.
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And somebody says--and his boss says, "That hasn't failed in 60 flights; get out of my
office."
And so here's something that's bad that could happen: a single point that this guy has dis-
covered by desk work or by qualification or bv test and it doesn't get through the system because
this boss has got a nillion things on his mind. He's worried about something else; he doesn't
have the money to do an)thing about it and so forth and so forth, and it shouldn't happen.
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And the way I th_nk vou cart prevent that one way--and I sure h(_t)_' it isn't the oni_ _vav-
would [_, to _et ._ttet_ wide and a¢{,m'y wide tqi_ht safet_ _r_anizathm. -qmilar to th_e of many
airplane pro_rarns
If such a program were developed, the _uideline_ for that program might b,, the :,afetv
people in the organizatton would be independent of the c_st and schedule concern.- _,l their
b_anches or d_vislon_ or directorates or centers
And don't misunderstand me: The branch, tl,e
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division, the directors, center bosses would still be responsible for safety and their responsibility
should be documented clearly for everybody to see. But ".he grass roots and pervasive safety
people report to their organization heads and still pass the word on safety issues that are going
on right there up the line through the independent safety organization
Unless we take very positive steps to open safety communications and to identify and fix
early-on safety problems, we are asking for another shuttle accident
These flight salety peop!e would be continuously involved in design, manufacture, qualifica-
tion test and turn-around test and checkout and inspectian. Flight safety people could have con-
tinuous involvement in launch mission entry and landing operations. What the)" would do woulci
be to identi_, and report--in real time, if necessary--space shuttle program flight safety prob-
lems to their bosses--their boss in that division, and also up their independent chain of com-
mand in their safety organization.
And the sole purpose of this group o[" people would be like any other fli_ht safety group to
prevent program accidents
This is offered only as a constructive
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suggestion. If there is some other way to keep the lines of communication open and guarantee
that they stay open for as long as we run this program--if there is a better and more foolproof
way to do it, then we ought to do that.
And, needless to say, I go along with Crip: Wid-,out responsible p ople--the right kind of
people, who are independent and safety conscious and ori nted--such organization will be use-
less to NASA and wouldn't do anybody any good.
But it is requested that some reasonable system be added to checks and balances and added
to the launch rate and cost reduction process because it is really important to being successful in
this program. And I think we can be successful.
We proved it up to a point, and we want to continue to prove it; we just have to be very
careful and we have to keep those lines of communications open. NASA doesn't do business
without everybody knowing what everybody else is doing. You can't keep a secret anywhere in
NASA; we never have been able to do it.
And so let's not start now. But let's make sure we don't do that anymore.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Captain Young, you know the Commission has been con:id_ring this
suggestion for some
2519
time now, and I think most of us agree with you. It would be helpful to us if each of you would
give it a little thought to the desirability of that kind of safety--independent safety panel, and
with specific suggestions about how it should be set up and how many people should be involved
and so forth, because if that does turn out to be a major recommendation of this Commission. I
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think it will carry a lot of weight And this is the :.._,e to do it bet_een now and the time '_e
make our rep_)rt.
And so any suggestions that you have alone[ those lines, we would appreciate them
MR WEITZ: I don't have any speci_c suggestion, Mr Chairman, because the more we l_k
into all of" the aspects of what it take_ to make flying the shuttle safe, it's a very complex oper-
ation It starts, you have to control design--design changes, maintenance, tur,.around inspec.
tion--the whole aspect of it
Basically what we fee! intuitive or what | feel intuitively i_ that what we need is some
system very similar to what is used in aviation and throughout the Armed Sere'ices. and I'm
confident in the airline world in which you need a functional safety organization in place, which
must have the support and the very obvious
2520
and visible support of command at every level within the organization.
That starts with the director of NASA right on down. in which those foi_s must be heeded
and certainly their concerns paid attention to, regardless of, as John said, an impact on schedule
and cost.
MR. ACHESON: May I ask a question, going to Captain Young's recent statement?
I assume that independent safety functions of the kind you described would have to work
really at the project level; otherwise, they wouldn't be likely to see the work in enough detail,
and yet tkey couldn't--I don't suppose you would want to have their promotions and their salary
reviews dependent on the project people with whom they work.
Would you comment on that?
MR. YOUNG: l view thi_ as just the way you would do it in. I hate to say, a military pro-
gram, but safety people in mi}'tary programs are still working for the commanding officer of
that outfit and they get promott :l the same way everybody else does.
I'm not sure how much independence that safety person would have to have. My safety offi-
cer is an astronaut and hes going to fly spacecraft. I don't see why a safety person in a division
who is a knowledgeable
2521
person at the same working levels couldn't have knowledge of the safety issues that is going on
in his division and be reasonably successful. And one of these days he could be the division chief.
I don't see an_hmg wrong with that. And just because he reports these things off to the
side, wouldn't necessarily !.:eep him from going rigt:t up the same chain. And he could end up
being the administrator of NASA. And I see nothing that would be necessary to stop that
I think one of the things those kinds of people could do ('or the program properly oriented,
they could educate everybody else in the division of the importance of safety; there may be
people sitting down there with this problem that is orgoing that they're working that they don't
really know whether It is a safety problem or not and once attuned to this kind of thing, they
would be more likely to report it.
I think it is just as important to have those kind of people throughout the agency to keep
the lines of communications open. I don't think you would get points taken off for keeping open
your communication lines in NASA becau_ that is the way we work. And we just want to make
sure that those lines of communication never get closed again for whatever reason.
2522
If there is a better way to clo it, I would sure think that would t)e a good thing to do--a
better, faster, a quicker way to do it; we cught to do that. I wish I knew what it was.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just before you leave, Captain Young. [ just want to, for the record,
indicate as I understand none of the memos that you've talked about were released to the press
by you it happened some other way, right?
MR YOUNG I believe that is the case, yes, sir. I don't give ,_u_ internai working papers
because--shoot, you ought to se,e those othe, t_eople's internal worktn_ papers
t Laughter. )
MR. YOUNG Becaus_ that is just what they are: They are structured to open up some ideas
and avenues of thought to pursue to see if youre right or you're wrong. And you get your facts
straight and then you work with it
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So those memos you wrote were part of your job?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that's the type of thing you're supposed to do is to point out
problems and hope that they are corrected: is that right?
2523
MR. YOUNG: I think they are part of my job, yes, sir. I feel responsible for a lot of thinrs m
this area. I feel very responsible to these people that fly this machinery, and I sure want :hat to
be successful. And if there is something that is more risky than it needs to be, I think :._ is really
important to get that up the chain and let people at least look at it.
There may be good reasons for not doing everything; of course. I never thi_ of that, but
other people might. But I sure think it is important to get the word around.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And I gather you're very satisfied with the wa_ Admiral Truly is
proceeding with improving the program and taking into account some of Lhe concerns you've
expressed in the past?
MR. YOUNG: Yes. sir I think that the word that he put out in his memorandum is really
outstanding and everybody in the astronaut office believes that is a sa',.e way to go, considering
the problem that we just encountered. And it will help us get ba.'__: on tt_e track and the program
will be much stronger and much better, if we do those things.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. thank you, gentlemen, very much. We appreciate this and I
think it's been
2524
very constructive and helpful Thank you.
DR. KEEL: Admiral Truly, Mr. Aldrich, and Mr. Charlesworth, please.
iWitnesses sworn.
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WHAT DO ASTRONAUTS DO?
l PROVIDE FLIGHTCREWS FOR NASA SPACE VEHICLES AND STATIONS
• PARTICIPATE IN rilE DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS OF SPACt=
VEHICLES AND SPACE STATIONS
PROVIDE CREW INPUTS INTO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE
VEHICLES AND STATIONS OPERATING TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
• PERFORM CREW EVALUATIONS SUPPORTING DESIGN, TEST AND CHECKOUT OF
SPACE MACHINES
• PERFORM OTHER DUTIES AS ASSIGNED
]R(_I" ) :),-:_)
._°
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ORIGINAL 'I_/_E |S
OF POOR QUALITY
O
O
CURR ENT AS TRONA U T ACTIVITY
.<
, 1.
FLIGHTCREWS ASSIGNED,T,O:11;MISSIONS (53 CREW SEATS)
MISSION DEVELOPMENTiID'Ei_I_0¥S-UPPER sTAGES/PAYLOAD
DE PLOYM ENT/RETRIEVALS;_EVA' SERVICING, MAINTENANCE,
CONSTRUCTION; LIFE & MATERIALS SCIENCE,: OBSERVATORIES,
SMALL PAYLOADS, MISSION)NTEGRATION . :
• . ,..h_,,..,i_ ; , ,
M!SSION SUPPORT: CAPCOI_:S;':KENNEDY SPA'C'E CENTER,
SHUTTLE AVIONICS INTEGRATION LA£, CREW EQUIPMENT,
SOFTWARE/HARDWARE, FLIGHT DATA FILE, TRAINING,
ASCENT/ENTRY, AMES SIMULATION
FIREFIGHTERTASKS: DISPLAYS/CONTROLS, LANDING &
ROLLOUT, LANDING SITE AIDS & NIGHT LANDING, IMPROVED IN-
OR_!T AUTO PILOT, SHUTTLE ONBOARD COMPUTER UPGRADE,
SHDT-'.E TRAINING AIRCRAFT
© OPERATIONS/ADMINISTRATION BRANCH LEVEL ASSIGNMENT:
DEPUTY FOR FCOD, AOD, NATIONAL SPACE COMMISSION, DOD
COQRD',NATION <_^rcc_^_-,_, OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION
APFEARANCES & SAFE]'*(
• BOTTOM LINE' MANY ASTRONAUTS DO MORE THAN ONE JOB
SLOTS
51
18
38
6
25
138
JANUARY22, 1986
[Pef. I :{ I I
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CURRENT ASTRONA UT A CTIVITY SLOTS
• FLIGHTCREWS ASSIGNED TO 4 MISS!ONS (18 CREW SEATS) i£
• MiSSIONDEVFLOPMENT: DEPLOYS-UPPERSTAGES/PAYLOAD 18
DEPLOYMENT/RETI_IEVALS. EVA SER"7!CING, MAINTENANCE,
cordSTRUCT!ON; LIFE 8, i_!ATERIA.LS SCIENCE, OBSERVATORIES.
SMALL PAYLOADS, MISSION t.NT'.:GRAT!ON
• ,'M!SS!ON SUPPORT: CADCO_."_S, KENNED v SP,_CE CEN TL:_' 38
S_UTTLE AViON:CSiNTEGRATION L,_ C_,FW EQU',P%':_"dT,
SOFTWARE, HARDW,,RE, FL;GHT DAT,:-, F;LE, TRAI:',. NG,
ASCENT.ENTRY, At.:ES S:MULATIO,%
• F!REr',GHTERTASKS: D:SPLAYS.CONTROLS. LA",;DING & 6
RQLLOLJT, LANDING SITE AIDS & NIGHT LANDING. ',MPROVED 1'4-
ORBIT AUTO PILOT, SH_JTTLE ON'3©.ARD CQY,._P_T."{R UmGR".DE,
SHUTTLE TRAINING A!RCRAFT
• OPERATIONS/ADMINISTRATION BRANCH LEVEL ASS'.GN{'vIE_,,;T: 25
DEPUTY FOR FCOD, AOD, NATIONAL SPACE COMMISSION, DOD
COORDINATION. SPACE STATION, OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION,
APPEARANCES & SAFETY
• 51-L ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND RECOVER" 60
• BOTTOM LINE: .MANY ASTRONAUTS STILL DO t' RETHAN ONE .--T......[5_
JOB
z_DDI; _ !Q,,-°_ [k_.f 1 { ",'
• NiNE SPAr"E SHUTTLE MISS ONS FLOWN (S0 PERCENT MORE THAN 1984)
• TWO "HOLD KILLS' Ah'D ONE REM,.qNiFEST -- ABOUT EQUAL TO ELEVEN
FLIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO CREW REQUIREMENTS
• M!SSIONTYPES: FOUR DEPLOYS THREESPACELABS, andTWODOD
• OPERATIONS:
• ELEVEN COMMUNICATION SATELLITES DEPLOYED
• FOUR RENDEZVOUS- ONE UNPLANNED TO LEASAT
• THREE EVA'S- LEASATACT'VATION ATTEMPT; LEASAT REPAIR; SPACE
CONSTRUCTION DEMONSTRATION
i_ ONE ABORT-TO-ORBIT
• NOT COUNTING DOD, IN SEVEN MISSIONS HAULED OVER 130 TONS U _
AND DEPLOYED OVER 51 TONS IN ORBIT
• TWELVE FLIGHTCREW,S IN TR '-JNING FOR FLIGHTS THROUGH OCTOBER 1986
• 59 SEATS AND 54 ASTRONAUTS, 14 NEW CREW PEOPLE
• 57 OF 9! ACTIVE ASTRONAUTS HAVE SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT EXPERIENCE
• BOTTOM LINE-,THE NATION HAS PROFESSIONAL FLIGI4TCKEWS RE_DY NOW FOR
SPACE OPERATIONS-TO DELIVER, RETRIEVE, REPAIR, REFURBISH, REFUEL,
CONSTRUCT, OR v'VHATEVER.
APRIL 3, !986
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REVIEWS, PANELS, BOARDS, WORKING GROUPS,
AND TEAM PARTICIPATION
• PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS CONTROL BOARD- S_IUTTLE LEVEL ]I
• DESIGN CERTIFICATION REVIEWS
• CONFIGURATION CONTROL BOARD ORBITER LEVELII[
• ORBITER AVIONICS SOFTWARE CONTROL BOARD
• AVIONICS SYSTEM REVIEW
• CARGO INTEGRATION REVIEW
• MISS!ON INTEGRATION CONTROL BOARD
• SYSTEM INTEGRATION REVIEWS
IRef. I :3-7 t
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• FLIGHT OPERATIONS REVIEW
• PAYLOAD OPERATIONS WORKING GROLJP
• GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE) CONFIGURATION CONTROL
BOARD
• PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT TEAM
• FLIGHT TECHNIQUES MEETINGS
• FLIGHT OPERATIONS INTEGRATION GROUP
• MISSION OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE DAILYTELECONFERENCES
• CREW PROCEDURES CONTROL BOARD
• SIMULATION PLANNING IMPLEMEN-IATION REVIEWS
[R,'f.j 4-_, I of 2]
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• SHUTTLE MISSION SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION WORKING GROUP
• COMPREHENSIVE UPGRADE PLANNING GROUP (FACILITIES)
[Ref. 4 :{-_ 2 of 2]
fLIGHT REan'_iFSS REVIFW
I EVEL [ PRO!SRr_ REVIEW OF MISSI,'_N STATHS AND ITS PPEPAR_,TION FOR
LAUNCH.
o #'_,TR,nNAIJT nFF[_E REPI_ESENTF_n R'f r'[RrrTF_r, OF Fi [_!_T CREW ,QPERATION
Dlr#r -")RATF _,N_ A _'r ,_._
[l':,'f. I :l-_ I
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LAUNCH ;:TNII_ QNE _n,_yREVIFW
F_NAL LEVEL | FORMAL TAr,-IIP ON THE MISSION'S STATUS FC,R LAUNCH,
THTS MEFTING CLOSES ANY ACTTCN_ nPEN FROM T_E FLIGUT REAP!HESS
REVIEW,
O _STR_NA!]T OFFICE REPRESENTED BY DIRFCTOR OF FLIGHT CPEW OPERATT_NR
DIRECTORATE AND CHIEF OF THE ASTRONAUT OFFICE
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FT_,',i _ ;_N _ I "_'_,i _
_bir,,_ u, 'JF_-I,_L REPRESENTATTON
FL TG'HT CREW
D_RECTn, R FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS ,n,!RECTORATE TN OPERATTONS
SUPPORT ROOM &T kENNEDY SP&EZ CENTER.
CHIEF OF &STRONALIT OFF!£E ]N _N &TR_R_T QHEEKING RET!IRN TFI
LAUNCH SITE WE/_THER.
- r_EPUTY B]REETOR OF FLIGHT CREW nnER^TIONS TI_RECTORATE AT FLTGHT
EONTROL R')eM (FER) &T J_NNSnN spArE C_NTER (J_C_,
SENIOR _STRON&UI iN SP,mCECRAFT ANALYS!R (SPAN', ROOM &T JSC,
C,',PCnM, PI_!M_RY &NO BACKUP, !N FLIGHT CONTROL ROOM AT ,ISC.
[lt,,r. i :1-111
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MISSION MANAGEMENTTEAMMEETINGS
DAILY MISSION STATUSMEETINGFOR_RO_RAMMANAGEMENT.
ASTrONaUT OFF!CE REPRE_ENTATISN
- DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT CREW OPEn_T!ON _!RECTO_ATE
- C!i!E_OF THE ASTRDNAUT OF;;CE
- SENIOR _%TRnNAUT, SPAN _EDPESENTATIVE
[Ref. I :] 12]
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ENTRY PREPARATION
ASTRONAUT OFFICE REPRESENTATION
- FL!GHT CREW
- CHIEF OF ASTRONAUT OFF!CE, IN AN AIRCRAFT CHECKING LANqING
WEATHER.
D_RECTOR OF FLIGilT CREW OPERATIONS D!RECTORATE _T LANDING SITE.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF FLIGH _ CPEW OPEraTIONS DIRECTORATE AT THE
FLIGHT CONTROL R_OM. JOHNSON SP_KE CNETER.
SENIOR ASTRONAUT IN 3PAN AT JSC,
CAPCOM, PRIMARY ANn BACKb;', IN FLIGHT CONTROL ROOM AT .SC.
[Ref. t 3-13]
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UNRESOLVED iSSUES
OR
WHAT MUST BE DONE TO ACHIEVE
A VIABLE STS PROGRAM
H. Hartsfield
April 2, 1986
{Ref. 4 3-141
e THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HERE ARE MY OWN
• THE GENERAL THRUST OF MY REMARKS ARE
SHARED BY ALMOST ALL IN THE ASTRONAUT
OFFICE
[Ref. 4'3-1 5]
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REVALIDATE THE DESIGN
I DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
• ADEQUATE DEFINITION
• CONSISTENCY
• DOES AS-BUILT STS MEET REQUIREMENTS?
• WAS DESIGN TESTED AGAINST REQUIREMENTS?
• IF NOT, HOW WAS DESIGN CERTIFIED?
• WAIVERS?
• WHAT ARE OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS?
[Ref. _ .) 16}
REVIEW HIGH CRITICALITY ITEMS
SOLICIT CONCERNS FROM ALL ELEMENTS
• CATEGORIZE
• CONSOLIDATE
REVIEW CRITICAL ITEMS LiST
• REVALIDATE
• ADD NEW ITEMS, IF ANY FOUND
IDENTIFY AND PRIORITIZE CONCERNS/FIXES
• FIX BEFORE FLY
• SRB SEALS
• OTHER
• FIX AS SOON AS PRACTICAL
• HIGH LEVEL OF QUALITY COHTROL UNTIL FIX
• .ACCEPT RISK
1480
[Ref. t, :LIT}
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OREVIEW MAINTENANCE
REVIEW TURN AROUND REQUIREMENTS
• ADEQUATE PREFLIGHT CHECKOUT OF ALL SYSTEMS
• CHECK REQUIREMENTS ON ALL HIGH CRITICALITY iTEMS
• REVIEW TEST AND CHECKOUT PROCEDURES
• TRACEABLE TO REQUIREMENTS
ESTABLISH METHOD OF VERIFYING HIGH CRITICALITY ITEMS
• SPECIAL NOTATION IN PROCEDURES?
• NASA QUALITY CONTROL?
• REVIEW WAIVER MECHANISM
IRef. 4 3-!V,]
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REVIEW 2PERATIONS
FLIGHT RULES
• REVALIDATE RATIONALE
• MEASURE AGAINST CRITICAL ITEMS, SYSTEMS
• RE-EVALUATE LAUNCH/ABORT RULES, LAUNCH COMMIT CRITERIA
TRAINING
• EVALUATE CREW WORKLOAD
• REVIEW TRAINING FLOWS
• REVIEW FACILITIES
MISSION PLANNING MILESTONES
• FREEZE BASIC MISSION EARLY
• TIMELY DELIVERY OF MISSION PLANNING PRODUCTS
• FREEZE MISSION CONTENT AT L-5 MONTHS
• CONCENTRATE ON FLIGHT CLOSE TO LAUNCH
• DELIVER SOFTWARE ON TIME
• TRAINING CREW AND MCC
• S_";ELFLIFE
IRef. ::3 z,_I
O /
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REVIEW OPERATIONS (continued)
COMMUNICATIONS
• INSURE ADEQUATE CHANNELS FOR PROBLEMS TO SURFACE
• CHANNEL TO CREW
SAFETY
• ESTABLISH INDEPENDENT SAFETY PANEL
[Ref. t 3-20]
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ESTABLISH FLIGHT RATE
FLIGHT RATE MUST BE ESTABLISHED ON CAPABILITIES
• TESTAND CHECKOUT REQUIREMENTS
• RESOURCES
• FLIGHT RATE INCREASE BASED ON
• PROFICIENCY IN TEST AND CHECKOUT
• MORE RESOURCES
• NEW RELIABILITY HISTORY
lRef. 4 3-21]
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SUMMARY
THE RIGHT THINGS ARE BEING DONE
• WE MUST CARRY THEM TO FRUITION
• NASA HAS SOME OF THE BEST PEOPLE IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
• DEDICATIO.rJ
PRIDE
• THESE SAME GOOD PEOPLE WILL MEET THE CHALLENGE TO PUT US IN
THE AIR AGAIN
BUT
WE MUST NOT LET THE CURE BE WORSE THAN THE ILLNESS
• DO NOT MAKE HASTY FIXES
• F!X THOSE THINGS WE MUST
• THOROUGHLY, RATIONALLY EVALUATE ALL CHANGES
[R_'l
FINAL THOUGHTS
WE MUST .aCCEPT:
• THE STS IS NOT OPERATIONAL IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE
• TO THOSE WHO FLY IT, iT WILL NEVER BE ROUTINE
• THE RISKS WILL ALWAYS BE HIGH
BUT WE SHOULD REMEMBER:
• THE SPACE SHUTTLE IS THE MOST FANTASTIC, MAGNIFICENT FLYING
MACHINE IN THE WORLD
• THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE ARE UNMATCHED AND
MUST BE EXPLOITED
14S4
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TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD TRULY. ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
SPACE FLI(;ttT: ARNOLD ALDRICH. MANAGER OF SPA(E TRANSPORTATION SYS-
TEMS: AND C.E. ('HARLESWORTH. DIRECTOR OF SPACE OPERATIONS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Admiral Truly. will you identify )ourself. and tbr the record explain
what your present duties are. We've had Mr. Aldrich, and so you might all do that briefly.
ADMIRAL TRULY: Yes, sir I'm Richard Truly. and I'm associate adminis=rator for space
flight at NASA Headquarters
My background is that I am a Georgia Tech graduate with a bachelors degree in aeronauti-
cal engineering: I was commissioned in the Navy from Georgia Tech and am still in the Navy: I
was selocted first in the astronaut program for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory in !965: when
that program was canceled in 1969, I went to NASA.
My experience at NASA was that I was on the support crew for the three Skylab missions:
also for the
2525
Apollo Soyuz mission
I flew with Joe Henry Engte on the Enterprise on the approach and landing test in i977 I
was a back-up crewman on ST_I. backing up Bob C,'ippen. I flew again with Joe Engle on the
STS-II. commanded STf_VIII.
Immediately after that flight, i was asked by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Wat-
kins. if I would consider returning to the Navy to be the first coramander of the Naval Space
Conlmand about two and a half years ago, which I did.
After the accident--a few weeks after the accident. I was again asked if i would consider
coming back again under these unfortunate circumstances to this job. and here I am.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Charleswoi_h °
MR. CHARLESWORTH: My name is Cliff Charlesworth. I joined NASA in 1962. I started
out in the flight control world, the gro,md flight cor, trol world, working as a flight controller
during the Mercury, the end of Mercury and the Gemini program.
During the second half of the Gemini program. I was appointed a flight director and I did
_hat job up through Apollo 12. From that point on I moved into program office work for a
number of years, both in the world of
2526
applications and in the world of--some of the early shuttle work on the payload part of the busi-
KeSS
I spent a tour as '_-e deputy director of the center, and now I am currently director of space
operations.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Mr Aldrich. I don't see any s_-,_-_,_ _n going throu_;h vour back-
ground You can say an:,tbing you want to. out we have h__" :he advantage of having you here
before And so I think we are quite familiar with the work - ou do
How did you want to proceed. Admiral" Did you want o start or Mr Aldrich?
ADMIRAL TRULY It is your call. sir This has Deer. an interesting day for me I might--
with your permission, i might make a couple of remarks _nd then proceed anyway you would
care to go. I found it interesting today to listen to this morn:., g's testimony because I feel like. in
a sense, that I can bridge the gap from the points ot view the" yot have heard in the testimo-,,"
of the guys m the crew office and vet also see the same pro_le ns with the responsibility o"
having to make the decisions required, along with pa_icularly .'_, Arnie, t,_ solve those that
we must and th_ e that we can within the constraints that we ha;'e.
As you have seen this morning, the astronaut
2527
office i_ filled with a number of individuals with individual views and that has not changed from
the way I remember it.
I think you have also seen that they are extremely supportive of the program that they are
in and the people that are salving that problem and following the accident. They obviously and
necessarily and qu_ze appropriately are very concerned that we identify and fix those problems
that have turned up.
Flight safety must always be balanced, in any real program between the real programmatic
problems of cost and schedule and performance. Nothing is different in this situation than it is
in airplane safety or airplane programs; nor was it different in Me,'cury or Gemini or Apollo or
Skylab or Apollo Soyuz at_a: now the shuttle.
I would, however, point out that the strategy, that I issued of--I forget when; a week or so
ago--which is a 'strategy" to try to lead us back into operati.m of the space shuttle was not based
on the inputs of just the astronauts, although I did discuss i: with many of them. But I also
discussed it ie great detail with a lot of other people.
And it is a strategy': it is not, as we would say in the Naw_ rudder orders. It does leave the
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response--the primary responsibility and acco_,atability for us getting back to flying to the
proper place in the organization, which is led by Arnie at our Level II for most of the actmns
that I outlined.
You heard this morning suggestions tha: we undoubtedly do not have the funds available to
correct each and every one; and I think that is appropriate. As a matter of fact, there are some
that I agree with more than others, but we do intend to take on each and every one of those
suggestions and those concerns. And I think they ar_ extremely important.
Interestingly enough--and I jot Jt aown as George and John and the other crewmen talked
this morning, each of the specific suggestions that they made--and I did not hear a single one
that was new to me--these are concerns that in the shuttle program up to now have been
argued, and I think that they must be ncw re-looked at on the basis of our ezperience, and that
is what I intend to make sure that we do. And I know ',hat I have their support.
But it is not only their support that we have. Everybody in NASA could not be more at-
tuned to starting from today and getting back to safe. sustainab,e flight.
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As usual, I'm afraid I may have run on too long, but those were the only comments that I
had on the basis of this morning, sir.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think all of the Commission appreciated very much the strategy
you have worked out We appreciated the fact that you consulted with us ahead of time and we
had a chance to make comments although I must say that we accepted readily the suggestions
you made and we _hink that what vou're doing is exactly right
it is pa_icu!_rly important, I think, for the Commission because it would have been a mis-
take if people had cor_.e to the conclusion for 120 days because that is our mandate that we were
going to report it after 120 days and NASA was going to stop ever,,'thing for 120 days and do
nothing but to look at the cause of the accident.
And I think the fact that you have taken the lead with the support of NAS.¢ generally ,_o
make corrections aheady, you are moving ahead as quickly as you can _o corre-t some cf these
things that are quite apparent as a result of this investigation.
And do we compliment you for that. And we also appreciate the fact that our staff has been
working very diligently and has had full cooperatiop from you and your people and the _¢ubcom-
mittees of this Commission that
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have been working with you and your people, I think, have coordinated very well, and we appre-
ciate that, too.
Mr. Aldrich, did you want to makc some comments about the testimony thi_ morning and
what Admiral Truly has said?
MR. ALDRICH: I found the testimony this morning to be interesting, but also very familiar.
And this space shuttle system is, as was pointed out, th9 most complicated, technically sophisti-
cated machine and vehicle in the world today. And when it was built, it required some very
significant technology application and developments and breakthroughs--specifically the space
shuttle main engines and the characteristics they run with.
The fly-by-wire fault-tolerant software and avionics system that controls the vehicle, the
thermal protection system that goes over a standard aircraft skin and stringer system :o aliow it
to fly the unique environments of the shuttle and the very configuration that it is in for flying
the ascent flight and the entry flight regime and the demanding chart :teristics of those regimes
make it an extremely technologically impressive technolognca! development.
And sitting here this morning were two men who probably did what I think is one of the
most technically
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demanding and courageous things in the history of man's space flight in that they piloted the
space shuttle system for the first time.
And you can't but be impressed with these men. And the discussions here this morning were
about their concerns. And in the jobs I've had before the shuttle program and in the shuttle
program, I've spent many hours working technical concerns and issues and understanding them
and attempting them--either to work them or to bring them forward.
And it was a very familiar discussion. And as Admiral Truly point_t out, the issues dis-
cussed this morning, are ones that I am familiar with and that we have dealt with previously
and we certainly had stirred up a large amount of activity to be certain that they all are re-
heard and re-thought and re-assessed again.
And I have started on an activity to do that. prior to the time that Admiral Truly put his
plan in place for the strategy for the next few months and year.
In mid-February I asked each of the projects and division level organizations that support
the program to come forward with those critical areas that I knew had been of concern to them
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_n the past _r that might be potentlaJ ,'or concern and chan_e n the future because, a_ain. ]
agree ',,,ulh the earl:er d_scassion tha.'.
a very hl_h percentage v! areas _here we have potential for crtica_ risk or where judgments
have been made that ought te be reassessed are well known to the members of' the shuttle team
across the program
And I feb it was important to bring this information forward and to start on it both to get
an earl)" lead on understanding it for corrective actions that we would want to make in parallel
with the fixes that might be required related to the 51-I. tragedy' and also to understand upfront
the b',_'.dge,' _'ructure that we ma_ be dealin_ with in terms of some of the things v,'e '*'ill nov." say
we feel we want to do or we must do.
So I initiated that activity: it is ve,-v consistent with several of the items in the directive
that Admiral Truly passed down from myself and mv office also to integrate and to coerdinate
and bring forward and that is well underway I have already h,<{ two meetings of detailed tech-
nical review on systems and operational issues of that kind. I have f:ve more scheduled within
the next ll_ days. And we are proceeding as _ell as we can but in an orderly" way to understand
all aspects of each issue and "_reat it uniquely and understand how we want to deal ",_-ith it. as we
move forward
DR COVERT: Mr. Aldrich. w-ould you clarify
.)r-._.J
_, ) o),3
for me the role of--I th,nk it ,s called the Aerospace Safety Board in terms uf how the)" interact
with the safety needs of your prog'ram
MR. ALDRICH: The Aerospace Satety Advisory Panel is a panel that '*'as created early" in
the man-space program before the shuttle, t)ut i cant recall exactly" at what aoint. It i-t:_, pa:_el
'.hat has been formed. I believe, by the NASA administrator and repo_s w the NAS_ aclm:n
trator, and it is a standing panel of external e×per_s to the agency, primarily in the field of
aerospace.
And they have each ",ear they" prepare an annual agenda of areas of interest or perhaps
critical concern that they choose to review, and that takes them acr>_s the breadth of the pro-
gram in the same manner the Presidential C_,mmission has been operm,ng in the last few weeks
and months, and they key on both the known issues they're aware of in the program that the)'
want to access and provide independent recommendations on. And as they" do this work. thev
often uncover other things that are going on and will also highlight them. And their prime em-
phasis in the program i_ seeking safety" concerns and safety issues and providing high-level rec-
ommendation,_ on the thrust NASA ought to take in that regard.
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The3 are presented in an annual report, but concerns that they develop as they go are also
relayed re us. and we .*'ill certainiv give them immediate consideration.
DR COVERT: Would you feel, in terms of the discussions we have had earlier today, that
that m{ght be a suitable steering committee for an independent safety review organization
wi_h;- the agency or do you think that there is a need for separation between two ._uch organi-
zations7
.MR ALDRICH: Well. I'm no, probably broad enough in my _,nowledge to recommend to you
,abut I think an optimum safety organization structure shoula be for the program I firmly agree
with the recommendations you've heard here today that the system and structure in place in the
lass
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shuttle program today' needs to be strenc,,-thened significantly and how it would be done and ex-
actly' the scope and the mvo!.'ernent I havent collected my thou_'ht, on
I think the nature o! ti;e gentleman .n the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and the oppor-
tun:,tv they have to participate whiie it is broad in its coverage, it is not the day-to-day kind of
augmentation I think is important _n terms of the kind of business _e have discussed a iittle bit
earlier
27,37,
DR. COVERT: Tl,ank vou
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Perhaps bv way of backgrou.nd, could you clarify' for the
Commissior_ how the program office and the operations directorate divide their respective re-
sponsibilities and what the difference is between those and how you coordinate your activities?
MR. ALDRICH: Well, I can talk a lot abgut that. I want to be sure that I talk about it in a
way that relates directly to your inten:.
VICE CIiAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: With regard to what responsibilities fall into the pro-
gram office and what fa!}s under the directorate of operations generally and then see how you
coordinate those activities and respond to concerns from either side')
:,tR. CHARLESWORTH: Arnie. why don't you let me try to start on that
MR. ALDRICH: All right
MR CHARLESWORTH: in my" job as Director of Space Operations. I am responsible to the
center director, as Mr. Abbey pointed out this morning I have three major elements. You heard
from o._e of them this morning I have ancther major element, which the best way to describe is
the gro _nd control function
These people do the ground flight
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contro!ler:,' job: they do the--maintain all of our facilities, like tl,e control center, the simulator
that Mr Eartsfield talked about. They do the training of the astronauts _hemselves. It is a very
large, complex organizatmn under Mr. Gene Kranz.
Then I have a third group, which is principally" development that develop new facilities or
upgrade facilities. They do things like the software development and that sort of thing.
So it is the three major-line institutional organizatior:s which I oversee. We report--I report
to the center director. I also. in effect, report to Mr. Aldr_ch because I take his programmatic
direction and go implement it. For example, if a manifest is baselined, we're going to fly flight X
and we're going to put these payloads on it. that comes out of the program office.
But my organization, from our point of view, then go implement that. We go do the flight
design, we go do whatever is required in our area of responsibility to fly the mission.
So, in effect, I work for the program office. But I maintain the institutional organization to
effect that work,
New as far as coordination, I think one of the
2537
questions that l saw and Mr. Abbey touched on it--how do I handle issues that are brought to
me? And they come to me in a variety of ways.
In my' weekly' staff meeting, for example, which I hold with Mr Abbey and Mr. Kranz a,,J
Mr. Berry--my three directorates--issues ere brought to me: they may be brought to me on an
ad hoc basis, they may be brought to me outside of Mr. Abbey
For example, recently i had a meeting with the Centaur Commanders over some issues that
they wanted to talk about. I address these in a number of ways Normally when they come to
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me, they have already been integrated between the Gene Kranz ground control systems people
and the flight crew people
They work together and come to me with an integrated suggestion. If I agree with it, which
usually I do, I will take it to Mr. A}dnch Depending on the urgency, I will take it right away or,
if necessary, I will schedule a meeting to discuss it with him.
If necessaLv, I certainly feel free, if I don't feel Eke we're satisfied from the program office, 1
will go to the center director, if that's required. I can't think of an occasion we've had to do -hat
other than intorrnational. But that is the process we foilow.
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Do you want to add to that, Arnie?
DR. FEYNMAN You said you haven't collected your thoughts yet on what kind of a safety
organization would be a good one, But have you collected your thoughts yet on what you think is
the cause--I wouldn't call it of the accident but the lack of communication which we have seen
and which everybody is worried about from one level to another?
Do you understand why? And, therefore, that helps of course in the first step in trying to
figure out what to do.
MR. ALDRICH: Well. there were two specific breakdowns at least, in my impression, about
that situation: One is the situation tha, occurred the night before the launch and leading up to
the launch where there _'as a significant review that has been characterized in a number of
ways before the Commission and the Commicslon's Subpanels and the fact that that was not
passed forward
And I can only conclude what has been reported, and that is that t.ke people responsible for
that work in the solid rocket booster project at Marshall believed that the concern was not of a
sigmficance that would be required to be brought
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forward because clearly the program requirements specie" that critical problems should be
brought forward to Level II and not only to Level II but through myself to Level I.
The second breakdown in communications, however, and one that I personally am concerned
about is the situation of the variety of reviews that wore conducted last summer between the
NASA Headquarters Organization and the Marshall Organization on the same technical area
and the fact that that was not brought through my office in either direction--that is, it was not
worked through by the NASA Headquarters Organization nor when the Marshall Orgamzation
brought these concerns to be reported were we involved.
And I b :lieve that is a critical breakdown in process and I think it is also against the docu-
mented rer Jrting channels that the program is supposed to operate to.
Now, ,t in fact did occur in that manner. In fact, there is a third area of concern to me in
the way the program has operated. There is yet one other way that could have come to me,
given a different program structure. I'm sure you've had it reported to you as it has been report-
ed to me that in August ! think or at least at some time late in the summer or early fall the
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Marshall SRB project went forward to procure some additional solid rocket motor casings to be
machined to new configurations for testing of the joints.
Nov," it turns out that the budget for that kind of work does not come through my Level II
office. It is worked directly between the Marshal Center and NASA Headquarters and there
again had I been responsible for the budget for that sort of work, it would have to come through
me, and it would have been clear that something was going on here that I ought to know about.
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And sothereare threeareasof breakdo_;n,and I haven'texactlyansweredyourquestion
But I hay.,explained it iv the way that _ best know it and--well, I can say a fourth thing
There was some discussion earlier about *.he amount of material that was or was not report-
ed on O-ring erosion in the FRRs and I researched the FRR back reports and also the flight
anomaly reports that were forwarded to my center--to my office--by the SRB project and as was
indicated, there is a treatment of the solid rc_:ket motor O-ring erosion, I believe, for the STS 41-
C FRR. which quantifies _t and indicates some limited amount of concern.
The nex' time that is mentioned, I believe is in the STS 51-E, FRR in January 1985 or early
in
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February, and that indicate_, again, a reference to it but refers back to the 41-C as the only
technical data.
And then from there forward the comment on O-ring erosion only is that there was another
instance and it is not of concern.
Clearly the amount of reporting in the FRR is of concern to me, but in parallel with that.
each of the flight anomalies in the STS program are required to be logged and reviewed by each
of the projects and then submitted through the Level II system for formal close-out.
And in looking back and reviewing the anomaly close-outs that were submitted to Level II
from the SRB project, you find that O-ring erosion was not considered to be an anomaly and,
therefore, it was not logged and. therefore, there are not anomaly reports that progress from one
flight to the other.
Yet, that is another way that that information could have flagged ",he system, and the
system is set up to t_se that technique for flagging.
But if the erosion is classified as not an anomaly, it then is in some other cate_;ory and the
system did not force it in that direction. None of those are very focused answers, but the)- are all
fac,',ors.
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DR. FEYNMAN: Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: There is one other consideration that should be mentioned in the
flight readiness review on 51-D, where it refers to ev'_lence of hot gas passing the primary O-
ring.
The resolution says acceptable risk because of limited exposure and redundancy. And yet,
under the critical items list, it was decided there was no redundancy. And it seems to me that
the Marshall people seem to proceed on the basis that they had a redundancy when the system
had determined there was no redundancy.
Am I correct on that?
MR. ALDRICH: Your understanding of that information and mine come from the same post-
event review and that is the way I understand it, yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And one other, I guess, while we're on the subject. And that is the
uncertainty about the position that Rockwell took as to the weather conditions.
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that seems to me to be you understood it and I would say based
on the testimony, understandably so, that there was expressed a minor concern but not a no-go
vote, whereas they in their testimony indicated that they were recommending against
2543
the launch or at least they thought they were.
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That certainly is a flaw in the system that can he corrected easily and that is if you are
going to count on the contractor's opinion, they should vote either go or no-go and it should be
clear how they voted so there is no arvbiguity about it later on.
MR ALDRICH: It is clear to me. sir. after the fact, that that _as not crisp enough dealing
with that discussion, I can assure you that aspect of my fbrward work and the projects deiine
procedures which wilt take that into full _ 'count and correct it
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I would like to have you comment, if you will, on a few
of the comments that we have heard in earlier testimony today. We heard today and we've
heard from other sources on other occasions of the matter of cannibalization in spares and the
potential problem that that might create in the future, had the accident not occurred.
Would you just comment on that consideration as you saw it from the program office point
of view?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, I can comment on that fairly assertatively because prior to my current
assignment as the NSTS program manager this past summer for the p_ior three years I was
manager of the orbiter project at JSC and
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dealt directly with issues with the orbiter and. in particular, that one.
And the situation on the spare parts for the orbiter project or program is that there had
been fund contentions in the program for a number of years, at least starting in the mid-seven-
ties and running through into the early to mid-eighties. And with that fund contention over a
number of years toward the end of the 1970s and early in the eighties, intentional decisions were
made to defer the heavy build-up of spare parts procurements in the program so that the funds
could be devoted to other more pressing activities in the program.
And I can't sit here and recall what they were: but it was a regular occurrence for several
annual budget cycles. And once the flight rate really began to rise and it was really clear that
spare parts were going to be a problem, significant attention was placed on that problem by all
levels of NASA and efforts had been made to catch up. But it has been a catch-up problem and
it has put us in a problem of several years that we're right in the middle of now when our parts
availability is well behind the flight need and through cannibalization the flight rate has been
and can be maintained.
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But that was strictly a funding priorities issue that was created qmte some time ago and
that we are still dealing with.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is the camlibalization problem a concern about the future of flight
safety, as far as the three orbiters are concerned now?
MR. ALDRICH: Well, there certainly was a good point made this morning about the more
you work on a vehicle a 4.climb around in it, the more likely you are to do something that you
inadvertently create and aon't find.
On the other hand, some parts are readily interchangeable between vehicles. And so it is
probably a mixed kind of an issue with respect to safety. And the plans are in place in the pro-
gram to buy the parts we need. It is just strung out over a number of years now, probably
through the late 1980s before the total parts inventory for the whole orbiter system would be in
place That is not an insignificant cost. The cost of a full inventory of spare parts for a follr
orbiter tleet is roughly the cost of another orbitez. So it is a significant workload in manpower
and funding issue to deal with.
And that is a thing that I have been describing that has been difficult tor the program to
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maintaincurrentwith someofthe otherprogress
VICECHAIRMANARMSTRONG:Wehavebeentoldby somethat in fact the 19_ launch
schedulewouldhavebeenimpossiblebecauseof sparepartsshortagesandI wonderif youshare
that con,'ictionor whetheryou believethat cannibalizationand other techniquesm_ghthave
beenable-to keepyougoing.
MR ALDRICH:i think that unlesswe ran into oneor two uniqueareaswherethe system
hadreally trappeditself with workaroundstrategiesthat the par's programwouldhavebeen
consistentwith a flight rate,givena robustwillihgnessfor annibal,zation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Any other questions?
MR. ACHESON: Yes. ! have a question relating to the flight readiness procedure in confir-
mation of remarks you made earlier.
I was struck by the fact that the certification of flight readiness of 51-L oy the contractors
incmding Thiokol and the forward certification by Level III to Level II did not make anv men-
tion of the previous program of testing the heightened concer s of both the Marshall staff and
the Thiokol staff of the gas seal and the joint.
My question is: had that been appreciated by
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Level i[I to be a serious problem? Is that the sort of thing you would have expected to find in
those certification documents?
MR ALDRICH: Well. I'm not sure I've had the opportunity to review the whole certification
history of the solid rocket booster, particularly the field joints through the Marshall Center and
through them to their contractor
I would have expected such a review as it may have or may well do re show that they were
fully certified And that was the basis that we were approving 51-L launch and any other launch
on with that understanding across the board for the flight systems.
MR. ACHESON: But I guess my specific question is: had Level III appreciated the serious-
ness _f the problem, would you not have had a notation to that effect to have appeared in the
flight readiness document reporting which would have served as the flag to you that the system
called for? And that is what I'm reaching for.
MR. ALDEICH: I really would have expec,ed that if the Level III organization had realized
that :he) had a critical problem there that tl-,ey would have immediately called in and have led
to specl,_l meetings and special activities _,ld they would have been taken right out of the se-
quence for STS-51-L and would
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have been a major program _oti¢_ty.
And that appears what might have been underway last s_zmmer. But if it was, it did not
follow through in any manner that caused the whole program to get involved.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Again, following the earlier testimony today, it was the
view of the earlier witnesses that the brake programs were in work and they may or may not be
technology limited but resource limited and I wanted to add the view of the program office oi_
the brakes.
MR. ALDRICH: I'm really glad you asked me about brakes because that is a subject that
has had a lot of attention earlier and deserves it and has also had a lot of effort and I would like
to try to give you a feel for the effort that has gone along in parallel with the frustration of a
problem we have had a very difficult time solving.
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That problem is probabl.v most frustrat-d by a com_nent made eariier that we only get one
landing per Qi_ht a "d there is no way to have a real flight break test programl so whatever _x
you make, you have o fly on the next shuttle m_ssion and then you have to land it and see how
wei! you did
And sornetlmes you don't get any answer and
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sometimes you get a negative answer. But you have to repeat the process. We started having
brake problems imtiall3 in the program. During OFT there were minor problems with some of
thp componerts in the brake. O1"_!TM was the first four flights. Colum['ia flew again on the fifth
flight.
On the first four flights there were only minor wear and chipping problems on some of the
internal parts; but on STS V we had a major failure of the brakes and a heavy landing. And
from that point forward, we have had some degree of problem on the brakes on almost every
landing.
And the problems have been of two kinds. They are the kind that indicate the system is
energy-limited and when you put high energy into tt-,e brakes and stop, you do damage to the
stators in the system and can run the risk of a wheel lock-up And I would like _o come back to
that.
We have had that happen on two occasions: we have had the stator damage and heavy land-
ing loads on STS-V and on STS-IX and we also bad a fairly high energ2y landing, as Captain
Young pointed out on STS-61-C and did some stator damage
And so you can really say we have had three landings with stator damage, and the,so are of
concern
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%r damage to the vehicle and for wheel iock-up On almost all the other flights weve had the
kind of damage that is post-flight rework--cracking of carbon pads. chipping, clips bending, all
of which appear to have relation to a vibration or an oscillatory condition in the brakes when
you apply them or when you use them, which have made everyone very nervous about the
brakes, but which have not directly led to a critical problem on the flights where those have
occurreo. You just have to repair the brakes.
Since the early time in the program, the late OFT time period, we have had a series of re-
pairs and corrections that have been attempted to find the cause of the brake problems and find
solutions, and we have been frustrated by this limited amount of time to test them and no really
excellent ground facility for a real test.
We also have called a panel of independent experts from the braking industry for brakes for
large aircraft on two occasions: In January of 1984 and again in June of 1985 we assembled this
panel and had them look at all of our flight data, the fixes we've tried, where we were in the
program then and asked for recommendations.
And we have implemented or are in the process of
2551
implementing ail of the recommendations made in the two reviews. How wer. as witnessed bv
the last landing in January. we are still f_ustrated and have not solveo the problem
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The last t'me we landed at Kennedy Space Center _as April 12 ofiaSL year. a: d that was,
:n iact--iet s see, I th;nk i gave you the wrong flight ,,'or the second stator damage. _.: was 51-D.
ana it was last April It ' -r_'t STS.9. but ar>_'a>', that one landed m Apri! of its*5 at Kenned>
runway, and we had a cross wind and therelore a high braking requirement, and we had stator
damage, and wheel lock-up bef_we stop. and it caused tEe tire to blow. and teat gave us .great
concern• We have o •n _ landed a* Kennedy Space Center since that time and we did not plan to
until we implemented a nosewheel steering system that was failsafe, and we worked on that all
last >'ear. From that event, the 51-D landing, we worked to pu* a failsafe nosewheel steering
system in to take the steering load off the brakes so that the>" could be applied for only braking
load. And the plan was to land the 6!-C flight again back at the Kennedy Space Center.
As Captain Young pointed out concerns for landing at Kennedy relate directly to these
brakes. The>- also relate weather, and on 61-C we tried three mornings in a row to come into
Kennedy, assuming our nosewheel steering md our brake system would perform n a satisfac-
tory manner, and we were not able to solve the problem of variable weather just before day-
break, and
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waved off and landed at Edwards Of course, we had damage again on that flight, and we now I
am sure are in a position regardles_ of a firm decision for the long term. are in _ position where
we wilt not want to land at Kennedy again until we see some more significant improvement in
the braking system.
We have instituted last summer, in parallel with this. a complete redesign of the system
which is long term and expensive, but we have decided the various fixes we have tried to '.he
bery!!ium-carbon brake system that we have been using througheut the program to date. may
never give an adequate solution that will satisfy all of the program re( .irements. And so v,e
implemented a detailed design phase for a carbon, all-carbon brake, and that is now ready for
implementation, it will take about two >ears to implement this system, but the design reviews
have been held. and it is read>" to go. and I am certain the program will be implementing it
within the next several months.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I am glad you answered the question that way because
that ead_ _l_n into th_ question m" the l_,,Amg at Edwards that :ve heard "J"..... _; ..... ;
................ * ...... _I, UULI LIII_ ll,_,, ,lln_,
and I would like both program office and the operations directorate to comment, if they would
We heard a persuasive argument on behalf of
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the crews, and I would like to hear what the operations directorate, how they have supported or
rejected that, and how the program office has supported or rejected that proposal.
MR. CHARLESWORTH: Let me say that follov, 510. the instance that Mr. Aldrich de-
scribed where we wound up blowing the tire. one of tne first things I did was go talk to then
progra:n manager. Mr. Lunnev. and say we don't want to try that again until we understand
that w aich he completely agreed with. and we launched into this nosewheel steering develop-
ment ,Ve thought with the develcpment of failsafe nosewheel steering and close control o _ the
er.',,ronment landing conditions, and that means very conservative, tLat once we got that nose-
wheel steering system to failsafe, that it was probably reasonable to go back and try the Cape
again. And that was the basis tbr 61-C. and I was satisfied witn that
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As Mr. Aldrichdescribed,the weatherbuggot uson that flight. "_'edoplay tha*verycon-
servatively.Sometimesweareaotcompletelypopular,but wehaveheldour groundonplaying
thosegamesconserwativelyrelativeto landingat theCape.
Giventhe problemthat hascomeup nowwith the brakes,i think that wholequestionst_ll
needssome
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more work before I would be satisfied that yes. we should go back and try to land at the Cape.
MR. ALDRiEH: Two points on that. One, I certainly would not propose to attempt to land at
Kennedy again until we think we have a brake solution that is satisfactory and we have tried it
enough timex to have some level of confidence in it beyond one or two flights.
Over the .ast six months, it seems to me, in being involved directly in the program and com-
paring it to what I've been with in the program prior to that time. which was also directly in-
volved with the launches at Kennedy, we have had an extremely significant run of variable
weather at Cape Kennedy. and a number nf the launch days that I have had to deal with since
last July. We have had weather that came right down the middle of the ground rules, which we
write very clear, very good ground rules, They are as definable a_ you can define on paper, and
we have tl_e best weather forecasting and assessment people and equipment that you can have.
and we hi.re our crewmen in airplanes up in the weather assessing it, and even yet we have had
multlpJe days of very marginal calls. That is, yes, it just barely meets the ground rules, but it
may not stay that way, or the other way around, it doesn't but we're sure it's going
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to clear within a short period of t:,me.
And we have had repeated events like that at a much higher degree thqn 1 can really feel
we had during the earlier several years in the program. And I don't know why that is. but it has
become very frustrating. And it occurred to us three times in the landing phase for 61-,'.
On the other hand, the runway at Kennedy Space Center was built, that was one of the first
things built in the Space Shuttle program, was built with the intent of landing there. I think it
was built to all of the known specifications that were put on the table at the time. That is. there
were no constraints on it. It is as wide as a football field It is 15,0o0 feet long. We have to train
there because we have to land thore for RTI,S, and so one day in the future when our brakes
really do work, there pertod_c_,y are days ,,,,e_;_""_-,;_,..... one _,,_,_*_'_'_here today, where you ___knowyou
can count on the weather, yo- know it is good, and I think there should be consideration to
sometime later in the program that we use the Kennedy runway in some manner I would think
it would be wrong to draw a finite conclusion at this point other than that we have problems
today, and a long perioa of working brakes before I would want to readdress them.
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MR. CHARLESU'OPTH: And Mr. Armstrong, I would like to say I agree with that because,
you know, we even -'.re runs of days in Houston where it is CAVU. as they call it, and I don't
think it is unreasonable to expect that you can pick up runs of weather like that. And given we
can figure out a situation with the brakes and be satisfied with that, to go back into Kenned),
but I think you've got to meet all these co -litions.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Was it possib e that just the characterization of a so-
called operational vehicle in some ways influenced the .,:_sire or pressures or inclination or
whatever to land at KSC?
D
D
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MR CHARLESWORTH: I think it started out as a program goal, and I think we _ere
trying to do it, and I think in my judgment we ran into probiems And as ,xe saw the problems,
we began to back away.
And until we are satisfied we've got a solution to those problems, I don't think we ought to
try it again. Once we do, and if we can make the weather cooi_erate for a reasonable period of
time, I don't see anything wrong with it.
MR. ALDRICH: There is one other factor. It is not a major factor, but m the way our re-
sources are deployed in the program today, it takes about six extra da?-z and about $i million
extra for landing at Edwards versus landing a_ Kennedy, and Lhose are certainly parameters
that are easily dealt with, but they are
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factors.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you have to offset that with the fact tLat with weather condi-
tions being so chancy in Kennedy, every time you have to scrub or change _ _ur plans because of
the weather, that is costly, too.
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir, it is.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Aldrich, with the advantage of hindsight, this Commission has been accu-
mulating a lot of evidence over t',¢ past two months on trends in the Shuttle program which are
basical], a greatly increased flight schedule in 1986, plus se,'eral exotic payloads such as Cen-
taur, balanced against a series of trends, including an increasing number of launch sciubs and
increasing shortage of parts and cannibalization, and _rew training load that was cnN. a:_ _,_ to
keep up with the schedule because of _he launch scrubs, and a very demanding mission software
program that was difficult tc maintain, and I just wonder if in any of the meetings that you sat
in during the last year or so, that anybody in NASA management v_as plotting tiiest trends and
putting them all together and wondering about where they were leading the Shuttle program
MR. ALDRICH: Well, I can say yes to all of that excep*, maybe assessing where it was lead-
ing the Shuttle program. I think it was leading the Shuttle
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program where we were trying to go.
I have in my organization in Houston a Zairly large organi,.ation that is respo,_sible for im-
plementing the manifest that is requested by the Agency, and in doing that, we do the detailed
flight planning for laying out all of the parameters you mentioned and assessing what is realis-
tic and what is doable and what is achievable and where it is not, and all of the constraints you
mentioned are well known, and each is worked with the organizations involved, and within the
understood boundaries and parameters we were attempting to meet what the program could
achieve in terms of the requirements it was asked to achieve.
MR. HOTZ: And you felt that in a realistic analysis this was achievable?
MR ALDRICH: Do you mean the manifest for 19867
MR. HOTZ: Yes.
MR. ALDBICH: I believe it was a good goal. and by setting that goal we would achieve as
much of it as was real as we move forward I think we discussed in other testimony that we set
an ambitious manifest and plan. and we work each day to meet it and we deal with each day's
problems as they come. We did not meet tl_ goal we set for 19_5. even though Captain Young
said
®
p,
that :t _<_s 9. :_ne performance; :, d_d not meet the pian that was ia_o o_)t We did not a-h:eve
t_.e numbt-_ < :_t_ht_- that "_er_- on the booK_ And tP.at qu_te i_, co:tt_ h__vv ha.ep_,v.ed m "'-
gliso
_ome ot the most ................,mportant,i.;,_ that we be]ieve _ere on tne a_enda _ere "he '_',,_._'k'- _uth
the C'entaur earl) in the summer, and the !]:,:ht from Vandenber_ later in the summer. Those
were both very high priority a,.ti_ities in the program and stiil are. not .*or those same _hed_._e_
And the)" were receiving extensive attention and review, and had great concern about then:
There are a number of satetv issues with the Centaur that were a coPcern before the 51-L
that were in work [n the program, and tho_p are still [n work today, aPd others are on our books
as a result of our re-review.
MR. HOTZ: But nobody expressed an) con0ern that the system faced an overload in 19_,6
MR ALDRICH: Each of the areas you mentioned expressed cc, n:erns, and those concern:.
were _orked in detail Specifically. the ones with crew training and with the sottwale deiiveries
were worked directly with Mr. Charlesworth. and we attempt to understand what the program
would like to do and understand wha t is believed by _.he impiementin_ organizations can be
done. and _e
put on paper wha" we believe L- .in achievable plan.
Grante_ • .anger you p_-oject it downstream, perhaps the more iikeiy i_ ts you ,,.i no _ be
abie to acmeve n.
MR, ACHESON Sc I take it you do not a_ree _ith the con,:-.,,_ant that was made at some
point earher today that the impact of spare parts shoi-ta_es would reall\ ha_e begun to slow the
program very seriously by th_ m.idd[e of IF;6'7
MR. ALDRICt_: It was impacting the program seriously. I am not sure tnat it _ould have
slo_ed the progran_ l"or instance, our plan for 19_5 _as to land each of the flights at Kennedy
Space Cemer. which saves five or six days per f]i_rht, and the manifest was built originally as-
:'ning that _e would have each of those five o." six day periods. After tb- _ .own tire accident I
discussed. _e diverted and delivered all of our orbiters to Edwards.._::d turned around and
brouF_ht them tmthv Cape. and _,e found [n fact even in doing that. that did not pose significant
impact on our manifest, even thou_;h we would have predicted before the fact that it would have.
6o. I believe the plen for !9_6 was workable. It was packed as complete as it could be packed
for an optimistic shot at the thin_s the program
"25 _ '2
and the Agency would like t,) have done, and we would have clearly changed it as w_. crossed the
line wheie something could no', be continued in the manner it was structured.
DR. WHEELON: Mr. Chairman. I w'ould like to invite the comments of Admiral Truly and
his colleagues, on the followin¢ proposal.
If we sake ourselves back to earl) January. the country had four orbiters, we had a base in
Florida and _ere preparing a base in Vandenberg from which the Shuttle could be launched It
was due to go into o_ration i., the summer of 19S_ _, As we sit here today. _e have three Shut-
"_( . .... u ,,,_ 'oIJera*lon thai base at Vandenb_r_. ]f _e do so. the
opel ations and maintenance c'osts for the._ base "ai'_ b(_ about ,$':G!_ m:_lh)n to $400 million a >e,:s
we v,i[t pay this price whether we launch or r: t._st it. order to maintain the or, tion to no so
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Now, with only three Shuttles left, why doesn't it make sense to ,:oncentrate those three at
Kennedy and forgo the beginning of operatit,ns at Vandenberg tor a number f yea_s until the
fourth orbiter is available?
I make that proposal because it is quite clear that there is no compelling reascn to open
Vandenberg
256:3
All of the launches going out of there can be accommodated by the expendable launch vehicles
or can be moved to Florida.
And m that cor, nection I invite your comments on the following. One is the apparent prob-
lem in the design of the flame bucket at Vandenberg which will require correction anyway. The
second is what risk you attach to the use of the new filament wound cases on the solid rocket
boosters rather than the steel cases which are used from Florida?
That is a lot, but that is the essence of the proposal In other words, why not d, lay Vanden-
berg, concentrate our Shuttle assets in Kennedy and save the O&M costs which are very signifi-
cant in these days of tight budgets?
ADMIRAL TRULY: Let me make a couple of brief comments, and then I will turn it back
over to Arnie.
There has been a t,-emendous expenditure of national funds to get the Vandenberg launch
site into operation, and we have been working, and I know m the last few weeks since I have
been back on board, have worked extremely hard with the Department of Defense to work these
very. issues that you bring up. And they are being considered
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I personally don't see an impediment to us getting Vandenberg into operation because we
o,,ly now have three orbiters for the immediate time. Your point on expenditure of O&M costs is
certainly a valid one, and as I said, we are working that with DOD.
As to the filament wound cause issue, I view that as--well, let me back up. As to the launch
facility issue, that also is being worked very diligently, primarily by the U.S. Air Force, and the
use of that facility on the schedule that we can support it with a flight vehicle is dependent on
those efforts being successful.
Again, with the filament wound case, to me that is clearly a development and qualification
issue, and assuming that the design passes its development and qualification testing, I am per-
sonally comfortable with a flight, including the first flight off Vandenberg, using the filament
wound case.
And so the bottom line from a strategy point of view is that as long as ou- discussions with
the Department of Defense indicate that that is in the national interest to continue to use the
Vandenberg launch site beginning or shortly after we come back into flight status, we will con-
tinue to support that.
MR. ALDRICH: I would secom almost all of
2565
what Admiral Truly said.
The filament wound case is a separate issue, and it needs to be understood, and the qualifi-
cation needs to be understood, and when we understand it and feel we're confident with it,
think we should use it.
The flame bucket issue, *:he entrapped hydrogen in the main engine flame bucket at Van-
denberg, I think we have several ways t_ solve that problem and can solve it consistent with the
C" q 1499
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schedule we are on that would lead to a first flight out of Vandenberg following the resumption
of the Shuttle flights
In terms of whether we should do it. ,_ perso,_aliy believe tn a two-coast launching system
and a four orbiter fleet, and I believe some of the plans that have been expressed for the nation
at the end of this decade and on inte the next decade really require a four orbiter fleet
DR. WHEELON: The suggestion was quite in line w.th that, but we don't have four orbiters
now, we have three, and that will be our situation for several years. The question was simply to
delay the beginning of operations at V..ndenberg until that fourth is available. That was the
prup_l
MR. ALDRICH: Well, and the amount of delay, of course, would be another question. There
is some
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advantage to ;he program uniquely in the Shuttle vehicle to continue to get a !aunch at Vanden-
berg as early as we can. The launch environment, the ascent environment going out of Vanden-
berg is different from Kennedy Space Cer_ter, and we specifically have instrumented the orbiters
for their first flights out of Vandenberg to take measurements which will characterize that
flight regime and give us an engineering indication of the performance of the vehicle on the
west coast as a launching system.
So there are benefits not only bringing the launching system on line, but to completely
round out the understanding of the Shattle design requirements and its ability to meet theft in
continuing to fly.
DR. WHEELON: I m _ what are the benefits of bringing the facility on line?
MR. ALDRICH: Well, I may not have said any benefits for bringing it on line except That I
believe it is an advantage to continue through with the process of checking and verifying the
facility and bringing it to the point of flight readiness to complete that work which as been in
work and delayed for some lengthy period of time for a variety of reasons o','er the years.
DR. WHEELON: There is an old role that every accountant knows, it mn't how much money
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you have paid out so far in the project, there is only hcw much is left to be paid. It is a hard
theorem to accept, but it i-eally is true, I submit that the $3 billion that we have invested thus
far in Vandenberg is irrelevant to what we do from here on.
Do you agree with that?
MR. ALDRICH: I shouldn't think that would be a major priority in deciding what we shoulc
do forward.
DR. WHEELON: I thought I heard Admiral Truly make that argument. Maybe I was wrong.
ADMIRAL TRULY: No. The argument or the sta_ment I meant to make was to point out
that the nation has invested a great deal of its treasure in that facility and that we are respond-
ing to the Department of Defense in their wish to get the facility on line. The missions out of
there are national security missions, and we ar ,_ r_ponding to that desire and are working it
extremely diligently with them to look at the available options.
DR. WHEELON: Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Aldrich, since you were here last there have been certain com-
ments made, put:lic comments made that media criticism of NASA, some of it was very harsh
and unfair, prior to launching 51-L, may have influenced you in your decision ma.dng, and I
aB$ume
1500
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that you and Mr. Jesse Moore really are the two key people in n,aking that decision to launch
51-L.
Did the media criticism or comments influence you to vote go on that launch?
MR. ALDRICH: No. they did not. Media criticism would not have that effect of any of that
variety on my actions officially within NASA.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that would also be true, I am sure, of i_ir. Moore?
MR ALDRICH: Well, I can't speak for him, but I would be amazed if he would answer in
any other mater ,,r.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. ACHESON: I have a question relating to Orbiter 103. On any reasonable assumptions
of funding and availability of spare pe, rts and progress and repairs, what would be the earliest
you think that Orbiter 103 would be, let's say, repaired of its cannibalization and could be ready
to the point of being considered an available orbiter for the fleet?
MR. ALDRICH: 103 has three major classe-e of modification going into it. None of those have
to be made to cause it to be an orbiter available for the fleet. In fact, if we were able to launch,
we could launch any of our three .'biters within a few months,
2569
depending on their current configuration today.
However, 103 has been delegated to receive the Centaur modification configuration, and that
will be done over the spring and summer in Florida. We are a ,,o looking at an additional safety
feature lor the orbiters that will fly the Centaurs, and that is to take the Centaur hydrogen vent
which currently comes out beside the vertical tail on the fuselage and move it to the tip of the
vertical tail so that it will exhaust the hydrogel away from the rest of the vehicle. That is an
extensive mod, and it is a new mod. It is starting on the drawing boards in this timeframe, but it
will take ten months for that implementation to be able to begin, and then a down period on the
orbiter to install it.
Both of those to 103 are only required to enable it to fly tha Centaur. The third modification
is the completion of a series of modifications to the orbiter _ings and underbelly to strengthen
the 103 and . 04 configuration orbiters for the west coast environment, the west coast flight envi-
ronment. That has _:_en known as a requirement for appror, imately nine months to a year, but
the parts . ad to be made, the kits had to be made, and then the work period.s had to be ached-
uled, and they were going in incrementally in Florida because the Florida flights could proceo:l
257O
witl.out them.
103 is scheduled to receive the remainder of those mods between now and the end of tee
summer. If, however, we had a requirement and a capability to fly in that timeframe, any of
that work could be deferred, and 103 is flightworthy, as is 104 or 102.
ViCE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Regarding the Centaur, I would like to ask Admiral
Truly if it would be his intention to have the, in view of your recent memo directive and so on,
to have the Centaur maintain the same standards of safety and flightworthiness as other pay-
load packages in the past.
ADMIRAL TRULY: Yes. I wrote that portion of the memorandum ver) carefully after werk-
ing with both Arnie and a number of other people, and what it says in that section, it has to do
with some guidance for the first flight of the orbiter when we return and the first year of oper-
ations, ard in the case of the first flight, I specifically laid on some guidance like a day launch
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anda day landingat Edwards,etc.,in order to allow the Level 2 to do its _ rmat job of looking
at many options. The guidance for the remainder of the fir_ year was mdch more general in
nature but laid out some guidelines so that Level 2 could steer its course
And what it says is that we intend in general
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to fly the first year of operation within our flight experience. That is, if we have flown the en-
gines at, say, 104 percent, we will remain within 104 percent unless whatever the new thing that
we do, including classes of payloads, which includes Centaur, goes through the same sort of con-
servative scrutiny for flight safety as we are putting the rest of the system to.
So in a word, the answer is yes, if we fly Centaur or any other new class of payload, we will
apply that rigor to it.
VICE CH_-JRMAN ARMSTRONG: Just one last quick note to that in the subject of Critical-
ity 1 kinds of things. I think we heard this morning that it was the feeling by some at least that
Criticalit) 1 items should deserve some special treatment as they proceeded through processing
and flight readiness and inspection and so on. Other views apparently in the pa_t have been that
if you treat Category 1 specially, then the Category 2 kinds of things might ge'_ unduly slighted
and you want to be cautious about that.
Do you have a feeling that there is a practical way to treat Criticality 1 items with some
special care0 Can that _ Jone?
ADMIRAL TRULY: Well, I should let Arnie ._
2572
think expound a little bit on where he is because we haven't had a lot of opportunity in the last
weex or so to discuss it, and I know he has done the most detailed work and is clos,_t to the CIL
review, but in the guidance it clearly stares that we wilt do two things in the time we have in
there, the two most important things that ! think that we should do.
First is to relook at each Criticality 1 and 1R item from the ground up, and that work was
already in process and had been started by Level 2 prior to, as many other things had been,
prior to my memorandum. As to Ca_gory 2, we intend to have a review to make sure that none
are rniscategorized and have someho_ slipped through the crack and in fact should be catego-
rized at a more critical level.
Beyond that level of detail, I migk _ ask Arnie to comment.
MR. ALDRICH: Well, a lot of the things in the program that are Criticality 1 items have
been defined and accepted, I think as you have been briefed, in a general category. That is, they
are things that are structure or they are things that are vessels, and therefore they are not
other than inspections for use or assessments of engineering use. "I_ey are basically static kinds
of items, and they don't undergo a lot of
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unique testing from one flight to another.
The situation with the SRF, joint is q_lte different. That is a very dynamic and active set of
components, and when it is c_lled Criticality 1, it implies a whole lot more regular work and
rework and activity, and one of the proposals that has been implemented in this review or re-
review of our activity is that _e tie al', of the operation's, maintenance instructions at KSC, all of
the formal procedures for working and handling tbz equipment on CriticaEty 1 items directly
back to the design centers for formal review and configuration control.
In the past in the program the operations and maintenance requirements documents have
come from the design centers, have been maintained by the design centers and controlled by
1502
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them. But the Kennedy Center has implemented those requirements through another set of doc-
umentation called the Operations and Maintenance instructions, and those have not been re-
viewed back through the rest of the program for formal concurrence and control.
And as part of this rereview, we are going to institute that kind of control on atl OMI' "hat
relate to Criticality 1 and Criticality 1R hardware. Specifically, the reviews I am taiking ac_, t
are the
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FMEA CIL review which was started several weeks prior to the time Admiral Truly's memo
asked us to start it. That is being headed by Bill McCarty ot,t of the Level 2 safety office but
involves all elements of the program across the projects and tke contractors and up through
myself, and then to the Level 1 organization.
There is also a cornplete rereview of all of the OMI's at KSC, and that is under the lead of
Bob Sieck at Kennedy, and it is in that review where we will tie the CIL work and the OMI
work into a new process that gives this additional assessment and control.
And then the OMRSD's are all being re-reviewed also by the various projects, and that is
being led by Mr. Bill Fisher at my level office at JSC.
And m_ that is a very specific and finite answer to your question. Perhaps you had a broader
'implication as well. That is the most specific thing that comes to mind, and I think it is a very
positive s'Lep in that regard.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Charlesworth, in your role as operations, this morning we talked
a[ ::Jt safety, and crew survivability quite a bit. As we have flown the Shuttle, the crews have
varied in number anywhere from two in the early development days to eight recently. In his last
chart, Hank Hartslmld said that
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the STS is not operational in the traditional sense and the risks will always be high. In light of
that and what we have learned recently, have you given any consideration to limiting the crew
to the minimum essential size to do the job; and what would that size be for the various mis-
sions?
MR. CHARLESWORTH: The answer to your question is no, I haven't considered it a great
deal to this point, but I think as we go back through reflections on where we are and what has
happened, that win be a question we ask ourselves. I can't give you an answer as to what the
minimum size is. We started out, clearly we have flown with as few as two, but that is a tremen-
dous workload. It is very difficult to do. Three, four, we have debated on occasion because of
space station, but I am sure we will address that as part of our reflection on where we go from
here.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If there are no other questions, I would like to close with an easy
question to Admiral Truly.
First, I want to compliment you on the excellent work you have been doing, and we appreci-
ate it very much, and ask you, do you agree with the testimony this morning that astronauts are
a very important management resource?
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(Laughter.)
ADMIRAL TRULY: Astronauts come in various varieties, and some of them I think would
make outstanding managers in the Shuttle program, and in ;arious parts of NASA, and some
frankly would rather remain in the cockpit. As a matter of fact, most of them would rather
remain in the cockpit, but I thin_ there's a lot of men and women in the astronaut office that
1503
wouldservevery well in a numberof areas,particularlyin this nextyearor soasweget the
systembackon its feet.And we fully intendto providethat opportunityto selectedpeopleinselectedpositions.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Good.Goodidea.
Thankyouvery.much.
7Jhereupon,_, 3:45o'clockp.m.,the Commissionrecessed,to reconveneat the call of theChair. J
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MORNING SESSION
PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I call the Commission to order.
Mr. Mullo:¢, Mr. Wear, we have been considering the history of '_:he joint that failed, and in
connection with that we have been considering the history of it going back several years. The
pu_se for the meeting this morning is to discuss some of the documents that relate to the his-
tory of it and give all of you who were involved in i_ development and the experience that you
have had with it the opportunity to refer tc, some of the documents that have been provided to
tlS.
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JThis wil! be on the record. I assume--has Mr. Wear been sworn?
MR. WEAR: I have not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We!l, let me finish. Then we will do that. We decided to have this in
executive session because we want it to be informal, and secondly, we want to deal with several
documents. In an exploratory kind of discussion of this kind, it isn't really suitable for public
session, but we will make the testimony public at some time later on. because we may use some
of it in our final report, and we thougLt that we would have one of our staff members refer to
the documents. Mr. Kehrli, so that you can Identify the
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documents, so that we are all talking about the same documents, and then he will ask some
questions about those.
It is our intention to end the hearings of the Commission today. We do not plan to have any
further hearings, so this will ly_ the last hearing. If we might swear Mr. Wear.
!Witnesses sworn. )
CHAIRMAN ROGERS:
Randy, do you want t(, start, please?
MR. KEHRLI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, in front of you you have a book that
contains the documents that we wou!d like you to refer to today. I am going to refer to them
specifically and read lT_)rtions of them into the record, and you might want to follow along while
I do that, before the Commissioners begin asking you questians.
That booklet is divided into two sections. The first one is a major tab, O-Ring History, and
the attachments run, the tab attachments run from Number 1 through Number 35. The second
major tab, the second division is Launch Constraint, in the back, and those attachments run
from 1 through 4.
) would like to direct your attention first of all to the Launch Constraint Attachments 1
through 4.
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During the course of the investigation, either as a result of interviews o_ specific requests by the
Commission to NASA, we received some of these documents, as the Chairman indicated to you.
The first document I would like to refer to is Launch Constraint Attachment Number 1,
which is a document dated .qeptember 15, 1980, to distribution from Mr. Lindstrom, and the sub-
ject of this memorandum is signing launch constraints on ._pen problems submitted to Marshall
PAS. This is in the back of the book, in back of the Launch Constraint section, Attachment
Number 1. Im.I 3 z I I
The memorandum reads, "The following guidelines have been established to aid in making
constraint decisions on open problems and are limited to recurrence control determination only.
In accordance with practices established on past programs, remedial actions, for example, remov-
al and replacement of defective hardware, et cetera; for correcting discrepancies on the vehicle
to be launched are considered launch constraints and are tracked by the KSC system."
This is an excerpt from the document. I haven't read it in its entirety. It is Paragraph A.
Subparagraph 1 reads, "All open problems coded Criticality 1, 1R, 2, or 2R will be considered
launch
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constraints until resolved, which is recurrence control established and its implementation effec-
tively determined, or sufficient rationale; in other words, different configuration, et cetera, exists
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to conclude that this problem will not occur o,,_ the flight vehicie during prelaunch, launch, or
flight."
Now, I would like to direct your attention to Attachment Number 2 of the Launch Con-
straint -_ection. and this attachmer_t is a Marshall problem a_sessment system. This d,:)cument
was in fact obtained from Marshall. It is dated February 26th. 1986, and it is m.x understanding,
and of course you are free to correct me on any of this, that this is a chronological history of
entries from the Marshall problem assessment system.
The relevant items on this document that we would like to have you address include the
fact that the document indicates that a launch constrain: was assigned to STS-51F, 51I, 51J,
61A, 61B, and 61C. The date, I believe that is R-e-c--which apparently means recorded or re-
ceived-over on the rigEt is July 10, 1985. That matches with the first entry on the document,
which is dated July llth, 1985, and it indicates_ that post--the entry on the llth indicates that
post-flight inspection, SRM-16A revealed a gas path through the vacunm putty at 54 degrees,
and it goes on to describe essentially the
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erosion problem in the nozzle joint, I believe, :n 51--STS-51B, which was inspected on June 25th
at Thiokol, in 1985.
There is an indication that the constraint closure recorded was December 18. 1985, in the
document under the date recorded, and without belaboring the further entries on the document,
it indicates that the problem was "not considered a constraint to 51F; 100 psi leak check is per-
formed, which confirms seating of the secondary O-ring. The nozzle O-rings ha-e been shewn _,o
survive erosion, gaps of 125 mils in hot subscale test," and it continues to discuss the math
model, as you can read.
Additionally, there are individual entries later on in that document which indicate that the
constraint was lifted for subseouent flights that were listed previously, 51I, 51J. 61A, 61B, and
61C
Finally, there was a handwritten notation on the last page of the document that says: "con-
straint can be lifted I:y project manager," and this notation was on the document when we re-
ceived it. Additionally, the last entry on this problem assessment report dated 1/2q/86 indicates
that there was a resolution: "In the SRM, field and nozzle joints have experiencea erosion of the
primary O-_ings during several missions and static
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tests as determined by post-flight inspection," and it continues to go on through that entry and
give the rationale for closure of the problem
The last paragraph reads: "This problem is considered closed based on MTI report TWR-
14359, Revision A, improvements in Space Shuttle SRM motor seals dated 8/30/85, and MTI
letter E150BGR86144, rationale for closure of the O-ring erosion problems."
The last important information on this document is the--at the bottom of the first page
there is an indication of assignee md approval, and the names there are R. McIntosh, D.
Newman, L. Wear, J. Fletcher, and there is an indication of the status of the docunent: "PAC
review is complete." The status is still marked open, Code M, I believe.
Finally, or additionally, the next attachment, Attachment Number 3, is a similar problem
assessment which was initiated on February 17th, 1984, and summarized in this document. This
is a problem as,,_essment begun after the erosion, the O-ring erosion problem on Flight 41B, and
it again tracks that problem up unti! the time the problem was closed, which is the same date as
the nozzle, the previous nozz, e problem. 1/23/86. ]m q, :, " :_1
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Again.the samenamesareon the bottom.Fhedifference,the keydifferenceon this docu-
mentis under
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-launchconstraints'' it says"none,"and thereis no indicationon the documenthat a launch
constraintwasattachedto this particularproblemassessmentreporton thefieldjoints.
Again.I won't go throughthe variousentries.Yougentlemenare probablyfamiliar with
them,andtheCommissionhasseenthem.Theclosureentry is the sameon this documentas it
wason thenozzle,thenozzledocumentdescribedpreviously.
CHAIRMANROGEI_ MayI ask,howdid this first documentyou referredto cometo our
attention?
MR.KEHRLI:Wefirst discoveredthroughan interviewconductedby oneof the investiga-
tors at Thiokol that therewasa monthly problemreport that Thiokol filed internally which
tracked_hevariousproblemsthat aroseduring andafter a particular flight, and trackedthe
problemuntil icwasworkedand/orclosed.
Wediscoveredin oneof thoseentriesa referenceto a specificMarshallproblemassessment
report,andit indicatedthat therehadbeena trackingnumbei,a problemnumberassignedto
the 41Berosionproblem,andalsoto 51B,andadditionallyDM7,I alsobelieve,hada separate
report.Thenupontalking to GeorgeHardyand,I believe,Mr. Mulloy,
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Marshallsearchedtheir recordsandfoundthesedocumentswhichyouhavein front of you,the
Marshallassessmentreport.Sotheseare in factMarshalldocuments.
CHAIRMANROGERS:And that wasafter our publichearings,sothat .,_, howwe found
this document?
MR.KEHRLI:Yes,this wasafte_the publichearings,andwe foundthesein the courseof
interviews.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Just to besurethe recordiscomplete,this J. Fletcheris a separate
J. Fletcherfrom the Fletcherthat hasbeennominatedand affirmed,I guess,asadministrator.
MR.KEHRLLYes.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Well,i think what theCommissionwouldlike to hearfromyou,Mr.
WearandMr. Mulloy,isanexplanationof this, first, whywedidn't knowaboutit, andsecondly,
whatgaveriseto the launchconstraint,howtheywerehandled,whomadethedecisionto wai"e
onall oftheseflights.I guesstheseweretheflights that preceded51L.
MR.MULLOY:Yes,sir.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Andwhy it wasclo_l outjust before51L.
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TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE B. MULLOY, MANAGER, SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
PROJECT OFFICE, AND LAWRENCE O. WEAR, MANAGER, SOLID ROCKET MOTOR
PROJECT, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
MR. MULLOY: Okay, air. I will start to address that, and then Mr. Wear, I think, can elabo-
rate.
The problem assessment system was put in place to provide visibility throughout the shuttle
system for the types of problems that do occur, not just in flight, but also in qualification tests,
and in failure of hardware that is bo¢k for refurbishment at a vendor or whatever. And it is a
closed loop tracking system that ;ists the anomaly.
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Now, in accordance w_th the memo there from Bob Lindstrom in September of 1980. the
procedure was established that in all flight readiness reviews, all open problems weuld be
flagged at the flight readine_s review, and it is our quality organization that does that, and that
requires them when the problem is not completely closed cut, it required dealing with it in the
flight readiness review proce,_s, as I testified in both the previous private and public hea:ings,
that these anomalies were covered in the flight readiness review.
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There was a cross-check by the quality people to assure that the problem had been discussed
and resolved, a rationale for mak_ing the next flight, in view of the fact that the problem had not
been ,completely eliminated in making the flight with the acknowledged chance that there would
be a recurrence of the type of thing that had been observed in the initial problem report, so on
each flight up to, from the time that the constreAnt was shown, it required a signature by the
project office, which is Mr. Weals office for the solid rocket motor, that that had been addressed
and closed in the flight readiness review, and it's required, his initial, essentially on the problem
assessment, and where you see on the problem a_sessment there, I believe there is a JWT initial
in there for each one of those. That JWT is Jim Thomas, who works in Mr. Wear's office, and is
director of his engineering branch in the proj_t office.
Now, the entry that is shown in there that the problem was closed prior m 51L is in error.
What happened there was, one of your doc'_ments here which we did not discuss is the letter
from Mr. McDonald to Mr. Wear which proposed that this problem be dropped from the problem
assessment system and no longer be tracked for the reasons stated in Mr. McDonald's letter.
That ]etter was in the review cyck.. The
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letter, I v iieve, _,as dated 10 December 1985. it came into the center, it was in the review cycle.
After Mr. Wear b:ought this letter to my attention, my reaction was, we are not going to drop
this from the problem assessm_m _y_em because the problem is not resolved and it has to be
dealt with on a flight-by-flight basis I_,'_ _ -' '1
Since that was going through the review cycle, the people who run this problem assessment
system erroneously entered a closure for the problem on the basis of this submittal from Thio-
kol. Having done that then for the 51L review, this did not come up in the flight readiness
review as an open launch constraint, so you won't find a project si_mture because the PAS
system showed the problem was closed, and that was an error.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who made the error? Do you know?
MR. MULLOY: The people who do the problem assessment system.
MR. WEAR: Mr. Fletcher, and he reports within our quality organization at the flight readi-
ness review, at the incremental flight readiness reviews, as I think have been described to you
before. There is one from Thiokol to me, and there is one from my group to Larry, and then
Larry, of coarse, does one ,,,ith the Shuttle
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project office, and so forth, on up the line. At my review and at Larry's review, there is a heads
up given tG the quality representative at that board for what problems the system has open, and
they cross-check to make sure that we address chat problem in the readiness review.
On this particular occasion, there was no heads up given because their PAS sxstem consid-
ered that action closed. That is unfortunate.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Leftsgobackjust a bit, becauseI think it is helpful to meif you--
youusewordsthat I understanda little bit. Whatcausedthe constraintto beputon in thefirst
place?
MR.MULLOY:Theconstraintwasput onafterwesawthe secondaryO-ringerosionon the
nozzle,I believe.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who decided that?
MR. MULLOY: I decided that, that that would be addressed, until that problem was re-
solved, it would be considered a launch constraint, and addressed at flight readiness reviews to
assure that we were staying within our test experience base.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And was that--what is meant by the problem description?
MR. MULLOY: Which document, sir?
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MR. KEHRLI: That is Number 2.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, reference similar reports. Yes, sir.
DR. RIDE: Why didn't you put a launch constraint on the _eld joint at the same time?
MR. MULLOY: I think at that point, and I will react to that question in real time, because I
haven't really thought about it, but I think the logic was that we had been observing the field
joint, the field and nozzle joint primary O-ring erosion. This erosion of a secondary O-ring was a
new and significant event, very new and significant event that we certainly did not understand.
Everything up to that point had been that the primary O-ring, even though it had experienced
some t rosion, does seal. What we had evidence _f was that here was a case where the primary
O-ring was ,"_.olated and the secondary O-ring was eroded, and that was considered to be a more
serious observation than previously observed.
DR. RIDE: Correct me if I am wrong, but weren't you basing most of your decisions on the
field joint on analysis of what was the maximum, what you believed to be the maximum possible
erosion, and you had that analysis for the field je:nt and for the nozzle joint. When you saw the
complete erosion of the primary
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O-ring on the nozzle joint, that showed you that your analysis- on the nozzle joint wasn't any
good, I would think. That would indicate to you that ;'our analysis on the field joint wasn't very
good, either, or at least should be suspect.
MR. MULLOY: The conclusion, rightly or wrongly, for th_ cause of the secondary O-ring
erosion on the nozzle joint, it was concluded from test data we had that 100 psi pressurization
leak check, that the putty could mask a primary O-ring that was not sealing, The conclusion
was--and that one was done at 100 psi. The conclusion was that in order to get that type of
erosion that we saw on the primary O-ring, that _hat O-ring never sealed, and therefore the con-
clusion was that it never was capable of sealing.
The leak check on subsequent nozzles, all subsequent nczzles was .run at 200 psi, which the
test data indicated would always blow through the putty, and in always blowing through the
putty we were guaranteed that we had a primary O-ring seal that was capable of sealing, and
then we further did, and we already had that on the field joints at that time.
DR. RIDE: The 200 psi check on the field joints were started about a year earlier. Is that
right?
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MR. MULLOY: I don't recall specifically where. I don't r_all the dates.
MR. WEAR: I believe it was--I think there was a separation of about th,-ee flows, I believe.
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Mr. MULLOY:Sowhatconcernedus aboutthe nozzlejoint ;;'asthat wehad.asyouhave
stated,Dr. Ride,wehadto gobackandthen lookat the aralysis for a violatedprimaryO-ring,
so the rationalefor the proceedingwith flight, havinglookedat the occurrenceon the nozzle
joint, angtheranalysiswas run which includedviolation cf ,t,"_ prima;y O-ring to determine
what is the maximum erosion that could occur on the secondary O-ring.
That analysis matched very well with the observation_ that we had from the flight that that
occurred on, and that was corroborated by test, and that was the rationale for proceeding with
the next flight, and whether or riot it was treated as launch constraint in the past, it was treated
as an issue to be discussed in each one of the flight readiness reviews on the field joints as well
as the nozzle joints.
DR. WALKER: Were you at all concerned about violations of the integrity of' the putty,
which was really the first line of defense ih this joint? In fact, apparently you were deliberately
trying to violate the putty by going to 200 pounds per square inch.
MR. MULLOY: Yes. sir. We were concerned with
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violation of the putty, and as has been laid out during this investigation, there was a program
under way to find something as an alternative to the putty. We were not deliberately trying to
violate the putty. What we wanted to be sure was that we got a leak check on the primary O-
ring, and the only way you could be sure you got a leak check on the primary O-ring was to put
a pressure between the two rings that wcul:l, if the primary, did leak. that it would blow through
the putty.
DR. WALKER: Well, all right. Then if you found that--well, if you were going to violate the
putty, there was no procedure you had which could determine that. You could violate the putty
in your test, and yet you would never know that, and yet that was an integral part of your pro-
tection, and no actions were instituted to _ddress that problem, as I understand it.
MR. MULLOY: Oh, yes, sir, that was the whole test program that was laid out, to find _n
alte,-native to the putty.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Mulloy, didn't it occur to you that if the putty could be masking a leak
check, then the putty could sure be masking pressurization actuation of the primary O-r;.ng, and
hence your whole analysis about how that primary O-ring sealed and the time it
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takes to seal could be just as suspect?
r,._R. MULLOY: No, sir, it did not. The pressurization is an entirely different direction
DR. KEEL: Of course, the putty is still a barrier in both instances.
MR. MULLOY: Y_, sir. And the putty has a substantially different pressure carrying capa-
bility, depending upon which side you pressurize it from.
DR. KEEL: That was your assumption?
MR. MULLOY: That is a fact.
DR. KEEL: Do you still think the putty doesn't have anything to do with the pressurization
of the primary O-ring?
MR. WEAR: You are speaking of today?
DR. KEEL: Yes.
MR. WEAR: Well, today there has been quite a;_ extensive testing conducted.
DR. KEEL: What is your answer?
MR. WEAR: Well. I think that the testing that has been done has demonstrated that the
time delay factor to the putty, as I understand, and I haven't been that close to the investigation
per se--
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DR.KEEL:SOregardlessocwhichsideyoupressuriz,_,it hasaneffectof delay
MR MULLOY:Theputty is highlyvariable,and
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weunderstandthat its ability to sustainor notsustainpressureis mpredictable.
DR.WALKER:But youwerenotawareof that earlier.Is that correct?
MR.MULL£)Y: Yes, sir. we were aware of it, because sometimes we saw paths through the
putty, evidence of paths through the putty. Sometimes we saw evidence of paths through the
putty and O-ring erosion Sometimes we saw no paths tnrough the putty and no evidence of hot
gas past the putty, and so we knew that it was performing in that variable manner
DR. WALKER: The evidence of paths through the putty that you speak of, was that evi-
dence directly looking at the putty after demating, or was that by implication because you saw
O-ring erosion?
MR. MULLOY: Both. It was looking at the putty and at the joint, looking for evidence of
soot between the putty and the ;','imary O-ring, and th,_ distribution of that soot, and the e;'-
dence of the path, hot gas path through the putty.
DR. WALKER: So you knew that in most cases pressurization was occurring by leaks
through the putty?
MR. MULLOY: I don't believe it is in most cases. No, sir, because we had a very limited
number of observations of the 170 some odd joints. There is a
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very limited number of observations where you have pressurization by breakdown of the putty.
The rest of them, there is no evidence of paths through tile putty.
DR. WALKER: But there was a memo from the Titan program suggesting that pressuriza-
tion, at least in the ca.:-,: of Titan, was oc:urring pr w arfiy through blow holes in the putty. Did
you receive that memo?
MR. MULLOY: Yes. sir. You are -r_,_.ing of, I think it was on your list for about a March,
1984, memo that I got from George Morefield. Yes. Im.X. _ -' -'1
DR. WALKER: And i think that was passed on to you from the chief engineer's office at
headquarters. Is that correct?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, that ,Jas written directly to me from Mr. Morefield at my request,
observing this problem, asking CSD and Hercules to look at this problem and give me their ob-
._ervations about what they thought wes happening and what could be done to rectify it, and so
that is what we were working on.
DR. WALKER: So did you accept their view that pressurization in the shuttle was occurring
primarily by blow holes, or did you think that the situation was different in your booster than
the Titan?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, I thought it was different b:_-_d upon the evidence that we had that
we
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had a lot of joints that didn't have any blow holes in them, and avidence that--no evidence of
any kind of a hot gas past the putty. And that is an established fact, I believe.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Assuming that you were advised as you were by Thiokoi that tEey
opposed the launch on the 27th because of weather, would you have reacted differently?
1512
®
MR. MULLOY No, sir. Frankly, I was not aware that this erroneous entry had entered in
the PAS because it did not come up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: !" _ yoc what does a constraint mean, then?
MR. MULLOY: A launch constraint means that we have to address the observations, see if
we have seen anything on the previous flight that changes our provious rationale, and address
that at the Flight Readiness Review'.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When you say "address it," I always get confused by the word. Do
you mean think about it? Is that what you mean?
MR. MULIX)Y: No, sir. I mean present the data as to whether or not what we have seen in
our most recent observation, which may not be the last flight, it may be the flight before that, is
within our ex'Jerience base and whether or not the previous analysis and tests that previously
concluded the t was an acceptable situation is still valid, based upon later observations.
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CH.aiRMAN ROGERS: Okay. So in tt..s case, because you didn't know that the constraint
had b_,.-n closed due to an error, if the constraints were still on, if no error would have been
had., you would still have reacted tb.e same way?
MR. MULLOY: Reacted to what, sir?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Reacted as you did on the telecon.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And so each time one of these flights took off that you knew there
was a constraint on, you had to make a decision to waive it, what -,vent through your mind?
MR. MULLOY: Okay. What went through my mind is, we looked at the most recent obser-
vation of recovered hardware. We compared what we were seeing to our previous successful ex-
perience with the joint, realizing that we were having some O-ring erosion, looking if we were
seeing anything that changed the previous rationale. That is what led to open _g the problem
report, when we saw that we violated the primary O-ring. That was something , _at was differ-
ent and therefore required additional analysis and test and until that was done.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But what did you do about
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it, though? It seems to n: e in that case, when you say that you addressed it, no change was made
in it. All you did on these waivers was to waive it. You just apparently--there is no indication.
What d!A yo,_, de? There is nothing in this chart that suggests that you corrected the.joint.
Each time there was further experience, further erosion, and we don't see any examples of
correction or effective action taken or anything of that kind.
MR. MULLOY: I guess I would have to take issue with that, sir. On page 2----
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is why we want you here.
MR. MULLOY: On page 2 of 3 of document No. 2, if you look at--and I will just pick one--
and I think there's a rationale here. It says this problem is not considered a constraint to 51-F; a
100 psi le_k check is performed which confirms seating of the secondary O-ring. Nozzle O-rings
have been hown to surwve erosion depths of 125 mils in hot subscale test. The math model
predicts max.mum erosion depth for the secondary O-ring to be 75 mils in the worst case condi-
tion. [R,,J _ 2 _'
The erosion on the secondary O-ring was 32
2602
mils, well below the demonstrated sealing capability.
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What was done was analysis and test to substantiate that rationale for accepting that condi-
tion for that flight. It is not just a matter of nothing was done.
DR. WALKER: You are relying on the secondaD' O-ring.
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. What we were saying was if we got a repeat, we didn't think we
woula get a. epeat of the condition because we had gone to 200 psi and it was concluded that. we
knew the putty could mask 100 psi leak check and we could have had a _ad O-ring primary to
beg,an with on that one.
We were sure on the 51-F flight because of the 200 psi leak check that we had a good pri-
mary O-ring was a substantial part of the rationale. The second then was if the primary O-ring
was violated, the maximum erosion that could o_ ur on the secondary O-ring was only 75 mils,
which tests had shown could sustain 125 mils.
Now, rightly or wrongly, that was the rationale.
DR. WALKER: So you then were relying on the secondary O-ring in that case.
MR. MULLOY: We were relying on the
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redundancy, yes. We showed that we had redundancy that, should the primary O-ring fail, the
secondary would function.
DR. WALKER: Well, I guess we are going to address the case of the criticality later, and so I
think I will save those questions.
MR. RUMMEL: Mr. Mulloy, I wonder how detailed your investigations were when you ap-
plied the experience of one flight to a subsequent flight.
For example, did you consider the differences in dimensional tolerances and dimensions of
the various joints--out of roundness, they varied in diameter, they varied in numbers of ways--
and so when you evaluated a specific flight, did you look into where the previous flight or flights
stood in this regard and then analyzed what would be applicable on a specific flight under con-
sideration?
MR. MULLOY: Out of roundness? No, sir. We gave no specific consideration to a variation
in gap that could occur due to :he out-of-round condition.
What we did do was look at the dimensional tolerances for the specific flight, the tang di-
mension and the clevis dimension, to assure that we had the minimum O-ring squeeze that was
specified and assure that that was within our experience base.
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We did not go in and look at what would be the effect of out-of-roundness and possibly a
higher squeeze on O-rings in a local area of the joint.
That is a revelation, I think, that has come from the investigation of the 51-L failure.
DR. FEYNMAN: Mr. Mu!!ny: when you use a math mode[ do you have any idea of how
accurate It is?
MR. MULLOY: We did not just use the math model. What we did was build a math model
that was correlated to test. There was a test fixture that was built to empimcally determine the
maximum erosion that could occur while filling the annulus between the putty and the primary
O-ring and the annulus between the primary and the secondary O-ring.
Then Thiokol's, Dr. Salita's math model was shown to correlate very well with that, and I
guess I can't put a percentage accuracy on that. But the fact that the math model correlated
pretty well with the test results gave us some confidence in that anc the fact that the test dem-
onstrated that there was a significant margin that was lx)lerable in *erms of the amount of ero-
sion, given the dimensional tolerance.
!514
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DR. FEYNMAN: I think that the math model determined how the constants were deter-
mined and a line was put tnrough the previous data on a somewhat s milar
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material. And the line that was put through deviated, i[t doesn't always give the same answer.
You took an average rather than the :maximum, so that there were factors of 2 above and
factors of 2 below on the original data. If you would have known that, you could have appreciat-
ed that wha this thing predicted could easily be a factor of 2 below the right answer, because in
fa:t it didn't =yen fit with the data on which it was constructed.
YOu weren't aware of that?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. I was not aware of that.
DR. KEEL: Well, Mr. Mulloy, what was your previous conservative estimate of maximum
erosion on the primary O-ring for a nozzle joint? Do you remember that? You briefed :.t at sever-
M Flight Readiness Reviews.
_Pause.
DR. KEEL: Going back to the record, it is 90/1000, based upon what you've cha_acteri_-_d as
a conservative estimate, by which you presumably meant worst case. Is that correct?'
MR. MULLOY: That is correct.
DR. KEEL: And what erosion was there on 51-B that caused the launch constraint.s?
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MR. MULLOY: On the primary O-ring er, sion it was 171/1000.
DR. KEEL: So 171 compared to he previous worst case analysis prediction of 90.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. And what was different--that again is why we were concerned
about this and established the understanding ot this as a launch constraint.
What we observed was we were seeing a different type of erosion on this pri:mary O-ring.
And that different type---what we had been seeing previously was---
DR. KEEL: By different type, you mean worse erosion than predicted?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. I mean a different type. The erosion that we had been seeing was
due to the hot gas direct jet impingement on the surface of the primary ring as it seated.
What we saw here, it was evident that the primary ring never sealed at all, and w,e saw
erosion all the way around that O-ring, and that is where the 171/1000 came from, and that was
not in the model that predicted a maximum of 90/1000. The maximum of 90/1000 :.s the maxi-
mum erosion that can occur if the primary O-ring seals.
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But in this case, the primary O-ring did not seal; therefore, you had another volume to fill,
and the flow was longer and it wes blow-by and you got more erosion.
DR. KEEL: But I think that the bottom line of all that is that perhaps your analysis didn't
consider all the physical phenomena, including how that primary O-ri:ng seals and how long it
takes to seal, and if it doesn't seal, what erosion should take place then.
MR. MULLOY: It did consider how long it takes to seal and how long it take,_ _o fill that
volume. What it didn't consider was that the primary O-ring did not seal and you had hot gas
impingement for the additional period of time that it takes to fill the voilume during the primary
and seconaary. It did not consider that.
DR. KEEL: And as a consequence, it was off by a factor of almost 2.
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. It was correct for the mode that it was analyzed for. It was not cor-
rect for an O-ring that was not sealing. It is absolutely correct and has ;_een demonstrat_-xl to be
correct for a primary O-ring that seals.
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DR. KEEL: It's hard, I think, certainly for me and I think the rest of the Commission, to
understar, d how you can say it's absolutely correct. I don't know
2608
of any models you've done since tl_,en or tests you've done since then that can correlate any
more accurately than Dr. Feynman has indicated with your erosion models, an analytic empiri-
cal model. And it has to have uncertainty about it.
MR. MULLOY: Absolutely. That is a very unfortunate adjective, i withdraw that. Nothing is
, -)solute.
DR. KEEL: I would have thought when you had this experience that you wouldn't have im-
mediately gone back to your analytic methods as the basis of your confidence for lifting these
launch constraints be,cnuse certainly this case of erosion v, as certainly worse than what you
would hyl_._thesize from the previous wont case.
ME. MULLOY: Yes, sir. And that is why we ran additional tests and expanded the analyti-
cal model to account for this mode where the primary O-ring did not seal.
DR. KEEL: And you expanded the analytical model and what was the worst case erosion
that that model then predicted?
MR. MULLOY: [ t_lieve I said 75 mils on the secondary O-ring if you had a primary O-ring
that was violated and never sealed. And that is what the problem assessment system report
shows on page 2 of 3.
DR. RIDE: Did you consider that acceptable?
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MR. MULLOY: Yes.
DR. RIDE: 75 mil erosion of the secondary O-ring
MR. MULLOY: Yes.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Mulloy, w 'he time this joint was conceived of, did you envision that the
O-rings would be eroded to this ex_ _,nt?
MR. MULLOY: I'm sorry, Dr. Covert?
DR. COVERT: At the time that the joint was designed, was it designed with the intent in
mind that the O-rings would be eroded to this extent?
MR. MULLOY: No.
DR. COVERT: So in some way, then, the acceptance of this erosion as a fact of life repre-
sented a departure from margins of safety that you originally had in mind at the time you were
designing it?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. It was treated as an anomaly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Going back just for a moment to the criticality I statement, one of
the things that has troubled me from the sta_L and still troubles me is, if I understand English
at all, this says that the leakage of the primary O-ring seal is classified as a single failure point
due to the possibility of loss of the sealing at the secondary O-ring, because of joint
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rotation after motor pressurization. [r,q a _, ,, I
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That to me says that if the primary O-ring fails, then there is apt to
be a loss of mission, vehicle and crew. That is what it says.
Then you have experiences of one kind or another over a period of time with a seal which
certainly causes a lot of discussion and a lot of concern.
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At one point in the same document it says, based on the amount of charring and erosion
paths through the primary O-ring, and what is understood about the erosion phenomenon, it is
believed that the primary O-ring SMR-61A never sealed or never seated.
Now, why at that point, wou!dn't you all have said we were lucky not to have a loss of mis-
sion and crew at that point because criticality I says if that primary O-ring fails, we will lose
everything? Why wasn't that a cause for concern on the part of the whole NASA organization?
MR. _._ULLOY: It was cause for concern, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who did _'ou tell about this?
MR. MULLOY: Everyone, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: They all knew about it?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And they all knew about itat the time of 51-L?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.You will find in the Flight Readiness Review record that went all
the way to the L minus one review.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's why I'm saying we want to talk to you this morning. That
suggests that was pretty well glossed over; that they didn't really realize it. But in any
event---
DR. SUTrER: Well, could I ask a quick question? I'm confused about this thing being signed
off and that was a mistake, apparently. But is it still on the books as being signed off?. When was
that mistake discovered?
MR. WEAR: It is in the books today, just like you see it her,,.
DR. Su'FrER: So then a lot of---
MR. WEAR: We haven't gone back and fixed the books.
DR. sUTrER: A lot of people must read these constraints, and a lot of people could read it
as saying, hey, that's signed off; don't worry about it any more. Who reads this? It's in the books.
MR. WEAR: Let me explain how _his occurs. There is what is called a Problem Review
Board Meeting.
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that is held within each project. There's one for each of the projects at Marshall as a result of
Bob Lindstrorn's letter that was read earlier that set this out, where they go over these items.
The reason you see Jim Thomas there, he's the alternate Chairman of that Board for me.
That is discussed at that time end that is where these are recognized as being within our data
base or perhaps not within our data base. And it is covered in the Flight Readiness Review and
that is the process.
DR. SUTTER: So at the Flight Readiness Review_ the people read qfis and understand it.
MR. WEAR: He or I in doing this activity know it's in the Flight Readiness Review or it's
not, as the case may be. Plus the other participants there know that. And therefore it is listed as
a result of being presented and discussed in the Flight Readiness Review.
And it would be within our data base or not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What do you mean by data base, because Thiokol keeps saying that
-perience was not within your data base on Flight 51-L, and you all say that it was within your
2ata base.
Which is right?
MR. WEAR: The Thiokol that I addressed, sir, says it is within their data base.
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DR KEEL:I think the Chairman'spoint,though,is with respecto the night of thetelecon,
?hiokol was arguing just what you are arguing now with respect to erosion. They were argu:ng
that we want to stay within our data base and we want to go with an O-ring temperature not
any lower than 53 degrees, just like you're arguing now that it'3 okay to fly because we are
within our data base, implying you wouldn't fly outside of your data base.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What do you mean by data base?
MR. WEAR: T_,e data base to me, sir, is the previous test and flight experience that we
have, as supported.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You've never had experience in this cold weather so when you're
talking about your data base on Flight 51-L you didn't have any. It seems to me it is used as sort
of a slick way of just getting over the problem, saying it's within our data base. But you hadn't
had any experience of that kind before and so you can't say it was within your data base.
The epgineers at Thiokol were saying it is not. We have never had that experience. We
warn you: Don't do it. We don't know what's going to happen.
And we keep hearing from NASA, it was within
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our data base.
MR. WEAR: Well, going to that particular evening, which I think what you are referring to
is the January 27th evening, on that particular evening in my process, in my mind process, we
had faced a cold launch the year before, in which we had had some erosion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The worst experience you had.
MR. WEAR: Which they had addressed and they, the Thiokol that you're referring to, they
had said that that condition, that cold condition on that particular occasion the year before
had--I forget the exact words, but in effect had aggra,vated the situation, but that it was accept-
able and would perform. That was the conclusion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you agree, though, it was not within your data base, don't you?
MR. WEAR: That experience of the prior year was within my data base; yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I say on that one, though, you had your worst result on that
one.
MR. WEAR: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you can say well, we almost had an accident, but we didn't quite.
Therefore, it is within our data base. And then you get to another day when it is colder and you
still argue it is within
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your data base.
Thiokol said it is not in your dam base because you had never tried it in this cold weather.
Now, what I'm asking is how do you explain that controversy? How do you explain that
conflict?
MR. WEAR: If I may continue, their engineering organization and my engineering organiza-
tion had agreed the prior year that that experience was--could be acceptable on the next
launch; that if the same condition occurred, that that was the findings that were made at that
time, if that same condition existed it could be accepted.
And that is the same engineering organization that was talking on January 27th, so their
conclusions and report to us on the previous year was that at those conditions and what we ob-
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servedon that particularlaunch,that if that condition--meaningthat typeof--that entire con-
dition,that weathercondition, whatever--occurred again, tha_ that was acceptable.
MR. HOTZ: But you didn't t ve those conditions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let me finish. That was within your data base, you argue. But what
I'm saying, you've got a new condition now which was not within your data base.
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Now, how do you keep relying on it was within your data base? The Thiokol people said it's
not. The engineers said it's not. We've never tried it at ,_his cold a temperature.
How can you keep saying that it was within your' data base? It wasn't. It exceeded your data
base. You never had that kind of experience before.
MR. W_AR: Well, on that particular evening I iheard what the Thiokol engineering people
stated. I _,lso know that they then counciled and they came back and they stated that the condi-
tions could be accepted. And so I have to conclude some engineering people must have changed
their minds.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm not taking issue with that. I'm taking issue with the slickness of
the words "within cur data base," as if that excuses e "erything.
What I'm pointing out is I don't think you ever nad a data base of this kind in Flight 51-L.
MR. WEAR: That's true.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, that's really all I was pointing out.
DR. FEYNMAN: Can I ask somethil:g, too? I wotJd like to understand this idea of within
the data base. For instance, 51-C had many seals on which there was no erosion at all. Which
seals should _e take?
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Why is it--suppose we had an accident? You see, we have an accident on five of the six
seals. And maybe it wasn't five, but anyway, most of them--there's no erosion, statistically.
Accidentally, it could happen that there was no erosion on any of the seals, only a little bit,
and then the next flight a lot of erosion. In other words, I don't understand how the logic works,
that because something just rnade it, that the next time it wouldn't be a bigger variation.
Could you explain to me, therefore, why when you have a successful flight which is success-
ful in the sense that the entire flight takes place, but which is unsuccessful in the sense tkat you
get effects that you didn't expect, that you consider that the next time it isn't going to be acci-
dentally a little bigger?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. That is what we addressed _lth trying to determine when we would
see a 10/1000 erosion or 20/1000 erosion or a 30/1000 erosion. That is why the test setup was
made, to determine how much erosion can you physicallv get.
And that is where the 90 milc _lculation came from, because that ,_rosion is limited by the
amount of time that hot gas can impinge on the primary O-ring, on t ne assumption that the
primary O-ring seals.
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So the logic was that there was a large margin against what were actually observing versus
what the theoretically possible erosion was, and then there was a large margin between the
theoretically possible erosion and that which you could sustain as demonstrated by tests.
Now, that was the logic.
DR. FEYNMAN: How many tests were made that would show that you really could sustain
90 mils of erosion?
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MR.MULLOY:I can'trecall.Therewereseveralhot gastestsmade,maybeten, with 125/
1000erosionontheprimaryO-ringseal.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Howdid the resultsof thosetestscomparewith the resultsof the
teststhat havebeendonelately?
MR. MULLOY:Theyare correlatablein termsof the erosion,Thereare no differences.I
don'tbelieve.I have_,l'tseenall of the testdata.
DR.FEYNMAN:This isn't quite,right, sir. Yousaidthereweretestswith 125mils erosion.
MR.MULLOY:Yes,sir.
DR.FEYNMAN:That isn't quite the way I rememberit. I think the hostsweremadeby
cutting thering away.
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MR. MULLOY:Thereweretwo tests run. Oneof them wasa hot gasimpingementhat
sustainedupto 125andstill sealed.
DR.FEYNMAN:Howdidyoumakethetestwith 125?
MR.MULLOY:By allowingthehot gasto impingefor a longerperiodof time andhavingit
impingelonger.And then therewerecoldgastestsmadewheretheO-ringwas--simulatedero-
sionwasput in there,and the maximumdemonstratedthere I think was95/1000as I recall.
But that wasthelogic.And I guessanyonecanquestionthat logic.
DR.SU2_YER:These were all the five-inch?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir; with a full-scale gland and O-ring, but a short length. Well, a 10-
inch diameter, I guess.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mulloy, I would like to try to understand this in somewhat simpler terms
than you people are used to using.
Is it correct to state that when you originally designed this joint and looked at it, that _ au
did not anticipate erosion of any of the O-rings during flight?
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MR. MULLOY: That is my understanding. I entered th_ program in November of 1982 ar.d
I wasn't there on the original design of the joint, but when I took over the program there was no
O-ring erosion anticipated.
MR. HOTZ: So that when you did run into signs of O-ring erosion, this was a bad sign.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
MR. HOTZ: You didn't like it?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
MR. HOTZ: So then you decided to introduce a standard based on the measurement or the
possibility of the limits of O-ring erosion. And as those limits, as the experience went up, your
criteria for safe flight went up too.
In other words, when you experienced more than maximum anticipated O-ring erosion, you
waived the flight and said well, it's possible to tolerate that. We still have a margin left.
MR. MULLOY: Are you speaking of the case where we did not have a primary seal?
MR. HOTZ: Yes.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.That iscorrect.There was another piece of logicthat went into that
though; that that flight,the next flight,we were
2621
positive we did have a good primary seal because we increased the leak check pressure to _200
psi.
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MR. HOTZ: But getting back to that, you mentioned that the ability of the putty to sustain
pressure was pretty unpredictable.
MR. MULLOY: Yes. sir.
MR. HOTZ: And wasn't that a cause for concern that you had an unpredictable elemen_ in
your equation?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. And what was done there was to look for some alternative to the
putty, such as MBR rubber strips or carbon fiber or carbon wool or steel wool or something that
would allow pressure to go directly to the primary seal.
MR. HOTZ: But to continue flying in the meantime?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
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MR. HOTZ: Then you finally, you're talking about these margins of safety, and I wonder if
you coMd express in either percentages or actual measurement terms--you have used the term
"wide margin" I wonder if you could give us a quantitative measurement as to what you consid-
er a wide margin?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. Well, as I said we had demonstrated that we ccuid stand 125 thou-
sandths of erosion and still seat. The maximum erosion that we had seen in the case joint was
on SDS-2, which was 53 thousandths, so that is a factor of two and a half.
MR. HOTZ: But it is still based on a 'very narrow physical measurement between 125 thou-
sandths.
DR. KEEL: Could I clarify something here, Bob? I think, Larry, if you go back a_d look at
your Flight xteadiness Reviews, that you were relying on smaller margins than that.
You wer_ arguing in the Flight Readiness Reviews where you Lriefc_ t_ problems of pri-
mary O-ring erosion that for the worst case for the field joint also that it would be 9C thou-
sandths.
MR. MULLOY: That is correct.
DR. KEEL: _, t that point you were pointing out that's okay, because, you can seal at 95, not
at 125 but at 95. I,. wasn't until later on during the process that
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you determined you could seal at 125.
MR. MULLOY: 'i_at is when we get the hot gas test data.
DR. KEEL: So that's a five percent margin, roughly, five and a half
MR. MULLOY: O] the 90 to 95 on a max predictable, yes.
MR. HOTZ: Just one more :luestion, sir. With all of this experience base, wasn't there any
time in this history of t:le flight that you or anybody else connect_d with the solia rocket booster
said we are getting a tot of anomalies here. We are getting things that are outside our original
predictions, and shouldn*, we take a look at it and stop flying until we've fixed it or have a
better feel for what ijs actually happening in the joint?
MR,. MULLOY: Only t}.e firs,L part of that, that we are seeing something here that n,eeds to
be corrected. We continuall)emphasized to the contractor that we need to put more emphasis
on resolving this proLlem. We _did not recommend that we stop flying for the logic that wa,_ pre-
sented in the Flight Readiness l_.,views and which I reiterated here today.
MR. HOcFZ: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Wea_ consideration
m
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given, as far as you know. to stop flying and fix the joint? Was there any discussions' about that?
Maybe we ._hould stop flying for a while?
MR. MULL?Y: Not to me, no sir. I have become aware of that in the course of _ome of the
testimony since the 51-L accident that there are some memos that are internal memos to that
effect.
MR. SuT'rER: I still am confused with the answers I got to the question about the state-
ments as the problem was closed. The quest'ion that's going on right now is how deep was the
concern over the joint.
The statement here that says this problem is closed is against the whole NASA phil,yscphy
of really documenting, c')ntrolling and having checks and balances. When I read this statement
that it was a mistake but it's left on the book. that gives me the impression that NASA did not
believe this was a very big problem. [Ref. 5:2-3]
DR RIDE: How serious do you consider a launch constraint?
MR. SU'I'rER: Do you have any comments on that?
MFL. MULL?Y: The comment I have, it's very unfortunate that that was erroneou:sly en-
tered. I had no intention of closing that problem, because I considered this to be a very serious
problern.
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MR. SUTTER: But did you know this?
MR. MULL?Y: No, sir.
VICE CHAII4MAN ARMSTRONG: Am I right that you didn't close it because you didn't
want to change anything after the accident? Isn't that right?
MR. SUTTER: But when was this signed oeC' This was signed off on 12/18/85.
MR. WEAR: This entry was made by this PAS system organization based _pon the entry
that they got f,'om the contractor where he recommended its closure and they did it.
MR. SUTTER: ,'m really confused, because the contractor was the guy that said don't
launch, yet he wrote you a piece of paper saying close this item out? If you're going :o depend on
the paperwork as to controlling the operation--and I've heard this now for three months, all of
these documents that, my God, we really control}led and we followed this to the point where we
can't get into trouble, yet here's a pmce of paper that says there's no problem.
How the--nobody reads this, I guess.
MR. WEAR: No, I think it is read.
MR. SUTTER: Do we have a copy of the letter?
MR. WEAR: Yes, sir, it's in the book here.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, we're going to ask the contractors exactly that question.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I think we have _ l'oilow up on Joe's point. You mean just be-
cause somebody ,,,r_te a letter, the whole thing was closed out and you didn't know? Nooody
knew anything about it? After all of this history of it, one letter would close it out?
MR MULL?Y: That was a failure of the human being within the system.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It was a little more than that. It's a failure of the whole sys1_e_-., if
one letter and one human being can close out a constraint that has been concerning you for
many years.
DR. KEEL: Can I ask for one clarification before you go away from this, Mr. Wear? You're
listed here as the project representative under the approval line?
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MR.WEAR:That'sright.
DR.KEEL:Doesthat meanyoudidapprovethis.or youdidn't approveit?
MR.WEAR:No.I did notapprovethis.It wasnotbroughtforwardfor usto consider
DR.KEEL:Soevenhoughyournameis onhereasapproval,youdidn't approveit?
MR.WEAR:Tkat's right. I think if youwill notice,thereis not an entry here that says so.
On the oti_ers, I thi:,k you wilt notice over here that there is
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an entry of initial, either JWT or LOW on the others as having lifted that for that particular
flight. I think most of them them put an L after it or som_ :hing that refers to it's lifted. In their
nomenclature there's an L entered for that purpose.
DR. KEEL: So as far as you're concerned you were still operating as if this was--remained a
launch constraint?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
MR. WEAR: Yes, sir.
KEEL: But may I follow up? That is correct, but as a matter of practicality even though
a launch constraint it was being waived for each launch?
MULLOY: That is correct, on the basis of the presentation at the Flight Readiness
DR.
this was
MR.
Review.
DR.
MR.
DR.
KEEL: So you in effect waived this for 51-L?
MULLOY: That is correct.
KEEL: But it doesn't show up on your summary?
MR. MULLOY: No because the man assumed when the closure came in from Thiokol that
this was going to close the problem, and that requires project concurrence, Mr. Wear's concur-
rence, which Mr. Wear and
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I had discussed it and that was aot going to happen.
DR. KEEL: As far as you were concerned, though, you still considered it a constraint in
spite of this document?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. KEEL: So the night of the telecon, for example, when you were arguing about whether
the primary O-ring would seal, you still considered the fact that there was a launch constraint
on the l::imary O-ring for 51-L?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. KEEL: Hence, in effect, the fact that in a strict sense there was no launch commit crite-
ria with respect _ temperature, there certainly was a launch constraint with respect to the pri-
mary O-ring sealing?
MR. MULLOY: Launch constraint relative to an understanding of our previous history to go
into the next flight.
DR. KEEL: Well, it's primary O-ring, isn't that what the launch constraint is on?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, it is related to the primary O-ring on the field joint.
DR. KEEL: And the reason you could have so much erosion is because it didn't seal on 51-B?
MR. MULLOY: On the nozzle joint, that is correct.
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DR. KEEL: That's right, and they were arguing on the field joint. They had concern about it
sealing or having time to seal.
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MR.MULLOY:Yes.that wasthepresentation.The concern for the time that it wouid take
for the primary O-ring to seal.
DR KEEL: So. in that sense, all that argument was in the cor_text of there being a la_mch
co'-.straint.
MR. MULLOY: I didn't think of it in those terms at that time.
MR. ACHESON: But I take it it would have made no difference whether it was formally
closed out or not because, az ! see the ;;ay the system had worked, a flag raised on 51-L--I
would have thought the determinatiea of the problem was contained by the fact that the leak
check had been changed to 200 psi from 100, and you could go on as before with that change in
the procedure.
Is that not the way it would have been resolved?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, it was contained by the fact that with the 200 psi leak check we were
sure that we had a good primary O-ring.
MR. ACHESON: So iL really didn't make any difference whether it was formally closed or
not as to what would have happened.
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MR. MULLOY: I would like to go back to the point Mr Wear made, because I think it is
important in addressing your concern, Mr. Sutter. and it's a very important point that Mr. Wear
made, is that you do not see the accepted closure on that last entry. That is an entry that "-he
guy who makes entries into the PAS syste;n made, and you do not see project signature concur-
ring in that.
So in essence, it is still open. It is open until Larry Wear concurs that it's closed.
MR. SUTTER: Do the people who read these look for all the signatures?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. I agree, it is unfortunate that that error was made by the gentleman
who make the entries into the PAS system on the basis of a submittal from the contractor that
this was no longer a problem of significance to carry in the problem assessment system.
MR. KEHRLI. Mr. Chairman, there are some documents, four documents, that we haven't
looked at that address these specific questions that have been asked for the last three or four
minutes that I would like to address the witness' attention to and the Commission's on the chro-
r, ology of this closure.
The first one is the launch constraint
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document number 4, which is a letter dated December 10, 1985 te Mr. Wear from Mr. McDonald
of Thiokol, which references the particular problem that we've been discussing and suggests that
or requests that the subject critical proble.-r_ be closed. [Ref. 5/2-4]
Additionally, the next document that follows that page is the letter from Thiokol to Mr.
Jack Fletcher of Rockwell, and it indicates :that there is fu_her information that's being provid-
ed with regard to the closure of critical problems. [Ref. 5/2.7]
Back on O-ring history document number 34, there is a letter from Mr. Wear to Morton
2'hiokol; subject, SRM Problem Review Board. The date of that letter is December 24, 1985.
:.+. reads: "During a recent review of the SRM Problem Review Board open problem list, I
found ti:-'.t we had 20 open ploblems, 11 opened during the past slx months, 13 opened over six
months; one three years old, t_'o two years old, and one closed during the past six months. As
you can see, our c:._sure record is very poor. You are requested to initiate the required effort to
assure more timely closu. : _ and the MTI personnel shall directly coordinate with the S&E per-
sonnel the contents of the clost.:._ rooorts." The letter is signed by Mr. Wear. I_,.J -, 2 _1
The final document is attachment nu::.b'_, " 30 t_o
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the O-ring history. This is. again, part of the Marshall package that was received when the
launch constraint document that we've been talking abcut, tln,e problem assessment documents
were received. !m.T -, _, ,,:
MR. WEAR: What' 'he number, please?
MR. KEHRLI: Number 30 iv the O-ring history. It gives a chronology. As you see. it notes
on the entry of 51-B there is an asterisk next to the Marshall tracking number A(_928& which
indicates that "this problen, contains secondary O-ring erosion of the nozzle joint and comz:-ains
launch anomalies."
Then down at the bottom, on STS-61-C. by the date. 1/12/86, there is an indicatiop of ero-
sion or an O-ring anomaly problem on the field and nozzle-to-case which was net reported and
not given a problem tracking number in January of 1986.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What aa you conclude by that?
MR. KEHRLI: Well, one, I am wondering if the closure of the item is the reason that the
January 12. 1986 erosion or O-ring anomaly was not reported or .given a traCing number
MR. WEAR: I'm afraid I didn't follow your question there.
MR. KEHRLI: Well. on document number 30, the field and nozzle joint erosion problem, on
STS-61-C on the
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primal" ring. unlike the other problems--except for STS-2--it has an indicatior that it was not
reported.
Is that because the problem had been clo;ed as a result of those previous letters we jus_
referred to, the Thiokol request to close it and your letter indicating that you want open items
closed?
MR WEAR' I'm afraid I can't tel! you why this one was not reported, looking at this right
here, now.
As far as mv letter is concerned, the thrust of my letter was we had problems. They ait:
,_,ithin this tracking system. It's more than the normal deviation, the deviation records. What
the thrust of my letter is is that they are not making adequate progress to satisfy me in resolv-
ing problems. We were continuing to have the problem but we weren't making sufficient
progress to smt me in resolving them. that _hey were hanging on for too long and we weren't
closing them out.
MR. MULLOY: Let me t,_ke a try at answering this question as to why it was not reported. I
see this was revised 3/19,'86. This would be speculation, but I didn't get the information on the
inspection of 61-C until after the Flight Readiness Re,_iew for 51-L. That came in--I believe we
got those joints dematecl just two or three day_ before the L-l, and I reported this in the L-1
review.
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Given that timing and given thv events of 51-L. I just--and perhaps you could address this
q_estion to Thiokol, but I suspect they haven't written up this four mils of erosion that oe_curred
on 61-C and put it into the system since the 51-L accident.
'rhere is no reason why it wouldn't be reported because there was four mils of erosion.
DR. I_EEL: Can I ask one followup question with respect to these memos and the documents
that Randy has referred to here? Based on our staff interviews with Mr. Thomas from Marshall.
he indicated that he had told Thiokol on the telecon to in fact close out all issues that were over
six months old, and Mr. Russell at Thiokol confirmed that.
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Wasthat your _mderstandingalso,that engineeringat Marshall_as sayingclose out the
prcblems over six months old?
MR WEAR: I'm afraid I don't know the conte×t of that discussion He and I had had con-
ve"sations
DR. KEEL: Wel , it's the s_me context here. I assume
MR WEAR: W_l, when y_u say close them out. ! say I'm not .-ure what the context was of
the statement he made My intent--and i trust it _s the same with Jim's because he and I usual-
_v communicate well-,-mv
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int__nt was lets get off our duff and work and reach solutions for these problems, not continue to
drag them out for six months, five months, et cetera. That is the thrust of my direction to Thio-
kol
DR. KEEL: D}d ultimately Thmkol recomm(nd, in four, closing out by taking the joint, SRB
joint problem off _he problen_ report list?
MR WEAR: That's the nature of McDonald's letter bad, hare ',_here he does _ecommend
taking them off, and as I understand the th- 1st of the letter the way I react it now and the way I
read it then was that we are discussing these problems in the Flight Readiness Review. Le:'s not
also put them someplace else, so that in effect he has to report them two pla;es.
As I read his letter, he's saying we are doing the trae 'r ng job in the Flight Readiness cycle.
Let's take them out of this other tracking system. He's s,..:_g lets do it once. i think that's the
thrust of his letter, the way I read it.
DR. KEEL: What was Marshall's response to that'?
MR WEAR: My response to that was no
MR. MULLOY: Mine, too.
MR WEAR: We will keep it in the system because it a formal check and bMarce. That is
_-hat its
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intention was. to be sure if something didn't slip through a crack someplace. That's tl3e way l've
always looked at it, was to create a double check by the quality organization to see to it that
something wasn't overlooked by the project. Perhaps the project might not even be aware that it
could be overlooked, that it had to be faced.
DR. FEYNMAN: Is this; answer of yours to McDonald in s'ome document?
MR. WEAR: Pardon?
DR. FEYNMAN: How did you answer Mr. McDonald. in adc, cument?
MI_:. WEAR: I ne_,er have.
DR. FEYNMAN: The answer you've just given us as to how you ans ered Mr. McDonald, in
what document is that where you say you _ on't close it out?
MR, WEAR: I say I v.ever have answered his memorandum; theref,qre, the system stands,
the Marshall system stands.
DR. FEYNMAN: Except for the mistake.
MR. WEAR: Yes, sir. It makes mistakes, but it stands. Frankly, it wouldn't be within my
power to accept t,,is recommendation and take this out anyway, because the establishment of the
system is well above me. and so it is not my prerogative.
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DR. FEYNMAN: Nobody answered this letter of Mr. McDonald's?
MR. WEAR: No.
1526
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I)R RIDE: How many of the problems in your tracking system carry launch constraints?
How many launch constraints have you been waiving light to flight?
MR WEAR: I haven't researched it specifically, but I think you would find every one of
.'.hem having to do with SRM or related to the joint putty, the joint and or the putty type 05
affairs that we've discussed here I don't recall anything else that would be there as a iauncl"
constraint
DR. RIDE: Say on flight t_l-C, how man)" launch constraints did you waive ')
MR WEAR: Offhand I can't tell you.
DR RIDE: I mean, it must be, and I mean I hope the answer is one. If the answer is more
than one, then there is more that we don't know.
MR. WEAR: Well, you've got the record here, and I would just stand on that. I m_an, you've
got the records from the past system.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let's talk about it while you're here.
DR. RIDE: What we've got, I think, is the record of the launch constr dnts as a result of the
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erosion problems on the joint.
MR. KEHRLI: That's correct.
DR, RIDE: I guess my question is are there other problems in the SRM or SRB system that
also carry launch constraints that you have been waiving at your FRRs.
Maybe I'm wrong, but I consider a launch constraint to be a big deal mt you have to ad-
dress ;n a signi_'ant, substantial way before every launch, and I would think that if there i_
more than one you would know that there is more than one.
MR WEAR: V(eii. you asi:ed me how many. and that infers :hat I can "ml] off the top of my
head exactly how" many there are, and I can't right here, but we are requireu -
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you be willing to say it's very few?
MR WEAR: Yes, sir. Absolute'y.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you be willing to say they all relate to the SRB? All the waiv-
ers would relate to the solid recket booster?
MR. WEAR: Do you mean that are going through the whole FRR process, is that what
you're saying?
CHAIRMAN" ROGERS: Yes.
MR. WEAR: No, because I'm only exposed to the
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SRM, pet se, so I couldn't answer that.
DR. RIDE: Was there more than this one?
MR. WEAR: In each Flight Readiness Review we addressed problems that occurred on a
past flight and/or significant waivers or deviations that occur during the manufacturing process,
the manufacturing acceptance process of the hardware. Those are categorized a_ being within
previous data experience or not.
DR. RIDF: I'm trying to understand how you deal with the launch constraint. How impor-
tant do you think a launch constraint is and how unusual it is in your system?
MR. WEAR: I think a launch constraint is a significant event in our system, and it is one
that has to be addressed within the Flight Readiness cycle because I don't have the authority to
not do that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The question is how many have you waived?
MR, WEAR: Well, of course each of these joint and putty entries th _' v "'_'ve seen. those are
there.
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CHAIRMAN ROGE} S: Can you think of any others?
MR. WEAR: Yes. sir. I believe I've got one. I think if you check the record I believe it would
be categorized as one. On a nozzle, where we had de-bond on a nozzle, I believe it is somewhere
in the system and
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we had to process it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is that the ontv other one :,_'u can think of'?
MR. WEAR: Well I know in the history of the program we have addressed several.
CHAIRMAN" ROGERS: We're not talking about addressing. We're talking about waivers.
MR. WEAR: There has been a tot of discussion in the Flight Uaeadiness Review process re-
garding the nozzle itself. I think some of you are aware that we struggled with a severe problem
on the nozzle erosion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm talking about how many have you waived?
MR. WEAR: Specifically I can't answer that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So probably most of them were in connection _¢ith this joint.
MR. WEAR: I think the preponderance of them have to do with this joint and/or the nozzle-
to-case joint, and I think it is the preponderance of everything that has been waived is there.
The reason I'm struggling here, I think if I went back and went th',,ough the whole record
there would be some related to the nozzle because we aid have severe nozzle erosion problems
about two and a haif years ago. We struggled with that problem for a while, and I suspect I
would find some there.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is it ,an easier question if you ask how many waivers
were there on 51-L. or is that still a hard question °
MR WEAR: I just dgn't recall i"., and I don : recall that there were any on 51-L that we
haven't discussed.
DR. FEYNMAN: In your letter of the 24th you said there were 20 open problems. These
open problems are not all launch constraints?
,'CIR. WEAR: That's right, they are not all launch constrain:s because the PAS system is
concerned with problems other than Crit 1, Crit 1R problems. It is a_ at,;empt to keep the record
clean for lesser probiems as well.
DR. RIDE: That's exactly the point, because you've get the system that records open prob-
lems, and you have to have some way of distinguishing unimportant problems from important
problems from very important problems, and it seems to me the one that says launch constraint
next to it must be the very most important problem.
MR. WEAR: That's right, and that is why it has to be cleareG by this PAS system before we
can proceed.
DR. RIDE: What I'm trying to understand is
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how many problems are in the launch constraint category in your system?
MR. WEAR: I can't give you a precise answer.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: A followup question which really does surprise me is that I would
think that if you have waivers and there weren't many, you would remember them all.
MR. WEt_R: When you asked me now many, I would have to go back over history, a_d his-
torically the only other problem of consequence that I recall we have wrestled with on the SRM
has either been related to nozzle erosicn and/or these joints.
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DR. WALKER: Have you ever refused :o waive a launch c_nstraint because you thought the
problem was so serious'?
MR. WEAR: No.
DR. WALKER: What wou_d happen if you didn't waive a launch cc pstralnt I.et._ say you or
Mr Multov had looked at this O-ring situation and said, well. i don't think we can waive this
because it is too s,.rious What would happen then'?
MR. WEAR: Well, I think immediately there have been some times when we have oked at
a problem and either I or someone else assc_ciated with my review have not been satisfied with
the data that was presented.
2_;4;_
On those, specific occasions there was some additional work that was done, some additional
data was provided, whatever, and then either I or that person was reconciled. But if I had said I
refuse to accept this. I refuse to go forward, I refuse to accept this problem and Pv with it, that
would have gone to Larry and to Larry's board, and it would have had to have been reviewed
with them.
DR. WALKER: Let's suppose it now goes to you, Larry. and yo,'re not going to waive it
MR. MUI,LOY: Fhe effect of not waiving it the first ume, it is presented as a launch delay,
and we have had several of them. One of those was after ST_; nozzle erosion. There were some
people who felt that *'e could proceed with the flight of the next flight, which was STS-9. with
the nozzles that we had on there, I did not accept that.
The consequence was we rolled STS-9 back and demated the aft segment and put in an aft
segment with a nozzle that had. after understanding, spending some time to understand what
the cause of that excess erosion was on STS-8. we changed out a segment
So the effect of not waiving a constraint when it has ff.'rst been presented has been launch
delay. Up to this point, we have taken the time necessary to do
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the analysis and tests to provide sufficient rationa to proceed with the n. ×t flight in the face of
the open problem.
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MR. HOTZ: Then you have refused to do it? On STS-_, you did it?
MR. MULLOY: On STS-9. On STS-9, after the problem was open on the nozzle, until we
und,_rstood what the probable cause was, and as I say, the effect was a rollback from the pad
and about a two-month delay in the launch of that vehicle.
DR. WALKER: So the nozzle was changed out?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, and that is what we would do in any case when there is insufficient
rationale to proceed on the schedule that is proposed.
MR. HOTZ: Well, I am confused, Mr. Wear. You said you have never refused to waive a
launch constraint, and I understand now :hat there was one instance when you did. Which is
correct?
MR. MULLOY: I said both, sir?
MR. HOTZ: No, Mr. Wear said you never refused.
MR. WEAR: My point is, either the problem was resolved before i: went forward, or else we
wouldn't have launched, but it would be resolveci before we would _:o forward. That is a case
where we hit a problem, and I don't know exactly.
MR. HOTZ: But you did not waive it to go on with STS-9?
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MR .,It__"LL()'_' " As it was conf'igured when it was on the pad That is correct And in fact I
think *hat was a two-m_mth launch delay, and that i_ what we w_u!d do in any instance when
ther: _ has been insufficient time from the time that the problem was observed to do the test and
analysis to understand whether you can proceed vith the next launch, and as 1 say, the effect to
date has been launch delays, but then ultimately that sufficient data is available to proceed, ar,:l
then the waiver is before you can fly it The waiver in the case for STS-,t_ was that the cause of
the excessive erosion on STS-_ had been determined, and that condition did not exist on the
nozzle in STS-9, and the rationale as to why the condition d not exist after we changed out the
nozzle, and the material change.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you have ultimate responsibility for waiving the lau :_ : con-
straints?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, I have ultimate responsibility for the launch readiness of the solid
rocket boosters,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So there was a launch constraint, and you waived it.
MR, MULLOY: Yes, sir, all flights subsequem to.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All those you waived on your
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own? Who did you consult with in connection with those waivers?
MR MULLOY: W._ll. in terms of consulting on the waiver, the waiver is approved by my
element managers, and the system that comes to me, the quality people who run the problem
assessment system, when they come to my board, will say. you have an open launch constraint
that has not been properly closed out. The raLionale for closing out that launch constraint is
presented by Mr. Wear to me in my flight readiness review, which is that rationale that exi:;ts
throughout this document that says why it is okay, given this observation to proceed with t_e
flight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I ha_e trouble following this. Could you do it a little slower'
There is a iaunch constraint put on by somebody, some decision.
MR. MULLOY: By me in this case.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: By you. Okay. Now, who has the authority to waiv'e it9
MR. MULLOY: I do.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: (.,kay, you put it on and you take it off.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who do you consult with when
2648
you take it off?.
MR. MULLOY: Mr. Wear, in this case, who brings me the rationale as to why we can pro-
ceed for the next flight in light of the observation that we have seen.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So in all of these flights, Mr. Wear, you were involved in waiving it,
too':
MR. WEAR: Sure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, did you know anything about the telecon before Flight 51L?
Were you involved in that?
MR. WEAR: The one on J_v.uary 27th?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes.
MR. WEAR: I was there on January 27th. Yes, sir.
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('FIAIRMAN R(X;ERS: And did you point out to evervbc_ly there was a launch constraint,
and therefore it was a little different than the usual Iavnch" When the Thiokol people said we
ou_.ht to, because or' the weather, we ought to delay this, <lid that cause you any concern"
MR WEAR: Did the existence ot a launch constraint ....
('HAIR*IAN ROGERS: The combination of launch constraint and _ warnin_ bv the manu-
facturer not to do
it, did that cause you any concern?
MR. WEAR' Let me make sure I answer that in the right context. The joint problem and its
understandin¢ had been a matter of concern _'or some time. and there was no one on that con-
versation that night to my knowledge--well, there was no one in that conversation that night
that was not we!l aware of the problem and its seriousness.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Put aside, the word "problem." Was everybody aware of the fact that
there was a launch constraint'?
MR, WEAR: There was a launch constraint to address the erosion. The problems on prior
flights, yes
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now. following along Dr. Ride's comment, we assume or at least I
assume that _hat means there was something a little different or special, more serious, the fact
that you had a launch constraint, this was a more serious problem than just an ordinary prob-
lem. She pointed out there must be grad_t_ .s of problems, and this, when you t-,ave a launch
constraint and it is in a Criticality 1 item, that is pretty serious.
Now, when the manufacturer then said we recommend don't launch to begin with did that
cause VOU
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an)" concern particularly in view of the fact that there was a launch constraint on it?
MR. WEAR: Yes. When the Thiokol engineering people expressed their concern, yes. That
caused me some concern, yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And they suggested a slight delay until the weather was better.
MR WEAR: That is what the Thiokol engineering people stated that night.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you were willing to go ahead even in the face of that re,com-
mendation, even though the weather was not good. and even though you had no, what you have
said, data, no data base that would say it was safe to do it under those conditions, you still were
ready to go ahead and launch?
MR. WEAR: Yes. Now, let me explain one thing, though. In my dealings with Thlokol. I deal
prmc:.pally with Mr. Kilminster. There are other occasions, and beyond this one there a_e nu-
merous occasions where the Thiokol engineering people and/or my engineering people have dis-
cussions and so forth. He occasionally has to deal with his people and understand the problem,
and they give me recommendations. I mean, they are not always one for one. He is not just a
mimic from them, and therefore I have to depend upon him to
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present what Thiokol concludes.
DR. WALKER: But you also ha_e to depend upon your own judgment, don't you?
MR. WEAR: Yes, I do.
DR. WALKER: It is not a situation where you are dealing with something you procc:red and
you don't understand it and you have to accept it.
MR. WEAR Ultimately you have to go with your own judgment.
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DR WALKER:Soyouconcurredin thatjudgment_'
MR WEAR:Yes,sir
DR.RIDE:Yousaidthat the thing that carriesa launchconstrainthasto bepresentedat
yourFRR,andthenyouhavethe opportunityto waiveit. Youthen takeinformationfrom your
FRRand makepr_entationsto the Marshallcenter FRR and also to the Level 2 FRR, and I
assume also to Level 1 FRR
MR. MULLOY: Yes.
DR. RIDE: Did you ever mention in any of those cases that there was a launch constraint on
the SRB nozzle joint that you had waived?
MR. MULLOY: No. What we did was, i am sure that we did address this recurring concern.
We didn't address it in highlighted launch constraint, waive
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launch constraint,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you ever say it in those words, though?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If y-u read the documents, it seems to me everything was almost
covered up, ever so slightly noted, and it seemed to be such a serious problem, and the papers
reflect that a lot of you thought it was serious, and yet it doesn't seem that serious when you
read the documentation. In other words, others that we have questioned said they didn't realize
that it was serious, and they apparently didn't realize it was a launch constraint.
Wel!, anyway, that is r_ot really in the form of a question. I don't nave any others. Are _here
any other questions?
DR. KEEL. i just have one other, if I can, Mr. Mulloy, just so we might understand it. There
are two bases on which you waive the constraint at least immediately after il]3. One was the
analysis, which we have already questioned. The other was, as you have mentioned, going to
higber leak check pressure at 200 psi. ,.But you must have been aware at the same time that
there were people at Marshall and your engineers in particular who were concerned about the
effects of the
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leak check pressure procedures on problems with the O-ring and on erosion.
Is that a correct statement? You were aware of that?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, I was not then and I am not now. That 200 psi leak check was on
the recommendation of our engineer.
DR. KEEL: Well, let me just read this memo then from Mr. Mille. to Mr. Hardy and Mr.
Coates that, Mr. Wear, you have got a copy of and, Mr. Mulloy, you have got a copy of. It is Tab
16. And it is "burned O-,mgs on STS-11." This was back in February, 1984, and the first sen-
tence, "The recent experience of two burnt O-rings in ST_-ll coupled with the missing putty
finding at disassembly raises concerns with respect to STS-13." Im,q ", 2 I.l
If you drop down further in the paragraph the last sentence in that paragraph, "The O-ring
leak check procedure and its poh_.ntial effect on the ZCP," that is putty, "installation and possi-
ble displacement is also an urgen, _ concern which requires an expedition of previously identified
full-scale tests," so that to me, and clarity it if I am misinterpretipg it, says we are concerned
about the leak check procedure and the possibility of during a leak check displacing putt_ blow
holes.
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MR MULLOY: Yes, sir, and filling in behind that their concern, of course, was that the 200
psi leak check is designed to en.,'ure again that you do seat the primary O-ring to verif)" that it is
capable of seating, althou_'h you are seating it in the wrong direction because you are pressuriz-
ing between the two, and what they are acknowledging is, what you are probably doing in the
time "hat the primary O-rin_; is traversing, you are probably blo_,ing by there and creating blow
holes m the putty, but then following up on that the question was, do you recommend reducing
the leak check pressure'.'
DR. KEEL: Can we just go step by step, though, because that is exactly what they are saying
here, and in fact that was the advantage that you were mentioning previously of going to 200
psi.
MR. MULLOY: That is correct.
DR. KEEL: That the putty wouldn't mask, and a blow hole would be created, so they are
saying we have got concerns about the leak check procedure creating blow holes which requires
urgent concern, which requires expedition of previously identified full-scale tests, and what you
are saying is, you are reassured by the fact that you were creating the blow holes, and hence nct
masking the leak.
MR. MULLOY: That is correct, and what I am
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saying is, these engineers, and I presume you are going to have Mr. Miller here, will say that he
would not recommend reducing the leak _beck pressure from 200 psi.
DR. KEEL: Well, we will ask him that question, but the point is that certainly they were
concerned about the leak check procedures putting blow holes through.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. KEEL: And that in fact was what reassured you from the standpoint of making sure the
primary O-ring was seating, that you wouldn't mask--that the putty wouldn't mask, to assure it
wouldn't mask you would go to a higher pressure, and there you were sure that you would get a
blow hole through the putty, and hence not mask the leak check.
MR. MULLCY: That is correct, to assure that you have a primary leak check.
DR KEEL: I he penalty was this concern, to the degree that it is concern.
MR. MULLOY: That is correct.
DR. KEEL: Tbey are also concerned about the cavity volume size, and obviously that is a
critical quantity to predict erosion. You have to know that presumably with some accuracy to be
able to predict
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absolutely, as you said previously, on an analytic basis.
MR. MULLOY: I withdrew that absolute.
DR. KEEL: I'll withdraw that. The other thing we found out, Mr. Mulloy, and ! am nct sure
you are aware of it, and I believe your Marshall quality assurance people weren't awa:'e of it, is
that after you went to the hig!,er pressure, if you look back at problems with the joints_ the
nozzle joints, and the problem being blow by or erosion or heat effect, that _or the eight flights
where you had a 50 psi leak check you had one problem, for the eight flights where you had a
100 _si leak check you had five problems, for the eight flights where you had a 200 psi check you
had seven problems.
MR. WEAR: Yes, sir.
1_%3
DR KEEL:That seemsto correlatebetweenthe problemsthat thesewere--thatMr N_iller
at leastwa...raisingwith respecto theleakcheckprocedures,doesn'tit'?
MR.MULLOY:No,sir. I don't think youcantakethat singlevariableand make any conclu-
sions from it. You have to also look at the putty changes, and the changes in the layup of the
putty, and probably changes in the roundness of the segments as we begin to reuse
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them.
DR. KEEL: Is it enough to cause you conce "n?
MR. MULLOY: Oh, yes, yes, and that is what was being addressed.
MR. WEAR: The specific question you raise there about does this lead you to think, to have
a second tbought about some things you have done, yes, that was all addressed by our engineer-
ing people and by Thiokol's engino_ering people, about what is the correlatiop between leak
check pressure, the change in putty manufacture, the changes we have made in putty layup pat-
terns. Those were all questions that were raised, and you have got one item here addressing one
particular aspect of it, but that question was raised, and attempts were made between these two
engineering organizations to try to correlate and trace out what is the significant factor, and
they were unable to do so.
DR. KEEL: I guess the reason for going through all of that is that you are using these two
bases, the higher leak check pressure and your ability to analytically predict erosion, as the
basis of waiving these launch constraints, and _t is fairly clear if you go back through the history
of all of this that they introduce problems, too. and the tradeoffs weren't quite that clear that
that was absolutely reassuring that this
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was a basis upon which you could waive zhese launch constraints.
DR. WALKER: Do you agree that the primary cause of the erosi _ is the blow holes in the
putty?
MR. MULLOY: I believe it is. Yes.
DR. WALKER: And so your leak check procedure crcatecl blow holes in the putty.
MR. MULLOY: That is one cause of blow holes in the putty.
DR. WALKER: But, in other words, your leak check procedure could indeed cause what was
your primary problem. Didn't that concern you?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Mulloy, what happens if you have, make a leak check and you discover
that the primary O-ring leaks? Do you now stop and destack it?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: And then put a new O-ring in?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
MR. WEAR: You clean it all up back to z,.ro and reputty.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Larry, let me follow Art's question. Blow holes in the putty cause
-_ion. The Titan joint doesn't have a lot of putty. Does the Titan joint show erosion?
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MR. MULLOY: Yes, it does. a higher rate than is happen, ag on the SRM.
GENERAL KUTYNA: It is net necessarily blow holes that are causing erosion, but could I
purCue just a quick line of quesqoning? This joint, is it the only one of this type in the industry?
MR. MULLOY: No
GENERAL KUTYNA: Whizn one is the next closest to it?
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MR.MULLOY:TheTitan.
GENERALKUTYNA: As a motto,"of fact, this wasfairly highly derivedfrom the Titan.
MR.MULLOY:Yes,that wasthebasis
GENERALKUTYNA Whataretheprimaryareaswhereit is thesameastheTitan'.'
MR.MULLOY:It is thesamein that it is atangandclevispinjoint that usesa boresealO-
ring sealing.
GENERALKUTYNA:It doesn't}lavethepatty?
MR.MULLOY:It hasa small a,nountof putty, but not filling a largegapliko wehaveon
the SRM.
GENERALKUTYNA Now,isn't it usualin the industryandbetweenagenciesthat if we
havea problemwecomerunning to eachotherandadviseif wehavesimilar piecesof equip-
ment?Whenwehadthe inertial
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upper stage we worked together very closely on that. When the PAMs failed, we were the pro-
gram office on PAM and got together on that, and even when you had the burn-through on the
nozzle on S_[S-8 you alerted us about that.
I had the program office for Space Shuttle for two years, 1982 to 1984, and of course was in
charge of all Titans at that time, and I never once heard about pr.'_blems with the O-rings. When
I called the program office this morning on the Titans, they had received no prior indications
that there was'a large problem with the O-rings. Why would that be? Why wouldn't you have
notified them?
MR. MULLOY: Well, the approach taken was, I did contact someoi:e from CSD, and I think
there is a memo in the stack of documents here that is i:_ response to that back in March of
1984, and there were some interchanges at lower !evels between engineers who know each other
in the field, but nothing, no official letter thin went to Space Division.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But Larry, here you are, and you have grounded this thing almost.
You have a flight constraint that you can't fly unless you clear iL last )ear, 1985. I in headquar-
ters _-as not aware of it. The program manager out at Space Division was not aware of
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it. It just wasn't made that big a thing, and yet you have got a f_,ight constraint. Why is that?
MR. MULLOY: It would be because as far as I know I didn't contact you or the program
manager directly to share that informotion or to request information on the Titan experience.
There were at other levels some interchanges in that regard, and I think Larry Wear can talk to
them.
MR. WEAR: Yes, there were. Specifically, Miller put his signature on *his particular letter,
has quite particular and specific contacts within the ETC echelon rego.rding the Titan. There
was considerable exchange of data of what Titan has done and what Titan's experience is and
why they think it _s. You might want to ask him about that.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Who in the Air Force?
MR. WEAR: I know of no specific contacts with the Air Force per so, but we did hold a
session at Thiokol. We spent a whole day with Joe Banna from Aerospace, and a group of six or
seven people, which were principally from Aerospace and some other organizations.
GENERAL KUTYNA: When was this?
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MR. WEAR: About a year and a half ago at Thiokol, where we discussed, we laid out for
them, we spent a whole day laying out with them all of the problems we have had with our
1535
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Rjoint, the design details of it. t_-p idiosyncrasies of it, and we asked them to exchange back to us
comparal:ie data from the Titan , ,_am. and their thoughts of what we were doing, and to be
honest with yolk. _ ne_er reCeived a r_ :,onse from Mr Banna.
GENERAL IiUTYNA: Uow. during t' _ time. a year and a half ago, was there nol a compe-
tition for a follow-on launch vehicle to complement the Shuttle? Were you not aware ot that?
MR WEAR: There were some discussions, yes. There was an exercise for a,_other----
GENERAL KUTY'5,A: Larry. did Marshall put an er._ry in the competition?
MR. WEAR: Yes, there was a Marshall design submitted "_ that.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And is that sort of unusual because "/arshall was competing against
two industry guys?
MR. WEAR: That is not normal for Marshall's line of business.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And what was the construction
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of that competitor? What was the makeup of that competing rocket?
MR. WEAR: It would have been United Technologies.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But what were the segments of that rocket made of?.
MR. WEAR: They were derived from our SRM.
GENERAL KUTYNA: There were three solid rocket boosters?
MR. WEAR: That is right.
GENERAL KUTYNA: That is all.
MR ACHESON: I have one question. I have never understood why it was that cold was not
originally thought to be. a variant which could be important or might conceivably become a
launch constraint. Reading these documents, we see an explicit flag in the flight readiness
review presentation from Thiokol. February of 1985, on 51E pointing out that lov, temperature
enhances the probability of erosion.
You have the presentation at headquarters in August of 1985 that made it plain chat resil-
ience was an important factor in the function of the O-ring. If you accept that concept, it is very
hard for me to see why a lot of difference in temperature wouldn't be understood
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to make substantial difference in the functioning of the O-ring, and when you come to the cold-
est day you have ever had for a launch by a margin of 20 degrees, why it was not thought impor-
tant. and yet you have the description of the telecon in which reference was constantly made to
the higher temperatures at which erosion had been observed, as if this somehow established that
temperature was not a discriminator.
I have never understood that. You are de-.:ing with an elastomeric material which, certain-
ly, you dor't have to be an engineer to know is affected by temperature, I have difficulty under-
standing, and perhaps you could explain, why that has been a missing factor in tb,_se equations,
seemingly, all through the history of this project.
MR. MULLOY: Are you speaking that it seems to be missing in the Marshall documenta-
tion? Where concerns have been expressed in other areas, concerns are not expressed in the cold
temperature areas?
MR. ACHESON: This is a concern Marshall apparently had for that problem.
MR. MULLOY: I can give you my thought process, and again, that can .e questioned. Look-
ing at the total context of Thiokol's conclusions on 51E, where it was concluded that cold tem-
perature does affect or
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enhance the possibility of erosion If you continue, though, to read that total Thiokol presenta-
tion. the conclusion is that what they sat on 51C really fits within prF. ious experience, and so it
turns right around and kind of refutes that there is much different, even though the tempera-
ture was a little colder.
They further conclude that that type of erosion can be expected on subsequent flights no
matter what the temperature is. I believe, if I am remembering what they said in that presenta-
tion to me.
DR. NEEL: Can I read you the conclusion, so we all know wh_t it was? [Ref. 5 2-11]
MR. MULLOY: 51E.
DR. KEEL: It is the 51E flight re,,_,iness revi,_w, after 51C, of course, which was the previous
coldest launch, and I won't read all of this, because it is an extensive review they gave to you.
MR. MULLOY: It is.
DR. KEEL: Based upon an urgent request from you to review all of the O-ring history that
you sent out a few days after the 51C launch? I_¢..I. _ -' J_'j
MR. MULLOY: All my messages are urgent, by the way.
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DR. KEEL: I will go through your conclusion, and I recognize there is a lot more to the
analysis and the scenarios in trying to explain what happens, but the conclusion is that STS-51C
is consistent with the erosion data base. That means that the erosion there presumably in yoar
vernacular hasn't exceeded the previous experience or is greater than worst case, but the_: in a
subbullet they say low temperature and hence probability of blow-by. STS-51C experienced worst
case temperature in Florida history, and so that is the conclusion they draw" there.
CHAIRMAN R_ER$: Now, getting back to Mr. Acheson's question in light of that state-
ment and others on weather--why wasn't more c,msideration given to the weather, particularly
on Flight 51L, why wasn't--why didn't that beco_ne extremely serious in light of all the other
things that the documents reflect'?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. I had started to explain my thought process in that. and I go _---'
to the extensive look at that we did with 51C after experiencing the worst, the coldest _empera-
t ire in Florida history, that the erosion was not outside of what we had experienced at 80 de-
grees, and that also the conclusion that that type of erosion which we all understood could be
anticipated in the future because we
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know we can get paths through the putty and hot gas impingement through those paths will
cause O-ring erosion, and the conclusion that 51E could be flown under those circumstances.
The next thing in the August presentation, if you look at that total presentation, I think
there is maybe one short reference again about the same thing that was covered in the 51E
FRR, and then you get to the night of the discussion of January 27th, where the engineers were
essentially citing the same data relative to the effect of resiliency, and that their concern was
increased blow-by of the primary O-ring seal, which I took to be what engineers always do, real-
ize what risk you are taking because you could have increased blow-by, thus higher erosion
The ultimate conclusion of that was +hat the data did not specifically conclude tha, ",ou
would have higher erosion on the primary O-ring seal, and the second part of the conclusion was
that during that pressurization sequence the joint was redundant. Now, that was the thought
process which, as I say, has been and will continue to be questioned.
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DR.KEEL:CanI just askagain.Larry. for a clarification?Youtalk abouterosion,ofcourse.
but thef tnoteof theconclusionwasa referenceto
blow-by.Thiswa_-the worstcasecf blow-by
.MR.MULLOY:That is carrect
DR. KEEL: It was the large_t arc. There was black soot. black grease, and what it _aid was.
it enhances the probability of blow-by.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, and it further 5rates the condition is acceptable. I believe.
DR. KEEL: That is correct. You are exactly right.
MR. MULLOY: And that was my basis.
DR. KEEL: They do say that the condition was acceptable throughout all of the flight readi-
ness reviews, that the risk was acceptable.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But they don't say that the worst condition would be acce,)table. In
other words, they don't say if the weather was even worse it would be _ccepted, and when the
wet:ther got worse they said. we recommend against iaunch, and so I have trouble with your
logic.
MR. MULLOY: I understand, sir.
DR. KEEL: Could I ask just a couple more questions on this, Mr. Chairman, since we are on
this subject?
What we have determined from our individual staff investigations and staff interviews, Mr.
Mutloy. is
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that apparently m"ter this extensive briefing thet Marshall ga_e to you--excuse me, that Morton
Thiokol gave to you, and in fact at your request to a large extent, my understanding is that the
center board--and I assume that's Dr. Lucas--wasn't given that briefing.
MR. MULLOY: No, they were given a summary briefing.
DR. KEEL: My understanding is, in fact, that the erosion problem wasn't mentioned.
MR. MULLO¥: Yes. sir, on 51E it was mentioned At the Level--it was discussed at the
Level 1.2 FRR at the Marshall center board, the Shuttle projects office.
DR. KEEL: Can you tell us what was said at the center board?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. It is the type of chart, I think, that Mr. Rogers was referring to,
which is a summary chart.
DR. KEEL: Well, I know it was mentioned at Level 1. Maybe you could provide that, be-
cause we have been unable to get that center board briefing. We have Level 1, but our informa-
tion was in fact from r,eople there that it was not mentioned, so if you could clarify for the
record, that is the purpose.
MR. KEHRLI: We dc have the center board
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briefing, and in that briefing I nave not seen the chart. If you could provide it, that would be
fine.
DR. KEEL: That is e_'er, more impor_ai;t, we have a briefing that doesn't show it. but then
the next question, :rod then a final one on this is, you are right, at the Level 1 it was mentioned,
but in fact you -_ad this extensive briefing, which was made up of six or eight charts, I guess,
from Morto_ Thiokol going into the whole history of ring erosion and mentioning that conclu-
sion I just mentioned.
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Thenat the Level i briei]ngit _ascondensed down to one entry under problem sum)"_ary
That basical'Lv said evidence of hc gas passed primary O-rings on two case joints, and tb:m con-
cerned mission safety :esoiutlon accep:abie risk because of hrm;ed exposure and <edundancy
Can you explain why _
MR. MULLOY. Does it reference another flight readiness review '_
DR. KEEL: It references STS-41C, fligh_ readiness review.
MR. MULLOY: That was a more extensive review rhen that document_ that rationale agaim
which is the rationaie for the limiting of the erosion, and the Tbioko! conclusion, of course, that
what they saw on 51-C was consistent with the previous experience, and it
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could be anticipated on subsequem flights. So you would have to go to the 4!G FRR
DR. KEEL: I have got the---
Nil: Xll!.l.,_'l ll_-,,It;
DR. KEEL: It is two charts that were mentioned there on 41C, and they didn't go through
all of the O-ring history, of course, because that was several missions before that Thiokol had
presented to you. so it made a reference to that, and presumably you didn't have the charts
there, and secondly there were two charts, and the3' didn't reflect everything that had happened
since 41C flight earliness review, and so I guess it is still difficult to understand from my view-
point why a more extensive reference wasn't made to t!iis problem.
MR. MULLOY: Well, I can give you--there is a reason. There is a very practical reason for
that, and that is that the Level 1 FRRs are generally limited te four hours and not two days. So
there is a screening and a summary ef the information as it goes forward. You have the total
FRR packages. You will see the FRR I take is this--as yo,a will see the F'RR that goes to the
shuttle is this thick, and you will see the one that goes to the center is this thick, and you will
see the one that goes to Level 2 and 1. a very abb:,:eviated _brm
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of that. and then what happens is, folks who take these briefings ask and assign actions usually
say. I would like to hear more about that and have the tota! briefing, in which case we accom-
modate that outside the flight readiness review activity, but that is the p_actical reason.
DR. KEEL: I understand that when you condense from six to eight pages to one bullet it is a
little ditficuh to understand, especially when you actually trigger the assessment bas_-d upon an
urgent request message sent back to Mr. Wear. in fact, who then presumably relayed that to
Morton Thiokol. The other aspect. I guPss, that is puzzling is that you--even that one bul!et, the
resolution is based on one acceptable risk, but also reclu,:danoy.
Can you explain how redundancy is a factor for resolving this concern when Criticality 1
sayb it ie .-at redundant?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just to take that question a Jittle more directly, doesn't that fly di-
rectly in the lhce of the Criticality 1?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. I don't think so, and I know that we have had--you all have had
difficu!ty understanding that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I sure do.
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MR MULLOY: I don't know that we will have any more success with it. but it is again--I
can see your interpretation of the words in the CIL. I would acknowledge that from--that those
words, the _ording could have been clearer. The intent was to show what is :he physical phe-
nomenon. The physical phenomenon is that after motor pressurization under "worst case condi-
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tigris. ' the secondary O-ring may not be in a position to sea! if called upo,,l to do so by failure of
th ,_ primary O-ring
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And the conclusion was, it was net redundant,
MR MULLOY ARer motor pressurization That is the key After motor p_essurization
Those words are in there, and the sentence structure is probably very poor. but the fact is that
on a_i flights that we have flown _o date, with the exception of one case joint on STS-4. given the
Chmensional tolerances that exist, that with after motor pressurization, the secondary O-ring
still has positive squeez, on it. and is indeed a redundant seal
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you relied on redundancy then ever since'?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. We relied first on the test and analysis that said that the primary
O-ring
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erosion would not cause failure of the primary O-ring to seal. That i_ the first thing. The second
thing then is, one has redundancy.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: _ you relied on redundancy since then "_
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
MR. KEHRLI: Mr. Chairman, there is one document that addresses that specific question
that I would like the wimesses to examine, and that document is from Thiokot, from Brian Rus-
sell to J.W. Thomas. It is Attachment 32 to the O-ring histoo, and I am wondering if you would
care to expand on your answer in light of that document, which specifically addresses the timing
function of the secondary seal and also raises resiliency as an issue. [ Rof. 5 2-131
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Try to keep your voice up What is the question?
MR. KEHRLI: The question is. I am wondering if the witnesses would respond to the same
question with regard to the timing function of the O-ring secondary seal in light of the letter
fron' Brian Russell _o Jim "i h,->mas at Marshall.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you conclude that this Ietter is contrary to _'hat Mr. Mu!!oy lust
said?
MR _'EHRLI: Well. that is what i am
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wondering, whether it is or noL in light of Mr. Mulloy's interpretation.
MR. MULLOY: I have ._een this memo. I first saw t.he front page. I didn't think I had. But if
you weuid go to the second question, if the primary O-ring does not seal, will the secondary seal
seat in suffic'ant time to prevent joint leakage? Answer, on the next page.. MTI has no reason t,
suspect that the primary sea! would ever fail after pressure equilibrium is reached, i.e., offer tt _e
ignition transient. If the primar3, O-ring were to fail from zero to 1.70 milliseconds, there is a
very high probability the secondary O-ring would hold pressure.
Since the case is not expanded appreciably at this point, if the primary seal were to fail
from 170 to 330 milliseconds, the probability of secondary seal holding is reduced. From 330 to
600 milliseconds, the chance of the secor_dary seal holding is small. This is a direct result of the
O-ring's s!ow response compared to the metal case segments as the joint rotates.
That is the same thing, I believe, as was in the August 19th briefing here at NASA head-
quarters, and so if your question is, does that change the conclusion :etative to the secondary
sea! being able to hold---
MR. KEHRLI: bet m_ be specific with ._he
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quest:on The question is. and you have repeated it several times, and ot.,er witnesses have as
well. that this redundancy is affected bv the worst case tolerance The seco',:darv O-ring is still
there so long as you dont ha-'e bad hardware
MR MULLOY: Yes.
MR KEHRLI: There is no mention of that in the answer to t.;:is question.
MR MULLOY: That is correct
MR KEHRLi: What is your understanding'? Does this answer incorporate that worst case
tolerance?
MR. M,LLOY: Yes, I think so I think it does. The worst case would be that you start out
with minimum O-ring squeeze ,f 7.5 percent, and now what you are doing is reducing the
squeeze, and at 17!) to :1:30 millisecor.ds that squeeze is reduced just some_,hat, and then the joint
rotates to 32/:.000ths. If you started at 20/1.000ths you don't have an', squeeze on it. and that
minimum squeeze, though, would only occur in hardware that is outside of the base. as we have
flown, is my understanding from Thiokol.
DR. WALKER: What do you understand by the term "high probability':"
MR. MULLOY: I think my understanding would be that the high probability is related to a
case where
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either the O-ring is not tracking the metal O..e to re raced resiliency or a case where you started
with a minimum 2tp 1._)(_,ths squeeze, and due '_o tc erances you have--well, you started witt_ a
minimum 20 1,tt00ths with tolerances. You rot.._te 5 "l,000ths. You don't have an,," squeeze at
all.
DR. WALKER: I don't think you understood mv q:, ::it- If. for example. I were to say to
the President that I think the Shuttle has a high probabii_._ -"';".,_.. _ _.u think he should
have the pr_ gram continue in that state2 I mean. is that a precise _ "o_.:_.. and sc_fficiently safe
enough situation that he should continue to P.v? What does high probaoility mean? Does that
mean 75 percent. 80 percent. _2 percent?
MR MULLOY: I don't kno_'. I can't quantify that.
DR. WALKER: But surely you are basing your decision to proceed on this assertion that the
secondary seal has high probability of working
MR. MULLOY: Yes. sir. and the reason was that the secondary seal would be energized in
the zero to 170 millisecond or 330 milli._econd time frame.
DR. WALKER: Does that mean 90 percent of the time or 70 percent of the time2
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MR. MULLOY: I don't know, sir.
DR. WALKER: But you are basing your decisions on that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Walker's question is a very good one in that it said, if we report
to the Presidenz that we think he should continue the program because it has a high probability
of being safe, would that be satisfactory, or there is a high probability that it is not unsafe, and
maybe that is not your question.
DR. WALKER: To me, a high probability is not good enough for the operations of something
like this.
._r-bMCHAII_,_AN ROGERS: Particularly _hen you have a constraint on it and ycu really
haven't solved the problem, and you are still speculating on whether it is going to work under
certain conditions or not.
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Well, unless ther_ -e any other questions----
MR. RUMMEL: ! h,. • one. just tc return for a moment, if I may. to an earlier point
If I understood you correctly, you indicated that out ,)f roundness was not considered when
evaluating the squeeze or the relative fit of the segments
MR. MULLOY: That is my understanding, sir
MR. RUMMEL: But you, of course, understood and knev_ that out of roundness to varyin_
degrees
ZG79
existed from Day One due to shipping and so forth, as has been explained a number of times,
that these items were out of round, and some required, squeeze and some not.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: And i guess indeed that is one of the reasons for the destacking operating
at the moment, is to _ whether any out of roundness might hav,_ adversely affected the seals.
MR. MULLOY. Yes, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: My question is, knowing that, why wasn't it considered, why wasn't out of
roundness measured and taken into account, or why wasn't it taken into account in your calcu-
lations when you were estimating, or your judgmental considerations with respect to the adequa-
cy of the O-rings.
MR. MULIX)Y: It was an obvious oversight, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: It is a pretty obvious oversight, isn't it "_
MR. MULLOY: Yes sir, it is.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, if there are no further Jestions, we will break for lunch.
_Whereupon, at !2:!5 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1:10 p.m. of the same
day '_
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Assigning Launch Constraints on Open Proble=s
Submitted to MSFC PAS -
The Shuttle Projects Office has established a requirement
for identification of launch _o_strain_s for problems 5eing
reported to the YSFC Proble_ Assess-men: System (FAS) by
element contractors_ Each element contractor (RDcketdyT,.e,
M_.C, USBI, and Thiokol) has been directed to support this
requirement by providing launch constraint irLformation oe
each ne-_ problem submit:e! to the M_FC PAS. A-'he la,_nch
constraint Infoz-_ation _ro_ded by the contractor is
based upon their prelim_a1-y =ethical evaluation and _.Ii
requfre f_nal concurrence by the responsible ele=ent project
manager
a. l'b..e follo'_in_ Kuideliues have bee= established to aid
in =akin_ constraint decisions on open problems and are l i_ted
to recu:-rence control dete:-mi_aTion only. In ac:ord_n:e with
practices e2tabIlshed on past programs remedial action_ (e._
re__cval and replacement of defeczlve _rdware. e=c[) for cor-
rectln_ discrepancies o_ the vehicle to be launched are con-
sidered launch c_ustrain_s and are tracked by the KSC syste=.
(I> All open problems coded cziticality i. iK, 2, or
2R w_i!i be considered la_:ch cor_traimcs um_il resolved
(recu._rence control established and its i_plemen=aticn
effecti_._y determined) or sufficient rationale, i.e.,
different cDnfiguration, e_c.. _is_s co conclude that this
proble= "_.Ii not occur on the flishc vehicle durinE prel•unch,
launch, or f!i_ht.
(2) Problems coded criticalit 9 3 will not be con-
side_:_ launch constraints ur.less (a) the potenni•l _ists of
leadin E to a criticality 1 or 2 failure mode: or (b) the
failed cDmpDnent has mui_ipi, u_ nn the element and more
than one occurrence could lead to • criti&a!_t7 2 condition;
_r (c) the failure could resu!_ in _ultiple loss of fii_hn
inst--L_entacicn channels. _f a criticality 3 is determined
to be a launch constraint, _C will be _reated the same as a.(1)
above.
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b. To assure char ¢sch reported probltm is reviewed
for correct criticality and constraint assigr_en_ by the
appropriate MSFC personnel, tlle followin K proceduxe will be
followed:
(I) The'resgonsib%_S/*E disiEn at:donee and the
element projec_ office ac=iouee will review each problem
upon receipt to assure that'_e _iticality and constraint
assigT_en=s mee_ with their approval Exceptions to
criti_a_it 7 or constraint sssi_r_meot will be coordinated
with the Proble_u Assessment £enter (PAt) act!thee w-_th_n
ruo working days from receipt of _he problem report
(2) T'he Problem Asses s---ent Center will prepare s
weekly ¢onstrainz_ list by el e_nent This list _i!! be
submitted to the Shuttle RAtA Sup_or_ Office, EG03, for
input to the Shuttle Projects Ravager, SA01. Copies of
the constraint list _ill be fu_nlshed c_ncurrenc!y to each
Shuttle Element PrOject ,Manager
(3) La,_nch constraints ws_ll be reviewed at _aah
Problem Review Board (P_) meeting
.'_,,e Problem Assessment Center w_l be responsible for
coordinating all launzh constrainl activity and assuring
that info_at_on is properly doc,_ented in the Problem
Assesymenz 5yste: <?AS> data base and transmitted to M_FC
_nage=ent
Manager
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Distribution:
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EP44/R. Pisher/J. Vaniman
_+581,_. Vaughan
ET01/E. Cagle
5A31/J. Odom/P. Bridwell
SA32/R. Abr_a_/C. Cavalarls/C. C_rane/M. Pessin
SA32/D. Ne_m_
5A4_]_. R.ice/&. Ha._dy
_A43/J S trick!a_,d/_. Andrews
SAS!/J. R. Thompson, Jr./L. Wear
SA_f/M. B_¢_-.t/J. Eat3n/B. M_ tchell/B. _orris/C. 51o_n/
j. Spla%rn/R. Weesner
5A4_/Brcgham City/E. Skrobiszewski
5M2!/M_2/M. Maurchese
SA99/Canoga Park/R. T_ulander
E&_3/C_noga Palk/B. Pagenkopf T .... ;
5K-;_AL/T. Brid_es/J. Hughes/J. Cook
SK-5+_B/J. Kin_
Ro:kwell/Hsv/R. S trand/J. Fletcher/B. Cox/G. Miller/
W. McGahee/M. G!ass/O. Burnett/K. Roberts/
J. Ash/C. Ne_on/R. 5aliba/B. Gontzr-m_n/
P. Pollack
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: r_corT_e"_ _t yOU S_C u_ a pane_ tc study t_e _se 3f putt_ an_ coKsiCe _
so_e a::er_at_ve$:
i) Is putty nee_e_ at a]]?
_, the tradition can't be broken, can the putty be a;;_eC wi *_
m_itiple _ or 8) pressuriz_tio_ paths built in?
think that the pri_r_ sea] should be allowed to w_rk in its c]as_icaR desis_
_cce. Both zhe Titan an_ STS SRM's have been designed for this _ot t_ ha_pe_.
TiSan has flown uver a thousand pressure joints with no failure. My o_inior
is that the potential for failure Of the joint is higher for the STS SRY,
es_ec_a_]_ _he- occasio_a]_/ the Secondary seal may not be tcca_]y effective.
G S ,_:S_e;-e-_-
Cr_e" Fn_iree _
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Morton Tbi_kc_, Inc., Wa_atch Dlvi_on
Antn: F'. J_e Kilmlnster
Vice President, Space Booster Programs
P.O. _ox 52_
Brlgh_ Clty, UT 8_302
_ubject: SRH Problem Review Board
During a recen: revie_ of the SRR Problem Revie_ Board open
proble= list I found that we have 20 open problems, 11 opened
_uring the past 6 months, 13 open over 6 months, I three years
old, 2 two year_ old, znd I clo_ed during the p_s% six _onth_.
As you can see our closure record ._s very poor. You arP
requested _: initiate the required effort to as_re more tl=_!y
clo_ures and the HTI personnel _hal! cor_inate directly _i%h _ne
S&E personnel :he content_ of the closure reports.
' O Wear
M=naEer, S_K Cffice
_A_11Kes_rs. _uiloy/Ldams
_A_2/_es_r_. Tho=as/Kiilerl_roek/Chrlst_an/Dentcn
_A_9/Mr. 5krob_ze_ski
£Ell/gessrs. $=i_h/$one_/Mc!ntosh
EG03/Hr. _e_=_n
AP_61Kr. FcoC_
MTi-WASIMr. HcDonald
RI-HSV/Mr. Fletcher
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SRM SEAL EROSIO_ P_OBLEMS
REVISED 3-19 b
DATE I'_FCTRACKING LAUNCH
SRM_.I _OINT OCCURPLD S_AL #EFECTEO NUMBER CONSTRAINT
28 FIELD-AFT lI-1Z-O! PRIMARY NOT REPORTED NO
(_4-4 NOZZLE-CASE 03-21-83 PRIMARY A066S8 NO
LOA FIELD-F_D 02-03-84 PRIMARY A07934 NO
106 NOZZLE-CASE • 02-03-84 PRIMARY A08014 NO
IIA NOZZLE-CASE 04-06-84 PRIMARY AOBZ99 NO
I3A NOZZLE-CA_E 08-30-84 PRIMARY A08687 NO
138 FIELD-FWD T_ FWD CTR 00-30-84 PRIMARY kO8615 NO
ISA HOZZLE-CA% 01-24-85 PRIMARY A07934 NO
ISB NOZZLE-_ASE 01-24-85 PR|,MARY A07934 NO
ISA FIELC-CTR 01-24-85 PRIMARY A08939 NO
1SB F!_LO-FMD 01-24-85 PRIMARY A08939 NO
IIA NOZZLE-C/_SE 04-12-85 Pg!IMRY A07934 NO
I?B NOZZLE-CASE 04-12-85 PRIMARY A07934 NO
1_ NOZZLE-CASE 04-Z9-05 PRIMARY/SECONOARY AOgZ88* YES
168 NOZZLE-CASE 04-Z9-85 PRIMARY AOgZ88 NO
DN-7 NOZZLE-CASE 05-09-85 - PRIMARY kOgZ60 NO
18A NOZZLE-CASE 06-17-85 PRIMARY A07934 NO
188 NOZZLE-CASE 06-17-85 PRIMARY A07934 NO
198 NOZZLE-CASE 07-29-85 PRII_RY AOgZM NO
20A NOZZLE-CASE 08-Z7-85 PRIM,_RY AOgZ98 NO
228 NOZZLE-CASE 10-3_-$5 PRIMARY A07934 . NO
23A NOZZLE-CASE 11-Z6-85 PRIMARY A07934 NO
238 NOZZLE-CA3E 11-_6-85 PRIHARY A07934 NO
24A FIELO-AFT 01-12-86 PRIMARY NOT REPORTEO NO
Z48 NOZZLE-CASE 01-1Z-86 PRIMARY NOT REPORTED NO
"TH'S PROBLEMCONTAINED SECONDARYO-RING EROSION OF TdE NOZZLE JOINT ANO CONSTRAINS LAUNCH FOR ALL O-RING ANOMALIES,
[Ref. 3 2-9]
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:.t r. . '.Routing Slip : _:._,,-.-:,,•
Mr. B_rdy
Mr. C_a _es
_orQv_
"ill me
_o_Jmmct
Fnformation
_ote _d Fo-w_c;
Pe? R e_Jelr2
_MM_dat_O_
S_,_
SVBjECT: Surued O-P_a&s on 5._-1l
The recent e_perieuce of tw_ b_r_ed O-ri_&s (=ozzle/case
boss and forward/forward center Joint) on STS-II coupled
wi:h the "'_issin_ putty" findinE at disasse_bl7 raise
concern with STS-1.3.
Specifically concern is raised about the _TPe II Randolph
ZL._.C chromate putty (ZL'_) seusitivity to humid:cy and
te_pe.-a_ure. The the:'mal desi&n of the 5RM Joints depends
on :he:-aal protection of the O-Tin& by the ZC?. ZC?
failure to provide a thermal barrier can lead to burui=_
both O-rlngs and subsequent _atastrophic failure. Adhe-
sion service, life and sensitivity to temperature and
hu=idity of the ty#e II ZCP must be reassesse4 and veri-
fied in the light of rec'e,_t experience. The O-rio& leak
check procedure and its potential effect on the ZC?
i_stallation and possible displacement is also an urEznt
[Kef. -_ 2-I0 I of 2_
/
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ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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Or_llil _ Oel_oy
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concern vbich requ_.ru mrpediclT, n 0£ pr/vi_ully i_tl=ci-
lied full/ella ti/_l. _flct of cavil: l volume size
(cavity be:wiem the ZCI' and prLmary G-rlmi) ou O-rim S
d4ulage lever:t,i:y lust" also be lisLilled.
Yo_t" mup._O_'t iD t_i _._£ge-1_(: ma_ter l-I _et%lel_.
Q. _t/..l 1 er
C'_ef, Solid Mot_r 3raoch
co:
_:JOl/_. 5chvln_er
E_,,_3/_. _.I_Z__
SA_I/Mr. Mulloy
.S_4_/MZ. Wear
_?01/Hr. _cCool
L'P21/_:. McCart7
E_251Mess_s. PowerslRa_
Ioi'm Q. D_ller
Tel. No.(orCoo'e# &_.._U
453-3702
Olt, 2/28/8_
CodWe (or o_ _t_c_y
EP25
FORM2JI 2UN 71 _ll _lOl_Ji IO_7t_S e,_a_ ill _e$im
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T_I-lJl7_IO REV. D
STS-'51E SOLID ROCKET ROTOR (SRM-16)
FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW
SRR SPECIAL TOPIC NO. 3
O-RING EROSION OBSEIWED ON STS-Slc (SR/'T-15I
12 FEIlRUARY 1985
I_T_ THIOI_OL, iNC.
WASATCH DIVISION
P.O, Box 52h, BllGx_u4 CITY. UTMX 8_302 {NO1) B63-3511
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®
SRM-HPM Field Joint
Putty
O-Rings 1
4b
MORON l_OC INC.
'vV_t_(h £YNt_JOn
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STS-51C (SRM-15) POSTFLIGHT IIARDWAREDAMAGE ASSESSMENT
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
A67 (LEFT FORWARD FIELD JOINT)
GAS PATH 1HRU PUTTY AND PAST PRIMARY O-RING AT 163"
HARD TIIINCHAR ON TANG INSULATION AT 163"
CRAR ON CLEVIS PUTTY STILL SOFT (T = i/B - 3/16 INCH) AT 163"
S_TED ARC ON TANG SEAL SURFACE AND INSUL, FACE 12q" TO iBB"
BLACK GREASE (SOOTED) BETWEEN O-RINGS 150" TO 230"
_RIMARY O-RING SOOTED AT INTERFACE WITH GROOVE ON UPSTREAM SIDE
SOOT IN THE PRIMARY GROOVE ON THE DOWNSTREA_ SIDE
SOOT TOTALLY COVERED TIIEGREASE ON THE LAND BETWEEN THE O-RINGS
GR_SE WAS SOOTED (BLACKENED) BUT STILL WAS GREASY - NOT HARD
BOTTOM AND AFT FACE OF SECONDARY GROOVE HAD CLEAN GREASE
CLEVIS SURFACE AFT OF SECONDARY O-RING HAD CLEAN GREASE
NO SECONDARY O-RING BLOW-BY WAS OBSERVED
[Ref, 5 2-11 3 of IS]
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, _STS-51C (STS-20) (SRM-15). Performance
Preliminary Postflight Hardware Damage Assessment
• Path Width 1.0_ . 118 - 3116 Thick Putty
2.2 Wid._ _A_I_"_
I18 Thick J
'i':i,'iiii
MORON _Ok I_C
w_J_h DMa_
View A-A
A67 Forward Field Joint Gas Path (3TS-51C)
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STS-51C (SRH-15) POSTFLIGHT HARDWAREDAHAGE ASSESSHENT (CoNT)
0 A68 (RIGHT CENTER FIELD JOINT)
o
o
o
o
o
o
GAS PATII TitRU PUTTY AND PAST PRIHARY O-liNG AT 35q"
CLEVIS P!ITTY (T = 1/8 iN.) STILL SOFT HiTII LIGHT CHAR AND SOOT AT 35q"
SOOTED ARC ON TANG SEAL SURFACE Arid iNSULATiON FACE 32D" - O" - 10'
BLACK GREASE (SOOTED) BETWEEN O-RINGS 282" - 0_ - ]2"
PRiHARY O'RING SOOTED AT iNTERFACE WITH GROOVE OH UPSTREAH SIDE
O'RiNG EROSION WAS VERY OBVIOUS AND HAS SEEN ADJACENT TO THE
FGRWARDWALL OF THE PRIHARY GROOVE
SOOT TOTALLY COVERED THE GREASE ON THE LAND BETWEEN THE O'RINGS
GREASE WAS SOOTED (BACKENED) BUT STILL HAS _EASY - NOT HARD
SECONDARY O'RiNG OBSERVATIONS
o NO EROSION ON SECONDARY O'RING
o HEAT AFFECTED ZONE 18 IN. CIRC - APPROXIHATELY 60" CROSS
SECTION ARC
o HEAT AFFECTED ZONE BASIS
o DIFFERENCE IN SURFACE APPEARANCEH/O'LOSS OF HATER;AL.
o SECONDARY O'RING ON A67 HAD NO DIFFERENCE IN SURFACE
APPEAHANCE
BOTTOH MD AFT FACE OF SECONDARY GROOVE HAD CLEAN GREASE
CLEVZS SURFACE AFT OF SECOHDARY O'fliNG HAD CLEAN .RE%SE
NO SECONDARY O'RING BLOH-BY HAS OBSERVED
o
o
3-4
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STS-51C (STS-20) (SRM-1 5) Performance
Preliminary Postflight Hardware Damage Assessmert
I--_ 118 Inch Thick Putty Soft Wlth
Soot end Light Char
Surface Char _-_ /_ _.,,_r-TL._'---._ _. ,
. , . _ _ A ; ) J (.;leVla
on insumtlon '_ _ i
114 Circumference, _ I
1.0 Long _.
_ p--,f- 1.0 Soot Track
1.8 inch Thick Putty .,_ _ _ _ :9_-35_4"Deg , .
Both Sidea of Gea I_lth_'_ "\ /_. I J ._ _J m''-'_'-'lnsul
_ _ _ Face With
NoPutty_ _ _ <-_--_L_ L Putty
This Surface _ _ "-_ Inlul Slope
(putty on tang insul) _ _ _.-f_...._ insul Face
• _:_ _ _ _Steel
Ct. O-Ring Max -_--_--_--_--_--_ 1.0
Erol_lon '- "354 Deg
View A-A
A68 RIglit Center Field Joint Gas Path (STS-51C)MomoN ]HK_LINC
_OMmn
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=|i
O-Ring Erosion Patterns
STS-41D {SRM-13A)
Nozzle
STS-51C (AE/)
SRM-15 • I
_0.283 ,
0.010
J
I-
0.2
1
Eroded Length
..
165.6 Deg {point of max burn)
_..IKh 01,4Skin
le_&lliMi Oil lit I_1 w_dl PRIPktdD 10 I_0_1 _ _ NI$1NIAIION
O/_,OA6 _..121Deg ._._
o.0_7 -_
0.024_
_ //_ L274.J I STS'51c(A69)SRM.16'
',, / o.2s_ \ /
_ Y 0.036-
Erodedr_..]p7.0._Length| I "_• 14.o," il
Heat Affected Zone J 0 26_Center of_
Blow Through
{-, 309.6 Deg) .Eroded Length
7.7 _?'5-- 1
_'" |
353.3 Deg (point of max burn)
IteJ.lq=
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O knelyelm o! Soot fr.m STS-51C Ul Fot'uard FtoZd JotnZ
FTTR
Note: No HI PoLymer,
No Fluorocarbon
detacteJ
ED/,Xe
Vluorlde (O-tin6)
Sodium (Gleiee)
)_tlneeLua (Ambeotom,
putty)
Al+uLnun (PropelJa_c)
Stilton (kebelto/.
putty)
_hlortde (Propellant
AP or See Water)
Calcium (Green)
Sul'Jr (Crease)
Fluoride Ion Test
(z2OZ)
rr[tlcy Groove
Selai, le
IID-2, Water
Prelect
P_eeen£
Present
HaJof
Prelent
14aJor
NaJor
Nlnor
O.8Z
Lind |ecwcen
O-Rtn&e
liD-2, U_cer
Trace
Preener
Present
Hit,or
French|
HaJor
Ha Jar
}llnnr
I .h7Z
ellm|etlve niiounte detecLt.dt eta_tLn_ Vi[h |_r¢;ILvNL
_Jor
}liner
P_eeeflt
Trace
Hone
Ten_
Se._te
lie-2, I_atlf
rolycetef
(Putty)
Present
Platen|
||Lnor
HaJor
Hlnor
Hinor
_aJor
HI,or
2.It
C).evll SemO]e
OIiCk rott_ I Creen Putty
I
PoIyeitar. ] Polye|/er,
$1ater I Water
|lnne
6mall Tract
HaJor
PrescnC
Major
Preeent
N_ne
None
0.64Z
Hone
Cm.11 | Trace
l,-_Jor
Trace
llaJor
Hone
, None
None
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O iIISTOR_" Of $Rtl O-RIt.G UA/IAtr;,_
STS-20A l_dlFteld*t
STS*20B _n flsl_ (rr_ml ate
STS-20| Can Field (Sac) **e
CrOll-SectlOnla[ VIew Top Vlev
EroJton Perim_ter Nominal Lenoth of"
I_ptln Affected DialeLer _axlmum Eroeton
(a_x) (1..) O-.)
o.oto _s_ o._ao _.zs
o.o_e nz0 o.2no )2.s
It_e 45 .O,2BO Hone
ST$-k_| F_d Field 0.028 lLO O.280
STS-LIA All Field • Hone None 0.280
STS-IIA I_d Field _.OtO 217 0.280
ST$-21 Aft fitld 0.0J3 116 0.280
STS-I4A NoszIeee 0.046 l_l 0.275
STS-|]I NozaI* O.03t 136 0,275
$15-111 Nozzle O.039 103.S 0.275
Qfl-q etozzle n.oSz +_L 0.275
STS-6A Noel|el None NaPe fi.2?_
ST$-6_ HO:_IIa Nono _one 0.275
Total Ileal
Affected Lanlth
(*-.)
_.25
50.7_
29._
3.0 Hone
Hofle No_e
3.0 1_._
4.0 7.D
1.8 5.6
O.75 45
5 It
No_te Herin
Hone None
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a Hal lie plr.h detected in p.tty,, Indite|taft uf hear on O-rLng. but no da_ILe.
ee Soot behinC primar_ o-rJ+zg
e4 dr' _.oo[ behind pTimary o_rl,l:, heat affected eec.mdary o-ring
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"C0,'_AR]SON OF STS-51C AND STS-51E
NO PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH PUTTY LOT NUMBERS OR INSTALLATION ON
ALL FIELD JOINTS
NO ANOMALOUS _nN_ITIONS AT ASSFMBLY OF:
o O'RINGS
o GREASE
o LEAK CHECK
o ALL STS-51C (SRM-15) AND STS-51E (SRM-16) FIELD JOINTS
PASSED LEAK CHECK WITH A DECAY OF O,Z PSI OR LESS, FIRST
ATTEMPT. (1,3 PSI LEA_GE ALLOWED DURING 10 MINUTE
PERIOD AT 50 PSIG)
C,_IGINAL _/_;E" IS
OF POOR QUALrTY
V_ (_.je,_.i_tgbua_N_a,-tW
MOK_N IHW_OL INC
•. w • ft , v_ _.,
_.._ "_'_LL_,-'-__;, "..,,':_'_,,.,_._"_
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O'RING EROSION SCENARIO
i
0 O'Ri_G ACTU#TIO/_ SCENARIO IS THE SAMZ FOR FIELD JOINTS AND NO7ZLE JOINTS
9 FREE VOLUME IS CREATED BY DESIGNj VACUUM PUTTY LAYUP, O'RING GROOVE
A;!_O'RING SQUEEZE AND CLEARANCES BEI_/EENPLATING PARTS
FLOW PATH CAN BE CREATED BY JOINT ASSEMBLY. O'RING LEAK CIIECKAND/OR
PUTTY BLOW-BY DURING _TOR IGNITION _D INITIAL PRESSURIZATION
FLOW PATH LEADS TO iHE FREE VOLUME FILLING PROCESS WHICH INDUCES
LOCALIZED SHORT TIME DURATION HOT GAS JET IMPINGEMENT.ON THE O'RING
WITH THE ASSOCIATED HIGH STAGNATION POINT HEATINGj PROCESS CONTINUES
ONLY UNTIL THE FREE VOLUME IS FILLED AND PRESSURE EQUAL.IZATION IS ACHIEVED
TEST DATA INDICATES THAT VITON RUBBER (UNFILLED FLUOROCARBON) EXHIBITS
VERY HIGH EROSION RATES (> 200 MILS/SEC) DEPENDING UPON THE HEAT
TRANSFER COEFFICIENT
Mo_n_z_lh_oKOLINC
3-10
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IF
STS-51C (SRM-15) STS-20 O'RING EROSIONSCENARIO
i i
A o NO EROSIONUNTIL SON{C FLOW ESTABLISHEDINFIELD JOINT AREA (0 - 50 PSI)
B o PRIMARYO!RING SEATINGPHASE (50 - 200 PSI)
o LOW TEMPERATURESHRINKSO'RING AND INCREASESDUROMETER
o GAS JET THROUGHPUTTY IMPIHGESON PRIMARYO'RING
o INITIALEROSIOROF DR!MARYO'RINGOCCURS (<:10MILS)
o GAS FLOW PAST PRIMARYO'RING OCCURS
o O'RING PRODUCYZFOUND IN SOOT
o PUTTY PRODUCTS FO_D IN SOOT
o GAS FLOW DEPOSITS SOOT AND LG_ES HEAT (_T - 5265'F)
IN CIRCUMFERENTIALEXPANSIONBEY_EENO'RLNGS, AT = 570'F
BETWEENO'RINGS
o NO DAMAGE TO SECONDARYO'RING
o BLOW-BYPRIMARYO'RINGSOBSERVEDMANY TIMES DURIi_GLOW PRESSURE LEAK
CHECKS CONDUCED BETWEEN @0-200PSI
T_ _,_, s suow4w,v W
Ivk)_l_m_lNC
3-11
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A
HPM Predicted Pressure During Ignition
1564
1.000 -
900
8001
.-. 700
_= 600i
_ 5oo
H 400
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leo
0
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70
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.Moron T._OKOLINC.
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ei
STS-51C (Ski't-15) STS-20 O-RING EROSIOH SCENARIO (CONT)
PRIMARY O-RING SEALS AND CONTINUES TO ERODE
0 PRIMARY O-RING SEATS BY TIIETIME PRESSURE flEACIIES200 PSI
0 FREE VOLUME INCREASES IOX FROM POINT "A" TO POIIII _C"
DUE TO MOTOR PRESSURIZATION ArIDJOINT EXPANSION
0 I.iAJORITYOF O-RING EROSIOI( OCCURS DURING THIS PIIASE UNTIL
PRESSURE EOUILI_RATION OCCURS AT APPROXII'IATELY330_IS
0 DEPTIIOF EROSION IS A FUNCTION OF GAS JET SIZE I.E.
SMALLER SIZE HIG!IER EROSION
0 A67 (L.II.)GAS PATII2.2 INCIIESNEAR O-RING COY'_PAREDTO
l.D INCIION A68 (R.II.)I.E. AREA RATIO = q.8,EflO_ION
DEPTIIRATIO = 3.SpASSUI'IINGFINAL AREA SAt'rERATIO AS
IiJITIAL
[Ref..3 Z-ll 14 of IM[
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VOLUMETRIC AND THERMAL ANALYSIS ANU TEST RESULTS
FIELD JOIIIT
PRIMARY
SECONDARY
NOZZLE JOZIIT
PRIMARY
SECONDARY
MAXIMUFI
EXPECTED
EROSION
O. 092
0.O60
O, 070
O. _OZl
!_XIMUM
EROSION
EXPERIENCED
0.053
ffOtlE
IIEATEFFECTS WITII NO DEPTIISEEN ON STS-20B
TESTS SltOWTHAT O-RING MAINTAINS SEAL UNDER 3000 PSI WttEH 0.095 IIICll
MATERIAL IS REMOVED, A 3:I SAFETY FACTOR FOilPIIESSURE EXTRUSION
SOOT SEEN BEIIIND STS-IlIA NqZZLE PRIMARY SEAL WAS A ftESULTOF IIOHENTARY
GAS PASSAGE BEFORE TIIEO-RING SEATED
IRef. 5 2-11 15 of IV,}
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WHY DO MOST O-RINGS NOT ERODE AND WHY DOH'T WE SEE SOOT BEHIND PRIMARY
O-RINGS MORE OFTEN?
0 NO O-RING EROSIOI_ OCCURS IF GAS JET IS NOT PRESENT
0 IF NO GAS JETS ARE PRESENT, O-RING IS ENZRGIZED BY PUTTY
COMPRESSING S_LL VOLUME OF AIR TRAPPE_ BETWEEN PUTTY AND
O-RING
0 IF BLOW BY OCCUR_ DURItIG SEATING, NO SCOT IS PRESEtIT
IN TRAPPED AIR
0 SOOT COMES FROM EROSIOI_ OF PUTTY AND/OR O-RING
_ NO EVIDERCE THAT PRIHARY O-RING IS LEAKING AFTER INITIAL SEATING
PIIASE
IRe!. 5 2-11 16 of IS I
RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
o O-RING EROSION ON STS-51C WAS'WITIIIN EXPERIENCE DATA BASE
o I_OMENTARY GAS PASSAGE BY TIIEPRIr_I_Y SEAL WAS SEEN ON TIlESTS-11aA NOZZLE
JOINT
o SECONDARY SEAL HEAT EFFECTS WERE WELL BELOW ANALYTICAL WORST CASE
PREDICTIONS
o GAS JET PENETRATES TIIEPRIMARY _EAL PRIOR TO ACTUATION ANn SEALING
o TESTS SHOW IIIATO_RINGS WILL SEAL AT 3000 PSi ItITIl0.095 INCIIOF MISSING !_TERIAL
(WIIICIIIS GREATER TIIANTIIEWORST CASE PREDICTIOH AND ALMOST THIEE THE
THE EROSION SEEN ON ANY SRM MOTORS),
o PRI!IARY O-RING EROSION OBSERVED TO DATE IS ACCEPIABLE AND WILL ALWAYS
BE MORETHAN EROSION ON SECONDARY O-RING IF IT OCCURS.
0 PRI|'IARY O-RING LEAK CtlECK PUSIIES O-RING IN WRONG
DIRECTION -- SECONDARYO-RING IS SEATED BY LEAK CItECK
0 GAS VOLUHE IN FRONT OF PRIMARY O-RING IS 50X GREATER TIIAN
FREE VOLUME BETWEEN O-RINGS
o GAS WiLL COOL AS IT P_SSES PRIMARY.O-RING AND DIFFUSES
CIRCUMFERENTIALLY
o SECONDARY O-_NG IS A REDUNDANT SEAL USING ACTUAL HARDWARE DIMENSIONS
1566
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FLIGHT READINESS ASSESSMENTFOR STS-51E
0 EVALUATION SUMMARY
o STS-51C PRIMARY O'RIRG EROSION ON TWO FIELD JOINTS
o STS-51C SOOT BETWEEN "'RIMARY AND SECONDARY O'RINGS ON BOTH FIELD JOINTS -
FIRST TIME OBSERVED ON FIELD JOINT
o EVIDENCE OF HEAT AFFECT ON SECONDARY O'RING OF A68 (RIGHT HAND) CENTER
FIELD JOINT BUT NO EROSION - FIRS[ TIME HEAT AFFECT ON SECONDARY
O'RING HAS BEEN OBSERVED
o CONCLUSION
o STS-51C CONSISTENT WITH EROSION DATA BASE
o LOW TEMPERATURE ENHANCED PROBABILITY - STS-51C EXPERIENCED
WORST CASE TEMPERATURE CHANGE IN FLORIDA HISTORY
0 EROSION IN TWO JOINTS OBSERVED BEFORE - STS-11ANF ±q
e STS-51E COULD EXHIBIT SAME BEHAVIOR
o CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE
o STS-51E FIELD JOINTS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT
MOKrONI_K)KOL INC.
3-17
ORIGINAL _AGE. IS
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History of O-ring (23) /_%._\. ",
+. '++
+%{ m_mY w_a +u sammy coL_ _n_-,r :;,L-
.a: Larry Mulloy
Postmark: Jan 31,85 7:39 AM "; "J'_'_"'
StatuE: Certlf£ed Urgent
Subject: 51C O-RING EROSION RZs 51_ FRR : ' "
Relsage:
" __E_D_U_SSION SHOOLD RECAP ALL INCIDENT_u/IE__{G__E_OS/.0N. WHETHER '+
__O",ZLEoR cA_z oonrr _.o_Jmz,,I __;DEm'S wcr.u-Ta_zs EV,_E__---'5-_-f2_,
_PAST TEE PRIMARY O-RING_ ALSO, TEE RATI_ONALE USED FOR ACCEPTING _THE; i:,
:UNDZTiO_ U_ TSE S0_/Z_E O-RING. ALSO, THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARIO AND
LIMITING MECHANISM FOR FLOW PAST THE PRIMARy ON "+HE 51C CASE JOINTS.
IP MTI DOES NOT. RAVE ALL THIS POR_TODAY I WO_LD LIKE TO SEE THE LOGIC
ON A CHA_"_ WITH BLANKs TED.
[Ref. 3 2-121
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MORTON THIOKOL INC_
• _ I hvisJOll
g August lg85
E1SO/BG_-86-17
Hr. James _..llloewks,Jr., SA42
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812,
Dear Hr. Thomas:
Subject: Actions Pertaining to SRH Field Joint Secondary Sea!
P_r your request, this letter contains the answers to the
t_ questions you asked at the July Problem Review Board
telecon.
i. Question: If the field joint se;ondary seal lifts
off the metal n;at)ng surfaces during motor pressurization,
how soon will it return to a position where contact
._s re-established?
Answer: Bench test data indicate that the o-ring
_ency {its capability to follow the metal)
is a function of temperature and rate of case
expansion. MTI measureo the force of the o-rin_
against Instron plattens, which simullted the
nominal squeeze on the o-ring and app'oximated
_he case expansion distance and rate
A I00"F. the o-r;ng maintained cuntact. At
75"F. the o-ring lose contact for Z.4 )econds.
_it _O)F, the o-ring did not re-establis, contact
in en minutes at which time the test w_s
ten:Jnated.
The c_nclusion is that secondary sealir:g capability
in the SRM field joint cannot be guar)nteed.
2. _uestiom: If the primary o-ring does not seal,.
secondary seal seat in sufficient time
to preven joint leakage?
)RPf. 5 2-1:{ I or2)
1568
m
ORIGiN/It. '_£" IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Mr. james W. Thomas, Jr., SA42
g August 1985
[15C/BGR-B6-17
Page Z
Answer: MTI has no reason to suspect that the
pr_m_y seal would ever fail after pressure
equilibrium is reached, i.e., after the ignition
transient. If the primary o-ring were to fail
from 0 tO 170 milliseconds, there is a very high
probability that the secondary o-ring w_uld hold
pressure since the case has not expanded appreciably
at this point. If the pri_k_ry seal were to fail
from 170 to 330 milliseconds, the probability
of the secondary seal holding is reduced. From
330 to 600 milliseconds the chance of the secondary
seal holding is small. This is a direct result
of the o-ring's slow response compared to the
metal case segments as the joint rotates.
Please call me oi' Mr. Roger Boisjoly if you have additional
questions concerning this issue.
Very truly yours,
Br_an G. Russell, Manager
SRM Ignition System
rp_B_ / CO
c9 L. Wear, SA42
E. Skrobiszewski. SA4g
I. Adams, M_II/_FC
bcc: J. Kilminster
A. McDonald
R. Ebeling
J. Elwell
_. Brinton
A. _cBeth
R. Boisjoly
A. Thompson
S. Stein '
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AFTERNOON SESSION
t1:10 P.M.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Will the Commission come to order, please?
Gentlemen, good afternoon. I guess all of you have been sworn in, and those of you who
have not been sworn in, maybe you had better be so.
( Witnesses sworn.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission is coming to the end of its tenure. In fact, we think
this is probably the last hearing that we will have, and in the ceurse of preparing our report, we
have--our staff has looked at a lot of documents, and we wanted before we closed off the hear-
ings to give you gentlemen a chance to make any comments you want to about the documents,
and I guess some of the documents have already been shown to you, and so if that is all right we
will just get started and ask questions.
Do you want to say anythiv.g?
MR. KEHRLI: I would just like tu--there is a book that is in front of you, the red book, that
some of you don't have, with additional copies of documents. What we will be referring to is
Documents Number 2 and Number 3 in the very back of the book. They are tabbed according to
number.
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And what I would like to start off with are those two specific documents which are Marshall
problem assessment system tracking reports, and one was started after ST_41B in 1984, and
that is Tab Number 3, and Tab Number 2 was the problem report that was started after the 51B
nozzle O-ring erosion problem, which was discovered at Thiokol on June 25th, 1985, and you will
see from that particular problem that a launch constraint was applied as a result of the 51B O-
ring nozzle erosion problem. [ Ref. 5 2-14] [ Ref. 5 2-15]
What I would like to ask you gentlemen is if you have ever seen those two Marshall track-
ing reports before, or are you familiar with them?
TESTIMONY OF BRIAN RUSSELL, PROGRAM MANAGER, DEPARTMENT OF SOLID
ROCKET MOTOR IGNITER AND FINAL ASSEMBLY: ROBERT EBELING, DEPART-
MENT MANAGER° SOLID ROCKET MOTOR IGNITER AND FINAL ASSEMBLY;
ALLAN J. McDONALD, DIRECTOR, SOLID ROCKET MOTOR PROJECT; J.C. KILMIN-
STER, VICE PRESIDENT, SPACE BOOSTER PROGRAMS: AND ROGER M. BOISJOLY,
SEAL TASK FORCE, MORTON THIOKOL. INC.
,MR. RUSSELL: I am Brian Russell. I'm familiar with them. I can't recall if I have seen
exactl': these, although I would receive in the mail in my office a
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rnonthlyproblemreportwhichwouldbesimilar to that. andwhetherit wasthis oneexactlyI
can'tsaywithoutcheckingmynotesbackat the plant,but wewouldgettheseeverymonth,and
theywouldcontain these problems as well as others that were being tracked
MR KEtIRLI: Now, some of these entries, isn't it correct to say that the entries themselves,
the information came from Thiokol that was eventually placed on these documents?
MR. RUSSELL: That is correct.
MR. KEHRLI: How would that work" Could you tell the Commission how that system
worked, please?
MR. RUSSELL: We have our reliabil:'y engineering department, who is -_sponsible to com-
plete the monthly problem report, and in addition to that we have our monthly problem review
board telephone conference with NASA and the contractors, of which we are _ "tort, and the
monthly problem review or the monthly problem report that reliability prepare, they get the
information from engineering or from the program office as necessary to complete heir status of
what has happened during that month, whether the problem originated that month or what has
been done to close the problem out, ana that is submitted every month, and I for one do review
that before it is submitted to the
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Marshall Space Flight Center, and so much of the information that I would read in these reports
would be the same information that we had given in that monthly problem report or over the
telephone on the teleconference.
CHAIRMAN RO ERS: Mr. Russell, when you say close the problem out, what do you mean
by that? How do you close it out normally?
MR. RUSSELL: Normally, whether it takes engineering analysis or tests or some corrective
action, a closeGut to the problem would occur after an adequate corrective action had been taken
to satisfy those on the problem review board that the problem had indeed been closed out. That
is the way that that happens. For example, we had found a loose bolt on the recovery one time,
and we had to take corrective action m our procedures and in the engineering to make sure that
that wouldn't happen again, and then to verify that corrective action, and at that point that
problem would be ready to be closed out. It generaPy involves a report or at least a mention by
the review board stating what had been done to adequately close it out, and then it is agreed
upon by the parties involved.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Without reference to a particular flight, if you had a problem with
erosion and
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blow-by, how would you expect it would be closed out? How would you normally close that out?
MR, RUSSELL: The normal closeout procedure would be after there had been changes to
prevent the problem or to control the problem or to prevent it from recurring. That would be
the normal system.
MR. KEHRLI: Now, as I mentioned earlier, one of these problems, Tab 2, the problem on
the nozzle erosion, the O-ring erosion after 51B, did contain a launch constraint. Is that your
understanding?
MR. RUSSELL: Well, my understanding was, until we adequately handled any of the O-ring
erosion problems in the subsequent FRR, that I don't know if it would be so formal as a launch
cot straint, but I know that when we discovered any O-ring erosion or soot blow-by or whatever
migW have been beyond our experience base, there was always some analysis or some justifica-
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tion in the flight readiness review to continue to fly. and I guess I didn't realize that that one
was any different than the others.
MR. KEHRLI: What do you understand a launch constraint to mean?
MR. RUSSELL: My understanding of a launch constraint is that the launch cannot proceed
without adequately--without everyone's agreement that the
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problem is under control,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Under control meaning what? You just said a moment ago that you
would expect some corrective action to be taken.
MR. RUSSELL: That is correct, and in this particular case on this 51B nozzle O-ring erosion
problem there had been some corrective action taken, and that was included in the presentation
made as a special addendum to the next flight readiness review, and at the time we did agree t.o
continue to launch, which apparently had lifted the launch constraint, would be my understand-
ing.
DR. WALKER: What was the corrective action which was taken in that case?
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MR. RUSSELL: One of the corrective actions was an increase in the leak check pressure
because one of the ways we thought that could happen, our analysis said that the blow-by across
the O-ring which added to the erosion of that particular O-ring, started right at ignition, indicat-
ing the O-ring didn't seal right from the very beginning.
And one of the ways that we thought that could have happened was that the putty could
have masked our leak check, and we thought it was of utmost importance to have a verified
primary O-ring and so we increased leak check pressure to 200 psi to make sure that we would
blow through the putty, realizing that blow holes are not desirable either, but yet it is more
important to know that you have a good O-ring and have some putty blow through than other-
wise.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Russell, where did 200 psi come from? Is that twice 100?
MR. RUSSELL: No. We did some bench testing of some putty and some gaps that showed we
tried at 50, !00 and !50 psi and since we have a ten-minute stabilization period, the question was
can the putty hold these certain pressures for ten minutes? And in no case did 150 psi, in no
ca, se could the putty hold 150 psi for ten minutes. And we put a factor on top of that
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of another 50 psi, and that was the basis for that.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
DR. WALKER: The analysis that some of our staff has done suggests that after you increase
the test pressure to 200 pounds, the incidence of blow-by and erosion actually increased.
MR. RUSSELL: We realized that.
DR. WALKER: Did you realize that only after the accident?
MR. McDONALD: Could I try to answer some of that because I was very involved in this,
and in fact this is the first time I realized that was a launch constraint.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you speak a little louder, please?
MR. McDONALD: This is the first time I realized that this was flagged as a launch con-
straint and the others weren't, because the problem of the O-ring erosion was predominant all
the way fl-om STE-2. The uniqueness of the 16A nozzle which was 51 Baker, that was the first
time we had violated _ primary O-ring. And that erosion that caused that violation is different
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than we had seen previously and was different for a s gnificant reason, in that it had blow-by at
ignition which caused the erosion of the primary
2688
O-ring.
It just wasn't jet impingement on the sealed O-ring which was what we had seen before.
And because of that jet impingement on the unsealed O-ring, it made it unique. And we had to
understand for the next flight, before we could launch it, as to what happened to that flight that
we don't think will happen to the next one.
The poir, t that Brian made was that in looking at the records for the assembly and leak
check of that flight, it was the last one which we had one with 100 psi stabilization pressure by
the leak check. That was the last one.
And we knew that we had to have blow-by at ignition to ccnsume as much of the O-ring as
we consumed on that particular flight. Therefore, we felt that we missed the leak check on that
flight because the putty may well have masked it, or the fact that the groove in the nozzle is
actually wider than it is in the field joint, and it mow_s farther, and therefore there is a higher
probability that you may lose the leak check there because when you run the leak check it is on
the wrong face.
It has got farther to travel, and either contamination or whatever, when you finally pressur-
ize it to the other side, maybe it won't seal when it
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pressurizes the right side where it may have sealed and passed the leak check.
S¢ the conclusion was that may have been unique to that assembly and that all subsequent
flights have had the 200 psi leak check to eliminate the potential for the putty masking it. And
that, I think, was the basis for proceeding on with the next flight.
Now, I notice this is dated February 1986. i've seen a lot of these and I don't recall that that
was a flight constraint earlier.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think it was, wasn't it?
MR. KEHRLI: It's my understanding that that is a February 26th printout, but from those
dates on the left-hand column there, the dates of the entry, you will _ that the launch con-
straint was applied in July of 1385.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let's ask some specific quest;ons.
Did you all know that there was a launch constraint placed on the flights in Ju'.y 1985?
MR. McDONALD: Brian is right as far as every erosiou we had. We had to addres_ it prior
to the next flight, and I always felt tkat it could always become a launch constraint if it was not
adequately understood and explained why this prob,em could not get worse on
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the next flight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But really my question is: Did you gentlemen realize :hat it was a
launch constraint?
MR. RUSSELL: I would like to answer for myself. ! didn't realize tha _- there was a formal
launch constraint on this or_e, any different than some of the other erosion and bl )w-by that we
had seen in the past.
MR. EBELING: I agree.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Isn't there a letter recommending that the launch constraint be
taken off from you?
MR. KEHRLI: No. Thece's a letter recommending the problem be closed, the entire problem.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:What'sthedifference?[Ref.52-16through191
MR.KEHRLI:Well, let'saskaboutthat letter.Mr. Russell, you wrote a letter, did you not.
or a memorandum indicating that the problem should be closed.
Could you explain to the Commission what you meant by that?
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. In our December telephone call on the Problem Review Board and I
can't remember the date it was around the 9th or so there was a request to close the problems
out and particularly the ones that had been open for a long time, of which this
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was one, and a long time meaning six months or more.
There was a request from the Director of Engineering, as I recall it, that we close these
problems out.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What did you think that meant? You've got a lot of problems; close
them out. I don't understand that language.
DR. WALKER: That was the Director of Engineering at Marshall?
MR. RUSSELL: Yes, at Marshall Space Flight Center. Now, he wasn't in that telephone call.
My understanding is what they told us and my recollection was that Mr. Kingsbury would like
to see these problems closed out.
Now, the normal method of closing them out is to implement the corrective action, verify
the corrective action, and then the problem is closed, it comes off the board and is no longer
under active review.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's what you just said. Now, you get a request to close it out.
What did you think then?
MR. RUSSELL: Well, it was expanded. As we talked in that telepSone call, we were looking
for ways to close out any and all of the problems and we talked
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about each one separately.
DR. WALKER: Is there any other way besides fixing them?
MR. RUSSELL: Well, the way that we discussed is what I'm leading to; that we talked about
the fact that this telephone call and monthly Problem Review Board as well as the Problem
Report, really in our eyes and in those apparently of the people on the phone call at the Mar-
shall Space Flight Center, was not adding any more visibility to the problem.
The fact was that we had a task force created with full-time people on it. We had constant
reviews going on We had an active program plan that we were working and were doing some
test analyses and so forth to come to a solution of the problem.
And so we talked about that and pretty much jointly agreed that we would not be losing any
visibility by closing out, and agreed that that would be rationale to close it.
CH,_IRMAN ROGERS: I have trouble. Losing any visibility to close it. What does that
mean?
MR. RUSSELL: What I mean to say is that from my understanding of why there would be a
Problem Review Board is to make sure that things don't inadverter_tly become lost in the system
or ignored for any reason;
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that you have a problem and you adequately attack it, fix it, and implement it and verify it.
And that is my understanding of the purpose of such a board. On thls problem, however, T
personally felt that there was no chance of possibly ignoring the problem; that the visibility--
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what I meanby that is that managementat NASAandmanagementat Thiokolwereadequately
awareofthe problemandalsounderstoodwhatwasbeingdoneaboutit to fix it.
And that iswhat I meanbyvisibility.
CHAIRMANROGERS: What was being done to fix it?
MR. RUSSELL: Well, we had a task force created of full-time people at Th_okol, of which I
was a member of that task team, and we had done some engineering tests. We were trying to
develop concepts. We had developed some concepts to block the flow of hot gas against the O-
ring to the point where the O-ring would no longer be_ damaged in a new configuration.
And we had run some cold gas tests and some hot gas motor firing tests and were working
toward a solution of the problem and we had some meetings scheduled with the Marshall Space
Flight Center. We had weekly telephone calls where we statused our progress and there was a
team at Marshall also of engineering
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people who were monitoring the things that we were doing to fix the problem with the goal of
implementing a fix in our qualificationmotor No. 5,which was scheduled at that time in Janu-
ary, thistime frame being about the December time frame of lastyear.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can I interrupt? So you're trying to fig_Jreout how to fix it,right?
And you're doing some things to try to help you figure out how to fix it.
Now, why at that point would you close itout?
MR. BOISJOLY: I think ifI may---
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just let me |inish.Why would you write a lettersaying let'sclose it
out now?
MR. RUSSELL: Because I was asked to do it.
CHAIRMAI_T ROGERS: I see. Well, that explains it.
MR. RUMMEL: That explains it, but it really doesn't make any sense. On the one hand you
close out items that you've been reviewing flight by flight, that have obviously critical implica-
tions, on the basis that after you close it out, you're going to continue to try to fix it.
So I think what you're really saying is, you're closing it out because you don't want to be
2695
bothered. Somebody doesn't want to be bothered with flight-by-flight reviews, but you're going to
continue to work on it after it's closed out.
Is that right?
MR. RUSSELL: I would like to respond to that. Now, this was not a flight-by-flight review.
This was a month-by-month review, regardless of what was going on in the flight cycle.
MR. RUMMEL: Excuse me. But each flight up till then for some time had been reviewed.
You reviewed prior experience and this had been on a list which really mandated that each
flight be reviewed with respect to the O-ring problem. So I assume you did in fact review each
flight.
MR. RUSSELL: Yes, but we were not requesting that it be taken off of that review. That
was a separate set of reviews, and in fact it was one of the rationale items for removing it from
the Problem Review Board. That was just one activity in the system that we had rmde a move
to take it off of that review system, the Problem Review Board.
It had not been removed from the Flight Readiness Reviews.
DR. FEYNMAN: It says here that there was a formal reporting system used to evaluate the
problem
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resolution part of it, and that is why you wanted to close it out of the problem assessment
system.
Maybe Mr. Boisjoly could explain that.
MR. BOISJOLY: Basically, closeout may be a poor term because nobody was going to close it
out. Instead of tracking the same problem through two or three different channels, we were
going to track the problem now in the highlight of the task team, plus the Flight Readine_
Reviews, so there was no need to track it in several different locations. It was the same problem.
we were tracking it as it came up in Flight Readiness Reviews and we were statusing and
tracking it within the Seal Team. So it was a simple matter of bookkeeping to take it out of one
area because we were already doing it in another area.
DR. SUTTER: Well, was this task force, did it have the priority and ability to really charge
out and move on this problem? Was it receiving top management attention?
MR BOISJOLY: As top as we could get; yes. i,Ve had statuses every week. And we were
reporting the weekly activity.
DR. SUTTER: Well, there were memos written saying they couldn't get parts and you
couldn't get
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tests.
MR. BOISJOLY: That's right, but it was just to take it off of one area instead of tracking
the same thing in two manners with two different groups of peJple, two sets of manpower, to put
it and consolidate it.
DR. Su'FrER: Well, taking it off of that list, maybe that would remove it as a pressure point
in upper management to move out and make sure this task team was given the ability to do
their job.
MR. BOISJOT,Y: No. If anything, the t_sk team turned the gain up on it a little bit more, as
indicated by my memos.
DR. SUTTER: It is just hard to know why, taking it off of any list, when it was one of the
more critical items. Why not leave it there and have everybody get bugged by it?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, Mr. Russell said they did it because they asked him t). It's as
simple as that, I guess.
MR. EBELING: It was being tracked in three separate locations, three written and teleconed
descriptions every month or weekly in many cases, in the case of the O-Ring Task Force as it
was called, and it was a poor expenditure of people's time tracking it in
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three different places simultaneously.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I say, though, so that you understand, the confusion on the part
of some of us is we have a constraint which was placed on July 1985 and Marshall and Mr.
McDonald is listed as being one of those who knew about it.
And Mr. Mulloy _ys--and he testified this morning--he has the right to waive the con-
straint every time, so on all of these flights he waived it.
Now, during that time, as I understand it, you were doing some tests and so forth. And so,
each time nothing happened. I mean Mr. Russell said you were working on the problem, but as
far as the joint is concerned, things continued on just the way they had been going and you had
been having a lot o! :_ouble.
1<-_,/6
This was a very troubled joint, obviously. And getting back to the group that is working on
the problem, trying to fix it, I don't know, my word is repair it or fix it, do something about it,
apparently that wasn't going very well either because there's a memo here dated October 1, 1985
on Tab 33 from Mr. Ebeling which starts out--in connection with this it says: "Help. The Seal
T:,sk Force is constantly being delayed by every possible means. People are quoting policy and
systems and not working on them. Marshall is correct in
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saying that we do not know how to run a development program." [[Ref. 5 2-20]
And late _ on, after a lot of discussion about O-rings and putty he says: "The allegiance of
the O-ring Investigation Task Force is very limited to a group of engineers numbering eight to
ten. Our assembled people in Manufacturing avd Quality have the desire, but are encumbered
with other significant work. Others in Manufactu;,.'ng, Quality, Procurement, who are not in-
volved directly, but whose help we need, are generating plenty of resistance. We are creating
more instructional paper than engineering data. We wish we could get action by verbal request,
but such i_ not the case. This is a red flag."
Now, how does that happen? And then there are constraints on the launches. The con°
straints were waived and there seems to be total lack of coordination between Marshall and
Thiokol.
MR KILMINSTER: Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to respond to that.
In response to the concern that was expressed--and I had discussions with the team leader,
the task force team leader, Mr. Don Kettner, and Mr. Russell and Mr. Ebeling. We held a meet-
ing in my office and that was done in the October time period
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where we called the people who were in a support role to the task team, as well as the task force
members themselves.
In that discussion, some of the task torce members were looking to circumvent some of our
established systems. In some cases that was acceptable; in other cases it was not. For example,
some of the work that they had recommended to be done was involved with full scale hardware,
putting some of these joints together with va"ious putty layup configuration; for instance, taking
them apart and finding out what we could from that inspection process.
DR. SUTTER: Was that one of these things that was outside of the normal work, or was
that accepted as a good idea or a bad idea?
MR. KILMINSTER: A good idea, but outside the normal w_rk, if you will.
DR. SUTTER: Why not do it?
MR. KILMINSTER: Well, we were doing it. But the question was, can we circumvent the
system, the paper system that requires, for instance, the handling constraints on those flight
hardware items? And I said no, we can't do that. We have to maintain our handling system, for
instance, so that we don't stand the possibility of injuring or damaging a piece of flight
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hardware.
I asked at that time if adding some more people, for instance, a safety engineer--that was
one of the things we discussed in there. The consensus was no, we really didn't need a safety
engineer. We had the manufacturing engineer in attendance who was in support of that role,
and I persuaded him that, typical of the way we normally worked, that he should be calling on
the resources from his own organization, that is, in Manufacturing, in order to get this work
done and get it done in a timely fashion.
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And I also suggested that if they ran across a prgblem in doing that. they should bubble
that up in their management chain to get help in getting the resources to get that done.
Now, after that session, it was my _mpression that there was improvement based on some of
the concerns that had beei, expressed, and we did get quite a bit of work done.
For your evaluation, I would like to talk a little bit about the sequence of events for this
task force.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can I interrupt? Did you know at that time it was a launch con-
straint, a formal launch constraint?
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MR. KILMINSTER: Not an overall launch constraint as such. Similar to the words that
have been said before, each Flight Readiness Review had to address any anomalies or concerns
that were identified at previous launches and in that sense, each of those anomalies or concerns
were established in my mind as launch constraints unless they were properly reviewed and
agreed upon by all parties.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You didn't know there was a difference between the launch con-
straint and just considering it an anomaly? You thought they were the same thing?
MR. KILMINSTER: No, sir. I did not think they were the same thing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: My _ :estion is: Did you know that this launch constraint was placed
on the flights in July 19857
MR. KII,MINSTER: Until we r olved the O-ring problem on that nozzle joint, yes. Wc had
to resolve that in a fashion for the subsequent flight before we would be okay to q:, again,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you did know there was a constraint on that?."
MR. KILMINSTER: On a one flight per one flight basis; ye._. 31r.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What else would a constraint mean?
MR. KILMINSTER: Well, I get the feeling that there's a perception here that a launch con-
straint means all launches, whereas we were addressing each launch through the Flight Readi-
ness Review process as we went.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No, I don't think--the testimgny that we've had is that a launch
constraint is put on because it is a very serious problem and the constraint means don't fly
unless it's fixed or taken care of, but somebody has the authority to waive it for a particular
flight.
And in this case, Mr. Mulloy was authorized to waive it, which he did, for a number of
flights before 51-L. Just prior to 51-L, the papers showed, the launch constraint was closed out,
which I guess means no longer existed. And that was done on January 23, 1986.
Now, did you know that sequence of events?
2704
MR. KILMINSTER Again, my understanding of closing out, as the term has been used
here, was to close it out on the problem actions list, but not as an overall standard requirement.
We had to address these at subsequent Flight Readiness Reviews to insure that we were all
satisfied with the proceeding to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you understand the waiver process, that once a constraint was
placed on this kind of a problem, that a flight could not occur unless there wa3 a formal waiver?
MR. KILMINSTER: Not in the sense of a formal waiver, no, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did any of you? Didn't you get the documents saying that?
MR. McDONALD: I don't recall seeing any documents for a formal waiver.
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MR. KEHRLI: Now, on the letter to Larry Wear, where Thiokol recommends to Mr. McDon-
ald-where Thiokol recommends closing out the problem, that letter specifically references The_e
AO numbers. If you look at Attachment No. 4 under launch ccnstraint, the subjvc: of the letter
written December 10th, 1985, is closure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which one is this?
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MR. KEHRLI: Number four of the launch constraint attachment, the letter from Mr.
McDonald to Larry Wear of Marshall, and this is the request to close t]-.e problem. Under the
subject, it specifically references the Marshall tracking numbers AO-793,1, and those other num-
ber,_ ds well.
When you look at those numbers, those are the documents that you have in front of you,
that report specifically lists the launch constraint on the nozzle joint and on the field joint
number--the field joint problem, it says: "launch constraint, none".
So, isn't it accurate to say, based upon this letter, you must have seen those documents if
you are referencing them, is that correct?
MR. RUSSELL: Answering for myself, yes, and I will have to also say that my understand-
ing was that we were closing it off at the problem review board, and I did not know that there
was a launch constraint that had to be waived every time, and I did not realize that this kind of
an action would lead to removing any such constraint that ! did not know about.
MR. McDONALD: I wrote the letter, and I would like everyone to read the letter to see
what it says. It says, the subject critical problems are ongoing problems which will not be re-
solved for some
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time. So, right away, I don't think that tells anybody that we are going to forget about this and
take it off of anything.
It also says that, we reque_: that subject critical problems be closed and removed from the
next PRB agenda list, and The reason being that we spend more time each month going through
reading all of that same thing that we have been reading every month for two years, because
somebody colors a square in down at Marshall, please keep track of this each m_,nth.
We said, we've got a full-time task force working this problem. We have weekly meetings.
We need more people solving the problem and less people keeping tracking and statusing it, and
there's no sense us continuing doing that when we've got a very heavy activity doing that, _r_d
we got a letter a couple of weeks later from Larry Wear.
In fact, I was called before that letter, saying we were going to get it, that Marshall was
very upset with us because we've got problems that have been on there for several years, and we
haven't gotten them off of this list because it keeps getting thicker and thicker.
And, if you ever want to get something where nobody will read it, you get it so thick that
they
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finally pay no attention to it and that is exactly the thing the Problem Review Board was doing.
It was getting so thick it had problems on there we knew we weren't going to solve for some
time. And, they were the same problems we're having today.
And so, we said, okay, if you want to get them off the list, then just ',ake them off and we
will handle them through this other mechanism that we're addressing with everybody that
really knows about this problem. And, I was unaware hat a waiver was ever written for every
flight after this problem.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So, your idea wa_s really to cut down th_,_ paperwnrk?
MR. McDONALD: Yes. We're spending a lot of time in going through this matter where we
had nothing to add, nor did anybody else.
DR. FEYNMAN: Mr. McDonald. *_h__-letter is a request. Did you ever get an answer that
permitted you to do this?
MR. McDONALD: No, I didn't get any answer that permitted me to do that, nor did I know
that anything was, done about it. I just said, we've got a lot of things to do. This is one thing we
don't need to do.
MR. ACHESON: Did you take the lack of answer
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to mean that it had been closed out, that your proposal had been accepted?
MR. McDONALD: I don't know, because I ,believe we cancelled the subsequent Problem
Review Board and I think the one after that or something, and so I don't know whatever hap-
pened after that letter was written. I wasn't involved in the next meeting.
MR. RUSSELL: I would like to add, we wouldn't have expected to get a letter back to this. It
was a Marshall tracking system and, like Mr. McDonald said, we would have heard about the
action in the next Problem Review Board meeting, which would have then been scheduled in
early February, which was after the accident and did not take place.
MR. FEYNMAN: You mean, they come that _ar apart? This was December 1985.
MR. RUSSELL: But, we wrote the request--old, they come every month.
MR. FEYNMAN: Well, then what happened?
MR. RUSSELL: Well, my recollection of being there is that.
MR. FEYNMAN: Oh, okay. January t986 is right after December 1985. I made a mistake.
Excuse me.
MR. SUTTER: The task force was trying to improve the joint?
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MR. RUSSELL: Yes.
MR. SUTTER: That in effect does not tie into what you do for the next launch? It seems to
me that this conveys an attitude then that, okay, we've got troubles with this joint but it is okay
tc ,_eep flying with it even though we want to fix it, that you're willing to keep flying with the
joint even though you know you've got problems? And, I'm just wondering, what was the atti-
tude.
There wasn't really undue concern about continuing flying.
MR. RUSSELL: The attitude was that it was an undesirable condition but still acceptable
for flight, based upon the history that we had seen up until that point.
MR. SUTTER: The history of the erosion and the blow-by and the changing the leak checks
and all of that did not really build into your people that should have been responsible, that tkis
was a critical item?
MR. RUSSELL: I don't think that's true. I think _e considered it to be a critical problem,
which is the reason that we had the task force created to fix it. But, critical to stopping the
program, it obviously wasn't.
MR. SUTTER: Well, you were going to run, say
2710
another 20 or 30 flights without doing anything?
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MR.BOIS,JOLY:No.Thosewhowereintimatelyfamiliar with it--that is whywewerewrit-
ing thesememos,to try to get a little bit of flame turned up underneathit. to beableto get
somethingdone,becausewewereconcerned,wewer_extremelyconcerned.
I think that is what thosememosreflect.Theyreflect frustrationandconcernboth,to con-
tinue to fly in a condition that is marginal or a condition after the 16-nozzle erosion, if that ever
occurred in a field joint, we would have a terrible problem on our hands and that is what we
were trying to do.
We were attempting in that t_ am to short-circuit company procedures. We were attempting
to get things done that are not normally done, so that we could try things that we could tweak
the system and get as many pieces of information in as short a period of time as possible, so that
we could effect a change and get it implemented as quick as possible, and that was a big source
of frustration because we weren't getting that support.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Kilminster, did you realize at the time you changed your vote
on Launch 51-L, about this frustration that Mr. Boisj sly is speaking about?
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MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you were not familiar with the fact that there was a constraint
that had been placed on it in July?
MR. KILMINSTER: That would have required a waiver, no, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would that have made any difference to you. if you had known
that?
MR. KILMINSTEF,: I don't believe so. We would have reported the information, the engi-
neering evaluation that we had that evening, I think in the same fashion that we did.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What would have required you to vote differently, as far as the
weather is concerned? tf the temperature had been a lot colder, would you still have changed
your vote?
MR. KILMINSTER: I've asked myself that same question. It is a difficult question to
answer, of course. But I think that if I understood that the temperature was going to be if th_
low 20's, that I may indeed have changed my mind, but I have to say---
CHAIRMAN ROGEr, S: You would have changed your mir, d twice, because you changed
your mind once.
MR. KILM!NSTER: Well, if we would have known in the first pIace--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You wouldn't have changed
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your mind, I gue_, since the answer?
MR. KILMINSTER: If we would have known in the first place it was in the low 20's.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But didn't the fact that you had these concerns, the papers show,
you were terribly worried about it? And, it also shows you didn't really have any knowledge
about what would happen if the weather became colder at that time, didn't you? At the time you
made the decisien, wasn't that a terribly difficult decision for you to make'}
MR. KILMINSTER: Again, the information that we had available to us on the sub-scale
work that had been done recently before that, the fac: that there was no direct correlation with
the full-scale data and the limiting _n::htlcal work that had been done. we used that as the
b_sis--I used that as the basis for my recommendation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is it fan" to say that when Mr. Boisjoly and others said that launch-
ing under those conditions on that date, January 28th. that you were exceeding your data base?
Would you agree with that?
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MR. KILMINSTER: Specifically, .fbr the SRM" Tb:'t's true, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN F 9GERS: So, you were willing to
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exceed your data base to get this launch going?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, sir, as we have been from the first launch on Every launch, of
course, extends the data base to a certain extent.
DR WALKER: I thought the data base should be established by te,t, and you shouldn't
exceed the date base in ):our Olx_rations until you understand from tests or apalysis or whatever
that it is safe to proceed.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Bob Rummel, you're in the airlines. Do you exceed the data base
every time you _y passengers?
MR. RUMMEL: No, sir.
DR. WALKER: What's the purpose of testing, then?
MR. KILMiNSTER: Youc first comment bad to do with testing, and then you eventually
said analysis.
DR. WALKER: Test or analysis.
MR. KILMINSTER: And we had indeed run analyses early in the program to evaluate the
effects of a cold soaked motor at 40 degrees and a warm soaked motor at 90 degrees. That was
analysis. ]'he system had agreed that we would not test or attempt to cold seak motors and con-
duct those tests, so analytical qualification or certification, if you will, wa_ acceptable.
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DR. WALKER: So, you had some analytical data then, that extendecl your knowledge to 25
degrees or 20 or 30 degrees _
MR. KILMINSTER: No analytical data. We had some test data at 30 degrees. We also, in my
mind, we have other solid rocket motors that utilize the same material in an O-ring at 30 de-
grees and had been qualified.
MR. SUTTER: But, wasn't your main thrust on the testing, to make sure that the engine
ha_a enough thrust and that most of the concerns over the temperature was the temperature of
the prooellant, to make sure the thrust was right? Is there much of a data base analyzing the
joint at 28 degrees, 40 degrees .or 50 degrees?
There is not a hell of a big data base.
MR. KILMINSTER" That is correct. There is not.
DR. WALKER: How could you proceed, then, if you didn't have either the analytical or e':-
perimental data base with the joint?
MR. EBELING: I have something I can add.
DR. WALKER: Well, let's just re.%rmnd tn the question.
MR. EBELING: We did that 40 degree tes_ data.
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DR. WALKER: But we're talking about 30 degrees, right. We're talking about even _"older
than that.
MR. EPELING: We bad a statement of fact. We had 40-degree test data on the same elas-
tomers.
DR. WALKER: Let's talk about 30 degrees. What did you have there?
MR. EBELING: We had on the 30-degree regime, we had information on one of the compo-
nents called the safe and armed device, and that's the only thing I'm aware of.
DR. WALKER: So, you didn't have anything at 30 degrees?
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MR. KILMINSTER: We also tlad informatiun on the steel at 2_ degrees from a fracture me-
chanics standpoint
DR. WALKER: But you didn't have anything on the O-rir gs?
MR KILMINSTER: On the seals, we relied upon the m ,terial capability, which was stated.
DR WALKER: What material capability are you talkim, about?
MR. KILMYNSTER: We're talking about the O-ring m,,.terial capability that's identified in
the mil spec.
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DR WALKER: The mi[ spec says specifically that the O-ring ms to be qualified for each
use, doesn't it?
MR. KILMINSTER: It does say that.
DR. WALKEB: So, you didn't have anything?
MR. KILMINSTER: In that sense, that's correct.
DR. WALKER: So, you were not within either your analytical or your experimer.tal data
base in proceeding to launch?
MR. KILMINSTER: On this specific program, no. As I mentioned, we have other programs
where it has been tested.
DR. WALKER: Do you think that your colleagues in NASA understood that?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes.
DR. WALKER: Do you think they understood that too?
MR. KILMINSTER: I believe they did.
DR. W__LKER: So, everybody knew that they were proceeding outside of your knowledge?
MR. KILMINSTER: Specific testing at 30 degrees?
DR. WALKER: Testing or analysis.
MR. KILMINSTER: I believe so.
DR. WALKER: Then, why did you do it?
MR. KILMINSTER: On the basis of the best
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information we had available at the time, we did have this testing data, as we mentioned, at 30
degrees on a subscale that did function without any leakage indicated
MR. SUTTER: Do you think that knowing what everybody knows now, how much credence
should really be put into the subscale testing device that is fired with--that is ten inches m
diameter and does not take into account all of the manufacturing tolerances, the usage effects,
the fact that for instance even this n-ietai yields a little bit at the loads imposed on it, even in
the Fressure tests, due to the firing?
Could you draw the conclusion today with what is known that the kinds of subscale testing
that had been used to qualify these large solid rocket boosters is way inadequate to prove safety?
MR. KILMINSTER: Specifically in regards to this seal, _ absolutely agree with that based
upon what we've learned since the accident.
MR. SUTTER: I would like to put that in the record, because that is a finding that I'd like
to arrive at. I think one of the things that was missed is, subscale testing l_ inadequate and l
know it is expensive to run full-scale tests with a gadge: 12 feet in diameter and 100 feet long,
but to continue without doing it, no matter what it costs, I think is a mistake
2718
and I know we're not drawing conclusions here but I feel so strong about that one, I would like
to get it at least in the written record so it is addressed before we're done with this thing.
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GENERALKUTYNA:Joe,you'regoingto haveit in the recordtwice,nowthat you'vesaid
it, andthe secondtimeby our independenttests.We'velookedat the testsandessentiallyrec-
ommended the same thing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who in Thiokol is working on the new design?
MR. BOISJOLY: I am.
MR. RUSSE,,L: I am.
MR. EBELING: I am.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you all agree with the comment Mr. Sutter just made?
MR. BOISJOLY: Absolutely, that blow-by rig was a static rig and it was never intended to
show sealability of a joint.
DR. WALKER: Is this the same thing?
MR. BOISJOLY: He's referring to the blow-by rig, the rig data that was used on the charts
that night, was strictly a blow-by rig. It is not a dynamic rig. It never was intended to be a
dynamic rig.
DR. WALKER: This was the 30 degree?
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes, it is, ,ind it was never
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intended to show sealability. It was to show blow-by.
DR. WALKER: Well, why was it raised, for the test, for this purpose? And I wasn't asking
you that question specifically.
MR. BOISJOLY: It was put into the presentation that night because of a series of disjointed
efforts under an umbrella by different people, trying to put together a presentation w_thout a
chance before presentation to go in and polish.
If I had my druthers, I would have taken that thing out of there after the fact because it
adds absolutely nothing to the presentation that night.
DR. WALKER: That was our impression.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. McDonald, are you working on the new design?
MR. McDONALD: Part-time, when I can. I have had some i Jeas that I've turned in on how
to fix it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Has your assignment changed since the accident?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What are you doing now,?
MR. McDONALD: i used to be the Director of the SRM project. I have a title now called
Director of Special Projects. The people that all worked for me work for somebody else. I am
involved in reviewing some of
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the failure data that is provided to me and coming up with some ideas on how to fix it, and
define a test vehicle that will give us meaningful information which is a full-scale hot-fire test.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you given any reason for the chan£e m assignment?
MR. McDONALD: Well, that is my second change in assignment since the hearing started.
My first change after the 25tn--well, the 14th of February testimony in Florida_ i was pulled ou_
of my position and given the assignment of scheduling.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was any reason given?
MR McDONALD: No reason other than. that is what i was going to do and my people again
were put aside and assigned under somebody else. And I wasn't to be involved,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who notified you to that effect?
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MR. McDONALD: Mr. Cal Wiggins. He was general manager of the Space Division at that
time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who?
MR. McDONALD: Mr Cal Wiggins.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were your people given a different assignment too?
MR. McDONA!,D: They were p;_t under another
27_'I
individual, in fact, one that used to work for me, and f,r a wa:!e i as under him too, during
that time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What was your second assignment?
MR. McDONALD: Well, when Mr. Dorsey came in and took over as the new general manag-
er of the spaze division, and Mr. Wiggins was made his assistant, he gave me the assignment as
Director of Soecial Projects reporting direqtly to him rather than to Mr. Wiggins.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What do you do in that capacity?
MR. McDONALD: In that capacity, he told me I can work on revie_ing some of the informa-
tion that has been provided on the failure analysis gererated at Thiokol and some at Marshall,
and to help Mr, Pelham in coming up with a test articie for the recovery program, full-scale type
test article for the seals, and te feel free to make what recommendations that I might want to
relative to improvements in the program.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Ki!minster, did you concur in the decision to change Mr.
McDonald's assignment?
MR. KILMINSTER. My assignment was also changed, Mr. Chairman. I've been located at
Marshall Space Flight Center, working on the investigation team.
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That was done while I was down at Huntsville, working there.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you have any reason, Mr. McDonald, to think that you were
given another _si_nment because of the testimony you gave before the Commission?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, I do. I feel that I was set aside so that I weuld not have contact with
the people from NASA again because they felt that I either cgul,_n't work with them or it would
be a situat'-n that wouldn't be good for either party, and so I was taken out of the failure analy-
sis work that I was doing at Huntsville prior to that assignment.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So, you were in effect punished/br being right?
MR. McDONALD: ! feel I was.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Boisjoly, your assignment hasn't changed at all?
MR. BOISJOLY: In one respect yes, in one respect no. I have been designated as seal coordi-
nator. I have been preparing a lot of information for input. But I too have been put on the side-
line in that loop with relationship to the customer.
(HAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you feel that may be in retaliation for your testimony?
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MR. BOIF_JOLY: I think that is a possibility, a distinct possibility.
CttAIRMAN ROGERS: How about any other engineers w_'o testified?
MR. BOISJCLY: That I have personal knowledge?
CHAIRMAN RGGERS: Yes, any change in their assignment?
MR. BOISJOLY: No, not that I have personal knowledge of, no.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:HowaboutArnie Thompson?ls hem thesameassignment'?
MR.BOISJOLY:Arnie is in thesameassignment.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Doesanybodyfrom Thiokolwant to commentenwhatMr. McDon-
aid or Mr. Boisjolysaid?
MR.EBEHNG I'm BobEbeling.Prior to this effort I wasinvolvedwith the night of Janu-
ary 27th.Brian Russellv _rkedfor me at that time, and he basicallydoesnow.But the Seal
TaskForce,to giveyoua,_instance,wasundermy auspicesasa managerat that time prior to
the incident,andsincethen it hasbeen--thatSealTaskForcehasbeendissolvedandhasbeen
reorganizedundera differentmanager.My helperhere,Brian Russell,nowhasbeenassignedto
thisnewmanager.
It isjust oneof theanomaliesthat hasgoneonsincethen,andI think it hasgotsomething
to dowith testifying--it isn't all bad,becausethereareseveralof usthat alreadyhavegota lot
of work. andtherearesomepeoplethat don't haveasmuchwork, therefore,becausethe pro-
gramhasbeenbroughtto its knees.
Theseare veryqualifiedmanagersandqualifiedpeople,so thereforewhynot takeadvan-
tageof themandredelegatesomeofthis workloadto theseother
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people?At first whenit happenedI wasveryupset,and! challengedthenewgeneralmanager,
EdDorsey,with this.
Heexplainedto methat, hey,Bob,you'vegotmorethanyoucanhandleanyway.This other
fellow, he doesn't have nothing now that we've brought his program to its knees. Why not give
this portion of it for him to manage? At the time it seeme' logical.
MR. KILMINSTER: Mr. Chairman, l would also like tc 'omment that since the new general
manager has come on bo,_rd, Mr. Dorsey, there has been a oasic organizational concept change.
structure change, in that we ha'Je engineering now who in the past had been in a support orga-
nization, supporting all the programs in the plant, including SRM.
Now we have identified specific individuals from that core organization, and they now
report directly into the Space Shuttle SRM program. So in that concept or context, there has
been some shifting of responsibility in the engineering staff.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, having said all of that, you know what I'm driving at. I mean,
if it appears that you're punishing the two people or at least two of the people who are right
about the decision and objected to the launch which ultimately resulted in
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criticism of Thiokol and then they're demoted or they feel that they are being retaliated against,
that is a very serious matter.
It would seem to me. just speaking mr myself, they should be promoted, not demoted or
pushed aside. Do you want to comment on that?
MR. KILMINSTER: There was certainly no demotion involved that I know of.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, you heard what Mr. McDonald said.
MR. McDONALD: I was not demoted. They just took my people away and gave me r more
menial job as far as I was concerned.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All right, I'll withdraw the use of the word "demoted". It sounds as
if you were demoted.
MR. McDONALD: I felt like it.
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VMR. KEHRLI: I have a question for Mr. Russell and Mr. Boisjoly on a document, tab 32 in
the book, which is the August 9, 1985, letter to Mr. Jim Thomas at Marshall from you, Mr. Rus-
sell.
MR. RUSSELL: Yes.
MR. KEHRLI: Could you explain to the Commission what the purpose of that letter was and
what tt" _ genesis of the ietter was, what you were trying to
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do there?
MR. RUSSELL: In the Problem Review Board telecon we had a specific or we received a
specific question or two specific questions from Jim Thomas. He wanted a specific answer to
those, and he asked us to submit that in writing.
So I talked wiLh Mr. Boisjoly, who does not attend that Problem Review Board meeting, and
I wanted h_s expertise in drafting the letter, which I got and submitted it, and it was in response
to a direct request to send in a written answer.
I don't know what the motivation was at the head of that.
MR. KEHRLI: The letter refers to resiliency tests. What resiliency tests were those, sir?
MR. RUSSELL: Those were the ones that were performed in the spring of 1985 that were
done with a fixed rate as opposed to a variable rate test. They were done at 100, 75 and 50 de-
grees to understand the O-ring's response in a nonpressurized condition, because there was some
concern with the joint rotation; tkat even though the O-ring dimensionally should still have
squeezed or maybe a timing function '_here or a time for that O-ring to recove: where there is no
squeeze.
That was the purpose of these tests, and that
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was pretty much--well, it was driven by the inspection results that we saw on the 51-C flight
and in January, and I guess that we inspected in late January or early February.
MR. BOISJOLY: If you look at the answer to the second question, you'll find that is the
form of the chart that was used the night before the launch, and that was the chart. There was
the chart that was prepared for the August 19th presentation that A1 gave to headquarters.
MR. KEHRLI: In conversation with our staff investigators, Mr. Boisjoly, you indicated that
this was a new theory or there is a difference between the o_d theory on the timing function and
the new theory on the timing function, or that this letter somehow was a different way of look-
ing at the timing function.
2ould you explain that, please?
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes. What had happened is that we had made a presentation as a result of
SRM-15, s_et past the O-ring, which was the coldest flight at that time, the next Flight FRR we
presented that information.
There was a curve in that presentation, that we broke it up into zones A, B and C. When I
found out A1 was going down to give the presentation at Washington
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in August, i was trying to rework that information into a more concise form and to try to give
probabilities to those zones. I'm the one that selected zero to 170 milliseconds as the basis of
looking at that curve and said that at those pressure levels we would have a high probability of
sealing.
Then I selected the 170 to 330 and from 330 to full ignition and assigr,._d probabilities to
those. That's when A1 went down, and that was to point out the concern that if we were always
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qin the initial phases we had a very good lc obability of success. If we moved into the next region,
you lessened that probability. If you moved the event into a third region, you increased the prob-
ability towards a failure, and that was the whole impetus of the whole presentation.
DR. WALKER: What did you mean by high probability?
MR. BOISJOLY: Well, for instance, if you have a secondary seal lifted off the sealing sur-
face in the later timing functions and you had crippled the primary O-ring, you would not have
had the capability to pressure actuate the secondary O-ring when you take resiliency into con-
sideration.
Prior to this effect we had always termed it in terms of geometry. We always talked of the
geometry
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of the gap opening in relationship to an O-ring that always had the capability of following in the
seal surfaces and being pressure actuated.
But when you take that same group of data whici, was in this time frame and apply the
resiliency data to it, as we knew it at that time, on a limited number of tests, that said that if
the O-ring did not have the ability to foJ.low the loading surfaces as they were pulling away as
the gap was opening, the longer the period of time that you were in that regime the less chance
you had to seal.
So I tried to define it in a three zone region, to say a high probability, a moderate probabili-
ty, and a low probability.
DR. WALKER: I understand that By high probability did you mean 95 percent or 75 per-
cent?
MR. BOISJOLY: In the beginning on the basis of the limited test we had, I felt there was
100 percent if it happened within the first 150, 170 milliseconds because there would be an im-
pingement problem and then the margin would truly be a margin of impingement and not blow-
by.
DR. WALKER: But you didn't use the word likely. You used high probability.
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes.
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DR. WALKER: Which implies that there is some chance.
MR. BOISJOLY: Well, there always is.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. McDonald, as I remember your testimony in public session, it
was to the effect that you refused to sign the telefax or refused to go along, and normally when
you were at Kennedy you were the one that would have signed. Is that correct?
MR. McDONALD: I said I hadn't had an experience and wasn't aware of one where anybody
was ever asked to sign anything, but I felt that was my responsibility if it ever came up there
because I am the senior official for Thiokol.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Kilminster said, as I recall, he normally would be the one to
sign that and that seemed to kind of conflict with your testimony. Is that what you testified to,
Mr. Kilminster?
MR. KILMINSTER: I think what I said, Mr. Chairman, was that that whole business was
unusual in the sense that we were talking about something being signed the night before the
launch. However under other circumstances the piece of paper that is signed to identify flight
readiness, as far as Morton Thiokol is concerned, that is a document that I normally signed.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Even when Mr. McDonald is
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there?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is tha, correct, Mr. McDonald?
MR. McDONALD: That is :rue tbr every formal Flight Readiness that we have prior to the
launch. The reason I was there and Joe wasn't there is we alternate doing that. In case some-
thing comes up after the last formal review, and the last formal review is the L-1 Review, it is
signed by anybody and if anything comes up after that then that's why I'm there and the other
contractors have people like me there who can resolve those issues and are responsible for going
ahead with the launch.
As I said in my testimony, Jesse Moore makes an oral poll subsequent to that L-1 Review
because in many cases there are items brought up at the L-1 that are finally resolved, and then
makes a poll to ask each of the contractors if they are ready to fly because now everything is
supposed to be in.
I'm the one that has to answer yes, Thiokol is ready to fly. If something happens after that
time, it is my impression the reason I'm there is that I'm the guy that's going to have to get up
and say yes, we are ready to fly.
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I have never been in a condition where we ever had to sign anything, and I don't think
there was ever any condition where we had to sign anything after L-I. I expected, because of this
telecon, that I would have to do that because I felt that I had the same responsibility at the
launch site as he had when he was there or I shouldn't even take the time in going.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You told them that you would not sign?
MR. McDONALD: I told Mr. Mulloy I wouldn't sign and that it would have to come from
the plant. Ncw.. he didn't ask me to. I just told him I wouldn't do that because I felt that ! was
going to have to do that_ That was my responsibility. That's why I was there.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you know that, Mr. Kilminster?
MR. K!LMINSTER: No, I did not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You didn't know that he had said he wouldn't sign?
MR. KILMINSTER: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why did you think that they required your signature in this case?
You said you had never done it before.
MR. KILMINSTER: Because we had not had a
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later than L-1 identified problem.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why would it have to be i, writing?
MR. KILMINSTER: I guess the only thing I can say is I was not surprised when Mr. Mulloy
asked for that, but again the whole thing was unusual.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm interested in why you weren't surprised if you had never done it
and you had a man there that normally would orally approve this. Why weren't you surprised
when they asked you to sign it?
MR. KILMiNSTER: I guess I can't comment other than what I've said.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Didn't it occur to you that they might be wanting to put the monkey
on your back in writing?
MR. KILMINSTER: Well, the monkey is always on my back under normal circumstances.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS Not normally. It would be on the man who said it.
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MR. KILMINSTER: Well, again, I go back to the formal paper that is signed for the flight
readiness review sequence, and it normally is my name that is on there unless I am gone at the
time that signature was to be made, in which case Mr McDonald or someone else signs it.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In any case, the fact that they never asked you to do anything like
that before and that Mr. McDonald was there when normally he would be authorized to say
okay, that didn't strike you as particularly alarming at all?
MR. KILMINSTER: Well, the rationale came from the plant. The information that was pre-
sented came from the plant, and that is where I was, is at the plant.
MR. HOTZ: I wonder if we could poll the Thiokol delegation as to whether they were or
were not aware that a launch constraint was being waived on a formal waiver for each of the
flights after 51-B.
MR. EBELING: I was not aware.
MR. KILMINSTER: I was not aware.
MR. RUSSELL: I was not aware.
MR. McDONALD: I was not aware.
MR. BOISJOLY: I was not aware.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
DR. WALKER: Let me just follow up on that if I might. Although you weren't aware that
there was a formal waiving of the launch constraints, you were aware that anomalies from pre-
vious flights had to be explained satisfactorily before the next flight could occur.
As I understood Mr. Mulloy this morning, that was based on the analysis of the amount of
damage that
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was acceptable and the amount of erosion that was acceptable versus the amount of erosion
which had been seen.
There were some models used to predict the amount of erosion which was to be expected. As
Dr. Feynman has pointed out, these models really were not precise models. There is a consider-
able amount of variation, because all of the parameters were beyond your ability to measure or
know. so on what basis did you feel the erosion could be predicted sufficiently well to allow the
flight to be continued? What models, what data, what analyses?
MR. McDONALD: I would like to try to respond to that. Dr. Salita developed those models
at my request, I guess, starting in the spring of 1985 and published two different parts of that.
At that time, prior to the problem we had on 51-Baker, 16-A we had not seen any erosion
other than direct impingement on the seal, and that is what his model was based on.
When we recovered that hardware and saw that we had violated the primary seal, we imme-
diately were very concerned because his model, being a jet impingement model, is a function of
time, and it has to have a forcing function which is the delta pressure between
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the chamber and the cavity.
That's a function of ignition time. and so it does have a limit within the model that you
can't get any further erosion because there is no other time in the pressure trace, the pressure
trace of the motor, that you get that kind of a condition.
Based upon that, we thought we had a limiting model. However, there are a lot of un-
knowns as far as the fidelity of that model is concerned, but his predictions, models in five-inch
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tests that we ran and fairly good engineering terms to define how accurate it was and within
about a 12 percent spread, he predict_ all tkat data very accurately.
Now, the amount of erosion that we had, we then went and tested to see where we in Lhe
real world lose the O-ring relative to what we think would be the maximum with our model, and
we did that two ways.
The first way we took an O-ring and actually sliced pieces out of it just like we figured it
would be eroded away until we could no longer hold it as a seal. hi doing that we found out that
we could lose near_y two-thirds of that O-ring before we lost seal. That was cold, a cold ga,J _est.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Was that a dynamic test?
MR. McDONALD: No, that was a static test.
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GENERAL KUTYNA: No rotation of the joinLs?
MR. McDONALD: Right, no rotation of the joints.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Did you feel that was valid in that case?
MR. McDONALD: We didn't feel it was totally valid, and so we wanted to run some hot
scale tests because you eroded differently as well during hot scale, and so we then took some hot
scale tests of our motors and focused the jets so there were more and more higher heat transfer
rates to keep eating away the O-ring until it failed.
We found that in the evolution of that test series that we could erode up ,:o 125 thousandths,
and we had a lot of tests there and below that we n_ever saw a seal ever fail. W_ went up to _50
thousandths of the material removed, and it still ._ealed.
However, we had two tests, one at 145 and one at 160, that did fail. Now, both o! Chose _ailed
the primary seal and eroded something like less than 10 thousandths off of the secondary seal.
Now, these joints did not rotate but they did show the sensitiv_.ty and the capability of the
O-ring to jet impingement erosion. If you took our worst measured erosion on the O-ring relative
to what it took
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to really fail it, it was nearly a factor of three to one.
Recognizing the fidelity of the math model is not real good, we did not feel it was that bad
at three to one, and as long as we could retain the secondary seal during a good portion of the
erosion time period, we felt good. Our concern was if we ever got it past the time that we could
have a good secondary seal. That was our concern.
The meeting that occurred on August 19 came about as a result of this problem with the
nozzle eroding through, and that is what drove that meeting. Headqua_ers wanted to hear
about that. We lost the primary seal and eroded some secondary.
We all sat down together and got together with the engineering people and put together
that presentation and collectively said, you know, we ought to address the whole seal issue, not
just that failure, because we all felt that if that ever happened in the field joint we were in bad
trouble because the nozzle has a much better secondary seal than the field joint does.
We decided we would put it together as a total pressure seal presentation and highlight the
field joint even though there was a nozzle joint that caus_J the problem that
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apparently drove the restriction to launch 1 ,vas unaware that we retained.
MR. SUTTER: At this meeting on August 19th at headquarters, that was called because of
Thiokol's concern that the joint was really in trouble?
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MR. McDONALD: No, it was called--we had had another meeting scheduled at Washington
headquartez_ at that time that had a problem with the mixer fire earlier in the y._ar, and there
was a review of that
I believe Mike Weeks either called Joe or I or one of us and said well, you're here, you
ought to come and adaress a couple of other issues that have happened recently that we are very
interested in.
One of _hem is we had broken the structural test article on the filament wound case I be-
lie,;e in Jul: down at Marshall, and tbey wanted to hear about that.
The other one was they were made aware that we had violated tbe primary seal in the
nozzle and wan*.ed to hear about :hat and what our rationale was to continue.
So then I called Mr. Mulloy and told him that we had been requested for this presentation,
and he said we're going to have to review that with them before we can go to Washington, which
is the normal sequence ",f things, and so we were prepared to have to go down to
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review it with the Marsha'.l people.
We finally held that on a telecon and faxed down all the charts that we planned to take to
Washington and reviewed i'_ with all the Marshall people before we went to Washington. He
came up and met us here in WasLington.
MR. SU__rER: What was ;he tone of the meeting in Washington? That it was a serious prob-
lem or just business as usual? Apparently it wasn't the primary subject on the, agenda.
MR. McDONALD: It wa_ not the primary subject on the agenda.
MR SLIT'rER: There wau, another meeting in Washington, too, wasn't there, on this prob-
lem? Weren't there two meetings there in the fall of 19857
MR. McDONALD: Well, Fm not aware of the other meeting.
MR. SUTTEN: Well, what I'm curious about was NASA headquarters fully informed aleut
or _Jhat was their at*_itude based upon what they hear_ from your or nybody else as to how
serious this joint problem was?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I think they felt it was serious. They felt that we did a good job of
focusing the history of that problem; where we were at, what we understood about it, what we
felt _e needed to do to fix
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it, because we not only addressed the history, I think, and we focused it quite well.
MR. SUTTER: Would it have put them in the frame of mind that when another launch
came up they would ask how is this joint for this flight? Is it okay? Or would they be that con-
cerned?
MR. McDONALD: I don't think so, unless the previous flight showed an erosion problem or
something different than they had heard. They, I think, felt that we needed to establish this
task force in support of that which we had had in ,l_ce about that time to put forth a tocused
effort on trying to resolve the problem because th_-_ felt it was the same problem. It didn't
matter whether it was in the nozzle or the field joint.
MR SUTrER: Then apparently your presentation to them is a lot less or a lot more cooled
down t ban some of the internal paperwork as to the severity of this problem.
MR. McDONALD: Well, I'm frankly surprised that this piece of paper here generates as
much interest as that presentation, because that gets lost in the stack of those that's probably
that thick (indicating).
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I'm not sure when you say more interest, we're just trying to
complete the record. I don't think you should judge our relative
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interest. I mean, we're pretty ir:terested in all aspects of this, and we wanted to find out more
about this piece of paper because we had never been ale_ed to it.
No one told us before. We asked NASA and everyone else to be sure to let us know every-
thing there was that might relate to this, and we discovered this ourselves. So we're just asking
about it.
I'm going to first let Gene go ahead, and then I have a question.
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DR. COVERT: I had several questions on the sequence. I guess, Mr. Kilminster, I will ask
you first.
Were you involved in the original design of the SRM and the joints in any way?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Was it at that time the goal of the design to protect the integrity of the O-
rings against thermal distress of any kina:
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, sir, that's always been the goal.
DR. COVERT: In view of that, do you fee! that as the problem has progressed and you now
live with a situation that you hadn't anticipated at all, does this give you a feeling of discomfort
that this is not the _.ev O-rings ought to be treated?
MR. KILMINSTER Yes. I believe that especially since this recent testing has been done
that we have lear_.ed quite a bit from the subscale testing that has been done of higher fidelity
than we were doing [_fore, and I think we have learned a lot more about that joint. I think we
have learned a lot more about the effect of squeeze on the O-ring. And there has been a move, if
you will, from the time that this joint was initially de__igned, to getting rid of the putty, if you
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will, getting ri£_ of the thermal barrier, the protection.
I believe t:ha'c perhaps in some motors and in some circumstances, maybe even in the field
joints of our motor, that might be appropriate, where you can convince yourselves you're not
going to have circumferential flow or a replenishment of the heat, if you will. And teat is some-
thing we will have to take a very quick look at and deep look at.
DR. COVERT: Have you ever been associated with the use of O-rings in a rocket before
where there was continued and repeated thermal distress to the O-rings?
MR. KILMINSTER: Well, usually, Dr. Covert, you don't get the opportunity to look at fired
hardware to the extent that we have here.
DR. COVERT: How about Mr. Boi_oly, were you involved in the original design ,of this
joint?
MR. BOISJOLY: No, I was not. I came to work at Thiokol in 1980.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Ebeling?
MR. EBELING" Yes. ! was.
DR. COVERT: ,oes your feeling about the use of O-rings coincide with Mr. Kilminster's?
MR. EBELING: No, it doesn't.
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DR. COVERT: Do you want to tell me the difference?
MR. EBELING: Well, I am a hydraulics engineer by profession, and O-rings ard seals in
hydraulics are very sacred, but for the most part, a hydraalics or pneumatics engineer controls
the structure, the structural design, the structural deformation to make sure that t'..:,s neat little
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rpart that is so critical is given everything it needs to eperate. I_ soiid rocket motors I have been
there now pushing 25 years. They had a different attitude on' O-rir_gs when I came there, and it
is not just Thiokol, it is univclsal.
DR. COVERT: By universal, you mean the solid rocket industry?
MR. EBELING: The e ntir_ solid rocket industry. It gets around from one. the competitors'
information eventually gets to me by orie track or another, and mine to theirs, but my experi-
ence on O-rings was and is to this date an O-ring is not a mechanism, and never should be a
mechanism that sees the heat of the magnitude of our motors, a_d i think before I do retire, I'm
going to make sure that we continue to fly with round seals which [ am against round seals
anywqy. I think seals with memories, not pressure-activated, but ene, gized through mechanical
means, and in all cases,
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keep the heat of our rocket motor_ away from those seals. Whate_er it ._s, you do not need chain-
her pressure to energize a seal.
DR. COVERT: In this regard, then, did you have an increasing concern as you saw the tend-
ency first to accept thermal d_stress aod then to say, well, we can model this reasonably and we
can accept _ little bit of erosion, and then etc., etc.? Did this cause you a feeling of--if not dis-
tress, then betrayal in terms of your feeling about O-rings?
MR. EBELING: I'm sut_, sorry you asked that question.
DR. COVERT: I'm sorry I had to.
MR. EBELING: To answer your question, yes. In fact, I have been an advocate, I used to sit
in on the O-ring task force and was involved in the seals since i3rian Russell worked directly for
me, and I had a certain allegiance to this type of thing an3_'ay, that I felt that we shouldn't ship
any more rocket motors until we get it fixed.
DR. COVERT: Did you voice this?
MR. EBELING: Unfortunately, not to the right people.
DR. COVERT: How do you feel about inspectability of this kind of a sealing device?
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MR. EBELING: Like the ones that--I think the pressure testing that we dr.,, the leak pres-
sure testing is the only practical method that we can do for this type of a se3',. There is a possi-
bility you might invent an N-ray system te rotate the motor and make sure everything is all
right by N-ray, because N-ray is opposite of X-ray. It washes out metal, and elastomers and plas-
tics show up real keen.
DR. COVERT: N-ray is neutrons?
MR. EBELING: Neutrons. Such a system might be devised, but it would be very expensive,
but the pressure testing and the inspection of the joint the way we are doing it is probably the
only practical way of doing it.
MR. SUTTER: Do you think that pressure testing it 28 days before the rollout and the thing
sitting out there with the temperature working on it-
MR. EBELING: No problem. You're from Boeing. I am sure your people would say the same
thing, no problem.
MR. SUTTER: Well, maybe some people from l_oeing would say it. I still have reservations.
When you take into account-
MR. EBELING: Then quit flying. You had Letter quit flying.
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MR.SUTTER:Waita minute,now.We'vegot four systemsflying everythingin our bucket.
anda singlefailuredoesn'tdoanythirgexceptgiveyoua yellowlight. There's a difference.
MR. EBELING: It makes you tense tho'agh.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You said you didn't voice your views to the right people.
Did you voice your views to anybody?
MR. RUSSELL: I heard them.
MR. BOISJOLY: ! heard them.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you put :t in writing at all, any of your vmws?
MR. EBELING: No, not exactly, not in the words I just told you.
MR. BOISJOLY: I think I can express the fact that he must have expressed it at least two
or three times a week during the times of November and December in our seal meetings.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I want to make a comment to Mr. Kilminster, I guess, but to the
company as a whole. I am very upset about the testimony Mr. McDonald gave. It's a very serious
matter. In this kind of an accident where people come before a Co_'fflission and tell the truth
and then they are treated as he believes he has been _eated, which 9bvior,.sly is in some way
punishment or
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retaliation for his testimony, it is extremely serious, and the whole idea of the progra,._ is to
have an openness and to have an honest exchange of views.
And in this c_e, Mr. McDonald and Mr. Boisjo!y and others, Mr. Thompson and others,
were right. If their warnings _ad been heeded that day and the flight had beer. delayed, there's
no telling what would have happened. We might never have had the accident. And to have
something happen to him that seems to be in the nature of punishment is shocking, and I just
hope that you convey that to management.
I don't know how the others feel, but that is how I feel. 1 would think you would want him
in all of your discussions, and Mr. Boisjoly and he shoulon't be trea:ed that wa._ He should be
treated the other way, that he was right and you were wrong, and others who zhaaged their
decisions were wrong, and they were right, and to have something that seems to me to be in the
nature of punishment is very, very distressing, and ! just wanted you to know that.
There may be other questions.
GENERAL KUTYNA: I had one question. The briefing on the !9th in Wushington, Mike
Weeks was there.
Who were the other folks who were there, do
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you recall?
MR. McDONALD: I had a list at one time.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Could you send me that for the record?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Secondly, there has been some question that people understood that
there was a temperature problem. I remember your co:_clusions chart, your file chart, and the
very first bullet of that chart had the word "resiliency" in it.
Do yeu feel when you talked about resiliency at that meeting people got the conhectmn be-
tween resiliency and temperature, that resiliency was a function of teml_ rature, or was that
lost?
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MR. McDONALD: It may have gotten lo6t because w_ hadn't run a very long range of tem-
peratures when we got that data.
GENERAL KUTYNA: So it is possible that people at headquarters from that kriefing did
not understand temperature was a concern?
MR McDONALD: I guess it is possible they could have
GENERAL KUTYNA: Is it probable?
MR McDONALD I don't know if it is probable, because we put it as the first bullet of why
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we thought that was our highest concern, and if that hadn't have happened, we wouldn't have
had that concern.
DR. KEEL: Could I follow up on that, just one quick question?
In fact, in your 51-E flight readiness review after 51-C, which, Mr. Boisjoly, you have testi-
fied was the worst case of blow-by, and in fact, you drew a correlation to temperature in that
worst case, the conclusion of that that was briefed to Marshall at the project level, as we dis-
ctused this morning in testimony, in fact says that explicitly. It says STS-51C, consistent with
er¢_ion base, and then it says sub-bullet t_nder that conclusion, low temperature enhanced prob-
ability of blow-by. STS 51-C experienced wo_st case temperature change in Florida history.
Now. that is an unequivocal reference to temperature and the fact that it makes things
orse.
Can you explain, and _)erhaps you, Mr. Ri',minster, since you had testified again today that
you sign off on these flight readiness reviews, how it was that that information never got up to
headquarters, or did it get te headquarters?
MR _ILSIINSTER: I believe that that information was a direct quote from a flight readi-
n_
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review statement that we made for acceptability to fly. From that point on, that's up to Mar-
shall Space Flight Center. what they take fo,mvard.
DR. KEEL: Did you sit in on the Center board briefings of that flight readiness review?
MR. KILMINSTER: Either Al or myself, and I don't recall specifically on that one.
DR. KEEL: AI, did you _it in?
MR. McDONALD: Joe sat in as a member of the Center board. I stayed there because I gave
the briefing you just read from.
DR. KEEL: So you _tayed at the Center board briefing? So you were there at the Center
board briefing?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
DR. KEEL: Who briefed that?
MR. McDONALD: Mr. Mulloy.
DR. KEEI,: And Mr. Boisjely, were you there _
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes, I was.
DR. KEEL: Now, was it any of ,,,'our recollections, can you recall what was briefed, and was
this temperature concern or even the extensive brief you have given now on O-ring erosion prob-
lems, was that briefed at the center board?
MR. McDG_NALD: No, it wasn't. It was kind )f
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a one-liner that we had some erosion, but it was within our experience base or something to that
effect.
15 6 C - q/
. :-" ¢.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I want to ask one rr ,_e question.
When you said before that you answered rr,_ question that there was reference to how _ .r
customer would feel about you, what was the basis for that?
MR. McDONALD: Well, ori6r to the testimony I gave in Florida, as I indicated, I was spend-
ing full time at Huntsville, ana subsequent to that time I was not allowed to go back to Hunts-
ville. I wanted, too, to review so, he of the-----
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was any reason given?
MR. McDONALD: The only reason given was they didn't think it would be in the best inter-
ests of either party that I do that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who told you that?
MR. McDONALD: I talke_l with Mr. Dorsey or a while on that, and he felt that I would be
better off with working with problems in the plant.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did he indicate anyone from NASA had said that to him?
MR. McDONALD: No he ,lid not. I do know that even after the recovery te.qm started and I
had submitted some ideas on hew to fix the problem, before
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we went to our first f,_rmal meetlr)g at MaIshall, that one of the fixes thet we proposecl was one
that I had developed. I wasn't asked to even go and support that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Any reason given?
MR. McDONALD: No. In fact, I didn't even get a copy of the presentation. I had to go
borrow someb,'.,dv else's, and I also did not get copies of some of the material that was being
generated m failure analysis, and I had found out in the hallway that that had been done, al.d
so I went and found some of the data. But I got 'he distinct impression that it was not being sent
to me on ._u_ because some people knew that I did not agree with all of the conclusions that
were being drawn on some of the data.
MR. HO,'VZ,: Mr McDonald, c;d subsequent to the accident, in your testimony before this
Commission, did you receive any personal comment from people at NASA about your testimony. ?
MR. McDONALD: I think, I'm not sure of the exact meeting, was when part of the Commis-
sion came out, I believe it was Mr. Sutter's team, reviewed the development, qualification, certi-
fication of the SRMs. It was a two-day m_eting, and the second day I was there, Mr. Mulloy
came into my office and slammed the door, and as far as I was concerned, was very
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intimidating to me. He was obviously very. disturbed and -wanted to know what my motivation
was--and I won't use his exact words--for doing what I was doing, and I asked him what's his
problem? [h_ you mean w,mt my testimony was? And he said no. As I understand it, you're
giving information to the Colnmission without going through your own management, without
going through NASA, and w} _',t's your motivation for doing that?
And I told him to calm down, that I didn't think I had to get a note from my mother or
anyone to give anybody information, and _! felt it was appropriate to give them information. And
I asked him what specifically, and it was the information that I had generated on the fourth of
February while I was at Huntsville when I got frustrated with regard to the failure analysis on
what I thought would be some real, potential causes of the failure, that I had given that to Dr.
Co _ert when he was there, I think before nay testimony, at the end of February, and had not
gone through I g_less the proper channels or something in doing that, and for some reason he
was very upset about that and was very intimiaating. But I ignored him.
On the other ho.nd, he said that, you know, he never ,#a,s against me, and he had a hi_;h
regard for my capaoility, and he wanted to let me know that. But I
!",9?
27._7
could ._ee no reason for him doing what he did.
MR HOTZ: Did you get the feeling that there might be some feeling on the part of the
Hunts-ille pec_l_ :hat they wanted to control this flow of information to the Commission°
MR. VIcDONALD: I got the feeling that that was happening from things that I was reading,
the dat, r, that I was looking at, and the eol,clusions that were drawn, and hew they were drawn,
,nstead _f focusing it, to me was making it fuzzy.
GENERAL KIYTYNA: Mr. Kilminster, you are then--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Don, before we leave that, Mr. Mulloy, do you have any comment to
make on Mr McDonald's statement?
MR. M : LLOY: Yes, sir. If you would like for me to give you my version of that discussion.
CHAIR_IAN ROGERS: Why don't you?
MR. Mb'LIA3Y Yes, sir, I would be glad to.
_,s often happens. T guess, when we kave a meeting, we don't all remember it being the
same. It must have been a different meeting. I came to Mr. McDonald's door and asked him if he
had a moment, and he said he did, and I then closed the door. I didn't realize I slammed it. I was
not upset. I think I
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started by shaking Al's hand and said, before I say anything, I want you to know that I don't
have any personal feelings one way or the other about what ,has occurred sub,,quest to the
launch. However, I have a curiosity, and the curiosity I havo is why you have taken the ap-
proach that you have in circumventing ynur own ,nanagement and the customer in voicing con-
cerns about the launch of 51-L that were never voiced to his management or to me. HIS response
to that was that he was very upset about the way the investigation _vas goi_.g at Ma_hall when
he was down there, but when he got back to HOSC, after the incident, wbe :l _e came back to
Huntsville, he found NASA organizing a great number of teama a_ d !a" mg out a broad spec-
trum of areas _ look at, which included the exterr_al tmlk and the FdME and the SRB and
forming teams to look at in a broad way across the total system to cry and determine what
caused the accident.
A] I think mentioned to me that he had obtained the information about the temperature
readings on the right hand SRB from the !R gun at 9 degrees, and he was try;rig .t_ introduce
that into the team to which he was a_gned, which was Mr. Swinghmnmer's SRM team, and he
was very frustrated, that the team seemed to be more inter_ted in getting a structure t_ Ic_ok
_.cro88
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the total spectrum at the possible failure causes as opposed to picking up the obvious thing,
which was tI;__ low temperature on the right hand booster.
And that is the way I recall the disct_sion.
GENERAL KUTYNA: May I ask who directed you to look _,'ross the whole spectrum Pt the
accident structure? Where did you get that guidance?
MR. MULLOY: I did not do _hat. I wab not participating.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Well, let me tell yoa where I got--where _.he guidance came. Our
panel gave you the guidance tv look across the whole spectrum of the aecidev.t structure and
look at every facet of it rather than home in on 8omething that you ,'night lhink _as the conclu-
sion.
MR. MULLOY: I think that was the proper approach.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:But the discussionthat Mr. McDonaldreferredto wasinitiatedby
you?
MR.MULLOY:Yes,sir, it was.
CHAIRMANROGERS:And whatwasthe purposeof it again?Anddon't go t • ugh the
whole thing, but what was the purpose? Why did you do it?
MR. MULLOY: I have known A1 for some time and had worked with him for some time,
and why I did it was
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based upon his testimony that he had objected to the launch and continued to protest the launch
after the discussion on the night of the 27th when that was not a fact.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, you were challenging his veracity at this point?
MR. MULLOY: I wondered why he said that when he did not pass that on to his manage-
ment, nor did he pass it on to me, nor did at any time during the launch process when he was on
the cons61e during that morning did he make any comments or continue to object to the launch.
As a matter of fact,as ht testified,he lefthis console and leftthe loop during the launch proc-
ess.
2761
C!LAIRMAN ROGERS: So you had no particular motive to start this discussion othe ban
to satisfyyour own curiosity?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.As to why he felt that there was a concern now that he did not
consmur itworthy ofpassing on to his management or to the customer.
DR. KEEL: May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman? We did give directionswith respectto a
broad investigation,but we never gave a direction with respect to anyone who had reformation
that they thought should be passed to the Commission, that they could pass itdirectly to the
Commission. There was never any direction that that should go through management, or
through NASA, or through anyone.
DR. WALKER: I had a question for Mr. Kilminster. In the original Thiokol proposal, the
seal was differentfrom the present seal.Itwas a face seal and a jointseal.
MR. KILMINSTER: That iscorrect.
DR. WALKER: I wonder ifyou could or ifyou are aware of the evolution of that design and
why the change was made to two bore seals,and what the rationale for that change was.
MR. KILMINSTER: As I recall,Dr. Walker,
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there were probably three things that entered into that decision.Number One was that ifwe
maintained that configuration,as you will recall,at the end of tke clevisleg,where there would
be an O-ring groove, that would becom*, a very delicate item to have on the end of the segment,
and subjectto easy damage. That was one consideration.
DR. WALKER: Do you mean the thickness ofthe walls was insufficient,you felt?
MR. KILMINSTER: No, not the thickne=c of the walls, the O-ring groove. There was a
notch, as I recall, in that clevis where the O-ring sat :._-,,! then fitted against a face that was on
the tang side. That was one side.
DR. WALKER: I haven't understood the objection yet. Are you saying that the walls of the
O-ring groove were too thin, or what was the problem there?
MR. KILMINSTER: Instead of having a total thickness of the clevis end, you would have a
groove there where the side walls of the groove, if you will, are thin and therefore subject to
damage.
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MR. EBELING: We set the c.:ses periodically on-end, and said if you would have done tnat
you would have ruin.,_d that $100,000 plus component because you would have def6rmed that
fragile edge, and the distance on
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that O-ring groove is what he is replying to.
DR. WALKER: But of course a face seal is a much more reliable seal. In fact, it is one that
satisfies your criteria, as a matter of fact.
MR. KILMINSTER: Let me address the other two items. The analysis showed that we were
going to get elongation and therefore unseating of that face seal on the order of 20 to 30/
1,00(h.hs during pressurization. That is in the wrong direction. It wouldn't maintain the seal, the
squeeze, if you will, during pressurization. It would tend to move away.
And then a third consideration, and I believe those are the three main ones, was that at
that time we were trying to extend the total length of those segments so that we would not have
to have a weld in those segments, in that high strength D6 material, and we were exceeding
what the fabrica,_or had previously done. To put that other notch on there, to form the face for
the O-ring to match _galnst would have required more beef in the billet at that point, and there
was _gme question whether he would be able to give us the length of segment that we desired, so
those were the three main things, I believe.
DR. WALKER: Were you concerned in making that change that you were going away from
the standa.,'J way in
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which O-rings were to be used? You were going away from a seal which was a positive seal,
which was at least in principle independent dynamics? And I am not sure that I agree wtth your
second point, but you were. going toward a configuration which was not recommended by the
seal industry?
MR. KILMINSTER: To the contrary, going the way that we d;_d was in keeping with the
existing Titan configuration with the bore seal, with all of the history that they had be aind that.
DR. WALKER: I am not talking about the solid rocket motors. I am talking about the seal
industry. I am talking about recommendations from Parker and other people who had developed
O-rings.
MR. KILMINSTER: Subsequently we did have discussions with Parker, and initially they
had the same comments tkat you just mentioned. Subeequently, however, they came back to us
and said, with the data base that we had at that time, with the work that had been done, they
could understand our u*ilizing the seal in that configuration.
DR. WALKER: Are those comments documented?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, sir.
DR. WALKER: C_mld you see that we get copies of those?
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MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: Mr. McDonald, Marshall has been making some tests, and so have you
been making some tests of the seal and so on in various kiDds of jigs and small-scale and that
sort of stuff Do you have something to tell us in which you presumably disagree in some way
with the conclusions cr the attitudes that we have been getting, because we got most of our in-
formation directly from them and not directly from you, and I wan*J_l to correct that, if possible,
i_ you had something to suggest about the way we interpret the results, and have you seen the
kind of results that they have had?
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MR. McDONALD Yes, I have seen, I believe, most of them. I don't know if I have seen
them all. I don't know what their final re_:ommendations--I guess my comments would be based
on the last presentation ! am aware of that was made on the 10th of April. ! think it was made
by Ma_hall to the task force, and the conclusions from that presentation were that if you look
at the conclusions, they don't even mention temperature in there at all. but even where they do
mention temperatur_ as having an effect, that it by itself couldn't explain the problem. It had to
be in conjunction with other things.
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DR. FEYN:g/_ N: Do you mean like the seal fitting into the groove?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct, and it is obviously, I think, biased towards potential as-
sembly problems, either through the assembly itself or contamination of things that one can't
specifically prove other than that there is no indication in any of the records or any of our prior
history that this was outside of that, and if you look at their own chart on the dynamic O-ring
test, you can go across that chart and see at 25 degrees where they never had a single success. It
was I00 percent failurein both the primary and secondary O-rings
Ifyou go across the same chart and look at 55 degrees and up, there was not a single fail-
ure. There was 100 percent successes,and it was like 17 tests out of !7 at the higher tempera-
tures and ten out often at the lower temper _tures.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But, Al, ifI can interrupt,the chart was presented as a compilation
of your data and their data, and what is the ordinate on that chart? It'stemperature, right?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And the bottom lineof that chart is,boy, when itgets cold,you start
failing.Is
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that not true?
MR. McDONALD: Well, that is absolutely true.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Then how can you say they have not considered temperature?
MR. McDONALD: Well, they considered it, but looking at that chart----
GENERAL KUTYNA: Where were the reds on that cLart?
MR. McDONALD: That is exactly the point I am making. And how you can look at that
chart and then not conclude--I mean, you are making my point.
GENERAL KUTYNA: I think we are saying the same thing.
MR. McDONALD: I look at that chart and I don't know how anybody can not conclude that
that wasn't the major driver, if not the whole thing.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Well, Mr. McDonald, it is this Comm_ion that is going
to make the conclusions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is right. I wonder, the discussion that you had with Mr.
Mulloy, the one you were talking about a moment ago, when was that?
MR. McDONALD: I can't recall the exact date. It was when Mr. Sutter's team was out to
our plant.
MR. DUPREE: March the 17th timeframe.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: At that time Mr. Mulloy was advised he was no_ to have anything to
do with the investigation,and not to take part in the investigation.And you testifiedthat he
advised you about how you should convey i-'forrnationto the Commission?
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MR. McDONALD: Well, he asked me why I was aqing it. what I was doing, and why I was
taking the liberty of giving information directly to the. _ -,mission without going through my
own management and through NASA first. That is oxactly act,., _ _,o asked me. And it wasn't in a
nice voice.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you feel now that you have hod the opportunity to present as
much information that you want to the Commission? We want to be sure that anybody that has
any comments or information, that they have direct access to us. Do you feel that you have had?
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Chairman, let me interject.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let him answer first.
MR. EBELING: Does that apply to all of us?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To Mr. McDonald.
MR. McDONALD: Well, in violation of Mr.
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Mulloy's concern again I gave some information directly to the Commission without going
through the proper channels. I sent a copy to Dr. Keel and also to General Kutyna on a memo
that I drafted to my boss about a week ago, and I informed Mr. Garrison last night about that
on my conclusions from the failure analysis from the data that I have had access to, recognizing
that I haven't seen everything as to what I concluded I think happened and what may have
happened, and what seems very conclusively has happened, and what I feel is necessary to make
sure that we understand those things that are well substantiated and those that may be specula-
tive.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, will you feel free to give the Commission any information you
want to give us, and if you consider what Mr. Mulloy told you as a direction, forget it, because
we are running this investigation, and you have access to us any time you want, and that ap-
plies to all of you.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Just for the record, sir, I learned of this possibility that some things
had not gotten through early last week, and Mr. McDonald and I have had a conversation where
I wanted to assure that his concerns, both his and Mr. Boisjoly's ana whoever else--is that not
true?
MR. McDONALD: It is true.
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MR. RUMMEL: Mr. Chairman, j 1st in the interest of completing the record and accuracy,
Mr. Mulloy did sit in on some of our meetings up at Thiokol and did participate in the discussion
quite freely. I thought personally that it was generally more helpf,_i ttla= not. Whether he
should have or no'c, I don't think we chose to impose any restrictions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, to make it clear, and I hope it is clear, and I think it has been,
the Commission's decision to disqualify those who might have been involved in the decision-
making to launch 51-L was that they should not be responsible for matters involving the investi-
gation. That was not tu preclude them from giving information or preclude us from asking for
information from them, but any instructions from Mr. Mulloy about how the investigation was
going to be conducted or how information was going to be conveyed was directly opposite what
we told them. They all knew that. And I was very surprised to hear Mr. McDonald say that.
Now, Mr. Mulloy, I guess, says he didn't say that.
MR. MULLOY: Mr. Chairman, may I make a clarifying comment?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Sure.
1602
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MR. MULLOY From my vantage point,what I was talking about was not an_ information
relatedto the investigation The discussion I was having as to why Mr. McDonald didn'texpress
an)' of tk :oncerns that he expressed initially in the closed door hearing on a Friday at KSC in
the . _itim discussion where he stated that he had continued to protest against the launch after
the decision was made, and my question was why. if he had those concerns, did he not express
those concerns to his management on the night of the 27th or on the morning of the 28th "_
Now, what I heard him say was. t_e interpreted something different than that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It wasn't an interpretation. He said you questioned him about why
he was giving information directly to the Commission and not going through NASA and his own
management. Did you say that?
MR. MULLOY: Yes. sir. What I said was related to the events of the 27th, My question was,
if he had all those concerns, why he did not relay those concerns to his management on the
night of the 27th and up _,o launch time on the 28th.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So there was a misunderstanding. You were talking about why he
didn't
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do something on the 27th. And he construed that to mean something else.
MR. MULLOY: And waiting until the Commission hearings on that Friday to expres_,_ those
concerns when they had not been expressed to his management in time to do anything abo_lt the
launch of 51-L
MR. ACHESON: I don't want to stop this episode, but I do have two questions for Mr. Kil-
minster.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Go ahead.
MR. ACHESON: One goes to the desiffn of the joint. A lot of the material we have received.
one reads that the designers, presumably both the corporate designers and the NASA super_i.
sors. believed that the joint was designed to compress and seal in the gas tight under combustion
pressure And it turned out very quickly in _he joint histo-y that it did the optmsite. It openec
tip.
Now, to a layman it is kind of hard to understand wh) you wouldn't at that point say this
thing works the opposite of what we thought, so the,'e is a lot about it we don't understand, so
let's gc 3ack to the drawing board and design a new ,oint that works the way we want it to. If
you design an aircraft and you discover the windows are almost but not quite, pressure, tight, you
dm,'t tell the passengers to wear oxygen over
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20,000 feet. You send it back to the manufacturer and you say, make it right.
I just don't understand why the program then developed to go into a lot of little fixes to see
if you could compensate for a fundamental error, and maybe you can explain that m us.
MR. KILMINSTER: Again, I think we have to refer back to the experience base that we
used to d_ign that configuration in the joint, and that was the Titan joint. The Titan joint has
the same gap tolerances, the same diametral tolerances that we have in our joint. It has the
same bore seal. It has the same mate:ial in that seal, the O-ring seal. However, I believe their O-
ring is slightly smaller than ours in cross-sectional diameter, .275 versus .280.
When we first found out, and I think it was due to our hydrotesting, hydroburst _st pro-
gram, and eventually the structural test, Article 1 testing we discussed before, when we found
out there that there was not a closing of the gap on pressurization, there was an opening of the
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pgap, then we started to look. and I understand at that time v_e found 9ut that the Titan gap also
opened, and the numbe- that I recall is '2_ l..0a0ths, where ours is in "he 40 1,000ths. 4"2
'..000ths er thereabouts
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So. again, tho basis that that system heu been function,,ng, functioned acceptably wi[h basi-
cally the same material, the _:;ame O-ring, t_e same configuration, sam_. diametral tolerances-;, we
thought it was reasonable to [.,roceed witr. that basic design.
BR. WALKER: You are teiling me :his accident was the fault of the Air Force and th _ Titat:
program?
MR. KILMINSTER: No, _ir, I am just answering the question.
DR. WALKER: f jest do not understand that remark. You have got a system which you de-
signed, and it behaves exactly the opposite, as Mr. Acheson has said, and it is clearly a serious
problem. ! don't understand why you are pointing at somebody else who might have the same
preblem. What does that have to do with your problem?
MR. K!LMINSTER: They did not have a problem that was known at that time. They had a
long history of success, and it was functioning just fine.
MR. SUTTER: How many successes did they have when they only shoot it into the air once
and they don't pick it up and refurbish it? It seems to me that is a hell of a skimpy data base.
MR, NILMINSTER: Well. the analytical work that supported that continued to show, and
we have
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recently been surprised about some information that you are aware of about diametral grov,_h.
but _he information, the analytical information continued to show.
MR. SUTTER: Well, don't you know about the information down at Marshall? You nferred
that I know something you don't know about diametral growth. That dam was presented down
at Marshall when we were down there. From the test firings and from the actual firings you get
a deformation that stays bt;;lt in. You are aware of that now, aren't you?
MR. KILMINSTER: That is just _, hat I was speaking to. That is recent information.
MR. SUTTER: Well, that gets bac_: to the comment that I made before I think part of this
accident was caused by not a sufficient data base to design solid rocket booster joints, even
today, and before anything flies there ought to be five or ten of these full-scale things shot off.
and after you get about ten ol them that work right, thee you can say you should fly again.
I will go back to the remark_I asked a Question nf your people in one of the open sessions
and I didn't get a satlsfactoiy answer, an:t it has been bugging me ever since.
2776
My question was, looking back on things, do you feel that that testing that had been done
prior--well, with all of these problems going on, was that testing adequate to really give you a
sufficient knowledge to fly? And the answer I got is, there is not enough money in the Treasury
of the United States to do the kind'of testing I want.
I really sort of took issue with that comment, and I would like to just comment back to you
now. I am going to see that before anything flies again, there is going to _-? a lot of full-scale
testing or something suitable to back it up, not these Ettle dinky ten-inch tests _.here a whole
bunch of scale effects are missing.
And, you know, I don't see why we all don't say we didn't know what this joint was doing. It
worked backwards to the design. There was a mistake made due to lack of knowledge, and let's
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get the knowledge and get on w:th it There is a ',.or of pussyfooting going on about what we did
or d_dn't know
Mv view of ai! of the testlng that :s done. vou dont know _:.ether _t "s temperature, you
aont kno_ whether its tolerances, vou don't know whether i,'s the screwin_ ups when you have
to take
2_-7
these things a,:d put hydraulic jacks on them and squeeze them into [ osition. I still quesuon the
fact mat something sitting out there for 28 days. and the temperatures going up and down, and
it was sealed once--whether tha_ seal is still holding. The knowledge base. the data base that is
referred "o on joints and solid rocket boosters 12 feet in diameter is about 100th of what you
need to s,, the article is safe. and somebody ought to recognize that before they say they are
going to fly this thing again.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine. Unles_ we have a lot of urgent questions--did you want to go
ahead?
/DR. WALKER: I just had one more. Is the Titan a manned system?
MR. KILMINSTER: No, sir.
DR. WALKER: Do you think that there ought to be a higher standard applied to systems
where there are people present? I think that can be answered yes or no.
MR. KILMINSTER: The answer is yes. Obviously. I think I ha_e to ask the question.
though, not knowing the Titan safety factors, whether they were established tor a manned
system, I believe early on there was some talk about using it
GENERAL KUTYNA: Whether these--have that same factor or not I don't know. However,
you know.
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when I have a $600 millior:, payload on board, whether I have got a man on board or not, I put a
fairly high safety factor in there.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. thank you very much, gentlemen. I think that will be all.
{Pause.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let'_ come back to order.
Gentlemen, the Commission is in the process of concluding its hearings, and in that connec-
tion we are reviewing documents particularly as they relate to the joint and the O-ring history. I
guess you probably--the gentlemen have been given the documents.
So we just want to refer to them and ask you a few questions about those documents to be
sure you have a chance to respond and make any comments you wan: about them.
lWitnesses sworn.
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OmmaWAL
OF POOR QUALrtY
H:stcry of O-rlng (35)
MORON THIOKOL INC
Wasatch Division
Interof_ ce Memo
De:erce _ "98_
['%E/BSR-85-_S
I__
TZ:
C]
FR2_,
_. J. _c3ona]d, Di_ecto_
Solid Rocket _tor Project
D. Tho_psoc, R. Ebeiln_, S. Rod_e%, _. _a:_an
M_nager, SRM Special Projects
Closure of the SRM, O-Ring Erosio_ Critical Problens,
MSFC Record Number A07934, PR Numbe_ DR_-5/30 and
Associated Reports DR4-5/31, DR4-5/35, DR_-5/38, DR4-5/_9,
DR_-S/41, 9K4-5/48 and DR4-5/49
T_3 memc enumerates t_e reasons fcn Closing tDe subject open critica"
_p fo_iOw_; act!vlt!es ar_ :n work or _a_e been completed:
1 _ f_:-t:_e taSK f_rce has beet cre_te_ an_ :_ p_rsuin_ a
sc]ut_c_ to t_e O-r_ng erosion problem.
.. _ c-:g_ plan, TWR-14359, has bee- released defining the
ste;s to solve _he prg_ble_,s.
]. -_enty-t_ree (23> f_ll sca_e rezzle ?oiet mat_ tests rove
been camp]eteC an_ at least seven (7_ more are planned.
S:_ (6} field joint matin; test_ have been co_iete _.
_. A f_e]d joint deflection test is planned.
_. N_ne (?) o-rind resi!_ency tests have beer complete3 a_d -ixty {_C)
,,_re &re _ianned.
7. At least five (5} _:_re _" CP orifice tests are planned.
8. Forty (4C} nozzle joint talc f'ow tests have been comple!ad.
9. Twenty-nine (29) subscale braid porosity tests have been
performed and many more are planned w_th new braid samples.
1C. Eighteen (18) full scale braid flow tests have been Completed
and at ]eas_ two (2) more are planned.
P _
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12.
3-5" motor material erosion tests have been comoleted and
four (4) more are planned.
3-40 pound charge motor nozzle joint tests (five second burn
time) have been completed and at least seven (7) more are
planned.
.13.
14.
15.
16.
B-24" motor nozzle joint tests (30 second burn time) are
pla;Ined.
4-40 pound charge motor field joint tests (33 second burn
time) are planned.
Four full scale field joint short stack hot firing tests
are planned.
Continued analysis is underway to support the test effort.
Thermal, gas dynamics, mechanical and dimensional analyses
are included.
17. Nozzles are being removed at K.SC after each flight for
_mmediate joint and o-ring examination. Reports On the
nozzle joint as well as the field joint conditions are
provided in a timely fashion for consideraCion in subsequent
flight readiness reviews.
The MTI task force is in constant contact wit" _ _C personnel w_th
scheduled teleconferences weekly. With the we_; defined program underway
and proper emphasis on the problem, recO_nd the problems be closed.
Status will continue to be provlded in the flight readiness reviews
and in formal technical reviews at MTI and MSFC. At the conclusion of
the program, a comprehensive report will be written to consolidate
the results, conclusions, and recommendations.
Please provlde this information to NASA to support the closure of this
problem.
BGR/co
1612
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ORIGINAL PAGE
OF POOR QUALITY
Morn'ON T_oKo'_ INc.
l_ 00-8 _'-26
!
i
Kr. L- O. f,#_a,', S,A42
lacloaal AJrouaurlc_ a, md Space La,-_-,Lstrsclou
G4_rll_" C. lmr_.all Sl_ce lrL14ihC CamCer
KLrshall Space F3../4hc Camce_, Al,ubmu 35812
Dear I'tr. lle_r:
Subject: C2oim_t of Cc_cLcal Problems gumber Dt4-3/30.
D!4-5/31. Dt4-5/35. Dt4-5/38. Dt4-5/39. DIt4-_/41.
Dit4-S/48, ad O1[_--$/49 (I, tSY(:: Trscl:S.n S II_b*rs
&07934, _D801_, AG8299, A0_15, A0_687. AD8939,
A09260, .,..a AO9281) "ilozzle/Se_r ,oiqc Pr'l_t:'7
O-r4J_ Chaz-rud m
Lbe mebJect Critlczl h*obl.,--* ors maloin 8 pz'oble.,u vblch v_11 :oc
b. fully resolved fur _ tl_. 11_ere is • fo_l report/oZ
system being _8ed to evsluact r_e pz_ble_ _-_s_l_rlou progress •mS
_o ¢ou_/uuu _o rspor_ tbms ,ha _ir_ of _hs _SFC r_ob_e_ AJsessme_c
System _ _t ntCtS_l_.
Therefore, v_ request the subject cz_c£cal probleis be closed and
.-.starved frmu the oezt _ •g_s/llsr
• uclosed Ls • copy of memoraz_d_ El_O/B_t-86-95. T_-15349o stud
TVlt-l_359
Vt_ trlaly yours,
sire _'roJec c
co: J. [11m]Lnsc_.r IL. _Zntosh° EZll
J. I[lv_ll I. II .laud, I[£,03
D. l"ho_tp_ S. Ko_ers
Y. Ad•ss. hTZ_CSFC B. I_s,tLl
J. Thomas, Jr., SA_2 U. Ebsl_.n K
E. Skrublsze_skL. SA49 _.. Gdci:lns
J. FZ*cch_r, 04L--S_O Rockwell Zscera:etonal (HSFC)
[Ref. 5_2-I 7_
1613
,$
x
z. • " 2 ' .
° . .
H_st_ry ef O-rin_ (3 _)
MOFKTON THIOKOL INC.
Wasatch Opera_ions
fnterofliceMemo
Z _anuary 19_6
EI50/BGR-86-!I4
I
=mE::
TO.
CC:
FRON
SU3JECT:
D. E. Thonpson, Manager
Systems Engineer_hg
A. _IcDan_d, R. Ebe]i_g, S. Rodgers
Manager, SRM Specia] Projects
Rationale for Closure ef the O-Ring Erosion Prob!em,
AO7934, DR4-5/30
It is recotnmended that the referenced prob]_, be c]osed for the fo]lowing
reaSORS.
1 The increased stabi]izat!c_ pressure '?90 psi) prie- to zhe
53 psi leak test mJn]_]ZeS the chance oF blowy erosion
that was exper:enced on the STS-51B nozzle joint. Th_s
change was effective on STS-_In, STS-S!G and subsetQ_uent.
2. Stack$_g procedures ncve bee_ clarified to assure _oter
to motor co_slste_cy _n !o;nt T,_:_ng O_D changes were
effective SR_LO2A and subsequent.
3. Analytical studies n_sed on both imping_ent erosion a_d
blowby erosion sI:ow tha_ this T:enomenon has an acce;'aL]e
cef]:_g.
4. Recent experience has been w_th_n the _gram _ata base.
5. The recurring erosion is addresseu i_ subsequent Flight
Readiness Reviews to assure visibi]i_y of the problem _s
_aintained.
Br_an G. Russell
BGR/co
IRef ,%2-i. l
161_
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History/ cf O-ring (35_
MORTON THIOKOL INC
YVasatcl_ Operations
I0 January 1986
EISO/RVE-86-118
I __
_ :c _?=
L
5._
Mr. L. O. Wear, SA42
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aero_ :;tics and Space Administration
Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812
Dear Mr. Wear,
Subject: Request for Change Order on SRM Seal Anomalies
Efforts
Reference: A) MSFC Me_orandum SA4Z-180-S5
B) MTI Reply EISO/RVE-85-221
4
MT: reauests a contract C_'ange Order to fund the O_-gcinq
SRFIefforts based on the _ollowing MSFC requests•
MSFC letter reference A) requested that MTI re-examine
a] _ seals and leak test procedures for the entire SRM.
In additior it stated that MTI establish a program plan
tO validate thi_ seals a_d test procedures. MTI developed
a program p_an and sub,dtted it in our reply reference 8)
The plan objectives include a3i of the SRM joint seals
and correcting their r_lated flight anomalies.
MTi has created a Revision A to that (TWR-14359) progra,_
p!aff, which has been in effect since August, 1985. In
conjunction with this overall seal effort, MTI has supported
MSFC with visits and _eekly telecon status reports. In
light of MSFC requests and encouragement to fix the sea!
pr_,blem, MTI arolies for a contract Change Order to cover
these expenditu-es
Ill 1 J-_-.
[Rof. S 2-19 1 of 21
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Currently the Dlanned program is 331 Complete and is exp_cte_
to be f_nlshed prior to this iummer. At this point in t_me,
M'FI Engineering will provide rec.n_nmendations for the new
joint arrangement.
Current expenditures through 1985 have been $2.0 million
The expected funding requirements to final co_etion is
.estia_ted to be $6.0 million. An ECP will be submitted
to MSFC near the end of January quantifying the dollars.
Very truly yours,
Brian G. Russell, Manager
SRM Special Projects
RVE: BGR/co
co: J. _,ith, Ell
i. Adams, MTI/MSFC
J. Peoples, SA42
bcc: j. Rilminster
A- McDonald
R. Ebeiing
T. o'Grady
g. Ketner
H. Hazelton
1616
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MORTON THIOKOL INC /-
Wasatch Division
InteroHJce Memo
1 0ct_be- IgBS
EISO/RVE-86-47
TC':
FRO'M
CC:
S'JBJE[T:
A. J. McDonald. Director
Solid Rocket Motor Project
Manager, SRM ignition System, Final Assembly, Special
PFojects and Ground Test
_. McDougall, B. Russell, J. McCluskey, 3. Cooper,
J. Kilminster, B. Brintom, T. O'Grady, B. MacBeth,
J. Sutton, J. Elwell, I. Adams, F. Call, J. Lame_e.
P. Ross, D. Fullme-, E. Bailey, D. SmitF, L. _aiiey,
B. Kuchek, Q. Eskelsen, P. getty, J. McCall
Weekly Activity Report
1 October 1985
EXECUTIVE SUGARY
HELm! The seal task force is constantly being delayed by every possible
means. People are quoting policy and systems without work-around. MS;C
is correct _n stating that we do not know how to -ur a deve]opmert
program.
GROUND TEST
i. The two (2) GTM ce-te- segments were received a= T-Z_ ;_s: we_K.
Optical measurements are being taken. Significant work _s tc he d::-e
tc clear u_ the joints, it should be note_ that wne_ _ecessa,_ SZ3_
takes priority.
2. The DM.-_ test re_ort less composite section was released last week.
ELECTRICAL
As a result of the "latest engineering analysis oF the V-I case it
appears thzc highstress risers to the cas_ _re created by the p_e_:_:c
DFI housings and fairings. As it presently stands° these wil_ probaD_y
have to be modified or removed and if removed w;l] ha,e to b_ replaced.
This could have an impact on the launch schedule.
[Ref. -3 2-21) 1 of 2]
I_:7
A. J WcDona!_, 5irectc-
i Octooe _ 1985
EISS/RYE-86-47
Page
FInaL ASSEMSL v
One SPM 25 and two SRM 26 segments :_o_g with two SP_ 2a _t c_r_e_ were
completed during this period O_!y three segments a_ p-eoe-tl/ i_
ws'_. Avaiia_Tity =_ _9nite- c_,-oone_ts, n_zzles a_c systems tu *'_"
tooling are the present constraining factors in the final as%e_b_ I a_Ea.
IS_!TION SfSTEM
;, Eng;neerin? is currently rewriting igniter _ask-o-seal csat:n_
requirements to allow minor flaws and scratches. Bare mete; a-eas w_! t
be coated with a thi_ _ilm of HD-2 ]tease. Approve] is exbect_ wit_ir
t_e week.
2. Sa{e ar Ar_, Device com#c_ent de!ive-ies is beginning to cause
conce-n. T_ere are flve S&A's at KSC on the sne_f. Procurement,
P_ogram OffiCe _eprese_tatives visited Comso!!_ed C_tro_s t2 _3_sz
accelerating scheduleo deliveries. CSC has prOmiSed 10 A&_'S arc 2C
B-._'s nc later tha_ 31 Octobe- !S85.
O-P:NGS RN_ PUTTY
!. The 3i:ort stack f;naily went "ogether _f_er repeated a:tem_ts, _:
ono o_ t_e o-_ncs was cut. Efeo_ts to separate the 3e'nt were str_e:
_ecause some de not t_,k they wii_ wo-k, E_<nee_'-S _ des_'_-_
tcz's to separate the p:ecas. The prints should be rcOeas_c to?c--c,.
2. The _nm-t segments are at T-24 and are un_er_)in_ i':s=ect:c_.
3. T_e hot f]c_ test rig is i- _esign, wh!=_ is p_=vi_ tc be
d_"s_It. En_ee_n_ _s p'a_n_ release c _ these p_:pts _ec':£_:_ c-
Thu-sday.
4, Var{ous pctentia_ fii;_- h_ateria3s are or order s;.c_ as car#c _ ,
g-a_:te, _uartz. _d st;ice fibe- braids; and d;_fe-e_t pbtt:es T_e=
.;i_ ali be tried in hot flow tests and full scale assembly tests.
B. The allegiance tc the o-rin_ investigation task force _s very
limited to a 9roup o_ ens_neers numbering 8-10. Ou" assignee pets e _"
manufacturing and _uality have the desire, but are encumbe-ed wit_ ct"_ -
s_gnificant work Others in manufacturing, Quality, procurement wrc a-e
not invoOved d_rectly, _ut whose help we need, are generating p_enty o _
resistance. We are creating more instructiona] pa_er than engir_z'inc
data. We _ish we could get action by verbal request but such is not "_e
case. This is a red fla_.
R. V. Ebelin 9
1618
D1
[
=-
TFSTI)I(}Y:'f ()F GE()RGE B. H.tRI)Y. DEPUTY I)IRE('Ti)R. SCIENCE AND ENGINEER-
IN(,. Ft_RMERLY MANAGER. SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER OFFICE: JAMES E. KIN(iS-
BI'R_'. DIRE('Ti)R. SCIENCE AND EN(;INEERIN(;; ROBERT _;, EtI)Y. FORMERL_
CHIEF ENGINEER. SOLID ROCKET MOTOR. OFFICE OF ASSO('IATE I)IRECT()R
FOR ENGINEERING: JOHN (). MILI.ER. TECHNICAl. ASSIST.&NT TO SOLID ROCKET
MOTOR MANA(;ER: AND _VILIJAM L. RAY. SOLID MOTOR BR:_N('H. PR()P[LSION
DIVISION, ENGINEERIN(, D!RE('TORATE
MR KEHRLI: (;entlemen. m.v name is Randy Kehrli. I'm one of the staff mvest:gators as-
sisting
27_o
the Commissior,. You all. I believe, ha_e been interviewed by Commission panels or else by Com-
mission staff investigators.
I wodld like to specifically refer you to a series of memoranda that were written in 1978 and
1979 They are included in this red book that is in front of you as tabs 4. 5 and 6 of the O-ring
history. I believe you have all been asked about them in previous interviews. They're often re-
ferred to as the Miller to Eudy memos It's my understanding they were actually written by Mr.
Ray. ( Ref. 5 2-21 ]
Just to summarize them--we won't go through them. but the first memo is dated January 9.
197,', It is tab number 4. That is a memo from Mr. Miller to Mr. Eudv at Marshall. It's my
understanding it was written by Mr Ray
That memo raises some concerns in the second page, paragraph tb,. about minimum O-ring
compression. Joint rotation is mentioned as well as various shimming or thickness of shims used
in an attempt to increase the squeeze on the O-ring fieid joint design
Additionally. following that memo in the same tab is the document entitled "SRM Clevis
Joint Leai<age Study." dated October 21. !!_77. wr:tten by Mr. Leon Ray. which concerns--which
identifies the best
2781
option for a long-term fix to the problems raised in these memos as option number four. to rede-
sign tang and reduce tolerance on the clevis. [Ref. 5 2-22]
The next memo. which i_ tab i,umber 5, dated January 19, !979, again is a memo from Mr.
Miller to Mr. Eudy. signed by Mr. Miller wilh a copy to Mr. Hardy, I believe agmn written by
Mr. Ray. which states that the Thiokol positian regarding design adequacy' of the clevis joint is
completely unacceptable for a couple of reasons, among them the large surface gap created by
tang and clevis relative to surface movement and then secondly the secondary O-ring seal be-
comes completely disengaged as a result of thi,_ relative moment, iRef. 5 2-23]
The last memo, tab number six dated February 6, 1979_ is a memo directly from Mr. Ray to
distribution describing a visit to Precision Rubber Products Corporation and Parker Seal Compa-
ny. wherein the O-ring design and the fuortion of the O-ring is discussed. [Ref. 5 2-24]
I believe what the Commission is intereste:l in--and they will have some specific questions
but if you could comment on the genesis of these memos, why they were written and what the
thinking was at this time at Marshall with regard to the O-ring design.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And, I guess, how tkey were
2782
resolved after they were discussed
Now, M 4 Ray wrote these memos?
1619
MR.RkY: That iscorrect.
CHAIP.MANROGE_?,S:Couldyoustart, andwouldyouwant to ancwerthe questionabout
wh,,theywerewrittenandwhatwasdoneaboutthem?
MR RAY The reason :bey v.ere v-ritten v, as as a resuh of test data that we had. and I have
*o go back to, I guess, a littb: bit further back in time than these memos. When the joint was
first designed, ,,he analysis produced by Thiokol says the joint would close, the extrusion gap
would actually dose.
We had quite a debate about that until we did a test on the first couple of segments tbat we
received from the manufacturer, which in fact showed that the joint did open. Later on v,e did
somc tests with the _'truetural test article, and this is mentioned in the memo as STA-I.
At that time we ,-eal'y nai'.ed it dov'n. We got some ver3 accurate numbers on joint rotation,
and we knew foc a fact timt luring these tests that, just what the memo says, the joint rotated.
The primary O-ring was extr lded up into the joint. The secondary O-ring did in fact detach from
the seat.
Now, the proof of this is that we, in addition
2783
to measuring the relative movement bet.ween the two parts, the Lwo mating pans, we also
screwed a pressure transducer into the port so that we were able te judge the performance of the
secondary seal as well.
The test data showed that under a normal situation you get negative pressure, the cavity
between the two O-rings, when the joint rotates. The reason for this is that while the O-ring is
being extruded up into the joint and it should close the volume up and cause the pressure to
rise, that is what you would normally think. But the fact that the joint opens up so much. it
increases the volume. The ratio then goes the other way, and it becomes unbalanced. The pres-
sure in the joint was negative.
Nob-, you would expect this to happen while the case is pressurized. What, in fact, happened
during these tests is it did go negative but then when we got up on the pressure curve about 700
or 800 psi. the transducer showed--went back to ambient pressure like .12 or .24 psi. whatever
the calibration was at that time. which was proof that :ne joint vented the atmosphere. That
tells you the secondary seal is completely off the seat.
We di0 one other test in the static fire vehicle, which I can't recall which one, which didn't
2784
show this quite as clear but it was a very suspicious nature when the joint went negative. It's a
little bit different. You've got a dynamic situation here where we change pressures during the
static firing. The pressure goes up very quickly, flattens out for about 40 seconds, goes down into
a saddle and then back up again, so you have fluctuation in the pressure in the joint.
But when we got up to the 700 or 800 psi region, we had a flat spot there very quickly or we
were having a transient in the pressure, so it swept on by us. It was a suspicious na:ure. We had
sort of a gentleman's runn;ng battle argument, if you want to call it, our people and Thiokol,
over the years about this situation.
Our technical folks maintained the situation mentioned in the letter here did in fact
happen. The Thiokol folks were saying a much lower number. It probably was not happening.
We were successful after a time to convince them. I can't recall the days--I've been in Florida
for almost three months now, and i haven't had a chance--I have not had access to my files, and
so I can't recall the dates, but we were successful in getting the FMEA and the CIL. which are
basically the Failure Mode Effects Analysis documenk¢ that state the reliability of the joint.
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We were, in fact, successful in getting this chang_ t ,<_ that there _ere certai,, cop.ditions
that the secondary seal was ineffective.
DR. WALKER: When did that occur, sir?
MR. RAY: Sir?
DR. WALKER: When did that occur?
MR. RAY I can't recall. I don't have--my records are one place and I'm in another. I
haven't been back for three months, and I just haven't had time to look.
DR. COVERT: I think the record should show that Mr. Ray has been down in Florida look-
ing at bits and pieces and hunting for them in the bottom of the ocean for about 90 days now.
DR. KEEL: Are you referring to the change in criticality from IR to 17
MR. RAY: Yes, sir.
DR. KEEL: That was December 17th, 1982.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Ray, those tests showed that you cou!d have , shortfall in the
ability to seal regardless of temperature?
MR. RAY: Yes, sir.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Because of rotation of the joint?
MR. RAY: Yes, sir. Rotation has nothing to
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do with temperature.
In regard to the letter, the rather long memo there about the seal, the quality of the O-ring,
that was all taken care of. We made a trip to Parker, and we went through all the defects that
are mentioned in that memo and were successful in coming up w_th a good product. As a matter
of fact, somewhere in the records there's a tekter written that states that fact that we were real
proud of the folks that bid that work, and they got us a good quality O-ring at no additional cost.
The letter also refers to shimming of the joint. This letter specifically refers to shimming, in
this case, of the STA-1, the static test article. There was a proposal to put. I believe, 15 to 20
thousandths shims in the joint.
If you look at the joint clearapces, you will see that potential gap there that could exist
could range from 30 to 65 thousandths, so that tells you in the worst case you need to put a
rather thick joint in there or shim in the joint like 50 thousandths, which is a reasonable thick-
ness, you could probably get into the joint.
We recommended that we shim up the maximum. As a matter of fact, we came up with
three different shim sizes that would be required to put into tbe
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inventory to shim up, to come up with a range that is recommended by everybody is 15 to 25
percent compression.
Now. this only refers to the initial compre_ion. We have no data that says that shimming
will in any way diminish the change in the gap because of rotation. We have no data one way or
the other but it is a fact that it is highly desirable to have high initial compression. You need
that because of defects in the sealing, potential defects in the sealing surfaces and the O-ring
from contamination and so fo_h.
That was our point in that letter. We would like to ha',_ shimmed up the maximum under
all circumstances and particularly here for the STA-I. We were unsuccessful in getting our way
on this, and I can't tell you who made th., decision. ! don't know, but I think i can enlighten you
on some of the discussions taking place.
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The contractor's recommendation was not to do it, to go with a one-size standard shim 35
thousandths thick. They decided the reason is logistics. You have to stock a number of different
sizes. It _-ould be a logistics problem, and so I can+t remember who made the decision at Ma,-
shall. I just have a blank on that.
DR KEEL: Could I just ask a followup question? Your position according to the memo, Mr
Ray.
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back at least in January 1979, as you have already indicated based upon these static article test
as well as the hydroburst test back in 1977 was again, to read from the memo, "that the Thiokol
position regarding design adequacy of the clevis joint to be, complexly unacceptable."
You mentioned the two reasons that have already been referred to. One. of course, is exces-
sive tang clevis relative movement. Now, has your view changed at ail? Is it your position,
then--it was your position then that it needs to be redesigned, right?
MR. RAY: Yes.
DR. KEEL: Has it changed today?
MR. RAY: No.
DR. KEEL: It of course wasn't redesigned. This memo went to Mr. Eudy?
MR. RAY: Yes.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Miller, you signed it out?
MR. MILLER: I signed it out.
DR, KEEL: Did >.ou concur with that?
MR. MILLER: Yes, i did.
DR. KEEL: Is tha_ stitl your position today?
MR. MILLER: Yes.
DR. KEEL: And Mr. Eudy, you got the memo?
MR. EUDY: Yes, sir,
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DR. KEEL: What action did you take?
MR. EUDY: Well, of course, I recognized that the problem has been an importan; pro_lep
and an area of concern, and we had a number of technical interchange meetings and a nu:. \_r
of telecons with our contractors and of course with thence people, and we work with them on a
daily ha,sis, and we try to listen to all the data. Of course, we had management reviews, and we
tried to consider the test data that has come out of the test ,qrings in the structural tests, and
we tried to consider all of the data that was available to us.
Our view was to proceed with the shimming and compressions es we proceed with--this was
with everyone being informed of the test data and the results of the te_ts.
I might comment on the structural test article, I think there was--so far a_ shimming on
flu' "-lI'tl_'lkll'al tt'+t ,_ll'ti_ilt '. l thit++k x_,_'di<l et.I ttl_-,hilllmill_ ,+t_ the I,_x,, ,..ide. lr_,m +u,hat l+,_'_mand
some other people recommended, and I think at that time part of our position was to go to the
low side, to in fact insure on the low side that we were covering those low side concerns.
So that was part of the thinking.
DR I_:EEL: The low side with respect to initial
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compress on?
MR. EUDY: Right.
DR. KEEL: But that did nothing with respect to the relative motion?
)MR. EUDY: That's right.
MR. RUMMEL: At the point when that decision was made, had the cases been committed to
production?
MR. EUDY: Oh. yes.
MR. RUMMEL: They had been, so there was a production line going at that time and. I
assume, several cases on hand?
MR EUDY: Yes, the production line was running, and there was considerable data base
that we had with tests results from those motor cases.
MR. RUMMEL: Do you know, had you made a decision at that time or had NASA made a
decision at that time to redesign the joint and gone to some different configuration, what would
the impact have been on the flight schedule? Can you say approximately?
MR. EUDY: Well, I guess--and maybe Mr. Hardy would like to comment, but I guess we
would have been down probably two years, We would have been back to the billet stage, all the
way through the pipeline,
MR. RUMMEL: I assume that was one of the factors you took into account and decided to
continue
2791
with the unsatisfactory _int, is that correct? t realize the word unsatisfactory----
MR. EUDY: I didn't conside_ it unsatisfactory. This was flying well in Titan, aad we had
compressions in the same range we're dealing with in the current design.
MR. SUTTER: How do you know it was flying well in Titan'?
MR. EUDY: Well, all of the ground programs and the things that all of the test data we had
showed that--well, and all of the programs we had with our owr _ints looked very good, and so
we had absolutely no test failure history of any kind.
MR. SU_I'ER: Well. there wasn't any history. That's the poi ,: I was just ma :ing at the iast
meeting, that there is no data base. I don't consider Titan a data base, since every, time they
shoot one off it comes back in parts, and here you're talking about designing something that
you're supposed to bring home and use 19 times over.
MR. HOTZ: Well, it is a different joint anyway.
MR. SUTTER: But referring back to Ti',an. I think it's something that I don't think there's
any basis for.
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MR. ACHE$ON: Could I ask Mr. Ray in the tab 6 docume_.t ;he visit to Parker, it's report-
ed here by you the Parker exports thought that the O-ring was being asked to perform beyond
its intended design.
Now, what wa_ meant b_; that, that the O-ring ought not to carry primary combustion pres-
sure or that it had too large tolerances, zr just what?
MR. RAY: Let me give you a !ittle background of wh-t aztua!!y trmk place, or I will answer
directly if you like, either one.
Mr. Eudy and myself prepared a presentation to Parker Seal and also Precismn Seal Compa-
ny. Mr. Eucly and myself went to precision, and I gave the presentation. What it says is that we
were gen,rating a 41 thousandths extrusion gap at that time, and this is the number we knew at
that _ime. We've got the hardware filled. We're going to be flying this thing shortly. What do we
do? What do you recommend?
We went f_rt.ber on to Parker to Berea, Kentucky and made the same presentation up
there, the identical presentation, and we got the same reaction, that that's not the w_ v you use
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an O-ring. You don't use an O-ring with a large extrusion gap. You would prefer to have it zero
if you could get it, but that's not possible, but we will let you know later on.
So they wrote a letter to us, and I don't kno:, _ether you have the letter or not. The let_r
says, in essence, the best I can remember it says we realize :ou're in a bad situation. You're not
suppo_fl to use it like that but do all the testing you can to satisfy yourself that it will work,
and that's what the letter says.
In saying you're not using the O-ring in a way it's not intended, meaning we had a very
large extrusion gap, i.e. 41 thousandths, if you look at the Parker curve and the Parker manual,
it's _-ery deceiving. There are no curves on static data extrusion gap. This is a dynamic curve in
the cycle.
There are numerous pressure cycles. This one is generated by general motors. If you look at
that curve, we're not even on the sheet c_' paper, okay, with that extrusion gap that we have,
much less on the curve. But again, that is a dynamic situation and so we really have no written
standard as to what our extrusion gap should be except as reeommende<i by the Parker experts
which says hopefully zero, as little as possible but sure not 41 thousandths. That is the data, the
reaction that they gave us.
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MR. KEHRLI: Mr. Ray, we do not have that letter. If we could get a copy of that, we would
appreciat:- it.
MR. ACHESON: So you have a joint that opens up, much to your surprise, and you thought
it ought to close under pressure, and you have an O-ring which the manufacturer tb inks is being
asked to do a job that it isn't meant to do. And what else entered into the equation that made
you satisfied with that design, Mr. Eudy?
MR. EUDY: Well, I was with Mr. Ray on one of the visits, as he mentioned. My perception
of what the people were telling us and the conversation we had with people was what we were
doing was outside their data base. They were used to, if you would, O-rings on pistons and a
cylinder and they understc),xt where we were relative t _ having flight hardware cut. testing
flight hardware.
And I think the bottom line that I received when we left there is that you're going to nave
to gc back and use your data base. You are in a region that we can't gnve you direct consultation
on. You will have to look at your data and how your joints are performing, and that is _ hy at
least I, as an individual, put a lot of stock in tbe t_t data, looking at the assembly
2795
problems and how much compression and _o forth was needed on the joint, to come to a decision
as to where we should be.
DB FEYNMAN: In other words, you didn't discover that it wasn't true; that it did ha¢e a
big gap, much bigger than the usual applicativn. And it alsu3 was true that you had an opening
in the gap. All your tests only confirmed that the conditions were just the conditions.
And what test was it that showed you that that thing would work?
MR. EUDY: Well, from my point of view, we had a number of pressure tests, static tests
there in Huntsville. We also had the whole development and qualification series in Utah and
every one of those motors were torn down and the O-rings were inspected, and out of that wbole
development series of seven motors, we didn't have any O-ring problem.
DR. COVERT: Were they fired horizontally?
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MR. EUDY: Yes. There was no er_ion on any of them. And so again, we t ied to use the
data base tLat was available to us with the hardware that was available to us.
DR. SU'I_rER: Were any of those used segments?
MR. EUDY: I believe in t':e latter
2796
firings and George, you have to help me they were used, we did reuse segment in the Qual pro-
gram.
DR. COVERT: That is my memory" as well.
DR. WALKER: There's no discussion in these memos about the role of the putty. To me, the
putty is a thermal barrier.
Did that enter into your decision at all, the question of whether or not the putty would
indeed serve as a proper thermal barrier? Because temperature isn't mentioned in any of these
memoo, but when you have 5,_0 degrees, that is not the sort of thing t_'at an O-ring is usually
designed to do.
MR. RAY: Are you directing the question to me, sir?
DR. WALKER: Whoever feels they have information to answer it.
MR. RAY: I think since the inception of the design of the joint and the us- of putty, we have
never considered the putty as a seal, although it is called a sealan_ material, but we don't con-
sider it as a seal. We consider it a thermal barrier.
Now, thgre's a lot of question as to whether putty is really necessary, and that's another
question, whether you need anything or not, because you do have a rather long tortuous path
down to the O-ring. so that
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you don't really have any irradiation effect from the combustion temperatures down into the O-
ring.
You don't really have a direct look at it. It can't see the O-ring directly. It has to go around
quite a few turns.
DR. WALKER: But, by convection, you could get hot gas down there?
MR. RAY: Yes, you certainly can.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you want to speak a little louder? The stenographer is having
trouble hearing. If you would raise your voice.
DR. WALKER: I said you do have the possibility of convection 6_ gas down to the O-ring and
that happens if you have holes in the putty.
MR. RAY: That happens because we have holes in the putty and we know whv we have
holes in the putty; there's no doubt about it. The joint is never round; it's never concentric. It is
a rather large flexible piece of hardware.
To aggravate the situation, we have a bunch of rubber in there that has to interface togeth-
er, and it sags because of the propellant weight, no matter wiaat attitut ._ it's in. It sags Norse, of
course, if it is in the horizontal as opposed to vertical.
If it's in the vertical, it sags down and
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still changes shape, so you can put the putty on there e s carefully as you want to. When you put
it together, you're going to have some places that are going to have rather large gaps, some
places are going to be rubber to rubber. You're going to wipe it off.
That's one source for generating a hole through the putty.
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We'veknownfor sometime alsothat whenyouput the joint together,that weentrapair
downin theendof the little tongueandgroove.That'sthe bestway to describeit, I guess.The
air bubbleescapesand it blowsa channelthroughthe putty andI just toredownor destacked
oneat theCape and they saw that. It's no news to us.
We actually walked inside of a motor case after it was p'lt together, and you can. see those
volcanoes cot,he through there. That's another source.
MR. HOTZ: Is this the recent destacking?
MR. RAY: Yes. I don't think there's ever a case when you put a case together without
having some injury to the putty. SO the putty may be a contributor. We really don't know
whether, if you have one hole through the putty as opposed to eight or ten, wb.ether that has
any effect on it or not. Some people believe it does; that one jet trying to fill a single
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cavity ils more detrimental to the O-ring tban having several jets trying to fill the same bod.y.
MR. ACHESON: A question for Mr. Eudy. I guess the implication is sort o_ in everyone's
mind /:hat the threat of program delays and the threat of coat overruns had something to do
with your decision, or at least with Marshall's decision to fly with a basically unsatisfactory
joint.
My question is: If you know or could guess in an educated way, what threshold of cost or
delay would have been acceptable from the point of view of saying okay, with that much cost
increment and that much delay, we can tolerate going back and redesigning the joint?
MR. EUDY: I guess I can't say. Let me just say t.hat where I was in the organization at the
time, I was, if you would, on the engineering side and so I had the pleasure of being pure in that
regard of saying what I thought the right ',echnical judgments were, if you would, apart from
coat and schedule.
I can honestly say the judgments I made at that time were based upon my engineering back-
g'round, the engineering drawings I was looking at, and the engineering data in front of me and
the test results in front of me.
Obviously, the issue is there, but at least 1
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never sent a r._commendation forward to continue with a pro_,:am that I thought w,_ faulty
design.
MR. ACHESON: You're saying from an engineering point of view, you thought it was a sat-
isfactory joint to fly?
MR. EUDY: You bet.
DR. KEEL: Can we qualify the record here, just to make things clear? That at that point
you say the engine ;ring data you had--that point, of course, was January 1978 and this is Janu-
axy 1979 for the other--and how many tests did you have in January 1978 other than the two
that had failed? The STA article, the static article that had a problem and the hydrob'lrst test
where yot_ couldn't get it to seal, or any other test available at that time?
MR. EUDY: I think that is a point of perspective as to whether those failed or not.
DR. KEEL: Well, were any other tests available at that time?
MR. EUDY: Well, I'm a little bit like Leon Ray's condition in that I've been off the program
since early 198!, and so you're asking me for memory that "_don't have.
DR. KEEL: Does anyone know?
MR. EUDY: There were static tests in Utah at
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that rx)int._i d,)n't know how many, and there were also lots cf joint structural tests and other
tesL_ that we had L_een running during that whole period to come up to that point.
So there were---
MR. HARDY: What was the time reference?
DR. KEEL: January 1978.
MR. HARDY There had been ground firings at that time, one or possibly two. I'm not sure.
DR. KEEL: Well, maybe you had one or two others where you didn't have _ problem, but
you certainly had two tests where you did have problems.
Now, was that enough engineering basis to say it was sound and you didn't need either a
long-term or short-term fix?
MR. EUDY: As I was going to say, on the two tests you referred to having problems, they
had problems, I think, within some ranges that you would expect to t- ve problems. You're run-
ning one to burst, and structural tests, you're running some limits theze, too.
DR. KEEL: But you aren't saying that the fact that you ran the pressure up is why you had
rotation, are you?
MR. EUDY: I'm not sure I understand.
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DR. KEEL: Well, are you saying you wouldn't have had a rotation problem if you hadn't
exceeded normal operating pressure?
MR. EUDY: Oh: no.
MR. HARDY: But I think one could say that you wouldn't have had rotation,just to failure
of the O-ring ifyou had not exceeded the operating pressure by 50 percent.
DR. KEEL: What about to unseat the secondary O-ring?
MR. HARDY: I think to unseat the secondary O-ring was the information that was learned
during the statictest.
DR. KEEL: So that wouldn't have had to run above pressure to do that?
MR. HARDY: That iscorrect.! think that was the "new" information that we learned from
that testarticle.
MR. RAY: I think what you're referring to---excuseme.
MR. HARDY: Well. I just wanted to add that I believe the two instances you referred to
that represent test failuresis,as Mr. Eudy said,that in both cases those were limit testswhere
the O-ring was taken far beyond the planned operating pressure.
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DR. KEEL: But I gue-. the point is,and ifI could make the point again, isthat the concerns
that were raised had nothing to do with the fact that you were raisingthe pressure above oper-
ating pressure; namely, the one of the tang and clevismotion.
MR. HARDY: That iscorrect.
DR. KEEL: Ifwe could continue here. So, Mr. Eudy, you ultimately,on whatever basis you
testifiedtoday,you decided that itdidn't need to be redesigned.
Now, were you reporting to Mr. Kingsbury at that point?
MR. EUDY: No. During that point I was reporting to,Ibelieve,Bob Marshall during most of
thi_ period,William R. Marshall, who was Associate Director for Engineering there,who in turn
reports to Mr. Kingsbury.
DR. KEEL: Was he reporting to Mr. Kingsbury?
MR. EUDY: Yes.
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DR. KEEL: Did Mr. Kingsbury get passed the information?
MR. EUD lz: I feel reasonabiy certain that tl',a_.'s ,so.
DR. KEEL: Well, did you do it?
MR. EUDY. I can't say with certainty if I
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personally did. Again, that is a question--somebody else would have to go back to 1978 and 1979.
DR. KEEL: Well, did yJu get the information, Mr Kingsbury?
MR. KINGSBURY: No. I cannot comment in this time frame about these detailed concerns
of that joint. I just was not involved.
DR. KEEL: Well, they are faicly critical concerns, though, r)on't you think if you had known
about it, you would remember? Is that a reasonable statement?
MR. KINGSBURY: Well, I would ext_ct I might remember, yes. I have no recollection of
these discussions at aH
My discussions became, I got involved in this thing late, as Leon and John know, when we
were well into tbe flight program.
DR. KEEL: But, Mr. Hardy, you got a copy of the memo. Do you recall the memo, in fact
both the 1979 memo you got a copy of specifically, which was the one that raised these concerns?
You were then the Solid Rocket Booster Program Manager?
MR. HARDY: Yes, that is correct. And I've been asked that question before and I cannot
with certainty remember the time and the menaorandum itself. I do have some recollection of
the issues that were
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being discussed at that time.
In my office those were handled principally by Colonel Rice who was my Deputy. However, I
was involved, and I specifically remember the issue having to do with shimming. And I specifi-
cally remember the discussions that Mr. Ray referred to here between Thiokol and Marshall
technical people on trying to understand precisely what was the joint rotation, and whether or
not in fact the measured joint rotation and the static str,actural test represented the proper
quantification of that.
Other things I can remember beyond that is in fact that the joint was shimmed; that we did
apply shims. I believe there were 35/1000 nominal shims were put in the joint. Other things I
remember was that eventually after this time, there was a formal design review and there was a
certificate of qualification executed against this piece of hardware, as there was against each
piece of hardware.
And to the best of my knowledge, the responsible design engineering people at the Marshall
Space Flight Center and the responsible design engineering people at Thiokol signed that certifi-
cate of qualification.
It was presented to me prior to the first
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flight, STS-1, as being an agreed-m executed certificate of qualifica*ion.
DR. KEEL: Let's move on then to in fact the certification and verification proce_.
The next documents or another set of documents that the Commission has refers to the
Space Shuttle Veiification and Certification Propulsion Committee which was chaired by Gener-
al Morgan, and we have documents from July 1980 which have been made available to you.
In there, they specifically expre_ concern about verification of redundancy, and they say
with respect to this joint, of course, they say the committee was concerned that the redundancy
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feature was not verified by purposely failing one element in such a way to simulate all impor-
tant failure modes.
And they go on to say that the committee understands from a telecon that the p-in:ary pur-
pose of the secondary O-ring is to test the primary O-ring and that redundancy is nct a, require-
ment. [Ref. 5 2-25]
Do you know the basis of that statement?
MR. HARDY: I remember the review that you referred to there that General Morgan
chaired. I do remember some discussion about testing the capability of the joint to seal with one
O-ring; in effect, the
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capability to seal if one O-ring fails.
To the best of my recollection, that recommendation was implemented with a test that was
a hydroburst or a static hydrotest with one O-ring mis_ag. That is my recollection. I could be
wrong on that, but I think that's true.
The discussion there or the reference there to a telcon--and I don't know who that was
with--that that implies that there was no intent for the joint to be redundant is totally foreign
to me.
I don't know where they wou!d have gotten that information because that was the design
requirement for the joint.
DR. KEEL: Wouldn't you have seen tho_e documents, though, since you were then the Solid
Rocket Booster Program Manager?
MR. HARDY: Which document are you referring to?
DR. KEEL: The committee reports, Space Shuttle Verification Shuttle Propulsion Commit-
tee
MR. HARDY: Yes.
DR. KEEL: You wo,qd have seen them and presumably read them?
MR. HARDY: Yes. And Bs I said, I think the one recommendation or discussion there
having to do with
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verifying redundancy--to the best of my recoll.-ction, the further discussion of that and disposi-
tion of that recommendation was to run a test, a hydroproof test, with one O-ring. And I believe
,"hat was done, I can find out for sure. That is the best of my recollection.
But at the time, or as you remind me here, I don't know any discussion--and I may have
read that--but I don't know any di_u_ion that had to do with any claim on the part of anybody
that it wasn't a requirement for the joint to be redundant.
DR. KEEL: I just have---well, it does say it here, of course, and you have that document, but
if you have further information maybe you could provide.
Just one further question, since you brought up the verification point, the recommendation,
aside from the fact that they had been told redundancy was a requirement, they then made a
recommendation that the upcoming lightweight case test should be expanded in scope to also be
a thorough field joint verification test and not just for redundancy, but a full field joint verifica-
tion for STS-1.
Now, were in fact tho6e cases or those tests expanded prior to STS-1 and was that complete
verification consistent with this committee
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recommendation done prior to STS-I?
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MR. HARDY: I cannot tell you. I jus'c don't remember. The only thing I can tell is that the
closeo_t of every one of those recommendations was reviewed with the committee. That commit-
tee., by the way, was chaired by Walt Williams, and there were several panels and General
Morgan headed one of those panels.
The closeout of all of the recommendations was reviewed with and. to the best of mv knowl-
edge. resolved to the 3atisfaction of the panel or the committee and also reviewed at Level I! and
! believe at Level I within NASA.
But I could possibly research and find out e_:actly what was done with regard to the specific
recommendation that you referred to.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That would be helpfuk
Going to a _mewhat different subject on the _ ,_lesign proce,_s that you're working on now,
and I guess Mr. Kingsbury heads that up. Are Mr. Ray and Mr. Miller included in that?
MR. KINGSBURY: Mr Ray has been at the, Cape. Mr. Miller is in the Program Office and
has been working with us. We have all of the people that have been in this program in the past
involved, plus many many others.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How about Mr. Ebeling at Thiokol, is he on it?
MR. K!NGSBURY: Mr. Rogers, I can't tell you what the Thiokol staffing is. I have a staff.
We are running a parallel effort, and I am not familiar with the details of their staffing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I have no other questions.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Kingsbury, just one. The Thiokol gentleman, as he left _he ;oom
at the last session, expressed some surprise that we were letting orders to start cutting metal on
the 7th of May on the redesign joint, well before the Commission has come out with its recom
mendation.
Would you like to clarify that and say what we'ro d-,_,_g exactly?
MR. KINGSBURY: The way the SRM p, ogram is built, it does have hardware as ._ function
of time, and last July an order wa,_ placed for 72 segments, case segments. At that time the
program had incorporated a capture _:'ature on the filament wound case which uses only a ring,
as you will recall, which attaches to the filament wound case when the joints come together, and
the program at the time they ordered the 72 joints asked the forger in Wisconsin to forge thase
total case segments such that there would be sufficient metal that
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a capture latch could be incorporated at the tang end of the joint if that decision was made.
Now, those segments began arriving at Rohr. I have been up here all week, so I don't know
what day it is, but if this is the first of May, they began arriving "_oday. Rohr has asked us, us
being Thiokol and Marshall, to give them guidance on what we would like done so that they can
begin planning their tooling, and they say they would like that information by the 10th of May.
We have been working parallel but independently now for about three or four weeks. We
have met twice, and we meet again next week and attempt to come to a conclusion on any dif-
ferences we want in the metal itself. It will be, to a degree, a kind of an omnibus thing that
leaves us several options that we may then pursue which will require further refinement at a
later point in time, but so as to keep the program going. It is our intention to give them infor-
mation.
DR. WALKER: Who is we?
MR. KINGSBURY: We is Thiokol with Marshall concurrence, but it is a Tbiokol contract
and Thiokol will issue that direction.
DR WHEELON: A series of questions, if I may.
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How marl 3"of these new forgings are now available'?
MR. KINGSBURY: There will ultimately be 72. The_ are coining in pieces.
DR. WHEELON: But now many are there now'?
MR KINGSBURY: Today, none, unless if today is the first of May, there are two, or the
second of May, there are two at Rohr and there will be four mine by the end of this month, as I
understand it.
DR. WHEELON: And do these new forgings allow for a redesign or a limited redesign or no
redesign?
MR. KINGSBURY: A redesign, as we see it at this point in time, we can make a total rede-
sign we need within the forging billet that we have.
DR. WHEELON When could those first forgings be available, and when could they be
loaded, and when would they be ready for flight?
MR. KINGSBURY: I'm going to new give you some very, very early data that we are pursu-
ing. Rohr has committed to deliver two finished forgings end of July, four the end of August,
and six each month thereafter.
DR. WHEELON: _ when does that get us ready?
MR. KINGSBURY: That gets us to where we can have test motors available, we believe, in
the December-January timeframe, and flight hardware could be
2813
a_eilatfle mid-next year.
DR. WHEEI,ON: If the new design can be accommodated within these new forgings.
MR. KINGSBURY: Yes.
DR. WHEELON: Do you know yet enough abeut the redesign that you want to make to be
confident, sort of confident or not confident about the ability of these new tbrgings to accommo-
date the new design?
MR. KINGSBURY: Now, you are going to talk about engineering judgment, because the
analysis--
DR. WHEELON: That's what you get paid for.
MR. KINGSBURY: I'm highly confident that we can make a completely reliable, easily as-
sembleable, environmentally independent joint within the forging we are getting.
DR. WHEELON: Super.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I have a question.
The Commission ha_s not drawn conclusions to this point as to what recommendations it
might make with respect to redesign. It is certainly within our charter to do so, should we elect
to do so, but since we haven't made conclusions at this point, it might be helpful, to the extent
you are able, to tell the Commission what sort of guidelines and ground rules you are including
in the redesign effort.
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MR. KINGSBURY: I would be glad to, Mr. Armstro_ g, and I understand the Commission
has not reported, apd I further would comment that with respect to my friend General Kutyna,
I must know '_e answer to the TITAN problem before I can be thoroughly comfortable also, but
understanding _hat those are still outstanding, we are pursuing the basis that there were several
things about the joint which were not forgiving. Rotation is a bad thing We think we can re-
solve that issue. Putty, so far as I have been able to determine, no _body ha._ found anything good
to say about putty, and we expect to be putty-free. We will be environmentally independent
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eitherby conditioningor by protection,andby that I meanwewill put a weathersealonand
precludewater,andif thermalenvironmentalconditioning is required, we will provide that
Now, I say that not because I don't think temperature may have contributed to this Fro-
gram or to this problem, but we believe now we have a concept where we are whe_ we were in
or thought we were m 1976, and I can only tell you that from what I have heard, and that we
now have a concept where the joint actually closes when it rotates rather than opens
And so. resiliency does not become a factor But we will qualify for a spectrum of tempera-
ture that
2815
far exceeds the requirement. Aru those are the things that we are putting into it.
Now, anything else that comes _ut we will have to get back into it, and we will have to go
back and look at those factors, but those four elements we recognize need correction,
DR. COVERT: Insofar as it still sounds like it i_ going to be a reusable joint, do you intend
to take a stack and fire it and hydrot_t it and clean it and reload it and fire it some number of
times so that you get out in fiont of your usage and encounter the things like case growth and
so forth early?
MR. KINGSBURY: Dr. Covert, we've got to understand this case growth thing, and I can
tell you now that we do not put sufficient stress in the joint of the membrane of the segment to
exceed even the lowest proportional limits you can imagine. And sc it is not a simple, we are
overstre_ing it to pressure.
DR. COVERT: I did not mean to imply that it was simple. I meant to suggest, do you test it?
MR. KINGSBURY: Yes. We must understand that very thoroughly. There's absolutely no
question about that. We are dealing with tolerances that we are talking about here and you are
talking about with these gentlemen of .010 or .020 on a 12 foot diameter piece of
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metal, and although .010 or .020 may seem like sloppy tolerance on a piston for your automobile,
it is awfully tight on a 12 foot diameter cylinder. And so we have got to understand that prob-
lem and we may end up having a logistics track that says you match segments before you cast
them so you know when you get them to the Cape they will fit. We will use ground support
equipment to assist the joining, so we know we put two round pieces together and don't worry
about somebody has something that doesn't qt, and he hangs it sideways or whatever to try to
make it round.
Our intention and our goal is to have a joint that goes together pretty much like anything
that you put together at home when you buy it, and it doesn't take any labor-intensive oper-
ations.
DR. COVERT: What I am suggesting is it might be prudent to establish a lead-the-fleet type
program where you have a test article that you continue to use over and over again and get a lot
of usage out of them early on and be ahead of the problems you encounter.
MR. KINGSBURY: That may be, but one of the things that still has potential consequence
to us is there is a possibility that we do not have a complete material transition, and if we ao,
you can solve that with heat treating. And I think once we understand those
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kinds of details, then we should be able to resolve the issue that is in front of us. We simply do
not understand that case growth problem, and we cannot describe it mechanically. It does not
faP into a mechanical description.
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And so it is an unknown that has to be dealt with, and that coulJ cost ,_ some segments.
there's no question about that It is our intention to understa, d it and see if we can resolve it.
and if it means early termination of the life of some segments because of the condition that they
are in, that is what it will mean. they will get thrown away
I gness I should mewon tbat it is our ir "_,,tion to incorporate the new joint at the field
joint, and we are looking at the factory joint, b _t this point in time we do not plan to do
anything more than perhaps increase the insm_ "hickness. because that is simply Oust a
piece of membrane.
DR c'OVERT: But let me go back to my question again.
There is a process in many propulsion systems, and many, in fac', aircraft systems, and it
might even _ )rudent in the long run in space systems to select an :_rticle, run it through a
cyclic loadir z series that represents the usage, do it repeatedly so that ';ou _. _':e
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exposure on this one to all kinds of things that might not show up in analysis because it is the
real world, and I'm suggesting you might want to think about thi_ as a u_eful thing to preclude
other problems we might not understand at this point.
MR. KINGSBURY: Certainly I understand what you're saying. You and I have done it en
other programs. There is an element of use I cannot introduce which is of concern to me, and
that is wmer impact. And I have got to look at that.
DR. COVERT: We have got to think about there may be a way of having to simulate that
All right, thank you.
MR. SUTTER: What about the testing to qualify this joint9 Some preknowledge of that
might be useful, too.
MR. KINGSBURY: We have a very extensive test program. We start at the component !evel
using cold gas just as an indicator because we could do it quickly. We will stay at _he compo-
nent. Our next series will be prt,bably at the component level using hot gas. We w,ll then go to a
hybrid system where we can represent the pressure, the ignition pressure cycle that is up at the
same rate and stay there so that we can induce whatever mechanical--
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MR. SUTTER: Will it include the twang effect?
MR. KINGSBURY: We will do twang tests, certainly, on the structural test article, but
we're looking at how can we with hot gas cause the inflection that occurs in the hardware with-
out having to run two-minute static test program that we can run on a'cycle of about one every
three or four months, and thac is an awful lot of testing. And we have this hybrid system that
we are putting in place that looks very attractive at this time. One of the problems that has not
been thoroughly resolved or has not been resolved at all deals with how much full scale testing
must be done, and it is a very siraple question. I can say analytically, I can show you, I have
dealt with ever3"ching that has come out when it is all over, and I clearly by analysis am better,
and I will run a number of these, yet to be determined.
If you are a statistician you can say to me that's not enough, you have got to at least equal
the experience with the last joint before I say you are good enough to fly, and so that discussion
has not occurred, and it simply has.'t permitted me to resolve that issue at this point in time.
There will be some number, obviously, of
F
f static firings, hot firings.
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MR $U'_"FER: It would seem to me that that i_-,itiatlve ought to be pushed to the forefront
because that is obviou_t? going to cost a lot of money, end that is why it wasn't done before And
how much money needs to be sFent ought to be put o,:'_ there so people can start worrying about
it
MR KINGSBURY: Mr. Sutter. that subject is being discussed. I discussed it yesterday, as a
matter of fact. ,."bile I was here. and it is going on today.
There will be other discussions to size the program so we can know what the money sizes
are,
DR. COVERT: Might I suggest also you consider firing vertical as opposed to horizontal, and
I realize that is an expensive proposition as well.
MR. KINGSBURY Let me just offer for _our benefit some of the problems firing vertical, i
have no way to hold it down. The aft skirt will not hold it, and so I have got to build a structure.
Setting that aside, there is not a test stand availablo in the country that we have been able
to find--and we have been searching for three weeks. We tried vertical either way, fire ,p or
down. We cannot .find a facility. And the best time we have had suggested to us, and I have some
questions as to the
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validity of the offer, is i5 months to have a test stand available.
MR. SUTTER: How about firing one down and one up at the same time?
Laughter.
MR. KINGSBURY: Mr. Sutter. we p'_anned thr.,_t, but we want to gimbal the nozzles, and we
ran into trouble with our gimbal nozzle uattern in getting the balances in.
MR. HARDY: You are not suggestiug to take the thrust out cn the tbrward dome of each of
those two, are you?
iLaughter. 1
MR. SUTTER: I think, though, that asking some of your smart testing guys what kind of
testing can we do. they may t_ave been inhibited betbre due to lack of funds. M:_ only comment
is I really don't believe that this ten-inch small-scale test is hardly worth a damn.
MR. HARDY: You are absolutely correct. Th ,t i: ::::-t the way to qualify the new joint. I
think that gives you some early on information, bul that is not all the answers.
MR. KINGSBURY: The only intention of the small scale testing is, for example, if you
remove the putty from the joint. I'm n-:_t cure the current joint
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configuration, in fact, I feel reasonably confident the current joint configuration is not adequate.
It is too wide. Furthermore, it is ngt enough of a tortuous path. I need to take more energy out
that ! will get into turns. So that has to be changed.
And I think we can confirm that path on a small motor.
MR. SUI_ER: That kind of testing is very valuable.
MR NINGSBURY: That's what we use it for.
DR. FEYNMAN: Mr. Kingsbury, if I were a statistician and I was trying to determine if ._u
could fly, what probability would you--should I try to establish that the thing will not fail in the
future, that is, in determining the number of tests. I have to know that figure so when you say
you qualify it, what kind of probability are you quelifying it for?
MR. KINGSBUR_: I can't answer that question at this point in time. I obviously am quali-
fying for the maximum that I can get, and I have got to have some goal I am not aware, there is
a program goal that says you must demonstrate this reliability with this probability. That is
worked out on individual elements, and _h,.t has not been done on this particular exerci_.
1634
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GENERAL KUTYNA: But headquarters is claiming
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er was claiming a probability of fall:,re for the soild prior to this time as a result of that nuclear
investigation from Galileo. What was the probabihty on ;hat'?
MR. KINGSBUI-": Cn an order of i0 -s. Now', that is at anv second of time in the flight
trajec*ory, and that was. i believe, misunderstood by a number of peeple. If you say what is it
over the full spectrum, you have got to divide it by 120. _ut at ar_v point in time it was on an
order of 10- s.
DR. FEYNMAN: 10 -5 per second, the probability was 10 -s per second?
MR. KINGSBURY: No, at any second, in any one second slice, the probability of fai!ure in
any one second slice was 10 -s.
DR. FEYNMAN: That's what I said, it was 10 -5 per second, In two second slices it would be
2 times 10 -5, is that right?
MR. KINGSBURY: Yes, you could put it that way.
DR. WHEELON: So the chance of a solid rocket motor failing is about 1 in 10 -30
M}:. ixINGSBURY: Those were the numbers that we had, that is correct.
DR. RIDE: I just wanted _o comment, it's my understanding that NASA does have a pro-
gram philosophy
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on which the acceptable probability of a solid rocket failure is zero.
MR. KINGSBURY: Well. certainly. D-. Ride. that is the philosophy on everything that we
have, but there is nothing in this world that has a probability of either 100 or zero. It is some-
where in between those two numbers.
DR. RIDE: I appreciate that.
282,=;
MR. ACHESON: Did I hear you to say that the new design will have as one of its goals that
the O-rings will _ protected in some way from either binding by misfit in the _tacking process,
er injury in the stacking process?
MR. KINGSBURY: Yes, you did.
MR. ACHESON: And if so, how would that be achieved?
MR. KINGSBURY: Well, let me have--I have a three-hour briefing that does this. Let me
try to tell you quickly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Shorten it, if you would.
[Laughter,]
MR. KINGSBURY: I intend to put a ring on both sides of the joint, a fairly massive ring
which will make that joint round at the top and bottom. Now, to assure when they come togeth-
er, I don't have an offset on the cen_er lines, I have another ring on the bottom that extends out
further than the inside--where th( outside leg of the clevis, and so I force it wherever it's
coming down. I forc_ it to go in the m!ddle.
MR. RUMMEL: How about spring back when the ring is removed?
MR. KINGSBURY: Thank you, sfi At that point in time I will custom shim around the
diameter of the joint, and only then will _ take the ring off.
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MR RUMMEL: So, whatever stress may be there the spring back will just be there, and the
shims are tight enough so the segments wor't move. Is this what you are saying °
Mr¢ KINGSBURY: No, there will be _-ome motion, probably of an order to 0.002 to 0.003
,na×imum, we could have at ignition, anc we witl calculate based on measurements being made
toda1," and that have been made over the past several weeks and will continue to be made on
cases that have been loaded, what is the spectrum of out of round that we have so that we know
what kind of local strain we have to put in. rand then we will do a statistical analyms and put a
three sigma worst on that. and that is the number we will use to assume residuals to _ sure
that we do not have a problem of residuals when we are locked up.
MR. RUMMEL: Are they shipped in those rings?
MR. KINGSBURY: No. The rings will be applied at the Cape.
MR. RUMMEL: So, they could come in out of round?
MR. KINGSBURY: I think it is axiomatic, they will come in out of round. They are shipped
flat, lying down, because they cannot--we cannot clear the railways standing up. We will then
put them on a
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transportation doll-.," and attempt to begin the rout'cling process at that dolly, and then the final
rounding will be done with the rings.
MR. RUMMEL: In ,ther words, you will try to push them back into round before the
rings--
MR. KINGSBURY: I wi.11 stand them _p and put them in a round fixture on that dolly tha',
matches the tang which is down. force that to begin the rounding process, but I won't depend on
that. I will conclude with an actual fixture that does it,
DR. FEYNMAN: Mr. Kingsbury, I'm very confused. You'_,e been uzing these probability
numbers and I've suddenly discovered tbey_re not what I've thought. The flight has the engines
running at !east 500 secondz
MR. KINGSBURY: Five-twenty.
DR. FEYNMAN: And if the probability of failure is one ',lines _en to the 5tt: per second.
that's 500 to the 5th which is about one in two hundred.
MR. KINGSBURY: I wc.uld have to ge back and look at the engine numbers, Dr. Feynm.an
DR. FEYNMAN: It is very easy to multiy!y 509 times ten to the minus five.
MR. KINGSBURY: I doa't know that ':hey were built on the same basis as the SRB number,c
were built.
2828
I'm sorry, ] just can't answer that questie._.
Well, Dr. Feynman, you are saying the SRB is ten to the minus five and you divide it by
120 If the _ME is ten to the minus five, you must divide it by :520, and so it is a very high
probability.
DR. FEYNMAN: Let's take the SRB. Would that be one in a thousand, say, the probability
of failure from or_e of the two SRB's is about one in 5,,045`fiight_q?
MR. KINGSBURY: That is what the numbers would _y.
DR. FEYNMAN: But you were having a considerable discussion with Mr. Ullian where he
was estimating, was somewhere between one in a hundred and one in a thousand. There's a tre._
mendous amount of discussion, I euppose, and I discover you both have the same answer.
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MR KINGSBURY:Eventuallywe did have:hat.,Mr. Feynman.Originally we did not
havo--.original_yMr. UIlian'snurr,l:er wasonein /ifty-seven and that was based on every solid
rocket motor fai',ur_: "_hat had occurred since 195_, and I contend there has been learning in the
industry in _he !ast 25 )'ears apd that some of the things that we did in 1958, to 1960, we now
k,_ow _:aw to dc properly and therefor_ that data bm)e was invalid.
Mr Ullian's data base contained _c,'ne o_her
2S2'.-;
deficieacies, in my y,xdgment, in that he called failures--he called-he identified things as fail..
ures where a mission was completed successful|y, and I have difficulty calling that a failure, and
so we had a lot el" discussions.
You're exactly right, ultimate!? we came to essentially the same number. I never changed. I
should say.
.MR. SUTTER: I would like ;o change the subject and maybe :his is an improper subject, but
since this is the last meeting in our design reviews that Jack Lee supported us on. one of the
inputs that came out of there and one of the things NASA is doing is a review of the critical
items list and a review of the hazard analysis, it was the intent to make sure that there aren't
thi_gs in there that shouldn't be changed, or procedures changed or something, prior to the next
fligh_
And since the joint now, the joinl design is well along, how is the rest of the--look at the
test of the system and what may be coming out there and what time may be coming out there as
to what else needs to be done.
Do you gentlemen have any knowledge of that?
MR. KINGSBURY- Yes. I think I can speak Io that. The s_stem is lo._kmg a_ everything
except the solid rocket motor that we are looking at redec.igning
2_,3e
We will look at that and any changes that _ make, wt, will write a new FMEA. develop a
new CIL, or if we don't make a change we ,,-ill review very thoroughly the FMEA and the CIL.
MR. SUTTER: And this iecludes things like the main engdne?
MR. KINGSBURY: The system is doing--I didn'l: make my point. There is _ group tha_ i
have de-dicated to redemgaing avme el__ments of the SRM. The res_ of the sysu:m, the ._hmtle
system at the Marsha!t Space Flight (;enter, is iooking at the extental tank, the SSME, the SRB
_ystems that are no,: included in my activity, and I'm looking at the SRM.
MR. SUTTER: But you don't know how they're _:r_ming along on that and what _he timing is
ta reach conclusions?
MR. KINGSBURY: I have net..qeen me schedule, no, sir, I have not.
DR. WALKER: I have a c<_uple of questions.
MR. SU_'I'I'ER: We!l, i ,vould just like to make a comment. It would be good re know how
they're coming on that. Maybe before the relx)rt is finalized, it ought to be in the red,err that
this analysis was requested and NASA was doing it anyhow.
MR. KINGSBURY: Mr. Sutt.er. I'm sure duck I_.e
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can provide that. It's just that I haven't seen it. The program is working that problem and I'm
sure has a schedule developed.
MR. SUTTER: Thank you.
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DR.WALKER.First, I havea specificquestion.You'regoingto removethe putty, whichI
think is a wisedecision.What techniqueare yougoingto useto protectthe seals?I assume
you'restill talkingaboutthe rubberor Vitonseals.
Wh,• technique are you going to use to protect those from the interior heat?
MR. _,INGSBURY: The very early thermal analyses we've done, and these are far from
complete, show that the standing column of gas in the joint at the instant betore ignition, then
infused by the hot gas at ignition, temperatures at the joint achieve approximately 160 degrees
Fahrenheit.
Now, ;f that was all I had to deal with it would be easy, but the dynamics show also that if
you get a fairly small pressure differential around the periphery, you now set up circumferential
flow, and so we mus_ build some dams in there which cut off that circumferential flow.
That detail has not been worked out, but I understand it and we know when we must do it.
And the
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analytical work and some of the empirical _,ork is starting this week.
DR. WALKER: I thought the compre_ion of the gas generated temperatures of about 1,000
degrees or _.
MR. KINGSBURY: Well, I can't tell you tbe details. I got the numbers from my folks last
weekend, a very quick number, that said, with the joint as we have it now designed, and the
path that we now have designed, I can expect somewhere between 150 and 160, maybe as high as
200, but well within the capability of any of the elastomers that we are considering.
DR. WALKER: I have a bit of unease about the speed or the pace at which the redesign is
proceeding, and it seems as though there are some external factors such as these new cases
which seem to preclude certain design optior:s, for example, eliminating elastic seals altogether,
MR. KINGSBURY: No, sir, it does _ot. We can _ti]i modi "y the clevis end _,f the joint and
pat metal seals, pressure actoated metal seals. I really &m't _ ant to do that because I depend
upon pressure, but that's a possibility.
We _are not limited in what we can do at all.
DR. WALKER: Have you examined the possibility of metal sea, ,n depth?
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MR. KINGSBURY. We arc examining the possibility of metal seals. We haven't chosen the
seals. We have a program that will ,-,an out at the end of June that we are running, and when
that runs out, I think in June or July at Thiokoi, that they are running that, and both are fairly
broad programs and complementars, from which we wouid draw the conclusions of what the
seals should be.
DR. FEYNMAN: I just have calculated th_ temperature from the compr_icn. Supoosing
you get to 750 psi and you compress air at room temperature under that, under room tempera-
ture which is 50 times the pressure at which it starts, and then the entropy doesn't change and
the entropy is a log of the ratio, and then you soon find you get to about 1,000 degrees.
MR. KINGSBURY: Yes, sir, instantaneously, but you are n(_w stagnant. You will not main-
rain that pres,qure ibr ,'he full time. You now have a stagnant column which is going to give up
that energy.
DR. FEYNMAN: What happens to the pressure?
MR. KINGSBURY: It stays there.
DR. FEYNMAN: Where does the energy go, to the hea:ing of metal?
MR. KINGSBURY: Yes, and the rubber and anything else that is there.
t638
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DR FEYNMAN And the r hber'.'
MR. KINGSBURY: Yes.
MR. KEHRLI: Mr Kingsbur_ ")u have been discussing the redesign of" the case to case, or
the field joint. Did i understand you _o say that there will also be a redesign of the case to nozzle
joint seal':'
MR KiNGSBURY: I don't believe i said that. but there probably will be.
CIiAIRMAN ROGERS: I just wanted to say, unless there are other questions, I would like to
say first, tha_k you very much and I guess the most ;mportant thing that the Commission, I
guess can accomplish would be to have safety in tke future, in the foreseeable future.
And we realize it is a difficult job you have, and Jr. a sense you are going to be under the
same general conditions that you were under when you launched 51-L, that you had schedule
pressures of sorts. And there's been a lot of comment on whether that might have affected a lot
of the decisions or not, but certainly it is something that is real in life, and you are going to
have those now and m the future too because people--if they're thinking about starting to fly
flights---If the flights begin in a year or so and it drags on for two years, you will be under con-
stant pressure to do something right away and that would be rep_,ating the
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mistake--a mistake of the past, I guess.
And second, if you have financia! problems, that you can't do some of these tests because
you think you can't afford it, that also may be one of the things that contributed to this acci-
dent.
And I guess what I'm saying first, if we can help in any respect in our recommendation, we
would like to do it. I mean, as far as I'm concerned _he most important thing of all is to get back
to safe flight. And if you don't, even if you get back quickly and some :ling happens, it is a trage-
dy of great magnitude because it could almost end manned space flight.
So, you might want to think about what we could recommend that wc,ulcl be helpful.
MR. K1NGSBURY: Wel_, thank you, Mr. Rogers. Let me say that from the bottom of mv
heart, we are not going to fly again un:il we are ready, and I have found no one in the system
who has argued one bit _'ith me.
We have discussed when we can fly, There have been scme of those pressures, that, can't we
do it in a y_ar. The answer is no. We cannot do it in a year. We cannot do it until we are safe,
reliable, repeatable every time. And I have had no arguments of other than, gee, I wish you
could do better, type of thing.
I think we all understand that we are simply
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not going back to a flight program until we are confident we kave t_,,is thing fully controlled,
and I'm not going back to a flight program and I believe I can stand behind this, until I can say
there may be another failure in the shuttle in its history but it will not be a solid rocket motor.
I'm not stopping at the joint. We are looking at all of it.
CHAiRM,aN ROGERS: We!l, very good. I appreciate those comments very much.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, could I just have one nmre? Dr. Kingsbury, I'm really still a
little coneerr, ed that you may be under---
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Speak a little louder.
DR. WALKER: l'm really still concerned that you may under pressure, schedule pressures
that, for example if you decided you needed to bvild several designs, at least in scale and tesl
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them. that there might be pressures which would preclude your doing teat" And I m just _erv
concerned that the pressure to get the system _,perating again is going to force an early' decision
or, the design of the new .joint, and I'm just wor'_derin_g hew you anticipate that that w'lll be re-
:_lsted
MR KINGSBURY Well, I don't know what else I
can say. Let me say first that I am Mr. Kingsbur_, You spend a modest amount of time in our
fair city and I invite you to come ::nd sit with me at any time and let us show you where we are
I just have no intentions of doing anything hastily ,and I have found nothing in the system above
me that is encouraging it, and it is not one of these things I will quit. l'm not going to quit.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. we wish you luck It's a tough job and we all appreciate it. Did
he call you Doctor?
MR. KINGSBURY: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Chuck Yeager calls me Doctor. I'm not a doctor either.
[Laughter.]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thanks a lot.
[Pause.]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We have some Commission mernoers absent. We're almost at the
end of the day here and we would like to move along, if we may.
If all of you gentlemen haven't been sworn in. would you rise, please, and take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
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[PZ5 (_8-I) January 9, I9,8
I0:
FRC_:
SU;;JEL-F:
_EDilHr Eudy
EP_Si'_r. Miller
Resta%ement of Posi_On o_ SR_C|evis Joint O-Ring
Acceptance Criter;a anH Clevis Joint Shim RL'_qulrementL_
n view of recent event_ relating to proposals suggesting the r_laxaCion
of standards For clevis joint O-ring acceptance and the use of a standard
shi_ thickness for clevis joints which allows O-ring compression t_ fall
below m_n_mum irdustry accepted valJes, this office feels obligated to
restate its opposition to both p_poSals, l'he following 9aragraphs
address each of the related subjects in terms of events leading to such
r_co_nendations, risks involved by lowerin 9 standar_Is, and rec_ndat-ions
-tY$-resolve ri_ks.
a. Relaxation of O-Rin_ Acceptance Standards - I:_Jring the latter part
of Now. _Tg_-_, _s o'fflce was r'equeste_ by|_morandum EESI (77-2gi]
to review Thiokol documents SI_W7-2875, 5t_n_ar_ Acceptance Cr_teria for
Prefora_d Packing (O-Rings) and 171-116, $_andar(_ Repair Instructions For
O-Rings {see e_closure I). Our response, whic_h was _ocumente_ in _randLm_
EP_b (77-I0e) dated Nove_)er 30, Igl7 (see enc_osur_ 2), reco_ended
rejection of bo_n documents because of excessive deviations fr,jm MZL-S'TD-41_
requirements, "visual inspection for rubber O-rings', and for lack of
clarificatian on several subjece_. Our _e_r_rand_ also curl:ned recr_r_ended
allowable flaw s_zes per MIL-S')'D-413 and a11c_bles for othe_ L_ypes of
defects which were not contained in MIL-_PI_-_I3. On December 72, 1977, w_
w_-e provlded _ith and asked to Cn_w_nt on a draft copy of mc(_orandu_ E._I
(77-321) to pregram manag_.o_e_t (see enclosure 3) _hich conceited EESI
C_t: af.d rscotrmendatlons tO Thioko; doc,_nt._ S_d7-Zgl5 _ II_-136
_fhich were not in agree_ent w+th our pr_viOu_s assessment. _ecause of these
differences and to further a_)lify our position concer_ing O-ring defec=
allowables, the following rec_ndations and just+fications a_ reseat.ca:
(I) Inclusions - Remo_e all visible _nclusions regardless of
size or ty_e of included material. The included material can be detacJ_ed
during _-_,_ =n_:al_t_on _rd _se, creacin_ debris a_H prc_able leakage.
R_air "_ r_quired _f one r_sulting _oi_ e_:ee!: O-OZS ir=h J_'_=er by
0.005 _nch oeeg. Deeper voids create a greater risk _or leakz_? _r_tn le_
co_)re:sion (example: a voi_ .015 inch deep reduces c_pression effect
by 5.5 3ercent).
JRPf. 3 "._ "21 1 of lJ
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(21 Hold Deposit Effects, Pits, and Voids - Each defect must be
treated according ta defect sha_. Oefects having sharp edges sho_lcl be
treated a_ a notch sensitive cut and repaired if the defect exceed_ 0.025
Inch diameter by 0.002 inch deep. 0_fects having s_oth shaoes Should b_
repaired if e_ther the diameter Or depth exceeds 0.025 incL _,:_ G.rM]5 inch
respecti rely.
(3) Cuts - Radial cuts other than suoerffc_al cuts (cuts which
cannot be fe_t with the t;_un_bnail) are not allowed and must be re_)aired
or disoosit_omed by splicin9 or re.iectioo. The orientatiRn of radial cuts is
such that stretching of the O-ring can r-_u_e f:_rt'her--tearing. Cuts parallel
_o t_ _-r_n_. longitudinal axis must not exceed _O.OOZ inch dec_ by 0.06C]_
inch long.
(¢) Repair Limitations - The limitation= on maximum 6efect size
acceptable for r_pair should be based on results of Thiokol's te__t program
per TV(R-II507. Deviations should be approved by EHOI.
b. Below Minimum O-Rin_ C(xnpr_'ssion - Prior to the static firing of DM-I
in June T'_J'[_, shims were installed in the clevis joints to stop seal leaka2e
caused by tang distortion. Shim_ of various thicknesses (0.010 to 0.031 in.)
were placed around two of :he joints according to gal) width available
(with so_e exceptions). No leaks were apparent during the test; however.
the cavity pressure measur,_nt on clevis joint number S (see enclasu_'e 4}
showed peculiar behavior (negative pressur_ to +8.3 psig). Calcula_:(_a_
performed by M.SFC and agreed to by lhiokol sho_ that distortion of the
clevis joint tang for any joint can be sufficient to cause O-ring/'ca_g
separation. Data from DM-} sho_ that this condition can be created b3_
joint m_ve_ent (lowering of support chocks) and data from the hydrobur_t
test -hows the tang and clevis do not re_ein concentric during pressur_
cycling, All situations which could create tang distortion ar_ not kz_wn,
nor i - the magnitude of _ovenKnt known. Regardless of these unknowr_, l'_iokol
the_ proposed to use a standard 0.020 inch thick shim for all SRM cl___is
joints including the STA-I vehicle (see enclosure 5). Subsequent to arrival
of _e STA-I vehicle at MSFC, Structures an_ Propulsion Laborator_ was asked
to assess the adequacy of the 0.020 inc_ shims which had been ins-taIle_ by
Thiokol, The response, docu_nted by _randum EPO{ (77-Z5- _) (se__ e;_c_osur_
5) ,'eccar_ended shim s_zes ranging from 0.034 inch ILo C.Oa5 inch thfc< i_
order to maintain the industry r__commended mini,.-.um ccmor_sssion valve of l_
percent. I_ was, and still is. our desir_ to tess with 15 perce;Emi;_
compression since this value is the industry wide minimum a_d '_as Or<_inally
the m;nimum design value used by Thiokol prior to tP_e tang distortion problem_
After issuance of the Structures and Propulsion Lab_rator_ r_cc_ameeda-
t_(_s, a. --51 decisior, ,,_a_ made to use a 0.015 inch thick shim in the fie!d
joint eF STA-I _.hich result; in a _inim,_ ccmoressic_ ,,'}iue of a:_rc_i_a-.__ly
5.5 parterre. This va :Je ass_-,,ss no ¢Orepression set. We st.rongly object :o
this proposa} because it creates unacceptable risks which can and should be
avoided.
[Kef. 5'2-2l 2 of 1]
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Calculations conducted _y this o_fice show that in same instances. O-ring
cc_presslon on Flight .,ehicles has the potential of being _ by
approxi_t_ly 1.5 percent, these calculations included t_e effect of 0-ring
compression set. Thiokol test report dated August 15. 1977. per l'WR-llS07
"O-ring repalr verification test plan" (see enclosure 7) sh_s that the
p_rent O-r_ng material and Sl)lice joints exhibited m_limur_ compression set_
of S.q and 7.0 perrenc, respectively. Also, when considering that the SR_
process demonstration seTent O-ring sufferecl a cOm._pr-_ssionset value oF
approx_,_at_ly II.O percent, one must treat these values as realistic and
_nclud_ their effects when calculatin_ O-ring com4)ression. It is recogn,L.L-d
that O_ngs wilt perform properly at lo_r" values than t-he 15 to Z5 per-cent
range reco_nded; however, the higher" v_lue_ are u__ect-asa design p_o_r_cir_
order to account for losses such as O-ring L'_3D_3r_sicn set and def_L-tS in -
the hardware sealing surfaces and O-rings. Our reco_endations _ rt_design
on-coming hardware and custom shim each joint (with a range) on existin5
hard,_are aS presented tO yOU in October 1977, is still valid (see enclosur_ 8_
The following recc_-_ndations and justifications are considered m_andat_r_? t_
provide adequate clevis joint sealing on all SRI_s.
(1) Reshim _-! to obtain a minimum compression va%ue of 15 perr.._nt
in order to verify t_he design for flight.
(Z) Redesign clevis joints on _.11 on-coming h_rd_r__ _t t_e earlie._
possible effectivity co preclude unacceptable, hlgh risk, O-r_ng comores._fon
values. This will eventually negate the use of shims, thereby reducing assL-_ol_,
time and eliminating shi_min 9 errors.
(3) Continue to use shims with existing ar_ mixed hardware Shi=-_
should be of sufficient thickness to provide a mrinim_m O-ring com3ressTon
of 15 percent, This value is used and recommende(i by Park__r. Precision,
CSD (Titan), Aerojet, and MSFC Science and Engineering Laboratories. We know
of no instance where ]o_er values are recomT_ended.
(4) Direct the prime contractor &rid b_ster &sse_d)ly contractor to
reinstate the design requirementS of 15 to 25 percent CO_4_r_ssion f_r clevis
_irgs. _e see_ no v_lid reaSOn for not designing to __cc_t_ st.a.nd_r'Js.
.Tnsub,marT, _e believe tha: :he fac'Cs pr_sent2d ir_ _he _r-_c__di,-_/paragraphs
should receive your most urgent attention,. Pro_er sh_m sizing and hig_
quality O-ring_ ar_ ma,dator), to prevent hot gas leaks and resulting
catast-ophic failure. _e w_]l be pleased to provide assistanca in anyway
possible.
Ques:,ons.concerning the contents of this _emor-andum should be referred t_
Mr..W. Li Ray, 3-045g.
i]]er
Chief, Solid Motor Branch
8 Enclosures
cc:.w/o eric. g_._EPOI/Mr. McCool
EP41/Mr. Hopson
EP21/Mr. Lombardo
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MARSHALL SPACE FL_G _ENTEA
S_MCLEVISJOI_IT LEAKAS_STUDY
DESIGN OPTIONS
I LE3,'_RAY
i__ 0c_!___ cTZ__
OP 'r;O_!S
1, NO C_NSE
2. SWIMS BErwEEH rANG A/_D
CLEVIS (OUTS IUE)
3. OVERSIZED _2-RItIGS
(, REDESIGN TAt_ xMO REbUCE
TOLERANCE r:tl ,,LEVIS
5. C0W,OINATION L; REDESIGN
(AS IN OPTIOt; I) AND
USE OF SHITS
R_'_V_RKS
o UNACCEPTABLE -TANG CA_J _OVE O_)TBOARD AND CAUSE EICESSIVE JOI4T
CLEARANCE RESULT!NG Iw SEA', LEAX,AGE.
o ECCENTRIC TANG/CLEvIS INTERFACE CA_X CAUSE O-RING EXTRUSION WHEN
CASE IS PRESSURIZED.
o ACCEPTABLE SHORT-TER_P_PEP_H _ S,[ILIS_S{O,
o PROBABILITY OF ERROR IN CALCULATING PROPER SHIM SIZE.
o REgUIRES INCREASED ASSEMBLY TIME FOR SHIM INSTALLATI0_. AND JOINT
CENTERING.
o UNACCEPTABLE SOLUTION - HIGH PROBABILITY OF O-RI_ DA_UWGE
OR CLEVIS 01STORTION (_JRI_ ASSEMBLY.
o DEPARTS FR_I RECOMMENDED DESIGN PRACTICES.
BEST OPTION FOR LONG-TERM FIX - ELIMINATES USE OF SHINS W_4EN
ALL REDESIGNED HARDWARE IS USED.
o PREVENT1 THE TYPE OF ERROR W_41OH COULD RESULT IN CALCU_.ATING
JO;NT CLEARANCE FOR SH[M INST_LLATIO_.
o ACCEPTAB_ _PROACH. SHIMS WILL BE REQUIRED IN SaME CASES
W_[N RED[ i_9 _ARI)WARE AND PRESENT HARDWARE IS JOINTED.
o SHiHS WILL ._ ISCONTINUED WHIM B_SE_ I_RDWARE IS PISSED OUT.
JRel. ; "Z-22 1 of 21
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MAI4SHALL. SPA_LI:'_,_HT;_ C;._TEn
'_ :_,MCLEVIS JOINTLEAKAGESTUDY
.-F
N,mh
i_,_ LEO_iRAY
i
! OCTOBER25, 1977
S',_-_ tROPOSED S_IIM_'_OIFICATION
o CALC_,_,t_ JOINT C_ARANCES FRO_4 AS BUILT DIMENSIONS
o PE_L :u!hT SEALINC MATERIAL (RTV-700). PEMOYE ONLY
ENOUG}I !_FERIA[ T_ C,A]M ACCESS TO SHIM AREA.
::,_T^_L H[W SHIMS TO REDUC _ TANG/CLEVIS O_JTSIDE GAP TO
APPROXUs_TELY .0C5 IN.
o I_STALL JOINT DEFLECTION INSTRUMENTATION
o INSTALL CLEVIS JOINT SEAL CAVITY PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS
o RE-SEAL JOINT AREA.
IR_,f 3 -''-)-'-'(f _]
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U.'.J._'J So,w:e F _,,)r':l C cs-l;ei- A_,.T.L_+n.m
H_$tO_1 Qf O-ri_
_,_ ++ , _.+.+
_,_ ....._ EP25 (79-13) January lg, 1979
TO:
FRC;.L
SUBJECT:
EFSI/Mr. E_c
E_2b/Hr. Miller
Ev}lua_ion of SRM Clevis Joint Behavior
As requested by your memorandum, EEBI (Tg-lo), Thiokol documents
T_IR-!2019 and lette_ 7000/ED-78-484 have been revaluated. We find
the Thiol:o] position regarding design adequacy of _he clews Jo_rt
%0 be co,,-_letely unacceptable for the foll o_ing reasons:
a. The large sealing surface gap created by excessive tang/clevis
relative movement causes the primary O-ring seal to extrude into the
gap, forcing the seal to functio_ in a way which vlolates indusLry and
Govern_,_nt O-ring-apo]icat_on practice_.
b.T_Excess_ve tang/clevis _ovement as explainsd above also allows
the secendary O-r_eg seal to bec_w_,e c_]etely diseogaged from its
sealing surface on the tang.
C. Contract End item Specification, CP_V!-250OD, page 1-28, parag-ap_
3.2.l+2 requires that the integrity of allhigh pressure c_se seals be
verifiab}e; the clevis joint secondary O-ring seal has been verified
by tests to be unsatisfactory.
Questir+s or coe_ents concerning this me_orandum_hould be referred to,
Mr. _illiam L. Ray, 3-0459.
d );,.J,:L
Chief, Solid _;oCor Branch
cc:
SA41/HeSSrs. Hardy/Rice
EEBll;ir. Uptagrafft
EHOZIHr. Key
EPOI/_r." _;cCool
EP_2/Hr. Bianca
EP21/i-lr. Lom_rdo
EPZ5/IWr Powers
EP2B/Hr. Ray
lRef. 5,2-231
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NatwJrv,__,_c_,.foc_un_
Gm_3L_l_mC.MarT,t_IL$oac_ _ Cdmqm_
Mars_ Soace F_;,_:Cen:e_k_arna
3fia_2
_=,,=,,,,,,,*.E.P25 (79-23) Febraary 6, 1979
.O: Distribution
FROM: EP25/Mr. Ray
SIJBJE_T: Visit t_ Precision Rubbez Products Corporation an_
Par_r Seal Co_,,!_any
The purpose of this _w_randum is to document the r_sult.s _f a visit
to Precision Rubber Products CorPoration, Lebanon, Tll, by Mr. Eudy, EESI one
Mr. Ray, EP25, on February I, 1979 and also to inform you of the visit
made to Porker Seal Co_oany, Lexington, I(¥ on Fe_rruary 2, 1979 by Mr. Ray.
T_e ourpose of the visit_ was to present the O-ring seal manufacturers
with data concerning the large O-ring extrusion gaps b_in9 experienced on
the Space Shuttle Soli_ Rocket: M'ator cle,is Joints and t_ seek opinions
regarding p_tential risks involved.
The visit on February 1. lg7g. to Precision Rubber Product_ Corporation
by Mr. Eudy and Mr. Ray was very wel'I receive_. Co_pany officiaZs, Mr.
Howard Gillette, Vice President for Technical Direction, Mr. John Hoover,
Vice President for Engineering, and Mr. 6ene Hale, Design Engineer
atta_ndec(tJ_emeeting and wer_ preSe.ntmd with the SRM clevis joint seal
test dat_ by Mr. Eudy and Mr. Ray. After considereble discussion,
c_any reOresentaCives _eclined to make im_,diate rec_ndations because
of the need for m_re time tO study the data. Ti_ey did; hoover, voice
concern for the design,stating that the SRM O-rin_"extrusion ga;) was
larger than t_t covered by their experience. They also stated that more
tests should be performed with the present design. Mr. Hoover prOmf_-ed
t_ ¢ont._¢_cM.SFC for further discussions within a few days. Mr. Gillette
_rovided Mr. Eudy and Mr. Ray with the na_s of two consultants w_o may
be able t_ help. We are indebted to the Precisio_ Rubber Pro uo_.s
Corpor_tlon f_r the time and effor_ being°ex_ended by their peJ_le in
s_port of this p r_b_em, especially since they have no connection wit-_,
the proJe:t.
The visit to t_e Par_er Seal Co_any on February 2, IgTg, by Mr. Ray,
EP2S, was also we_l received; Parker Seal C_any supplies the O-rings
used in the S_M Clevis joi_t d_sign. Parker representatives, Mr. Ei]R
Collins, Vice Pres_e_t for Sales, Mr. W. B. Green, Manager for TecD_i:aZ
Services, Mr. J. W. Kosty, Chief Develop_nt Engineer for R&D, Mr.
D. P. Thalm_n, Territory Manager and Mr. Du_ _ No,dock, Technical
Services, met wi_h _r. Ra>, EP25, and were p,.jvi_e_ w_th the identical
_Ref. 5/2-24 I of 2]
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SI_W clevis Joint data as was presented to the Precision Rubber Produc*..s
tone,any on February I, 197g. Reaction to the data by Parker officials
was essentially the sa_ as that by Precision; the SRM O-ring extrusion
gap is larger than they have previously exoerienced. They also expressed
surprise that the seal had per'for_ed so wel} in the present application.
Parker experts would make no official state_nts concerning reliability
and potential risk factors associated with the present design; however,
their first thought was that the O-ring was being asked to pc-form beycnd
its int_.nded design and that a different type of seal should be considered.
Fhe Meed for additional testing of the present desig._ was also discussed
and it was agreed that tests wMich more closely sim-late actual rondit_:ns
should be done. Par_er officials will study the data in mo,e detail with
other tone,any experts and contact M_FC for further discussions in
approximately one week. Parker Seal has shown a serious inteTest in
assisting MSFC with this probl_ and their efforts are verj much appreciat-"_-.
Solid Motor Branch, EP25
Distribution:
SA41/Messrs. _ardy/Rice
ESl/_r. Eudy
EPO]/Mr. McCool
[Ref. 3 2 21 2 ,,f 2]
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SPACE SHUTTLE
_VE_DF!CATmON/ C[_T!FICATIOR
PROPULSION COMMITTEE
COGNIZ,_.HT ENGINEERS 5th MEETING
L/GEN THOMAS W. MORGAN
CHA_RBAR
'_:J JULY _80,_
[Ref'. 5")-25 _ of Ill
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RECOV#IEMDATIONS
GRAIH INTEGRITY.
' _"ARSHALLSPACE FLIGHT CENTER CONTINUE THEIR RESPONSIVE A_:_NS_''TO :;_0_',_......
THE rORWAFZ SPRAININTESR;TY PRO]LLM IN ARE.ASOF:
c INDEPENDENTSTRENGT_ANALYSIS 9F S_CiN ST_CT_E
: KATERIAL PRSPERTiES
PP,OC=_'JREPRIOR TG STS-I.
3, REFINE REQUIR_IENTS._ PROC_URES. ,v ,ANA_,S S, AND EQ_]_EN_ " _ AN:
HANDLINGOF _OTORSEGMENTSA,NDvaJ_A'n -r_ _,_vM_SUR_'_ENT,
T_PERATUEE EXTR_F_
4, PERFO_ _ _' ,A_I,_O_ vER!_ICATION _T T_'PERATU_E _TRgMES,
F_
CO.dOT FU[ -SCALE TE:TS, _%,LRY=_Tn TESTS _ND PPOC_URE KEVIE'VTO VERIFY
F_EL_ JOINT INTEGRIT_
[Ref. 5 2-25 "2 o# I,l_
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JOINT I_I[GRIT _
TYwe _ propellant se(_ments are attachecl to fur_, a ,;_pl_ta l_)'essure ve-_.se! h_ me.ms o_' a p!n,_e_ tln_
a_d clevis Jolnt. _ellsble )'ot gas sealing of tee JoI,_ Is critical for _afe _.B c_eratio_,
Info_-lmati_ was provided In I briefing at Thioacl. a _ber of Thinest! r_po_ts, a MSFC d_c_JSslor, sn_ l
conference call wlth Thiokol ar.d M._cC. Yeriflcatlon conc.ern_ IF:aSide; (I' adequacy of $_fety factor _o
prevent "0" ring leakag_ or extrusion flllure _ SRM Igr,itlon. (_ redundancy. :B) a _ _ _ U a Cy L c _ COrreCt JOin l
lssell)lyr(lt KSCoVR_F@) veriflcat!o_.
_r_
a. ?Ver_li_Icat!onFot;.beal_$afet_ Factor. A slng!e _Kar case "burst" test (T_wE-il 66¢) resulted _n "0"
rlng extruslon failure at | safety factr}, of _ 58 o,er _()F. _hls re!lure l_ode car, proCac_ a wide %preaC ef
reeultl due to lllw_ufact_rlng variations, including Joint lind "0" ring variati{_ c_blned with w_rs_ ca_e
_olnt ltrk_tural deflection _nder lo_d. Therefore. t_e c_Ittee #as inltiell_ concer!_,ed thlt the mlniwum
safety factor was inadequate. Thiokol/Wa:atCh reporls ,'fk(_-il_6; anl l'_-IZO_l ke1_htened the cO_rnittee'$
concern. TW ¢_Ittee allo considers thc finite ".le_ent lrlalylll of TWR-12019 of little value since it
"equlred slgniflcant "adjustment" to app)'oxlAate Structural Test Article {STA-,) tlst r_su]t_, and the
Imposed boundary condltlon$ are quest!onable. We h_ve since learned that anent Oes!gn chiantis. "_" rIrl_
change., li#Idl_creesed shlmmlng have been icc_p)Ished 141d also that the deflection da_a (mul_ivit 9a_ge_ _n
thl re_ortl arl erronloul.
@(A_ and _'hloko_ _re very relp_llVl to OkJr 4",_tlo_s. Applirently i lot of informlt_o_ I$ aval_lbl, e
be},o_ that shc_m_ In t)_l reports whlch lh_$ that dellgrl/proceckore changes hlve been made and (.gTTeCt.
dlflectIi, n data are r)ow lvlllab)e. Thl_ c)ltl;supgork_ I llxlfn_ll_gap *{ MEOP c_" £).U_| inci_rl (O.04B Inch_$
frame SIA-_ melsur_ent$ * 0.033 INCUS "la_nufacturIAg" tol_raAce) whlch results In I slnl_ $afet_ factor
Of ]..$6 usln_, lab test e_trusl_ data on _Ine!, und_aged "0" rlng_, Note that '0" rle,g hardness Vl_!I-
tie(,$ up to ZO% are c_on. Thll up-to-date data has conslderab]), allevlat_d the co_Im!tter'$ concern$_ how-
ever. other th_n c.'e figure'_n TWR-lIgg2 an up-to-date verflcatlon d_(a package _oe$ not _pp{ar t_ e_i(' a_d
sensitivity data on "0" ring dew,age 1$ lacking,
C-7-21
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_. ¥11"|f|cItt_ of R_dJi_derl,:y. Tht set., .s_gn w,ls orlg_n_!| 7 _v_s_.nte_ is redunciint {t_,h,_ "_nqs
plus thl Ovl_lipged _ntlrnil cise lnsu]_t_on). Thl ¢_llltt_ wes c_cer_d t._l_ th_ _edu_dar_y felture .is
+ot verlflfl by p4Jrpos+ly fll!tn; one elmnt in such a wly _for exmple, 'tn "C" r+m(.i dmmlged +o Is to
e_l_rud41 pr_latIJra!y) to s+mt_llte iil I_ortiflt I"ll|}ur e Iloees, _ht r.omR',tt+_ un4erstlnd_ from i te_econ thst
t_ primary _r_£I of the scald "0" ring Is t_ test th_ p"_mlr¥ _0" r_ng. in_ t_t reOundan{). Is qqt t
rlquirlment. (We recognize _olle Q_lulmtlf_ed Olgret of re_Jndlney exlsts_Is $h_ On the cy_1_c p_'lSS_rt_-
t1_ tests.)
c. Yerlflcltlon of FrQper AssIId)!_, Th_ :_t_ee _e_leves mmln_Lt attention L_, deti_ Is rlqolred _er_
_Ince the prlmlry "0= r_n_ and its sealing ;_etry _n_1 _urflceS consti_te _ ctlt!_.il s_ngi_ _*_¢mlnlYl!l_r:
m|r7 *0= rlng tS pres_vr!_ !n th4 w_-ong d1_ectlo_, l_o the eF_'_.t oF Ins'J11tloe pu! y !s not cert;m!i_, One
i. Th_ _ _:_tn_ !1ghtv_g_t c4!e tes% _ho_Id Ue T_lnde_ _n %Lo_e Io _so be I thorough _1tI_ _0_
_r!_'IC.It!_-"_r_test +'or _T___. ThlS $_t_l_ 1_C_ule ve-!F!clt+or_ OF &l_kwr_ct_r_ng I_$ 0"1$_ _r!_1On _t_$ 4_C
si_ety *_:toi_s _d s1._I_ ConS_dl_ *0" r!:_g _m_ge testing fo" _i_:t)' f_ctor S_r,Sltiv ty _:;l_S!_l_ltion.
_. _e,fo_ ,hlg_ _ossur_.ziti_ rate {fOll_'_ed by hO_ I1_ tests o_ spec!_e_s _i_,jlatlng t_e p_tt)./
_r_ul_ti_ 2_,-It tc _eter_Cr_ "_" rlr_ _resSuri_It!on t_._, AOp!_ t_s _4tl In _ _e)_w.
4. ',_ _tem _ sb_i _s fO_rd t.) Le _.c_ete or _._ck!n_, a_d!t_o_al Le_t!ng ST%_U_(_ _e _erFor_m_c e to Cc_-
p!ete ye_IF1c|t1_ ;':;r';_._, T_e inert prG_el!a_t se_ts _t KS¢ (_h1:h have Int+)rnll Insu]Itlon) sh_l(I
S. Review _d _rovI e_eld joint _SSe_wb!y pro_',_d_res,
C- 7-Z;:
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SOLID.flOCIIETtV OTOIT
OBSEflVATIOI',IS
1, THE CERTIFtCATIGN SYSTEM IS SATISFACTORY,
°
-CERTIFICATION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION IS ACCEPTABLE,
EXCEPT FOR:
A. FORWAR_ SEGMENT GRAIN INTEGRITY
B, NO TEST A_" TEMPERATURE EXTREMES (40 ° TO 99 ° ]
C. SHELF LIFE Oi: THE IGNI]FRS
3. THERE AgE HO "SHOW STOPPERS'" FOR STS-1 AT THIS TIME
IF 2A AND 2C ARE SATISFIED
A
IRef. 3 2-:Z3 tl c_f 14J
INTROOUCT;C,H ('AGE ]
_E+PTLMC_fRIS. 19_JF)
TII[tLATEIIlALPRESENTED HEREIH DEFINES TIlE SPACE SIIUTTLE PflOGRAPIRE'_POtISETO RECOMMENDATIONS GIVt'ftOY THE
VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATIOtl SPECIAL STAFF TO TIIECHIEF ENGINEER DURIrlG THE PERIOD APRIL 10 - AUGUST 15,
1980. TIllSMATERIAL CONSTITUTES A RECORD OF TltEJOINT REVIEWS CIIAIR[D BY rileADMINJ':,IRAIORON DEPUTY
ADIIIrlISTRATORWITH PRESENTATIONS BY PROGRA/I _[PRESENTATIVES AND PARTICIPATION BY TIll.SPECIAL STAFF
COGNIZANT ENGIIIEERS. ALL REVIEWS WERE PRECEDEO UY INDIVIDUAL COORDINATION tIEETINGS flFIW[EN THE SPECIAL
STAFF COI;PIIZANTENGINEERS AND PROGRAM COUNTERPARTS. TIIELOCATIONS AIi,]I}AT[S OF THE JOHI! RFVIEWS WERE
AS FOLLOW:
N_ES RESEARCH CENTER t_Y 28-29, 1900 RESPOPISE TO }tI|TIAL REzOMMEtlDATIONS
AS GIVEN AT KSC ON APRIl 10-II. }gnO
DASA tIEr_{X)UARTERS JULY 1, 1980 FURTIIER REVIEW OF SELECTED ITEMS ."ROe',
t_EEtlHG AT AHES
JOliet;ON SPACE CENTER JULY 10-11, 1980 RESPONSE TO SECOND SET OF RECOe'U41"NDATIOtIS
AS GIVCN AT AMES ON f_Y ?fl-zg. 191IU
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER AUGU.___ST15, 1980 RESPONSE TO THIRD SET OF RECOI_tPNOATIONS
AS GIVEN AT JSC ON JULY I0-11, 191IU
MATEPlAL RELATIVE TO CACTI NUIIOERED RECOHMEtIDATION WITIIIN TIIE FOURTEEN ASSES_JqENT ARFAS IS PRfSENr[D, CFNFRALLY.
IN IIIEFOHM,AT OF "RECOI4HENDATION", "BACKGROUND", AND "PROGRAH RFSPONSE". TIIEADOITIlltIALIIEADING, "DFCISION",
_OR LERTAItl OF"TIlE RECOPIIENOATIONS DENOTES FURTIIER DISPOSITION ANO AS" 'GNMENT OF RELAIED ACTIONS OY Tilt
A_'IlllISTRAIOR, TIlE DATE INDICATED ON TIlE I',ATERIAL FOR EACII RECOM_NOA,ION IDrNTIFll c, fllF JIHNT MEETINF, AT
WttlC_l THI: PROGRAMRESPONSE WAS RE¥IENEO. SIGNATURES FOLLO_4ING EACII ITEM INDICATE CONCURRIrNc[ BY Tile PROGRAM
COUI_TERFART AND THE COGNIZANT EtlGINEER AS A RECORD OF REVIEW AND MUTUAL UNDLRS'IANDING 0[ THE RECDI4MENDAIION,
RAT ,ONALI, AND PflI)£,RAI,RESPOMSE, ,_,, - _/_
PnflERT F, tttnHPgr)N (./JOHN F. YARDLL_'
IPIA/_A('__t,',PACE SIIUTTiE PROGRAH _ A_,NCIATI ADMINIK,TRATOR FaR iRef. _ +>-_.3T of 14]
SPACE IRAPISPORIAII(tN",yrl_r'l_
1___2
i.i
NO YI[AIF[CATI01 AT Ttle_JtATUR£ E)rT1NEP¢£$
ORIGINAl.
OF POOR
The 51U¢ vlertflcetlon progrm do_ not Snitude any fun, l-scale firings nor tony instrumented sto_
rigs tests lit envlromnent81 extremes.-_.T',_ese Ir_lucke thort,.term horizontal storage ccmdltions It
_t_ Or in Ihlll_t, long-term storige st ]Z ° - IO0°F, horlZo_tilly o_ vertical storlge In
Issemblid ccmdltlo_ (40°-90_1 r) or firing It 400-90°T. Yeflflcttto_ by i_elysiS Is besed
Or the conservative design appro_h emplojled (Similar to Titan Ill-C). The Committee is Concerned
tfl4t this approach Is risky considering:
|. The forwm'd I:_'ooellsnt segment grain destge (beslcilly m forlme_ cylinder w_th the
usull questlOnS In the trinsition zone) may _ot be COnServltlve (i.e., hlve large s|_ety littoral.
Z. lhe cb_ervell i)nlti_ OverSh(_l. the center segment llilllst!c Augmme_tltion Rite _Ic-
tor i,w_ tale thrult osc||latlens may _ mey e,_t be anilyticill), eltrlpoIeted to te_o_ri_ure
e_treles wlth co_fldence in the resuitino celculItio._i
). T_ sddlt(o(lal, thnugh less closely rel#ted F'.'ct_)rs Ire the SlAO 4PnJmoloy and t_e
intent t'a ldd 0._3% Fezo ) to Increase the burnln9 rlte for '_rR ecotor$.
R e_endat I O_ S:
).. leassess tM Maly$1$ in ill t_ Irel,. to _terelne Slfety lifO(hi.
?. C_$ider temkoerlture conditi(,nln 9 the forthcImmln] segmenLs (forwlrd In_ center) to
extre_es both In horlzontI) and in flight attitu('.e.
). PrepmrI an InsPecti_ approach for _tlcked motors tO observe any blln(:hle_)/¢r|cki/
leplration$ aS e_vlr'on_ents neturaliy occur o_er the months unt11 the motors l-e u_ed.
4. Write (nipect(o_ plans so _ that i_,dlcetlons and di$crepin¢les can be _isured llnd
recorded Ok_rln? tr:,nSport from Ut¢h to rece(p( it KSC to stick.
$. Assure thlt adequate flight Instrtmentltion exists to precisely track bIlllstIcs Is
the ei_vlronments naturally occur.
6. Co_slder I Q_-4 m¢rgln limit ty!_e test.
The informitlon on which these cecedatlo_s ire made was obtlln-d in brleflr _s It Thlokol/
Wasatch Division in(( st Ken_y Spice Center. Mr E. Oorsey, Thiokol ¢ d Mr Geor(je '_rUy.
NASA/M$FC. were present It the Thloko| brlefl,g. Mr H. dei_qos¢. NA$A KSC gave t_._ Xenne_)y Center
briefin 9 Ind _r j. G_eer_e_Id. MA(,A/T.$C, _ls present.
PJM_E" I_
QUALrI'Y
IRef. :_ "2-25 b of 1 1
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MAY29,. 0
pROeuLSlOS
RFCO@IPFJ_IIATIOM- PROP-21
I_RO_ CONTROLOF MOTORSEGMENTFIELDJOINTASSEMBLYPROCEDURES(CATEG_,YII)
CONCERNISIHAT_E COULDOCCUR_TO_THE,.tO.t_INI_LS.)_.T).(LI.J_-U_.,EI)M,J_,J._--_Q_FOR
p_E:_-_Ci'_..._p_EToTHE"0"R_"_SCOULD_"_AS___.Lmc"._L c0uLD
GRO!(IN_NITUDE AN_CD_I)']_IMOE'ON'Iilt-'EI_p'R'MGFtl Iil
ACT|U_: PROJECTAMO MOTORCONTRACTORWILLAGAINREVLF.WOMI PROCEDURESFOe(ASSEMBLYTO
ASSUREBAT COMMITTEE'SCONCERNSFOR "0" RINGDA/_AGEARE CONSIDEREDAND THAT
PRECAUTIONSUSEDON STS-IARE CARRIEDTHROUGHTO SUBSEDUENTSTACKINGOPERATIONS
-- i
¢
I
¢
(') MOIE: THISRECD_'tiEHDAT.IONWAS SUBSEOUE';TLYIMCLU_D IH PROP-38
I
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-' ' PROPULSION MAY29. 1980
PE_FO[M CASE BURST TEST WITH ONE "0" RING REMOVED (CATEGORY II)
DL)RINI,THE "BURST TEST" FOR FINAL VERIFICATION OF THE MOTOR CASE SAFETY FACTOR. ONE OF THE
TWO "0" RINGS FAILED BY EXTRUSION AND LEAKED. THE ANALYSIS USED FOR ADD!TIONAL VERIFICATION
DID NOT INCLUDEFURTHER GAP OPENINGS CAbSED BY JOINT DEFLECTIONAT PRESSUR[ZATION OR ANY
DF..FIFCTIONSCAUSED BY BENDING LOADS. TIIEPANEL CONSIDERS THE ABOVE TO BE INADEQUATETO
;ROV;IJI!OPERATIONAl.PROGRAM RELIABILITY,AND MARGINAL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SAFETY FACTOR
CONFIUENCEON STS-I
_ESPONSE - BASELINE
o PROG_M FEELS INTENT OF RECOMMENDATIONIIASBEEN MET
SIr_GLE"0" RING AND DAMAGED "0" RING TESTS IIAVEBEEN RUN ON TIIEORIGINAL IIYDROBURSTTEST
AT THIOKOL, CHAM@ER PRESSURE DID LEAK BY THE PRIMARY "0" RING SUCH THAI ONLY THE
SECONDARY "0" RING WAS PROVIDING TIIESEAL. SIMILAR PROOF OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TIIE
SEtlONDARY"0" RING SEAL WAS DEMONSTRATEDON TIIE STATIC TEST ARTICLE (STA) AT _SFC
[Ref. 3 225 I0 of 141
PROPULSION
_I_t._-L?.°ONSE - BASELI_ - {CONTINUEC!
0 HO_(L_ER,SI_CE I}IELIGHTWT_IGHTCASE PROGRAR RIGIITHAVE SORE EFFECT ON JOINT ROTATION
ANI_"0" RING SEALING, _FC AND TC WILL CONSIDER USING A SINGLE "0" RING IN PERFORMING
CA_;EJOINT ROTATIONAL _STS FOR TIIELIGHTWEIGHT CASE PROGRAB
•-_i_RAillCOUNTERPART /
(-).---,_.... cclJ ._H,.,., - __o
- COGNIZANT ENGINEER L.}
(') NOTE:
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TillsRECOM/_ENDATIONWAS SUBSEQUENTLY INCLUDED IN PROP-38
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AUGUST:'lS."mO 
PROPULSION
_CO#'I'IEN_TIONPROP-38 (CATEGORY J) (RF_JC'EJ_EffCEPR_-_22)
Ao THI)UPC_ING LIGHT_IGHT CA_ TEST SHOULD BE EXPANDED IN SCOPE TO ALSO BE A THOROUGH
FIELD JOINT _RIFICATION TEST FOR STS-I. TIIISSHOULD INCLUDEVERIFICATIONOF
_NUFACTURING PLUS PRESSURIZATION GAPS A_D SAFETY FACTORS AND SHOULD CONSIDER "0"
RItlGDA_GE TESTING FOR SAFETY FACTOR SENSiTIVIIY _ANTIFICATION, (PROP-22)
B, PEIIFORMHIGH PRESSURIZATIONRATE (FOLLO_D BY HOLD) LAB TESTS _ SPECIMENS SIMULATING
THi!PUTTY/INSULATIGH_INT TO DETERMINE "0" RING PRESSURIZATIONTlfqES. APPLY IHIS
_TA IN "C" BELOW
C. AN UP-TO-DATE RIGOROU_ AND COmLETE VERIFICATION PACKAGE COVERING SAFETY FACTOR
ON SEALING AT IGNITION AND MEOP SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED AND CRITICALLY REVIEWED BY NASA
SP(IC:ALISTSBY JUNE IS, 1980
D. IF THE ,JOINT_RIFICATION PACKAGE IS FOUND TO BE INCO_LETE OR LACKING, ADDITIONAL
TE_TING SHOULD BE PERFOR_D TU COMPLETE VERIFICATION FOR STS-]. TIIEINERT PROPELLANT
SEG_NTS AT KSC (WHICIIIIAVEINTERNAL INSULATION)SIIOULDBE CONSIDERED AS A SUITABLE
VEHICLE
E. REVIEW AND IMPROVE FIELD ,JOINTASSE_LY PROCE_RES, (PROP-21)
[Ref. 5"2-25 1'2 ,_f 1|]
AUGUST 15.'_.)80
PROPULSION
0 THE S_ PR_ELL.AffT_G,MENI'SME ATTACHED TO FORM A CO_LETE PRESSURE VESSEL BY _AN_
A PINNED T_G AND CLEVIS ..JOINT,RELIABLE IIOT-GAS ,SEALINGOF THE JOINT IS CRITICAL
FOR Z'Z'Z'Z'Z'Z'Z'Z'Z'Z_FE_ OPERATIONS
o VERIFIC.ATI_ CONCERNS INCLUDE: (I) ADE_ACY OF _FEI'Y FACTOR TO PREVENT "O" RING
LE/U(/_ OR EXTRUSION FAILURE AT SRE IGNITION, (2) RE_NDANCY, (3) A_QUACY OF CORRECT
JOINT ASSEMBLY (AT KSC/VAFB) VERIFICATION
A_
T_ LIGHTWEIGHT C./LS.EP_O_ INCLUDES A DAPAGED "0" RING TEST _D VERIFICATION OF C,APS
_RING PRESSURIZATION TO _ _O l,q MEOP, T_SE TESTS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY
COe.IPLETE_
t._
THEFIELD_|NT }IASBEENRI_ROUSLYEVALUATEDAND DE_NSTRATEDINLABTEST(NOLE_AGE)
AT2000PSI)_CDR_DCR:STRUCTURALTESTARTIr,LE(NOLEAJC_GEUNTILFOURTIIPRESSURECYCLE_
ACCUMU_TED2 HRS__ MIN.ATPRESSURESGREATERTIL_N900PSI_D 7 fIRS.27MIN.AT 600
PSI),,GREATERTNA."I200JOINTSPROOFTESTEDAT RDIiR(NOLEAKS):BASELINECASEBURSTF_,,,T
(NOIFA_GETIIRU_ MISSIONLIFEPRESSURECYCLES):SEVENSTATICFIRIHGS(H._LEAKS);Ai',(D
LIGHTWEIGHTTESTPRO_ (iNPROGRESS)
[Ref. 52-25 13 of 141
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4PA_ 9::
AUGUSTL5, L980
_OPULSIOH
_RtllLA[,_L_. (CONTI_ED)
_ 9PECIALISTS HAVEREVIEWEDTIlE FIELD JOINT DESIGN, UPDATEDWITHLARGER"O" RINGS
ANDTHICKERSHIMSANDFOUNDTHESAFETYFAI:T_S TOBE APEOUATEFORTHECURRENT_SIGN
REANALYSISOF JOINT VITH LARGER"0" RINGS ANDTHICKERSHIHS iS BEINGACCOMPLISHED
ASPARTOF THELISHTHEISHTC/L._..PROSRAN. COMPLETIONDATE15 OCTOBER1980
p, aXSrLLI_
THEJOINT HASBEENSUFFICIENTLYVERIFIED HITH THE TESTINGACCOMPLISHEDTO DATE(JOINT
LAJITESTS, STRUCTURALTEST ARTICLE, AND_VEN STATICFIRINGS ANDTHETWOCASE
CONFISLIIL_TIONBUST TESTS) ANOCURR[NTLY_HEDULEDFORL_GHT_iSHT CASE.PROf_
E. eASZU_
PROCEPURE$WIlE REYIEHEDTO ASSURETHATCONTINUINGATTENTIONIS _PLIEG TOFIELD
JOINT A$.E_LY TO ELINIHATE "O" RING D/LMAr_OHASS[NDLY, THIOKOLCREWSFROMTHE
WASATCHDIVISION (TDY} VILL DE USEDFORTIlE _TOR ASS[_LY/STACKINGOPERATIONS
oanr,]ae4 rtIIIHTFRPN1T/. -
---I
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TESTIMONY OF L. MICHAEL WEEKS. ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR. tTECHNICAI,_
FOR SPACE FLIGHT: AND
2_3_
GLENN R LUNNEY. FORMERLY MANAGER. NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS PROGRAM OFFICE. ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN R. STOCKER. ASSISTANT
GENERAL COUNSEl,. CORPORATE OFFICES. ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL COR-
PORATION.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you want to identify yourself?.
MR. STOCKER: My name is John Stoeker. I am assistant general counsel for Rockwell Cor-
poration. I am appearing here with Mr. Lunney.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You don't intend to testify?
MR. STOCKER: I do not, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We would like to refer to a couple of documents first, and then
maybe ask some questions.
MR. KEHRLI: Mr. Lunney, as you know my name is Randy Kehrli and I haven't met you,
Mr. Weeks. I'm one of the Commission staff investigators assisting the Commission, and I would
like '_o refer you to the red book in front of you.
I guess you have two there, turn to Tab Number 13, in that book. If you would turn to that,
arJ'd I would like to start with you, Mr. Lunney, I have interviewed
2839
you before out in Seal Beach, is that correct? [Ref. 5 2-26 through 29]
MR. LUNNEY: Yes, sir.
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MR. KEHRLI: And, during that interview we discussed, did we not, the change in criticality
of the SRM seal, joint sea!, from criticality i-R to 1, do you re_ ,11 that?
,MR. LUNNEY: Yes.
MR. KEHRLI: And also the subsequent waiver that was granted in connection with that
criticality?
MR. LUNNEY: Yes.
MR. KEHRLI: And would you tell the Commission at that time, what was your role with
NASA?
MR. LUNNEY: At that time I was the--what was called the level two program manager for
the space transportation system.
MR. KEHRLI: And your successor in that job is a man named Mr. Arnie Aldridge, is that
correct?
MR. LUNNEY: That is ccrrect.
MR. KEHRLI: And that was at Johnson Space Flight Center?
MR. LUNNEY: Yes.
MR. KEHRLI: Would you tell the Commission what your role was with regard to the criti-
cality change from 1-R to 1, please?
MR. LUNNEY: Because of the nature of it, I
2840
had to approve it or disapprove it. I had to disposition it. And I also. because of the nature of it,
I had to send it on up to headquarters for their approval. I approved it and sent it on for th,n:
approval.
2841
MR. KEHRLI: What do you rec: 11 specifically about that change? Why was that char, ge
made, sir?
MR. LUNNEY: I don't recall exactly what tests were going on, bu_ it was my understanding
that some tests were going on at Marshall anci some things had been learned about the rotation
of the joint in the SRB case-to-case sealing part of the rocket.
As a result of those t_sts, it was concluded that it was possible under certain circumstances
of extreme dimensional tolerance not to have the secondary O-ring seal. In that case we would
be left with just one seal, that is the primary O-ring acting as the seal for the SRB case-to-case
joint. In that case, then, we would have been dealing with not two seals, as we originally
thought, which is why the R was on the nomenclature, but rather one seal and therefore when it
was discovered that under these circumstances that such a condition could exist, the criticality
was changed from 1R redundant to 1 all by itself.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was the purpose of that to let everyone in the system know the con-
clusion so they should act accordingly?
MR. LUNNEY: Probably several purposes; that and also----
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would that be one purpose?
2842
MR. LUNNEY: Yes, I think that would be one purpose.
CHAIRMAN EOGERS: The other purposes would be-----
MR. LUNNEY: The other purposes would be to keep a good record of those over the life of
the program, because we were dealing even at that time with the program that was almost 15
years old, and we wanted to have a good recor¢_ of what all the critical items were in the pro-
1658
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gram so that as the program evolved _w people could be brought up to speed as to what the
critical items were and be aware of the design features that were critical
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now suppose that later on a contractor came to the conclusion or
Mav,_hall came to the conclusion that after all there was some redundancy What would you
ther do?
MR. LUNNEY: Well, the approval of the waiver was in March of '83. At the time I was
in, olved in that, I was operating on the assumption that there really would be redundancy most
of the time except when the secondary O-ring had a set of dimensional tolerances add up, and in
that extreme case there would not be a secondary seal.
So I was dealing with what I thought was a case were there were two seals unless the di-
mensional
2843
'_ erances were such that there might only be one seal in certain cases.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, to me, if you will excuse the expression, that sounds ahnest
coz:tradictory, what you just said. What you first said was you came to the conclusion that you
could only reIy on the primary seal and therefore you removed the R.
MR. LUNNEY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And now you're saying, if I understand it, that experience showed
that there was redundancy after all.
MR. LUNNEY: No, I don't know of any experience showing that. What I'm saying is that
the removal of the R is an inuicator that under all circumstances we did not have red,ndancy.
There were a certain number of cases under which we would not have redundancy of _he second-
: ary O-ring.
, Recognizing that, even though there were a lot of cases where we expected we would have
redundancy, we changed tho criticality designation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It was saying to everybody else you can't necessar'iy rely on the pri-
mary seal, and if the primary seal fails, as you've said here, there may be los,- of vehicle, mission
and crew.
MR. LUNNEY: I wov!d only adjust that to say
2844
you cannot rely on the secondary O-ring but we ",ould expect the pr:,mary O-ring to al,vays be
there.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You would exl_ct after that that if experience showed that tLere
was from time to time a failure of the primary O-ring, then you would say we had better now do
something right away b_ause we can't rely on the secondary O-ring?
MR. LUNNEY: And that could happen.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The purpose of the change was to ale_-t everybody to this possibility?
MR. LUNNEY: Yes, sir.
MR. KEHRLI: Mr. Lunney, on what basis or what data or what persor_.-_ were you relying on
to determine that the secondary should be there most of the time?
i MR. LUNNEY: I have trouble recalling all that transpired in that month, but I recall con-
-_j versations with Larry Mulloy.
.._ MR. KEHRLI: Tell us about those conversations, please.
' MR. LUNNEY: The conversations were that the cases under which the secondary O-ring
not were cases where the dimensions of both the seal and the grooves in thewould be active
_ cases that the O-ring was being put in would be stacked up in a worst case way such that the
seeondary O-ring would r, ot be active,
t, 1659
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In those cases we would not have the secondary O-ring active, and therefore we were down
to just the primary O-ring, and I don't recall in what forum those conversations were held, but
tha: is what I recall about the waiver at the time.
DR. KEEL: Can I just ask one clarificatic, n? If you r_._d the criticality, which of course you
signed off" on the waiver and I've just re-read it, it ooesn't mention tolerances.
MR. LUNNEY: I know.
DR. KEEL: So thero's nothing in the criticality that would indicate that that is the basis on
which the redm dancy was waived?
MR. LUNNEY: I agree, there's nothing in the writeup on dimensional tolerances.
DR. KEEL: This was done, as noted on your waiver, was done outside the Program Review
Board?
MR. LUNNEY: Yes, I didn't recall that and still don't, for that matter. Outside the board
means that we did not have a meeting where it was discussed at the meeting. Sometimes that is
done when the responses to the rhange are such that there is not any disagreement and there
isn't any known issue that wans to be debated on the subject.
In that case, in that kind .._f ,;ase a change
2846
would be processed outside the board. I would not say that that means that it's outside the
review process, whicil it was well within, but rather it was not dealt with formally at a board
with people sitting in the room looking at viewgraphs at the same time.
DR. KEEL: Did this waiver mean that, in fact, that the original design required there be
redundancy in this field joint and that you were now waiving that requirement?
MR. LUNNEY: Yes, sir.
DR. KEEL: So you waived that requirement o_tside the control board and based upon a tele-
phone conversation?
MR. LUNNEY: To th_: best of my knowledge, it was on the telephone. I don't know. I might
have seen Larry personaliy sometime that month. I don't know. I had no ev':dence of any quarrel
or debate about that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What is the meaning of this whole process, though, if you go
through this and you war:l everybody and then nothing is done and there's no change made, and
then you just keep waiving it? What have you accomplished?
MR. LUNNEY: W_-,at we were trying to accomplish was to let people kn.ow about the criti-
cality of it and malt, rain c record of that criticality of all of the
2847
design items in the program.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which would merely mean that if Larry Mulloy called you and you
made a notation of it, you would feel better just because you had a record of it?
MR. LUNNEY: No, I didn't mean for that purpose. I meant to maintain a set of records as
to what the criticality of all of these design issues were so that the program would have a ready
reference to that many years to come.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Just to follow that, at the time you were running the
program did you visualize the Criticality i items should have any different kind of treatment
from 1Rs or 2s ar anything else in terms of handling or inspection or any other considerations,
or was it just a paperwork kind of exercise?
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MR. LUNNEY: Well, I don't know that i felt that it would result in any different handling,
but I did not think of it as a paperwork exercise, in that I felt it was important to keep a good
record on the program of what the critical items were in the design.
In some cases, those critical items led to special requirements for testirg at the Cape before
launch. As a matter of fact, the critical items list
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early in the program was used as part of the basis to derive the test requirements and in the
test procedures that were conducted at the Cape.
What I mean by that in some cases the rationale for accepting a certain design condition
could be that it was testable at the Cape a short time before launch and then it would therefore
be tested each time at the Cape before launch.
So it did serve an active purpose in the program and especially on the front end of the pro-
gram, It had an influence on the kind of test requirements that existed and ultimately the kind
of test procedures that were conducted.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you can't really say that in this case, though.
MR. LUNNEY: I cannot say that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In this case, as Mr. Armstrong has mentioned, it is really just a
paper process. I mean, you sign it and you say you don't have redundancy that may result in a
loss of misaion and crew, and then with no change in an:_l;hing Mr. Mulloy just keeps calling and
waiving and nothing happens, and so from that standpoint it is just then a paper transaction.
MR. LUNNEY: Well. it can look that way, yes,
sir.
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GENERAL KUTYNA: There was no priority given in the decision process for Criticality 1?
For example, in an airplane there are certain things a sergeant can sign off and certain things
the chief of maintenance can sign off, but other things you only fly if the wing commander signs
it off. and this was signed off not at Level III? Go/no go on this Criticality 1 and on the O-rings?
Would not the fact that it was a Criticality 1 bump it up to Level II or III?
MR. LUNNEY: General Kutyna, do you mean at the time of this waiver or do you mean
later on?
GENERAL KUTYNA: Later on.
MR. LUNNEY: Later on there were several occasions of erosion of the primary O-ring. They
were surfaced in Flight Readiness Reviews that I recall as appropriate, and I don't mean to say
as I recall. I believe they were always surfaced in the next Readiness Review after the erosion of
the O-ring occurred. I am not sure of this, but I believe also that they were treated sometime in
the anomaly log from each flight, where we would have an anomaly, and that was also treated.
Then when we went to the Flight Readiness
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Review the subject would be treated again in terms of we had erosion, there were tests conduct-
ed to determine that the erosion of the primary seal was a duration limited phenomenon, that it
would only occur for a matter of milliseconds, and then it would not propagate any more than
that.
They ran tests, as I recall, to oe sure you could tolerate more erosion than that and still
have a good seal. So each time that there was an event on a flight on erosion of the O-ring, that
event triggered a su_)sequent discussion at the Flight Readiness Review. I would have to say that
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those discussions were never of the class that you might call a red flag but rather as a class that
once we had one.
We saw it occasionally on a couple of the flights while I was there, and it was treated as
something that occasionally happened. When we got flow past the O-ring or to the O-ring, that's
an erosion but thot it was limited in duration and would only go so far, and we had some margin
on how far it would go.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Weeks, do you recall the basis on which you waived this for Level l, is that
correct?
MR. WEEKS: Yes, sir.
DR. KEEL: Who was the associate administrator then for space flight? That was in 1983.
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MR. WEEKS: Let's see. Officially John Yardley left and General Abraharmon came aboard,
and the date _ signed it was the 23rd of March, I believe, or the 28th of March. I believe that
must have been General Abe.
DR. KEEL: Was it normal for you to sign off on a waiver of a Criticality 1 item as opposed
to the associate administrator?
MR. WEEKS: We had no fundamental ground rule about tbat. During the years that i was
deputy to John Yardley we would usually talk about these.
DR. KEEL: Did you talk about this with General Abrahamson?
MR. WEEKS: I can't recall that I did.
DR. KEEL: If you signed off on the 28th, what was the basis that you agreed to waive the
requirement?
MR. WEEKS: This whole program of all of the things that were critical on the Shuttle were
reviewed, and I think we put in here for your purposes into the report not only this waiver but
also the review- that Dr. Lovelace and Dr. Frosch [phonetic] put into the program about in the
August time frame of 1980 before we flew STS-1.
O¢ course, I attended every one of the meetings of General Tom Morgan and his propulsion
group
2852
that reviewed all of the propulsion items, and I think it's a!' here for you to see. We felt at that
time--all of the people in the program I think felt that tais solid rocket motor in particular
more than the SRB was probably one of the least worrisome things we had in the program.
I presume you rather carefully read all of General Morgan's--and General Morgan has re-
tired now but he was head of the propulsion group that did the entire program review. [R el. 5/2¢251
GENERAL KUTYNA: What year was that?
MR. WEEKS: That was Dr. Lovelacc and Dr. Frosch started that about--well, I guess the
first meeting was----
GENERAL KUTYNA: When wa_ that meeting when Morgan wrote his comments?
MR. WEEKS: The first review of it that we got was in the May timeframe, but it s_iCr_d a
fair bit earlier than that.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Of what year?
MR. WEEKS: In 1980 this was done by the administrator and his deputy because they felt
that we really needed to, and properly so, to have a complete verification certification before the
program started m 1972 and it was now, what, eight years.
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They thought we should re-review all of the certification on the program.
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DR.KEEL:I hateto interrupt you,but canwegetbackto the originalquestionherefor a
moment?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We have that, so we can look at it.
MR. WEEKS: Weii, _ presume you did read that.
CHAIRMAN" ROGERS: Why do you presume tr.at?
MR. WEEKS: Well, we sent it to you on the tenth of February, sir.
DR. KEEL: Yes, we have it, and amongst the other things it says Lhat General Morgan was
told that there was no requi:ement for redundancy and I a:,sum_,_l that you didn't agree with
that at this point, did you?
MR. WEEKS: Well, I don't believe in any of those reviews there was any discussion of aban-
doning the redundant O-ring seals.
DR. HEEL: Have you read his report of July 1980 where he said that he asked abom: redun-
dancy verification and he was told that the secondary O-ring was only basically--its primary
functiov was to leak check and there was no rt_t, irement for redundancy? Have you read that,
in July !9807
MR. WEEKS: I can't. I can't--is it one of your tabs?
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DR. KEEL: It is proSably in the same .book you've got there.
MR. WEEKS: I assume I read it, but I can't authoritatively recall the document.
DR. KEEL: But if we can just move along and assume that we have all read it and get back
to the question.
What was the basis on which you waived the requirement of redundancy?
MR. WEEKS: The fundamental thing is that thero was the review by that impartial group.
and then ..f you read the document itself, I think =he fact that it says that the laboratory rest
program demonstrated the ability of the O-ring to operate successfully _hen extruded into gaps
well over those encountered in this application.
U,_iform gaps of an eighth nf an incb and over successfully withstood 1,600 psi, which is 1.6
times the ooerating pressure.
The hydrobur_t test program out at Wasatch for the standard weight case all have shown
that the O-ring caa withstand a minimum of four pressurization cycles.
DR. KEEL: I gues_ the point is, then, that you wmved it because you leit the primary O-ring
would work? Is _hat what you're saying, becau_ it would have
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extruded in the gap?
GENERAL KUTYNA: While you're reading from the charts, I would like to make the point
that _here are no tests at the extreme temperatures is what the next chart says. These are only
tests between 40 and 90 degrees, so when you say the tests.----
DR. KEEL: But I think that that is irrelevant, and all he's saying is that that says the pri-
mary O-ring will seal, and you have to assume that; otherwise, you wouldn't waive it Is that the
basis, then?
MR. WEEKS: But your words were that I signed it because I was depending on the primary.
DR. KEEL: Isn't that what that says, that the primary would work?
Mt:. _-EEKS: No, the _econdary seal is still there and provides some capability, and that is
the subject of an extreme amount of discu_ion.
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DR. KEEL: Where does it say that from what you're reading?
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MR.WEEKS:It doesn't say that, but everybody knows you have a dual O-ring.
DR. KEEL: Well, that's what you're basing your waiver on. You're just read:ng from the
document. It talks about that the fact that: yes, the primary would work. I certainly wouldn't
think you would waive it if the primary wouldn't work because then you would have no seal: no
primary, no secor, dary.
MR WEEKS: Well, Dr. Keel, the secondary O-ring is still there and does provide, maybe not
dual redundancy, but one point X of redundar_cy.
DR. KEEL: But, Mr, Weeks, I'm not arguing whether it's there or not. I'm just trying to
understand why you waived and if you waived it because you thought the primary would work.
That is consistent with waiving it.
But if you're saying that you waived it for some other re: ,son. what was the reason?
MR. WEEKS: I waived it because I thought the system would work.
DR. KEEL: Does that mean y6u thought it was redundant or not?
MR. WEEKS: That I thought it was to a degree
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redundant.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Sort of" redundant? Tb_at's fail enough.
Are there any other questions?
MR. KEHRL!: I have one last question of Mr. Lunney.
During the interviews of some of the people at Marshall, the Commission has received infor-
mation that in the 1982-1983 timeframe, there was a consciou_ decision between Level II at.
_ohnson, your office, and Marshall, that some of the flight anomalies or problems :bat were dis-
covered after flight would no longer be reported from Marshall to Level II to the same degree
that they had been in the past.
Do you recall that?
MR. LUNNEY: No, I don't.
MR. KEHRLI: To your knowledge, did that ever happen? Was there ever a decision not to
report problems from Marshall to Level II at Johnson?
MR. LUNNEY: I just don'*, recall anything like that.
CHAIRMAN FOGERS: Mr. Armstrong.
VICE CH kIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I wanted to ask Mr. Weeks as a proper basis for the next
question, would you teil me what your responsibility is?
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MR. WEEKS: Today or at the :ime of this?
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Let's say in the pa_t year.
MR. WEEKS: In the p_st year 1 have been the Deputy ,_i_,,ociate Administrator of the Office
of Space Flight, Technical.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And un(,cr you would fall certain experts such as Mr.
Winterimlter for the solid rocket booster?
MR. WEEKS: Well, I think, Mr. Armstrong---
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And what would their responsibiVties be?
MR. WEEKS: Well, I performed essentially in the entire time that Mr. Moore was the AA,
there was no principal Deputy, and so I basically performed in both roles during the tenure of
Mr. Moore.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And during the period of 1985 when the questions of O-
ring sealing were of majer interest, you _nd your staff were closely involved with those discus-
sions and with presentations to Headquarters in August of 1985 and so on; am I correct?
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MR. WEEKS: We made them happen.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And you were in fact ope.-ating in the Level I_l__vel II
arena ') The Level I
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arena particularly.
MR. WEEKS: Well, I recall at the Level I arena particularly. I believe.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: As you know. we've had a lot of discussions about com-
munication difficulties on the night before the 5!-L launch, of information properly getting to
Level II and Ieve' I. And should it have, or should it have happened differently?
Is it not a fact that you and your people were very well aware of these particular difficulties
and interests and you did--you were at Level I and although you may not have been involved
directly in this communication chain, it wasn't a fact that you were not aware of these kinds of
r_roblems?
MR. WEEKS: Certainly I was. I happened not to be there. There were congressional hear-
ings, and I was in Washington at the time of the launch and that night, but absolutely, I attend-
ed every FRR of the 25 flights and every L-1 of the 25 flights.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: If I understand it right, you shared thes _ concerns about
the proper sealing of the joint under all conditions and so on. And that is what it was that in
fact caused you to require some of these presentatious to your offices and
2860
so on; am I right?
MR. WEEKS: Yes. The thing that triggered us most in the Office of Space Flight was the
fact that the 29th of April launch of 1985 was the first occurrence in the nozzle of the secondary
O-ring ever having any erosion and that caused me to review it in Wasatch with others, and
the: fGr a m'_-e complete review on August 19th in Washington.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Well, it has occurred to me and others that your group
was essentially a redundant path of information in this time period and that even though you
weren't involved in the particular meetings that we've discussed in earlier public hearings, that
you were in fact aware of the problems and it might have ,_ell been expected that you might
have passed these concerns on, knowing it was a winter launch and so on, to Mr. Moore or Mr.
Aldrich or others.
I wonder, am I misinterpreting that that might have oeen possible?
MR. WEEKS: Well, we certainly in a number of zases brought to--we have a monthly meet-
ing. It is called the Associate Administrator's Montiy Meeting. And during that time we bring
forward the directors, like Mr. Win_erhalter, and t_e other director_ on the orbiter, et cetera, to
the Associate Administrator and
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myself and review quite across the board, all technical, programmatic and cost i_sues.
And that was done and is done and the O-ring was actively brought into those monthly
meetings during the--well, during the entire last couple of years, where as you well know, there
were many of those erosion cases. There was nothing hidden in the FRRs. There was nothing
hidden in th_ Associate Administrator Monthly Reviews that didn't bring forward that there
was a significant O-ring erosion pr(,blem.
.\l|(I lll('ll \xl|('ll tll_' lll_.l I.-,' ,d Iit,' -q'4,_llqi_ll\ '_ IIII_Z IH'III:2 ,,:,.I,',t I_, It_,' Trills. ,,I ;ll,,,llt
;L_ lllll(l_,l :il_ !II(II. ill_ll _:IIL".I (I ;I ll[lll'll('l ,,I I('k ' ",A M ',\ Ill( Ii i" ili Tll;II ¢!,,1 i:l_ll'lll ,,l l"I'l,lll;ll \ ]I_III
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And, of course, Mr. Moore couldn't attend that. He had some other requirement. But we
then carried it to him and reviewed it _¢ith him, and I remember quite vlvidiy saying I'm still
not satisfied and said I've got to talk te_ somebody, and decided that the most prudent individual
that I had confidence in was Mr. George Hardy, and I did so.
But Mr. Hardy allayed my conc._rns. Maybe I was not tough enough, but I began to believe
that what we were doing with the f'_lament wound case changes was
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pretty prudent action.
VICE CHAIRMAN AEMSTRONG: Both Mr. Moore and Mr. Aldrich have testified to us that
they didn't get information Jf this concern, at least on the night before the launch. But I gather
from your testimony that ,hey somehow should have been very well aware of this general type
of concern as a result of ,ou and your staff's activities and your res!_onsibilities.
MR. WEEKS: Well, I can't speak as authoritatively for Mr. Aldrich. He's in Houston. But
certainly Mr. Moore attended every FRR, I believe, and every L-1 in his tenure as the AA, and
he certainly knew that we were having those erosion problems starting about two years earlier
than that time.
DR. KEEL: If I could follow up, Mr. Armstrong's questions, I think Mr. Aldrich's testimony
was to the effect that the level of concern wasn't in fact reflected in the Flight Readiness Re-
views, and I guess I would like to follow up on that and find out if you had some way of knowing
the level of concern other than the Flight Readiness Reviews before your action you took in
June of 1985.
For example, on 51-C, which is the previous coldest launch, Mulloy in fact asked through a
certified urgent message ultimately for Morton-Thiokol to recap
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all incidents of O-ring erosion and evidence of low past primary O-ring.
As a consequence of that, that was done by Morton-Thiokol, an extensive briefing was put
together including the entire history of O-ring erosion, field joints, nozzle joints back in Febru-
ary 1984 in the 51-E Flight Readiness Review and talked, of court, also about the 514Z experi-
ence.
And the conclusion in that presentation was that 1.'w temperature enhanced probability of
blow-by STS-51-C experienced worst case temperature change in F!orida history.
Now, that turned out not to be presented in th_ Flight Readiness Review at Level I. Did you
know about that and that conclusion?
MR. WEEKS: I don't think I knew about *hat specific thing you're reading from.
DR. KEEL: It was the preboard Flight Readiness Review to Marshall by Thiokol.
MR. WEEKS: No, Normally, I do not and have not in the 25 flights attended or listened on
the network to Level III reviews.
DR. KEEL: So you were only principally in on the I._vel I Flight ,Readiness ,Reviews?
MR. WEEKS: Yes, sir.
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DR. KEEL: So if this information wasn't passed up, you didn't know about it?
MR. WEEKS: No. I don't think that's a proper thing to say, sir.
DR. KEEL: Let me as,: that same question again. What did you know about this briefing
and this conclusion for 51-E?.
MR. WEEKS: I don't recall how Lad 51-E was. I don't recall it quite that way. The thing
that I recall and triggered upon was the ,_ne that was the April 29th of 1955.
' _6
DR.KEEL:I wasgoingtoget to that next. i think that is what piqued your interest.
MR. WEEKS: But there were others.
DR. KEEL: What I'm trying to find out is if--Mr. Armstrong has asked, did you know more
than what was being presented in these Flight Readiness Reviews back in January of 1984?
MR. WEEKS: Absolutely. Yes, sir. And that can be clearly shown if you look through our
February 10th submission of what the di,'ector level--this is Mr Winterhalter--brought to the
AA.
DR. KEEL: I guess Mr. Armstrong's question then still stands. If you knew more, then why
wasn't that communicated to Jes,._e Moore and to Arnie Aldrich who testified that they didn't
know the level of
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concern?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In fact, Mr. Aldrich said quite the oppos "_. He said he didn't re-
member at all. He was quite unaware that this problem had continued _: long. And he also was
quite unaware that there had been references to weather affecting the jol_
Your testimony is, it seems to contradict that.
DR. RIDE: He was also surprised that the problem wasn't tracked and _orked to resolution
through Level II; that it never appeared before his Level II board.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I presume you've read his testimony
MR. WEEKS: I have read his testimony.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Isn't his testimony quite contrary to what you're saying?
MR. WEEKS: Well, I, Dr. Ride, did not attend Level II FRRs either. So I don't know what he
may have heard from Level III to Level II. I jusz don't know.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let's be a little more direct. You've read his testimony and he
said he was not aware of the serious nature of this concern. And he was head of Level II and he
was in the decision making process. He said he was quite unaware of it, il _,,t, u,,
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back and read his testimony.
Now, in answer to Mr. Armstrong's questions, I got the impression you didn't think there
was anything wrong with the system at all. Everybody knew what everybody else was doing, and
I gather you don't think the system of communications should be changed.
Is that right?
MR. WEEKS: Well, I think that most any system can be improved, but certainly there was
no--I don't know what--I got more information through David Winterhalter and his people that
is another loop that gives us informati6n in Level I _.hat does not necessarily get into *,he FRR
Review.
DR. RIDE' Didn't it surprise you that there wasn't any activity on this problem coming out
of Level II?
MR. WEEKS: Well, there was activity, Dr. Ride, going on at Level III in changing QM-5 and
in changing the filament wound case qualification motor in terms of the O-ring and the separa-
tion of the O-ring, et cetera.
DR. RIDE: But aren't major flight problems in the Shuttle Program normally tracked and
resolved through Level II? Isn't that where you would expect that problem to be resolved? And
wou, 5n't you expect it
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to come to the attention of Mr. Aldrich and expect him to be taking action op. it?
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MR. WEEKS: Well, that would be improvement, I believe. Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you read Mr. Aldrich's testimony where he listed flaws in the
system as he saw them and the ones that had to be corrected, and do you agree with what he
testified to on that score?
MR. WEEKS: 1 can't recall all of his statements.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we'll see that you get the testimony.
MR. KEHRLI: Were you aware that there was an active launch constraint that had to be
waived, flight by flight after 51-B returned with the bad nozzle joint O-ring erosion problem?
MR. WEEKS I know that at Level I we dispositioned the case of 51-B at the next launch
and dispositioned the fact that the nozzle had erostoL1 of both primary and secondary. I knew
that, and we did disposition it.
MR. KEHRLI: Did you know there was a launch constraint?
MR. WEEKS: I did not know that there was a launch constraint.
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MR. ACHEg")N: Mr. Weeks, the contractor certification documents for the pre-FRR certifi-
cation documen'_ indicate a routine checkoff and ready to fly from Thiokol for 51-L and a rou-
tiz_e checkoff and ready to fly from Level III to Level II. And that undoubtedly is why Level II
we_ unaware of any problems with the joints.
The parallel track of work that was dealing with the concerns on the joint seemed to have
been know:: to M_rshall and presumably got to Level I through the August headquarters review.
Baat, of course, Level II wasn't part of that either, and so you appear to have an FRR proce-
dure that made no mention of these problems, presumably on the assumption that everybody
knew about them because they had parallel paths of work going forward and Level II was not a
party t_o any of those parallel paths of work. And so it was a system designed to freeze out Level
II from any knowledge of th_ roblem.
At least that is the way it strikes some of us. Doesn't that seem a little bizarre?
MR. WEEKS: The Flight Readiness Reviews in no way hid the fact that there was erosion
on the O-rings time after time, _tarting in February of 1984, which was Flight 19, and many
following that. And our basic
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:_ystem at the Flight Readiness Reviews was to review all anomalies of the previous flight and
we did so before proceeding with--
DR. KEEL: Can I just follow that up? I think what's troubling us is not that there was ero-
sion-everyone knew that--but the severity of it. And, for example, going back to the 51-E
Flight Readiness Review and the briefing, the Flight Readiness Review that was done at the
Project level, the Level III level, was an extensive briefing on the whole O-ring history. When it
got up to Level I, and plus they drew the conclusion that temperature made it worse.
When it got up to Level I it basically was, in fact, winnowed down to one bullet entry that
said evidence of hot gas past primary O-rings on two case joints. Concern: mission safety. Resolu-
tion: acceptable risk because of limited exposure and redundancy.
So that extensive review and history plus the concerns over the _mperature effects got di-
luted down to that statement.
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MR. WEEKS: I am sure that is true.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:CanI ask a question? Maybe you have already answcred, but I want
to be s'are that [ heard it right. Were you aware of the constraints out on Flights 51--what are
these numbers?
DR. RIDE: It is 51F and subsequent.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All of tho_e flights, that there were constraints or those?
MR. WEEKS: No, ! was not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why wouldn't you be advised of that? If you were in the loop and
ycu had been sort of dea!ing with this information, and you think the system is working pretty
well, why wouldn't you know about launch constraints?
MR. WEEKS: Because I felt our system of FRRs, of bringlng forward any anomalies of the
previous launches was a pretty good system of us knowing of whether we have a problem or not.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But in this case you not only brought them forth and decided a prob-
lem, you put constraints on it. And you said you can't fly unless there is a waiver, but you didn't
know that.
MR. WEEKS: I did not know that.
MR HOTZ: Well, wouldn't a launch constraint be brought up in the FRR?
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MR. WEEK_ Yeq.
MR. HOTZ: t'ar'Acularly if it required a waiver?
MR. WEEK_,: Yes, if it is a launch constraint, it is a Level 1 item.
MR. HOTZ: 13ut apparently it wasn't brought up at these meetings.
MR. 'ArEEKS: Now, it is possible, but it is the way it is looked at, and eve,T anomaly has to
bp reviewed.
MR. HOTZ: But every anomaly is not a launch constraint, is it?
MR. WEEKS: Well, I think in the case of this O-ring they are blood brothers.
MR. HOTZ: But I am talking abcut other anomalies. Because you have an anomaly, it
doesn't mean that eve ,rything has a launch constraint, right? i,'. has to be a big anomaly to have
a launch constraint.
MR. WEEKS: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We had testimony today that it is a very serious matter to have a
launch constraint, and there were very few of them, and it was just these that were waived for
about six or seven flights, and then they were ended just before Flight 51L.
Well, thank you. I think that is all. Thank
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you very much. And we would like to just have a quick session with the Commission before we
end.
(Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the Commission was adjourned.)
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_he SO.R"c_se Joint _es_gn is c_'_on In _he llght_e|Qht sad re_u14r weight cants hav_n9 _dentlcsl dlmen;1o_s.
The Joint cence_t Is basically the same as :_e single 0-ring ._o_n_ lu¢cessfully (_sg|oyeu on _he Titan Ill
so_.|d r'ocke_ _r. The $_-'_ 4otnt uses c_ncering cl:ps which ire Installed in _e gao I)e_*een _ _lng O.O.
and t.'.t ou_sJdv _j_v4s |e_ CO r.rll[1pflsa_ ,_or L_e loss o_ c2nce_l:r'iCl_.y dtm tO g4._-herlng and r_ reduce the
total Clevis ;so wntch has ._e*_n provlued For ease 01" 4SSl=n_alt. OR U_I chut;]a ¶RI. _1¢ _e-.Dndary 0-Hng
yes d_si_:,_d _o provida reCundancy and to ;er_t • |eaX checJc, ensuring prooar Ins_llet_on of r_4 _*r'lcv_.
Full red.clarity ex',s_s at _e _¢¢_nc o_ in_¢_ei pre.ss',_zac_on. Hc_ever. teS_ d&[l SP_S r_at a pfltflc_inofl
called Joint rotarian occurs 0s :_e =re:_ur_. rff.ses, ooenin_ us t.Se O-r'._.g eel.rue;on gao and =emtlH:Ir.g _he
• energlze¢ 0-rlnq :o =rocr_de _n:o :_.o gap. This c=ndltlon has been -h_n by test Co be yell vltflln t,_l¢
r_u_red .*or safe. pr_t=ar'/ 0*r_n_ seallncj. This gap :_y, however, _fl gosse cases. _n¢roise suf',_C_l_fl¢|y tO
czuse the une,_er;1=.-4 se_-:ndary _%-r_no _o lose cc_..ore'.slon,ratsl_l _ues:_on as co its eotll-y "-o _e_izo
and sol if called uoon TO oo so _7 pr_;'.sr-i seal failure. 5_nce, unaar _flis later ccnd1:'.on 0nly. :.he
s|ngle 0*_Ing is sealing, a rationale for re_en_ion Is provtded for _e stmplu mode Where only one 0-_In_
fs ec_tng.
The Surface fln|sh reclu|re£ent for the O-ring grooves Is 63 and *,.he finish of" ::he Q-ring conCac*..]ng pOr_on
of _he ta_J, _hlc_ slice_ acrc:s _.e O-e_ng _rtng Joint z_se_ly, is 3Z. Th_ joint desi;n :r_v_des an C0
for _J_e O-rtn_ installation, wnic_ _acSlicaces n¢ent_on dur_nQ join_. |;Se:qbly. The tanc _S a la_e sha]l_
ang|e cha_fer on one t_ [0 :rcven'- t._e cu_'._n_ o_ t._e 0-_n 9 aC as__-*e_iy. ,'h-.design arewfna soeclfies
eppllcaclon 0; 0-tin 9 |ubr_ca_C @riot _o [he _nscsll_Clon. The fac¢ory ass_l¢d Jo_ncs Mve nsX Pubber
_(eri_l vulcanize0 _cvoss the internal jo_nC laying surf|¢Ls &s a _|l-T of Ull C_$e tnTer114) lnsuJicl0n
s_bswsttm.
A sr_ll R5 pore ',eed'_nq [0 T_O annular cavity be_ee.n _e redundapc seals _ercHr.s a leak chec]( O_ che Se4]S
l_edla_ely after joini_J Se._en_s. The ,_L$_luQ, Installed after" leaz test. has a retalnln 9 groove and
CcctOression {ace for l_s 0-ring teal. A _ins to r_¢ r_e sea-| o_ ..he |nStal]ad _ plug _s not been
cs ta_ 11 s_d.
7he 0-r]ngs sop _he case joints are _old formod'r, nc_ groined to close tolerance and the O-rtngs foe" Use test
por_ are mold fomed to nec d_mens_ons, got_ 0-_ngs are Lice .¢or high tmmerature, low c_-_presslon set
rl_mmcarbon elas;omer. _o d:sign ;e_ics five scarf Jotn:s foe" _ case Joint seal r_ngs. The 0-ring
Joint strength oust equal Or exceed 40*. of _ _ar_nc m_.ee.ta} s:r_9_.
|, "Wc,ST XSG
"To date. eight static f.tr_na.s and five fliqhl:s have resulted tn 1_.0 (§4 field and 126 factor/) Jmn_
tested vit_ no evidence of IeaxaGe. The Titan |I! program us|ng a s_milae. _0tnC concept has r_sf_d 4" Soul
©f 1075 Joinr.s sucr._ss_ul ly.
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A laboratory _eST. p_r TM d_onStrated t_e ab_11_.y of _.he 0*r_n9 T.o c_e_llte successfully .hen e_t_aded
1nee gaps ve|t over those enco_tered |n _ls 0-ei_ aop|tca_.lon. Uniform gins of _/_-Inc,_ and over (T'._.
]34K) successfully viL_s:md pressures of 16C_ _s_. Th_ HyCt_.but%[ P_c]_ _am (T_R._G£4))rid the S[_-uc_.!Jral
Test P_oqrz_ (STA*I) (or the s_nda_ ve_gh_ case (T-_-I2_$1) and :_e Lt_etg_T Case Jotnr. Cer':.tftc_.lon
T(s_ (T_1;-12_;_9) al] have s_,_ U_I_ _e O-r_g can _ttz_:an_ _ _inl-.-_m of fovr pressu_zatlons before _a;e
_,0 r,_ I*lnc_ ¢_1 pennlL. 4z%v leik49e.
Further d_on_ltton of the caPabllt?.y o_ ,_oln_ _es11_9 _s round In ".a,q k_-9,_o_ _es_._fl 9 8_ _ A_d
refurbished case se_-:en:$. 0vet S40 _o_nr.; hove o_en exposed :o | t_d p_essurtZa¢lons a_. 1eve1;
exceeding _tor _,cr_ v¢O_ no leakage _zgerttflce_ _ts_ _e _.r_ror_ C-r_n_. T_e only oc:]slons _here legatee
_as ez_ertenc_d _s d_n 9 refm-_tSP_SenC Of 5T5-1 vnere _,o s:._l:fen_r segu_s vcr-t SeVerel.v daz_a_ed _ur'n;
uv'_' c_Tlzpse _ v_er tm_c_.
A rare clttall(d desc_tpl:_on Cf $N4 Jotnt l_es_Ing ht$_r,_ t$ c:nt_tned In T_-I:.c20. _evts_on X.
C. INS;_CTT (_
;he _ang -A- d|t,_lttr and clevis -_- dt_ue_er are melsurt_ "and r_¢_r_;d. TI_ depth, vld_h and sur_xcJ
/Sn(sh of r_e O-r_n_S grooves are vtrt._ed. The surflr, e l_On|:h of _.he tl_lo _s &|$o ve_ld. Charz:_TOsl:l¢3
art |ns_t¢*,dtd 0/1 elrJ10-rtn_ to _$$m*e c_,/Ifol_linC, e. _0 t_e s'_andar¢$ _ |t_ude:
.
• • $uTface ¢=ndttlOns " '"
• Hold flashln 9
• ._c_r_ ._o_nt mf._m_tr._ or separa_on
• Cross se¢¢_on"
• ¢1 r¢_-_,, • r_nce
• _X_r_o_r
Each assmbled Joint seal ts tts*.ed per STV7-2747 _ta pressur_:ln_; _._e annular cs_tty btt_,een sells t: ._0 :
5 ps_ ind r.ont_rtn,; for _0 IltnuCes. A pressu_ decly of 1 ps_,9 or creac_r Is no*. _¢ce_e. Follov_ng
seal verification by QC, t_e l*.Jk _s¢ _or'- . plug ts tns_.alled.Vi'_h _..vor_f_n9 tnsta_.latlon anO :,-_u.tn_.
D. FAZLUR[ HTSTO_ r .. .-
_o_ors and ten f_;ht _:tor'z.
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:_:zpcxlcncc h_ sho_,_ poslulve func=ioninE oF _h_t p=:b:_ry O-rin_ _= all i_sz_nz_s
of u=e in :ha ET._[ t:m; an_ clavi__ Joi=:. Te_nln_ h_ _n_izam_d 7=si:Ive saall:;
• . ° -
u=£_r a£vcm=: ::=£1:i=us_eyon_ :ha raqui/e_ si-glepressur_:_i_ _cT _c_0:
opera,ion. :_ is concluded _hac considering _heS_/4 _oin_ as _ si_Bie O-finE seal,
=uffi:l:_= :a:i:=a! _ci3:s :o ra_ain rhl_ design _rl_h ==su=ance o_ perfo.---_anc=. A
_aca base ia a!_o bci= E e_:_bli=hea in support of _h_ _econdary. C-:_E pos_:_ve
' _: _" .n =se _c'_" con_tn_ a slnNle O-tin; 5o:_ seal ---_
A,q.'utS I Off
ORIGINAL PA_ IS
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"-._. "'-f-5 :;o '..e,',k.; f: r r "-== '-'" 12.'.
_..-: 2 :¢ 3 -'2:, ,'.h=:i:..,
•".. 7iL=h: ch,':':._ =: F.5C .= ..- .= .." _" _, ._C e'-a:':.:
ex:ra ! - _
To:el 31
"e-_ l:a'.'.=re-_.per_-e.n:ed am! _a--r--. ;_ .... :: -"
i. -'-._-urbish-enc hydro:an: 17 x 6 - iC2 :_,-=--
ip
-. -:::-: :hc=k_ c= hydr0burs_, Join= "_er_fl-_-iana. _..---__-UA-I .-f-arT-=
p:_du:.e4 approximately 20 checks %-.-" --Q _.. .• -_ ea.a s"-- fire: aFcia- :" r _tin=3.
._. .=.vd.-z-'es'.._. a= Rchr, --hiokol --.._-a._.5-C have haan c=--duc'.-i= a-_ _raf_ures
a_c,'-. "-'037 7SiS with =o leakers
" .:-:Zohr 150 + $_ - "'-_ ---:= cn se_.._-e.-.cs
-'. --= Th.l='._=l !Tx" - 68 " s"
£X_.a - .3
71 Tests
.";o leavens experienced, upon or a_- pressure. (O.nl at J__.fa.-_•r"C $'.i._.=anar
Jo_-nt leaked u=on-. dcpres&uriza__.-_..) "
3. .MSFC _a_=s co. S_.%-I p._essurizatlo_ ,_i.-h n_:4 G-flags ;r0duc9 a. .-._i_ = -
•even =- & " "a_.ar pressure cycle_ (eac_..-rlenced O-r-=_ 'Da__-.=i--'-g"'
dur_-n_ dcprcssu_-a.=zt__on &rid n!bblir? mr=e--cycla-_).
2. _.ydrobu-sts -
1. _.--_al-'--_aea.-h-_ came Jo.a__'.Sware cycled _:h p.-nof .=--assuri--a-lcns
a_ expe=:Le--%ced le_kaSe paS_ =he "n/_bled" P="i-----=7.0-rim._ a-'neT
clgh= cycles, Af=er =w_n-'7 cycles, _he O-rlm._s -were. replac_ -_. a--_
c_%x/mu= design pcessuri--atlon was achieved (I./" safety factor)
no-eve- r lea/ca_c pas= =he =o=ata<_ _o_a_= O-rln_s_ occurred _= high
= u (l,/,aO ! .__=OP)..=== -'r=- p_i_ or .Sa x
2. Li_h='ae_-_ht case Jo_--nts passed all tasks _'hich izcluded four c':c-es
to H£0P ".one wi=h a planned d.£ectlve pr_ma_y 0-r__=g) an4 a= l.& ,_EOP
_rcssuri=a=ion. The Joln_s were the. s_.alad on :he inside ui-_h
•--i:a=i=ed rusher :o e--aSia the buts= ,'o t--L'e pla.-.e _r. !.=_0 ;si_.
E. = a a i _ng-: :_: Ymtor F r.. --
.No jc:..n" laaka have "_een _xperienc._ dur__z_ e-'-_k: h.-r_:o.-.:al :.':-c
= ==r .... .'.'-. Ai':_.rsa cO_._i;Inn- c- JC a " _-=:--
=._C
NO. --'-?,13Z20 ;v:-
I pat.=" %
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_f "-h_ cc":cr _-cld joi_C, showed variation_,- i:'.-r, e-su'.-e :.-:.=--'-hl =- -=
._..... - " s="-: (Src_n vRcu_-m _.o preesure abo-.,e a.-blan:)
F Y±-.'= "-'_.=--tlc #" h,-_e _ _n =ase__ink-_: ............... -.z
- -!_ irr:o'i_iz_ "-_ c=x -
r:'-'_en: =- o=" z .=re_=sure IeRR _ae. = =he o.r_=a at-: O-r/r.g c£ "-h& .'-±r--=-
G. Lzb=rz:o:--• _ench Tes-.=.
..... _h .pressure cccZrusion :",s_s have shc_.-_ pra--sure r-,_'.en:i-_.-. --
2. iz-; ?r_=ss._r_ ah_ck ,';"_-h :he se=l!=_ surface defects :a_----_
iev±:a 6hc_: r&uar',.abla _aal_.-n_ polar of the si_le O-.-i.n_ ","_:h
large, dccp and rough surface defects usln_ _n _-_. _-.-._ s=.ua===.
..--__'q_. ",; DATA __.-'_<E- _ cr;.er _o e_abllsh a radundan_ seal da-a h-ass, a£!'_:i-.-.;i
4a:a are he_-._ obzai_ed on all refu:bish--ent hydroteszs by checki._ ,_a _-r.:-:--! le!n:
_v_-__ an. = due to Dre_2'-'riza_Icz. "--t=h a. _irect read_. K 4ial -_dicazor :hr_v&k -he..Dr_._t:re
.norzo ini:ial i-.{o.'2m.A_Inn Sen_r_=m4 i=% -- light;eight cy!isder to cyli-'ar ;reef :2s=
sh_s a =c_s! mcvemeu_ o_ only .030 in. at 1004 pslz in the centerj_.inz (!is:
irate=or 4-a _an s as=ins= la=a between 0-rlng grooves on the clevls .-h-r i&_ i'ni_
•, ::_:,,<'"o-ccr./:::=_ i._ _he no.'--_al ver:_cal -o£a, _adlc_s -.hat _he _--,_o :: :__'_-i-__ ==:a=--r.:
;,_;! ncz unse.az :he seccn_-ar'j ' O-_!n_ at cperat/m z pressures. This one pcln: &_'" has-
%-___ be up -.o _en points =f'..,_r DM-5 am_ ._2.S-5 cases ha'¢c been re{urbi=h-=i-
OI061NAL pAGE" tS
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Rl_vl_,_o_ • A
p'OW*.4 .--= _'0. l|O'J
NO. "--3 _ 1:-_. ,V:'_
i
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•CK_(_.B NOT I CZ z
- . . - .
_i_:!-" Remove the.followin9 _,_._ies _6 replace with the indicated _tt_ched
,;-..,.:....pages :
....,
REMOVE REPLACE k'ITH
A-35 and A-36 A-35 and A-36
2. Add the following pages:
A-6A
A-6B
NOTE: A black b-r and CN 2) in the margin indicates the data that was
changed. C,_ Z3 Add in the margin designates the addition of a
new_sh_e.et..
°..._. • . •
Sign and;d_te thls page in'She space provided below "o show that the
chances have been incorporated and file i_ediately oehind "Change Notice
Sheet."
5igna:ure oi Person Incorpora=ing Changes O_e
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Page A-25
,T_ru._,,CDDE: - 10-01-01
FA:ILUR_ MODE:.. "Leakage at c_se ass_bly Joints"
•was r_classi_ied from Cat,go _ !R
to single failure point. Ca_eaory Z.
See CIL page-_ A-6A and A-6B for SFP
analysis..
[Pef. 5 2-21'1 4 _bf 14]
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bed Change Notice )lo.23 updel:es the SRB CIL Co include curren¢ datz. This ch_noe
ssifies failure mode, "Leakzge _ czse asse=b_y Joints," from category 1R ¢o sing_,e
de poi nt,..ca.t.eg.o.r_,l.-
"..: --7-,';
T& _.
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